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Empire of coercion: Rome, its ruler and his soldiers. 
Abstract 
This thesis explores the basis of the political power wielded by Roman emperors. Its 
hypothesis is that their power was of an essentially coercive nature, and was a 
manifestation of the Roman ethos of competition for personal dominance. This 
competition took place within the context of a society in which war and military 
organisation were of prime significance. As a result, political power was habitually 
obtained and held through the direct and indirect involvement of soldiers. It was 
inevitable that the relationship between emperors and their soldiers should be the 
major determinant of their authority. 
Issues considered to be relevant to this view are examined from a wide perspective 
and within the broad time scale of the classical world before the advent of the 
Christian Empire. Ancient writing on the nature of political power is explored, and 
every effort is made to give due weight to the direct expressions of our primary 
sources in their discussions of personal authority. Evidence is also cited from 
sociological and other modem theories of political power in order to illuminate the 
coercive basis of the Roman state. The development of power within Rome is traced, 
together with the explanations, justifications and mechanisms inherent to its 
operation. Soldiers are shown to have been the key agents of Roman political 
coercion. Bases of authority other than coercion are considered for their relevance, but 
are found either to have been derivative of, or secondary to, force and the threat of 
force. The qualities required of a successful emperor are explored. These are 
demonstrated to have been primarily military, while in the most significant aspects of 
political and personal behaviour the Roman ruler sought to establish and strengthen 
the bond between himself and his soldiers. When this link finally weakened, political 
authority passed directly to the soldiers. 
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Preamble 
'When and why do men obey?' asked Max Weber. Addressing his audience of students 
in the post-revolutionary Germany of 1918, he pursued his enquiry: 
'Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this 
domination rest?' 
For all their rootedness in contemporary politics, Weber's questions have a timeless 
relevance. Here I consider them in relation to the Roman Empire, in particular to the 
ascribed position and recorded activities of the emperors. What was the basis of their 
power? On what did their claims to legitimate authority depend? How were men and 
women induced, how indeed did they persuade themselves, to obey the commands of 
an Augustus, a Nero or a Hadrian?' 
The final part of Max Weber's second question to his students may hint at an answer to 
these enquiries. 'Domination' certainly implies a completeness of authority, the 
existence of an unbridgeable gulf between controller and controlled, and the lack of 
any countervailing authority limiting what the powerftil might visit upon the weak. 
Suetonius provided the Emperor Gaius with a most succinct expression of this state of 
affairs. Responding to his grandmother's attempt to give him advice, 
'.. .he not only disobeyed her but said, "Remember, I can do anything I 
please and to anybody.'" 
From this perspective, Gaius' boast about his power may seem to reflect but an 
extreme version of the general relationship between a Roman Emperor and his 
subjects. Physical coercion, potentially of the most extreme forms, cannot be far fi-om 
the surface in this situation. However, such a characterisation appears to be at odds 
with descriptions of other emperors in relation to those they ruled, such as Pliny's 
account of Trajan as 'one of us', or the saintly Marcus Aurelius. Beyond the 
idiosyncrasies of individual emperors, recent scholarship has tended to stress the more 
positive aspects of Roman rule. For example, echoing discussion by Cicero and later 
legal affirmations, Ando has presented the Empire as having developed into a 
communis patria. This characterisation comprised a progressively more benign and 
inclusive regime, presided over by emperors whose personalities and individual 
'Weber: 1948 p. 78. 
aspirations, although not insignificant, were nevertheless gradually subsumed under the 
ambit of an administrative system that was generally responsive to the needs of the 
widening populations brought under the sway of Rome. In espousing this view, Ando 
acknowledged, as he must, the reality of conquest and expansionism as important 
elements in the Roman ethos. Imperialism was, he wrote, '...essential to the Roman 
self-image and to Roman political life.' However, as the Empire became more 
established in its shape, and the participation of provincials in government extended, 
the aggressive drive to dominate that had engendered this process was seen as 
subsiding into political ideologies, such as that of Victoria, largely stripped of actively 
violent and coercive features. My thesis will put forward an alternative view that 
reflects elements of the sociological theories of Foucault, Bourdieu and Habermass. 
These characterise developments such as those described by Ando as camouflage 
rather than change; as social power becomes more established, its coercive elements 
are simultaneously softened and optimised, that is, translated into forms that are at the 
same time more acceptable to those who are dominated and more effective/efficient for 
those who wish to dominate. As we will see, the coercion at the heart of the developed 
form of Augustan ideology exemplified such an analysis.^  
Another perspective on the Empire must be dealt with in any analysis of the role of 
coercion in Roman rule. This is the apparent change in ideology and political process 
generally dated to the third century CE. In the standard and current statement of this 
idea it is held that before then the Empire had indeed been 'created and sustained by 
force', but that there had been a significant separation (ideological, legal, social and 
geographical) between soldiers and the civil power. During the third century a 
combination of degeneration in the political process, a new or at least enhanced role for 
the army as vehicle of social and political advancement, and threats from barbarian 
tribes had brought soldiers centre stage in the res publico. Another aspect of this 
proposed transformation has been expressed in the nature and even physical forms of 
many of the emperors who ruled, often briefly, during the third century. Plausible 
physiognomic interpretations of statuary (Plate 1 i and ii) have supported the idea of a 
hew breed of tough military emperors, given lurid biographical form in the pages of the 
^ Gaius: Suet. Calig. 29. Communis Patria: Cic. Leg. 2. 5; Dig. 50. 1. 33; Ando p. 10-15. Imperialism 
and Victoria: Ando p. 277-278, 410-411, 293. Sociology: Honneth p. 160; Habermass p. 211. 
Plate 1 
(i) Philip the Arab 
(ii) Maximinus Thrax 
SHA. The associated judgemental assessment of this development has perhaps changed 
little since Dickens described: 
'The murderous-headed statues of the wicked Emperors of the Soldiery, 
whom sculptors had not been able to flatter out of their villainous 
hideousness...'. 
An element of my thesis questions the reality of this 'change'. Perhaps, like the 
postulated transformation of Roman Imperial ideology from aggressive domination to 
consensual participation, there was no significant change at all. Rather, the observed 
higher profile of military elements in the political life of Rome in the third century and 
beyond may well be better understood in terms of continuity; that is, as another 
manifestation of Rome's basic ethos. Any coercive system of government requires 
appropriate instruments of political force. It will be argued that, in the case of Rome, 
the soldiers of the legions fulfilled this role. To establish this characterisation, three 
strands of evidence will be drawn out. One will display the historical military/coercive 
ethos of the Roman state, with its emphasis on personal domination. Another will 
examine the political behaviour of the soldiers themselves, revealing them to be more 
active political protagonists than has generally been accepted. Related to this will be 
the third strand, indicating the close relationship between the emperors and their 
soldiers. Thus the iron ring will be completed, connecting autocratic military rulers 
with a political establishment imbued from its origins with a psychology of dominance 
chiefly established by war.^  
To explore the hypotheses introduced above, this thesis will divide into two sections. In 
Part One the nature of coercive political authority will be considered and its 
manifestations in the ancient world will be explored. The material to be examined will 
progress from broad theorising about coercive authority to exemplification of its 
operation in Rome. Part Two will continue this narrowing of focus, concenfrating 
attention on the personal authority of the emperors and their relationship with the chief 
instrument of their coercive power, the Roman soldier. 
^ Third century change: Whitby p. 469; Dickens, Little Dorrit p. 583. 
Part One 
The Theory and Practice of Coercive Power 
1. Introduction 
Power and obedience 
In describing the events of 193 CE, Cassius Dio introduced the contenders for Didius 
Julianus' throne without the slightest equivocation. The qualification for the post 
possessed by the rivals, Severus, Niger and Albinus, was simply described as '...each 
commanding three legions of citizens and many foreigners besides'. In 211, the death-
bed advice of Septimius Severus to his squabbling sons was, 'Be harmonious, enrich 
the soldiers, and scorn all other men'. By the end of the fourth century, the tradition of 
soldier/emperors was unequivocally projected back to the very end of the second 
century. The author of the SHA had Pertinax, on the first day of his reign, set the tone 
by providing the tribune on duty at the Palace with the watchword "let us be soldiers". 
The same author developed the theme as the third century progressed. For example, in 
his book entitled The Thirty Pretenders, the great majority of the brief sketches reflect 
the military background of the various would-be emperors. The effect was often 
enhanced by direct contrast with the effete and dissolute reigning monarch, Gallienus. 
For example, of Victorinus it was said that '...he was most valiant and...an excellent 
emperor', while the link between soldier and emperor was spelled out regarding 
Marius, who '...rose through the various grades of military service to the Imperial 
power itself.'' 
To paraphrase the opening words of Reinhard Bendix' investigation into the historical 
development of power structures, 'This thesis, then, is about authority'. The need to 
explain authority in a broadly political sense has been spelled out by Cannadine: 
"* Three legions: Cass. Dio 74. 14. 3. Severus: ibid. 76. 15. 2. Watchword: SHA Pert. 5. 7. Gallienus: 
SHA Tyr. Trig. 9.1,23. 2, 26. 1, etc. Victorinus: ibid. 6. 4: Marius: ibid. 8. 3. 
'...for any society, in any age, the study of politics ultimately comes 
down to one elemental question: how are people persuaded to acquiesce 
in a polity where the distribution of power is manifestly unequal and 
unjust, as it invariably is?' 
He went on to suggest that ways of approaching his question will relate to the 
particular disciplinary route followed and to the conceptualisation of the issue that is 
adopted. In relation to academic disciplines, his context indicates that he was thinking 
of the anthropological, historical, sociological, philosophical, political, psychological 
and theological. Conceptualisations are seen as differing both in how wide a view is 
taken of political power within a society and in the range of activities in which 
manifestations of that power can be seen to be operating. The range of such 
conceptualisations explored in the literature is extensive, and a focus on the asymmetry 
of power relationships and their bases certainly does not exhaust the possible 
perspectives. At their extremes, alternatives can be represented by a view of social 
power as essentially benign, resting on a mutually beneficial consensus between ruler 
and ruled, and by a view that any concentration of power is 'presumptively 
illegitimate'. It must also be noted that other analyses examine power at more 
fimdamental levels of human interaction, stressing that in some form or other, 
domination characterises all relationships. Nevertheless, even i f an examination of the 
question of asymmetry does not fully explain all there is to be considered about social 
power, it still remains a potent phenomenon requiring investigation.^ 
My approach will be rooted in the methodology of the ancient historian and will focus 
on 'statements' of authority, whether expressed in language, imagery or behaviour. 
The historical orientation will help to define the sorts of explanation employed and the 
range of evidence to be tested. I would also hope to draw on relevant methods and 
material from other disciplines (philosophy, politics, sociology, law). The perspective 
to be taken on political power will encompass a nvmiber of elements: statements 
plausibly emanating dkectly from the emperor and from sources within or controlled 
by his regime; activities of the ruled, for example in religion and in the conferring of 
honours, that clearly reflect the prevailing Imperial ideology; and philosophical and 
Authority as a subject: Bendix (1978) p. 3; Cannadine p. 19. Conceptualisations: Cannadine p. 17. 
Giddins (1984) p. 31-32. Benign power: Ando p. 66. Illegitimate power: Parsons (1960) p. 221. Power 
in human interaction: Foucault (1980) p. 102-108. 
other expressions of general notions about the nature and exercise of supreme power in 
the ancient world. Within the Cannadine quotation there appears to be the idea that the 
assumption and/or ascription of political power in any concentrated form may be 
viewed by the relatively powerless as an arrogation. The requirement for its 
justification has the corollary that such statements may be contested. It has certainly 
been suggested that a plausible reason for our interest in the origins and nature of 
power centres on the general perception of the differential extent to which individuals 
can achieve what they perceive to be in their interests.^  
The unequal distribution of power suggested by Cannadine as a peretmial feature of a 
political society was famously studied by Max Weber. As already indicated, he placed 
the phenomenon within a concept of 'dominafion', which he declared to be '...one of 
the most important elements of social action.' Weber was careful to define his use of 
the term, limiting it to situations in which the relationship between the parties is one of 
compulsion rather than voluntary agreement. In fact, for the purposes of his analysis, 
he declared domination to be equivalent to the 'authoritarian power of command.' 
Weber identified three sources from which the legitimacy of any such domination 
could be established. The first of these was rational rules, the others being two types of 
personal authority, the traditional and the charismatic. Rational rules or norms might 
be agreed or imposed, but crucially they must be generally accepted by all those 
involved. In such a society, all elements of power/domination are seen to derive 
ultunately from these rules. Thus it is to the rules to that obedience is given, not to the 
individuals empowered by them. Where the legitimacy of personal power is claimed to 
derive from tradition, ancestral patterns of leadership are claimed by particular 
individuals and accepted by the majority. Such authority can usually be traced to the 
operation of 'natural' leadership in significant activities of the society, such as religion, 
war and the meeting of basic needs. Domination may be legitimized by charismatic 
authority when an individual claims to possess particular, usually remarkable, features 
or qualities that equip him uniquely to promote the success of the community. The 
achievement of success is deemed to confirm the legitimacy of the individual's claims. 
Obedience to the imposed domination then becomes a duty. Weber held that all forms 
of political power could be ascribed to variations and combinations of these 'pure' 
Differential ability to pursue interests: Whitmeyer p. 211; 
types. In applying this analysis to the ancient world, it may well be relevant that 
Weber, early in his academic career, had been a student of Roman law and society. 
Certainly, elements of his categories of political power are not hard to identify in a 
consideration of Roman emperors. The prominence of legal and procedural processes, 
the significance of mos maiorum and the relationship of the emperor to war and the 
gods spring to mind.^ 
Scope and evidence 
The focus will be on the authority of the emperor per se, as opposed to Rome's 
authority over the rest of the Empire. This orientation implies a greater interest in the 
bases of the personal power of the emperor than in its application outside Rome. In any 
case, the political distinction between the City of Rome and its empire became 
increasingly blurred during the Imperial period, eventually all but disappearing after 
the final collapse of the western Empire. A stage in this development can be illustrated 
by the direction taken by Commodus' megalomania, as reported by the epitomator of 
Cassius Dio. Also demonstrating the increasingly personal nature of the emperor's 
authority, Commodus was said to have wanted Rome to be known as the, 
'Irmnortal, Fortunate Colony of the Whole Earth; for he wished it to be 
regarded as a settlement of his own.' 
In the approach I am suggesting, the cultural and geographical widening of views on 
Imperial authority remains a significant matter. However, there is not the same 
necessity to define the boundaries of the central group within which that authority lies. 
In addition, a focus on ideology may reasonably limit the relevance of comment on 
practical politics. For example, that Augustus's social legislation of 18 BCE failed to 
influence elite behaviour need not detract from its importance as an element in his 
ideological programme. In fact, the purpose and success of such measures may best be 
viewed as part of the production of an over-all ethos, promoted in a host of different 
ways. In this case they would be added to evidence such as Augustus' acceptance of 
the honorific title Pater Patriae and the elaborate imagery of the Ara Pacis. Thus the 
ideology of a regime may be revealed by the imderlying pattern of its concerns, against 
which "the actual effects of its activities may be of illustrative relevance. To use another 
example, interpretation of the imagery used on Trajan's Column may be relevant, 
' Asymmetry and domination: Weber (1968) p. 941fr; Thompson p. 151. Pure types: Weber (1968) p. 
954. Weber's academic career: Bendix (1960) p. 26. 
regardless of its accuracy as a record of the Dacian wars. Nevertheless, where the 
imagery of such a monument can be specifically shown to support or be at variance 
with other sorts of evidence, that evidence will in itself be important in underlining the 
Column's essentially ideological nature.^ 
Roman emperors in the context of other ancient rulers 
The authority of Roman emperors did not develop in a historical vacuum. It may be 
correct to suggest that they are best understood ' . . . in terms of the traditions and 
prejudices of Roman society.' However, this truism should not obscure the extent to 
which those traditions and prejudices were formed in response to wider, especially 
Greek, norms and influences. Some of the most fiindamental aspects of Roman 
myth/history were clearly designed to articulate a desired relationship with Greek 
precedents. For example, at the outset of Roman historiography in the late third 
century BCE, Fabius Pictor may well have invented the story of the expulsion of the 
last king and the adoption of Republican institutions. The traditional dating of 509 
BCE offers inescapable parallels with the Athenians' ejection of the Pisistratids, 
generally dated to 510. There may even be the possibility of some degree of historical 
reality in the coincidence of chronology. The adoption of Aeneas into the foundation 
myth of Rome, given such ideological prominence by the self-styled second founder, 
Augustus, provides a more certain example of the absorption of Greek myth.^ 
Viewed as the development of a new form of absolute authority, the power of Roman 
emperors had precedents and contemporary comparators. Exploration of these might or 
might not illuminate what happened in Rome, but such examination may be justified 
and important. Greek and other theories of kingship predating the Roman Empire will 
be considered elsewhere in greater detail. Here, by way of significant example, 
mention will be made of the creation of new monarchies by the diadochoi, the 
successors of Alexander. Reflecting their differing personalities, geographical and 
political circumstances, and at the same time drawing on aspects of shared cultural 
heritage and experiences, this small group of elites developed a more or less workable 
' Commodus: Cass. Dio 72. 15. 2. Authority-Emperor/Rome: For a focus on the latter perspective, 
see, for example, Ando, Mattingly (1997), and Webster and Cooper. Pater Patriae: Res Gestae 35. 1. 
Ara Pacis: Zanker (1988) p. 172. Underlying concerns: Bennett p. 90-92. Trajan's Column: Charles 
(2002). 
' Roman traditions: Campbell (1984) p. vii i . Pisistratids: OCD3 p. 709; Cornell (1995) p. 148-150. 
Aeneas/Augustus: Wiedemann (2000) p. 520. 
theory and practice of absolute authority. In Egypt, for example, this lasted for nearly 
300 years. Adding to the intrinsic interest of this period for the present research, many 
of these kingdoms were ideologically opposed by, and met their end at, the hands of 
the Romans. At the same time elements of their operation and glamour influenced the 
development of the Roman hnperial system and the behaviour of emperors. In 
particular, it has been suggested that these would-be monarchs employed two main 
approaches to establishing their credibility; besides an understandable desire to exploit 
the prestige of Alexander, they all stressed and relied upon their ability in war. Other 
evidence for the relevance to this research of post-Alexander politics can be located. 
Citing Cornelius Nepos, Syme suggested that Roman interest in the histories of the 
diadochoi understandably increased with the rise of figures such as Sulla, Pompey and 
Caesar in the first century BCE. Here it is worth reflecting that after the upheavals of 
that era the Roman Empire did not collapse, as had the Hellenistic kingdoms. Instead 
the young Octavian was able to harness powerfiil aspects of the res publico to 
transform it into a durable personal monarchy.'^ 
The relevance of the diadochoi to the present thesis is underlined by the specifically 
military elements of their regimes. Unfortunately, this has not been a much explored 
area of scholarship. Austin's 1986 lament that there was no work focussing on the 
Hellenistic rulers similar in scope to Campbell's 1984 study of the emperor and the 
Roman army has only recently been partially answered by Chaniotis. His work has 
addressed much of relevance to the relationship between the kings and their soldiers. 
However, its broad focus on war and society inevitably curtailed consideration of some 
of the more detailed military features of rulers. Examples of the sort of material that 
the missing analysis might include are that down to the last of the Ptolemies, 
Hellenistic kings wore Macedonian military dress and that their soldiers' oath was 
sworn to the person of the king." 
'° Hellenistic monarchies: Shipley p. 331T; Lund p. 154-6. Influence over/conflict with Rome: In the 
dispute for power with Antony and in his development of the principate Augustus provided evidence on 
both sides of this balance. Hellenistic historiography: Syme (1939) p. 250; Nep. Eum. 8. 3. Personal 
monarchy: Mann, M . (1986) p. 259. 
" Lament: Austin (1986) p. 454; Chaniotis (2005). Military dress: Austin (1986) p. 458; Plut. Ant. 54. 
5. Oath: Polyb. 15.25. 11. 
The relevance of earlier Greek material 
Greek literature consistently provided starting points and models for Roman analysis. 
Isocrates claimed that his Evagoras was the first prose encomium to a ruler. 
Supporting a view of the work's influence, it has been seen as a pattern for 
Xenophon's slightly later Agesilaus and as providing an ultimately conventional list of 
topics for such a work. Evidence can be found in Cicero for the wdder influence of 
Isocrates as the 'master of all rhetoricians'. In considering the range of intellectual 
opposition to the Roman Imperial system, Murray noted the '...shadows of Socrates 
and the philosopher before the tyrant.' 
Of course, earlier Greek material was constantly recycled, by Latin writers, by Greeks 
of the Roman Imperial era, and indeed by Greeks of different eras writing about 
Greeks and Romans. In the last of these categories a good example is provided by 
variants of the story of a ruler not having the tune to stop and listen to the petition of 
an old woman, including her punch line, 'Then stop being king/emperor'. It was noted 
twice in Plutarch, regarding Philip II and Demetrius, and in relation to the Macedonian 
regent, Antipater. In addition it appeared in Cassius Dio's account of Hadrian and 
became an established part of the medieval tradition concerning Trajan. Again 
reflecting earlier material, Plutarch recorded that Demetrius invaded Babylonia, 
claiming it in the name of his father, Antigonus. However, the author indicated that by 
ravaging the territory for movable booty, Demetrius had only confirmed that in fact the 
land belonged to its current controller, Seleucus. This account mirrored the advice that 
Herodotus had Croesus give to Cyrus on the latter's capture of Sardis. The defeated 
king reminded the victorious Persian that by permitting the city to be sacked, he was 
being robbed by his own soldiers. Once more drawing on precedent, Plutarch's 
Demetrius and Antigonus displayed a problem described by Herodotus in Solon's visit 
to Croesus, that is, the impossibility of communicating clearly and openly with a 
tyrtmt. In fact, the whole enterprise of Plutarch's parallel lives may be seen as 
reflecting a view of the comparability of the two cultures, an assessment given 
credence in the context of the Second Sophistic's wider nature as a deliberate attempt 
to demonstrate their compatibility. In the first century BCE Cornelius Nepos had felt it 
necessary to argue for the relevance of Greek exempla, at the same time as 
Greek models: Isoc. Evag. 8; Too p. 139-140; Cic. De or. 2. 94; Murray (1969) p. 261. 
10 
acknowledging cultural differences. Although Plutarch did not go as far as Dionysius 
of Halicamassus and attempt to establish the Greek ancestry of the Roman race, he did 
discuss relationships between the Greek and Latin languages. Dionysius had declared 
his intention to be no less than to demonstrate the Greek origins of Rome; a purpose 
that, he informed his readers, was accomplished, hi the course of this effort he also 
took account of Aeneas' role in the foundation myths of Rome by demonstrating 
Troy's own Greek ancestry. With a similarly grand sweep, Marcus Aurelius declared 
that 
' . . .the whole court of Hadrian, the whole court of Antoninus, and the 
whole court of Philip, Alexander, Croesus...All these were the same, 
only the actors were different'. 
As suggested by Fergus Millar, this idea was intended to express a philosophical truth 
rather than a political reality. Yet, as Millar goes on to say, 
'...Marcus' words reveal the consciousness of a real continuity...of 
what a "king" should be which did indeed help to transform a Roman 
princeps into a descendant of the Hellenistic kings.' 
At the level of political philosophy and analysis a clear thread can be traced, for 
example, from Plato through Polybius to Cicero and beyond. In the Laws, Plato gave 
an account of the value of a constitution that balanced moderate authoritarianism with 
restrained democracy. Polybius echoed this in his treatment of the authority wielded by 
the Roman magistrates, senate and people. Cicero took up the same theme as an 
element in his deliberate attempt to marry Greek philosophical theory with Roman 
practical politics. His ideal state combined elements of royalty, aristocracy and mass 
democracy. Moreover, as part of his philosophical project Cicero explicitly stated that, 
in contrast with the work of Plato, his Republic 
'...was no shadowy commonwealth of the imagination, but a real and 
very powerfiil State.' 
It has to be added that Cicero's Republic did in fact reflect that of Plato in its 
juxtaposed accounts of the ideal city and the ethically ideal individual. There is also no 
Old woman's petition: Plut. DemetrAl. 3-4 and Mor. 179 C-D; Millar (1992) p. 3; Cass. Die 69. 6. 
3; Bennett p. xvi. Sacked city: Plut. Demetr. 1. 2-3; Hdt. 1. 88. Communication: Demetr. 28. 5, 42. 1; 
Hdt. 1.30-33. Second Sophistic: Swain (1996) p. 137. Exempla. Nep. Praef. 1-7. Language: Plut. 
Marcellus 22 and Swain (1996) p. 140. Dionysius' intention: Ant. Rom 1.5. 1. Success: ibid. 1. 89. 1. 
Troy: ibid. 1.61. 1. Marcus Aurelius: Met/. 10. 27; Millar (1992) p. 3. 
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doubting the seriousness of the Roman's philosophical artistry; thus caution is required 
before taking isolated statements at face value. Nevertheless, Cicero's model city was 
explicitly Rome and his own deep political involvement must indicate greater interest 
in its practical realisation than Plato's metaphorical application. As a specific example 
of the linkage between Greek and Roman political thinking, Suetonius claimed that as 
Tiberius became more sensitive to criticism and perceived challenge, a poet was 
executed for the 'crime' of writing lines that disparaged Agamemnon.''* 
The evidence from Republican Rome 
In a consideration of the political power of Roman Emperors, there is less need to 
justify the relevance of evidence from earlier periods of the City's history. Always 
prominent in every aspect social and political exchange in Rome were the combined 
legal and ethical precedents summed up in the phrase mos maiorum. The traditional 
nature of power in Rome was stressed by Hannah Arendt in her influential 1958 paper 
on historical developments in forms of authority. Alongside militarism and religion, 
she saw tradition as a basic building block of Roman culture. The ruling elite looked to 
the models of their predecessors, particularly those of their own family, in order to 
establish legitimate ambitions and the limits of acceptable behaviour. The increasing 
strength of this perspective is perhaps illustrated by the post-Augustan development of 
the term mos from its original meanings (maimer, custom, guiding rule of life) towards 
something nearer precept or law. An historical example of the pervasiveness and active 
power of precedent in Roman political life can be found in Tacitus' account of Nero's 
speech to the senate when he became princeps. At one level the young ruler was 
portrayed as reassuringly parading an adherence to wise exemplars and to the 
restoration of the 'ancient responsibilities' of senators. Tacitus, however, both 
insidiously undermined this statement of intent and doubled the emphasis on 
precedent. Members of Nero's audience noted that the speech itself represented an 
unwelcome novelty. Permed by Seneca, it was declared to be the first that had been 
written for a princeps by someone else. To underline the point, Tacitus proceeded to 
recall the exemplars of all the previous principes, interestingly including as his starting 
point Julius Caesar, to demonstrate that such 'borrowed eloquence' was an innovation. 
At a more practical level, Appian drew to the attention of his predominantly Eastern 
Greek and Roman political philosophy: PI. Leg. 691-692; Polyb. 6. 11; Cic. Rep. 1. 69; ibid 2. 52; 
Laws 3. 12; Laks p. 259. Tiberius: Suet. Tib. 61. 
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Greek audience aspects of his account of Republican Rome that he felt illuminated 
contemporary Imperial government. Thus, Sulla's decision to have himself 'elected' 
consul, at the same time as holding the dictatorship, was used by the author as a 
commentary on the emperors' acquisition of annual consulships. The mechanism by 
which adherence to mos maiorum could take on this dynamic character was spelled out 
by Tacitus in his version of Claudius' speech to the senate in 48 CE: 
'Everything...which is now believed most olden was new...This (new 
idea) too will grow old, and what today we defend by examples will be 
among the examples''^ 
Methodological Issues 
Another quotation: 
'History is an argument without end and historical revisionism is not 
only inevitable but also inescapable' 
Yavetz went on to suggest that any such revision will be based on one or more of three 
elements; new evidence, new methods of research and a new outlook. New evidence is 
likely to be a rare phenomenon in ancient history, although a steady stream of 
archaeologically discovered inscriptions have undoubtedly provided new insights into 
this general field of study. In relation to research methods, a degree of comprehensive 
coverage is perhaps a distinguishing feature of this study, facilitating a synthesis of 
available approaches. Only in outlook could I claim any originality, and that only of a 
strictly reactive nature. Although bolstered in confidence by the increasing number of 
advocates for asking the 'big questions', I need hardly add that in approaching this 
subject I am aware of the long shadow cast by many of ancient history's most 
distinguished scholars. I do not intend to attempt anything like a comprehensive 
critique or review of the wide field of studies of the basis of Roman Imperial power. 
However, references wil l be made to some of the main lines of interpretation, thus 
providing context for my approach and something for it to react against. Closer 
consideration will be given to a small number of recent studies, thus identifying more 
precisely the ideas and outlook on the topic that have sparked the present research.'^ 
" Traditional power: Lintott (1999) p. 5; Arendt p. 98ff. Precedent: Atkins p. 481-482. Mos. Lewis 
and Short p. 1168. Nero: Ann. 13. 3. 1-4; Wiedemann (2000) p. 529. Sulla: App. B Civ. 1. 103. 
Claudius: Tac. Ann. 11. 24. 7. 
Revisionism: Yavetz (1990) p. 21-22. Inscriptions: For example those recorded by Millar (1984) in 
relation to Augustus. 'Big questions': Schiavone p. 1-2. 
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I am aware of the possible dangers and distorting effects of undertaking a search for 
some single idea that wi l l encapsulate the answer to so wide an enquiry. Historical 
explanations may be messy, partial or variable over time and in differing 
circumstances. A related problem is common to all academic endeavours. Its essence 
was described by Edward Said: 
'My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of 
inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a 
localised focus.' 
A topic as large as the ideology of the Roman Empire is certainly prone to produce 
doubtfiil generalisations. These may be inspired by its complexity and long time span, 
and through the over-interpretation of unrepresentative details of fortuitously surviving 
evidence. In the wider field of studies of the development of power relationships, 
sociologists have long identified the pervasive problem of the teleological assignment 
of meaning. This involves the process by which the 'stubborn historical facts' are 
simplified by a concentration on only those elements that seem to contribute to a 
particular analysis and the stages by which it was reached. Max Weber, on the other 
hand, had directed researchers 
'...to construe meaning fi-om what each set of contemporaries 
demonstrably thought or intended to promote'. 
While this was clearly good advice, it is surely impossible to follow within the limited 
and partial sources of ancient history. Indeed, the problem may help to explain that 
great scholar's decision not to pursue his early researches into Roman themes as he 
developed the new explanatory tool of sociology! Information on events and society in 
the ancient world is mostly limited to non-contemporary accounts by writers imbued 
with the aesthetic, moral and political values of the Greco-Roman elite. A 
demonstrable awareness of these difficulties and modest attempts to compensate for 
them may be all that is possible in response. My approaches will include: clearly 
signalling both the specificity of quoted evidence and the generality of any broad 
explanations; the consistent appreciation and analysis of authorial standpoints; and, 
wherever available, a balancing synthesis of a wide range of evidence. A fiirther 
insurance against the dangers of explanatory monism may be available in relation to 
the sociological strands of my argument. Most of the material I will use has its roots in 
'second wave', neo-Weberian scholarship, of which a principal characteristic was its 
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proposal of multiple analytical factors. For example, leading theorists agree in their 
identification of a variety of bases for social and political power, although on their 
precise number and nature there is perhaps inevitably less concurrence.'^ 
" Distortion and inaccuracy: Linderski (1990 p. 43) describes as otiose '...the pernicious 
preoccupation with definitions and the essence of things'; Said p. 8. Teleology: Merkl p. 114; Weber 
(1968) p. 7-10. Values: Raaflaub (2003) p. 425. Multiple factors: Hobson p. 287; see, for example, 
Mann, M . (1986), Runciman (1989) and Hall (1986). 
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2. The Philosophy of Kingship 
Introduction 
As a place to start, i f only out of courtesy, any examination of the bases of political 
power in the ancient world ought to begin with a consideration of those societies' own 
thoughts on the matter. In the present context, such an examination must be brief and 
selective. It has been claimed that 
'...philosophy played a major part in the evolution of political thought 
on law and the state'. 
However, at the outset it is also important to acknowledge that much of the ancients' 
theorising on this issue was related to philosophical ideals, literary programmes, and 
even personal and local political agendas, rather than the analysis of general political 
realities. For example, Plato, in as much as his Republic was meant to represent the 
blueprint for a real state at all, constructed his ideal community to be one in which 
there were no conflicts of interest between sections of the population. The required 
justice will only occur in the city, as in the soul, when each constituent part 'does its 
own job' in a proper relationship of domination or subordination. This hardly soimds 
like an analysis of practical politics, seen as the process of managing inevitable 
conflicts about authority within a society, which were referred to at the outset of this 
thesis. Perhaps betraying his real interest in the ethics of individuals rather than of 
societies, Plato studiously ignored the question of whether anyone should rule in the 
state, simply leaving un-argued the assumption that the rest of the population could be 
convinced that certain people had the skills and therefore the right to rule; clearly it 
does not need to be proved that, in order to act at all, an individual must be able to find 
some resolution to conflicts of motivation. Although it is another area that he did not 
examine in detail, it is relevant to my thesis that Plato saw war between neighbouring 
states as inevitable and permanent, and that the group he put forward as the source of 
legitimate authority, the guardians, contained both the philosopher/rulers themselves 
and their military enforcers, the auxiliaries. It was specified by Plato that the early 
stage of education for his soldiers was identical to that of the philosopher/rulers.'^ 
Role of philosophy: Clark and Rajak p. 3. Conflicts of interest and justice: PI. Resp. 441c-442d, 
463a; Annas p. 104-105. War, the Guardians and education: PI. Resp. 468a-470c, 412b, 414b; Annas 
p. 101-102. 
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The study of the source and nature of absolute power was of considerable interest to 
the ancient world. However, both the forms of ancient philosophy itself and the 
personalities of its proponents can be factors that limit its application to the analysis of 
contemporary power relationships. From the second century CE, Dio Chrysostom 
provided an illustration. In the published speeches, he certainly acted both in and 
beyond the overtly political world of his home province of Asia. In doing so he did not 
allow any of his stated philosophical principles to limit his activities in the pursuit of 
power and influence. Even within the speeches themselves his choice of persona and 
the nature of his audience undoubtedly influenced the sentiments expressed. 
Comments about the difficulty of interpreting Dio Chrysostom's Kingship Orations 
can be extended to ancient political philosophy in general. Thus, there are legitimate 
cautions for those who 
'...see the speeches as little more than lists of propositions about the 
good king, which can be wrenched from their context and deployed as 
evidence for general imperial ideology'. 
Such extraction loses the 'internal logic' of a philosophical work, rendering 'balanced 
interpretation' impossible. In the case of Dio's four Kingship Orations, the current 
scholarly view is that they represented his general views on monarchy as an ideal form 
of government, modelled on divine kingship. It is true that they contain flattery of 
Trajan. It is also conceivable that the first and third Orations were actually delivered 
before the Emperor. However, even i f this were the case, the example of Pliny's 
Panegyricus suggests no necessary correspondence between the speeches as given and 
their published forms. In short, there is no conclusive reason to believe that Dio saw 
Roman emperors in general or Trajan in particular as fulfilling the requirements for his 
ideal ruler. Thus it is not safe to assume flattery of the Emperor in the content of the 
orator's First Discourse on Kingship. In what he presented as a breathless summary of 
Stoic doctrine on the matter, Dio Chrysostom described the 'administration of the 
universe' as guided by 'a governing purpose most righteous and perfect'. A ruler who 
upheld the correct principle was said to be 'law-abiding, devout and orderly'. Invoking 
Homer's declaration of the divine origins of kingship, Dio Chrysostom went further; 
he stated that '...no wicked or licentious or avaricious person can ever become a 
competent ruler'. Later, in the guise of Diogenes the Cynic, he tightened the equation 
between ethical merit and kingship to the extent that: 
17 
'...no one can be a bad king any more than he can be a bad good man; 
for the king is the best one among men'. 
Arguments for the ideal authority of a monarchical ruler were certainly in the majority 
in ancient thinking on the subject of power. To the extent that these ideas can be 
correlated with political realities, it is hard not to conclude that their unrelenting stress 
on the 'good' king, ruling by consent rather than fear, was more a wish-fulfilling 
response to the absence of such individuals than a considered reflection on the 
observed qualities of successful rulers. In some cases, for example Seneca and Nero, 
this state of affairs is all too clear. 
Peri Basileias literature 
Plutarch stated that Demetrius of Phaleron, a rare historical approximation to Plato's 
philosopher/ruler, counselled Ptolemy I to read books dealing with the office of king 
and ruler. He advised the monarch that 
'...those things which kings' friends are not bold enough to recommend 
to them are written in the books'. 
Other than their titles {peri Basileias) and a scattering of fragments, this apparently 
large corpus of Hellenistic treatises known to Demetrius is lost to us. However, from 
earlier and later periods literature does survive that had in some instances specific 
historical relevance and in general must inform an analysis of Roman Imperial 
ideology. Aristotle appears to have written a now lost book on the subject of kingship, 
while his views on the subject in the Politics included the common philosophical ideal 
of kings ruling by virtue of their '...excelling all the others together in excellence'. 
However, although he conceded the possibility that this ideal could be manifest in 
some (primitive?) societies, Aristotle concluded that, in general, '...kings have no 
marked superiority over their subjects'; therefore ' . . .all the citizens alike should take 
their turn of governing and being governed'. Of course, being more interested in how 
governments should operate than in analysing any actual manifestation of power, the 
philosopher did not trouble to consider how this just state of affairs might be brought 
about. However, the realities of the contemporary Macedonian monarchy may have 
intruded into his categorisation of the types of monarchy. There Aristotle noted the 
Context and persona: Swain (2000) p. 4; see also Plin. Ep. 81-82; Swain (1996) p. 190. Difficulty of 
interpretation: Swain (2000) p. 42. Importance of context: Moles (1990) p. 298; Griffin (2000) p. 
543. Flattery, 1. 36 and 3. 1-24. Delivery: Swain (1996) p. 193-194. Trajan: Swain (1996) p. 192. 
Law-abiding: 1. 42-43. A king cannot be a bad man: //. 2. 205-206; Dio Chrys. 1. 11-14 and 4. 24-25. 
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phenomenon of the Spartan kingship, in which the roles of monarch and general of the 
army were inextricably linked. A generation earlier, Isocrates had been the active 
advocate of Philip 11's leadership of Greece. Later his Evagoras was seminal in its 
laudatory prose account of a ruler. It had been preceded by the same author's To 
Nicocles and Nicocles, which were addressed to a contemporary Cypriot prince. 
However, although of interest for their presentation of a detailed programme of a 
ruler's political education and behaviour, they were probably more rhetorical exercises 
than practical advice. To the cautions implied by these points about the nature of 
surviving Greek peri Basileias literature must be added a reminder of the 
inappropriateness of using the elements we have, to fill in the blanks in our knowledge 
of the ideologies of particular regimes.^ *^  
The Roman context 
Recovered from the ruins of Herculaneum, the works of Philodemus include the most 
substantial fragment of the lost Hellenistic peri Basileias literature. It was dedicated to 
L. Calpumius Piso Caesoninus, possibly relating to his election to the consulship in 58 
BCE. Presenting ideas of kingship in a mid first century BCE Roman setting was 
clearly a delicate matter. In doing so, Philodemus provided another version of 
ostensibly timeless general advice about the art of ruling, while at the same time: 
'The naturalisation of kingship theory in Rome through the mediation of 
Homer shows a touch of genius; a dangerous topic has been rendered 
harmless.' 
Against this example of the carefiil tailoring of philosophical advice to fit the Roman 
context there is the comment of Rawson 
'...that most of the advice...given to Romans, either in fact or fiction, 
can be paralleled in our fragments of the vast ruler-literature addressed 
to Greek kings or other potentates'.^' 
In more ways than one, Cicero provided a major mediating role between the two 
traditions. It is undeniable that he played a consciously original and central function in 
the infusion of Greek philosophical ideas into Roman culture. Indeed he is credited 
°^ Demetrius: Plut. Moralia 189D. Lost literature: Smith (1988); Dvomik p. 241; OCD3 p. 807. 
Aristotle: Pol. 1288a35, 1332b24-27, 1285a3-16. Isocrates: 0CD3 p. 769-771. Warning: Lund p. 154. 
'^ Philodemus: Morford p. lOOff. Murray (1965) p. 177-178. Greek parallels: Rawson (1989) p. 254. 
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with the invention of much of the necessary Latin vocabulary and wrote extensively on 
a variety of topics. These included texts of specific relevance to the present enquiry, 
for example, his outline of the ideal constitution in De Re Publico. Nevertheless, 
important elements within his philosophical expositions reflected an understanding of 
the essentially uncomfortable relationship between Greek philosophy and the agreed 
ideals of the Roman elite. Embedded wdthin works such as De Natura Deorum and De 
Divinatione was a conscious contrast between the values of Greek philosophical 
reasoning and those of established Roman tradition. Thus, the first book of De 
Divinatione deployed a weight of revered historical anecdotes and evocations of 
figures such as Romulus in a defence of divination. Balanced against this in the second 
book was more recognisably philosophical argumentation opposing the practice. Not 
for nothing does Book 1 open with the weighty declaration that: 
'It is an old opinion, derived as far back as from the heroic times, and 
confirmed by the unanimous opinion of the Roman people...'. 
A cenfral character such as Cotta (significantly both sceptical philosopher and priest in 
De Natura Deorum) also supported his arguments by reference to '...what our 
ancestors have taught us'. For the purposes of the present research, the importance of 
these points is an acknowledgement that the ideology of Roman emperors was never 
likely to reflect Greek philosophical ideas in any but a form heavily modified by very 
different cultural norms. From another perspective, the combination in Cicero of a 
writer of political philosophy and active politician indicated that the two roles were 
compatible. This truth does not, however, make it any easier to extract clear political 
theory or factual analysis from the philosophy. This difficulty can be illustrated from 
the author's accotint of Scipio's 'dream' in De Re Publico. Scholars of ancient history, 
literature and philosophy have approached those passages from their diverse 
perspectives, coming to different conclusions about the way in which the references to 
Scipio's career and motives should be interpreted.^^ 
Emperors and philosophers 
The proposition that a wise man could usefully advise an all-powerful ruler can be 
traced back at least as far as the Solon/Croesus relationship m Herodotus. In the Greek 
world, it emerged as a practical possibility during the Hellenistic period. Stoic 
Cicero's philosophical works and language: Beard, North and Price p. 151; Cic. Div. 2. 1-3. Cotta: 
Cic. Nat. D. 3. 3. Scipio's dream: Cic. Rep. 6. 10-29; Stevenson p. 140fT. 
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philosophers may have expressed differing views on the matter. Zeno, for example, 
was credited with the saying that the wise man ' . . . w i l l engage in public affairs 
unless something prevents him', while Chrysippus appeared to be lukewarm about any 
involvement in politics. However, Stoicism's view of the universe as a single system 
tended inevitably to draw its adherents into the workings of that system. Stoics known 
to have been advisers to Hellenistic rulers included Sphaerus and Persaeus.^ ^ 
Seneca's relationship with Nero perhaps reflected the closest a philosopher/adviser got 
to the seat of Roman Imperial power. In De dementia the Emperor was addressed 
directly and flattered in ful l Hellenistic style. The problem of giving advice without 
seeming to criticise or point out deficiencies was overcome by the expedient image of 
the work acting as a mirror for Nero, reminding him of his already supposedly 
established good qualities. However, Seneca seemed confident enough to use an 
imperative, 'adice' ('consider further'), when addressing the young Emperor. In 
content, De dementia reflected many of the recurrent ideas of peri Basileias literature. 
These included: the origins of kingship in Nature (1. 19. 2); the use of analogies, such 
as the power of fathers, teachers and significantly for this thesis, centurions (1. 16. 2); 
the king as the breath (1. 4. 1) and soul (1. 5. 1) of the state; the king as father of his 
people (1. 14. 1) and physician, '...entrusted with the life of all the people' (1. 17. 2); 
the idea that the role of king amplified the personal virtues and vices of the monarch 
(1.2. 3); the use of sun and light imagery (1. 8. 4) and of lions and elephants as noble 
beasts, symbolic of kingship (1. 5. 5); and at 1. 8. 1 the notion of the servitude of 
greatness. The nature of these elements as philosophical commonplaces, added to the 
evidence of Nero's behaviour as emperor, must prompt questions about Seneca's 
purpose in writing De dementia. As suggested by ancient and modem critics, perhaps 
it represented either or both intellectual display and what might be equivalent to 
modem public relations. The extent to which Nero intemalised any of Seneca's lessons 
in being a 'good' monarch must be doubted. When feeling threatened, for example by 
his step brother, Britannicus, and his mother, Agrippina, the young emperor readily 
turned to murder as a solution. The central role played by Seneca in shaping Nero's 
political speeches and edicts cannot be denied. However, any assessment of the 
Solon: Hdt. 1. 29-32; Rowe (2000a) p. 392. Zeno: Sen. De Otio 3. 2. Chrysippus: Long and Sedley 
66B; Diog. Laert. 7. 187. Interestingly, this last source directly associated a charge of arrogance against 
Chrysippus with his failure to dedicate any of his many works to a king. Sphaerus and Persaeus: 
Gamsey p. 404. 
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philosopher's authority over the Emperor must be seen in the context of Seneca's 
partnership with the Praetorian Prefect, S. Afranius Burrus. The role of the soldier in 
the joint venture of advising and supporting Nero may be overshadowed by the status 
of the philosopher's literary legacy. However, its potency was demonstrated by 
Burrus' refusal to involve the Praetorians in the murder of Agrippina, and, most 
pointedly for Seneca, by the philosopher's rapid fall from favour on the death of the 
Prefect in 62 CE. To whatever extent Nero's power actually rested on the philosopher, 
it did so alongside the coercive force of the soldier.^'' 
From his vantage point as a Greek intellectual with influential friends in the Rome of 
Trajan and Hadrian, Plutarch provided much relevant material for mapping more 
general philosophical ideas onto the specific issue of political ideology. His wide 
philosophical interests, although described as being both popular and derivative, 
included technical treatises on the Stoics and Epicureans, and advice to young 
politicians. It is therefore perhaps not unexpected that a feature of his parallel 
biographies of rulers and other prominent Greeks and Romans was a keenness to 
demonstrate the relevance of philosophical motivation in his heroes. It can be further 
asserted that this tendency is part of a general desire to show his Roman subjects to be 
admirers of Greek culture.^ "^ 
Plutarch expressed clear views about the value of philosophy for a ruler and about the 
nature of the relationship between the philosopher and the possessor of political power. 
He started from the premise that philosophical knowledge could be of benefit to the 
private citizen, both by increasing his real happiness and by removing any evils 
harmful to himself or others. From this he argued that i f such knowledge were to 
'...take possession of a ruler, a statesman, and a man of action and fill 
him with love of honour, through one he (the philosopher) benefits 
many.' 
Plutarch expressed himself to be comfortable with the possibility that the philosopher's 
influence over a ruler might be achieved at the cost of his 'being called a courtier and a 
Flattery: 1.1-4; Dvornik p. 527. Mirror: introduced at 1. 1. 1 and expanded later: ' . . . in order that 
what is now a natural impulse may become a principle.' (2. 2. 2). Adice: 2.6. 1. Seneca's motives: Tac. 
Ann. 13. 11. 2; Griffin (1984) p. 47. Nero's speeches: Tac. 13.3. l;Cass. Dio61.3. l ;Gr i f f i n 
(1984) p. 76. Seneca's authority linked to Burrus: ibid. p. 72; Tac. Ann. 14. 7. 4, 51. 1, 52. 1. 
Philosophical range: 0CD3 p. 1200-1201. Philosophical Motivation: Rawson (1989) p. 236. 
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toady', and that the terms of the relationship would be entirely under the control of the 
political leaders: 
'...(the philosopher) wi l l not armoy them against their wil l , nor will he 
pitch his camp in their ears with inopportune sophistical disquisitions, 
but when they wish it, he will be glad to converse...with them.' 
In the substance of such consultations, Plutarch's philosophers did not need to flinch 
from the harsh realities of political calculation. Thus he had the Stoic, Areius, advise 
Octavian regarding the fate of the son of Julius Caesar and Cleopatra, Caesarion, that 
'Not a good thing were a Caesar too many'. These views clearly reflected Plutarch's 
realistic appraisal of the power of the Roman Empire and its rulers. They were very 
different from those expressed in his whimsical tale of the response of an earlier 
philosopher, Diogenes the Cynic, to Alexander the Great; when the king offered to 
grant him any wish, he was said to have replied, "Get out of my light". Plutarch 
dedicated his Saying of Kings and Commanders to Trajan. He described them as ' . . .the 
common offerings of the first-fruits that come from philosophy', claiming that unlike 
deeds, which can be affected by chance and circumstances, the attested words of great 
leaders provide the 'opportunity to observe, as in so many mirrors, the workings of the 
mind of each man'.^^ 
In the texts of his Lives Plutarch provided many indications of his views on the nature 
of power in general and that of Roman emperors in particular. His relationship with 
Trajan has already been touched upon and, in the depiction of his subjects, clear 
allusions are evident. These include a positive opinion of Augustus in the portrayal of 
Romulus. The Lives gave due prominence to the central role of military strength and 
coercion in the Roman state. Where it occurred, this aspect of Plutarch's analysis 
deserves attention in spite of or perhaps because of arguments suggesting that he did 
not understand the f l i l l extent of the military aspect of Roman politics. For example, 
the nature of Romulus as a warrior was drawn in bold strokes, the characterisation 
being introduced at the outset through the associated account of the origin of 'Rome' 
as the City's name. Of all the alternatives presented, that relating to the 'warlike 
strength' (p(Ji[ir]) of earlier Pelasgian settlers was presented first. The idea of Mars as 
Romulus' father was included in relation to his mother Rhea and even protruded into 
Private citizen: Mor. 777A; 778F. The many: 777A. Status: 778B; 779B. Areius: Ant. 81.2. 
Diogenes and Alexander: Plut. Alex. 14; Diog. Laert. 6. 37. Trajan: Mor. 172C-E. 
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another suggestion about the origin of 'Rome', that being a derivation from the Latin 
ruma ('a teat'). In the story of the baby suckling from the she-wolf, that creature was 
said to have been helped by a woodpecker. Accordmg to Plutarch, both animals were 
sacred to Mars.^^ 
Although, as another Roman subject, it was not paired with that of Romulus, the 
account of Numa provided a clear contrast with that of the City's aggressive founder. 
Plutarch emphasised the peaceful and virtuous qualities of Rome's legendary law-
maker; 'the gentlest and justest of kings'. Before being made king, Numa's 'great 
name and fame' had been gained through the virtues of '...discipline, endurance of 
hardships and study of wisdom'. Perhaps illustrating the portrait's evocation of Plato's 
philosopher-kings, Numa was reluctant to take power. He explained that this was 
because of his '...inveterate love of peace, of unwarlike occupations'. He went on to 
state that 
'...the city needs a king with a warrior's experience and strength. 
Besides, the people has become much accustomed to war ...and no one 
is blind to their desire for growth by conquest.' 
This reflection no doubt related to the author's experience of Rome. In his account, the 
populace eventually persuaded Numa to become king, declaring that they were 
'...sated with war...and glutted with triumphs', and that he alone could unite their 
factions. The evocation of Augustan peace is urmiistakable in this, as in many of the 
specific measures taken by Numa, notably his emphasis throughout on religious 
reform. Plutarch was so keen to establish the pacific credentials of the ancient law 
maker that he credited him with the symbolic removal of March (representing Mars) 
from its original position as the first month of the year. In addition it was said that 
during his reign the doors of the Temple of Janus were closed for 43 years. This 
reflected the action of Augustus, while diplomatically not quite matching the first 
princeps' 44 years of domination. Again the author was surely reflecting as much on 
contemporary Rome as on the myth/history of the great law-giver when he commented 
that to shut the Temple of Janus 
" Plutarch's analysis: Felling p. 345-346. Romulus: Jones, C. P. p. 89-94. Rome: Rom. 1.1. Mars: 
Rom A. 1-2. 
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'...was a difficult matter, and it rarely happened, since the realm was 
always engaged in some war, as its increasing size brought it into 
collision with the barbarous nations which encamped it round about'. 
However, Plutarch indicated the exceptional nature of Numa's regime by 
characterising it as a necessary balance or antidote to the earlier 'feverish' condition 
(again evoking Plato) that had resulted from the City's rapid increase in power. More 
pointedly still, in his comparison between Numa and Lycurgus, the author had no 
doubt that while the latter's achievements were long lasting, the peace and friendship 
pursued by Numa 'straightway vanished from the earth with him' when he died. The 
doors of the Temple of Janus were 'thrown wide open, and Italy was filled with the 
blood of the slain'. 
In the contrast between Plutarch's portrayals of Numa and Romulus it is not difficult to 
see elements of the traditional divide between the Romans' self-image as dominant 
men of action and their characterisation of Greeks as passive thinkers of decorative but 
ultimately useless thoughts. Cicero, as philosopher and politician, had articulated the 
supremacy of the latter. He argued this in the sense that the power wielded over others 
by the politician was likely to ensure that more of his fellow-countrymen adhered to 
just laws than were likely to be persuaded by the arguments of the philosopher. This 
crucial limiter on the direct application of philosophy to Roman politics can be 
summarised from the early third century CE Athenian writer, Philostratus. In his Life 
of Apollonius of Tyana, he provided insights into philosophical ideas of kingship in a 
historically fancifiil account of Vespasian. The Emperor was depicted as seeking the 
guidance of the philosopher about how he should rule. The advice given included both 
standard exhortations to moderation and practical tips about appointing governors who 
can speak the language of their provinces. Interestingly, Apollonius concluded his brief 
lesson with a suggestion that indicated the author's understanding of the prevailing 
Roman distrust of philosophy: 
'So now apply yourself to the duties of your throne, lest your subjects 
accuse you of indolence'.^^ 
Virtues: Plut. Num. 3. 5-6; Cam. 18. 1. Reluctance: Plut. Num. 5. 2-5; PI. Resp. 519c-521b. Sated 
and glutted: Plut. Num. 6. 1-3. March: ibid. 19. 5. Janus: ibid. 20. 1-2; 73. 1-2. Balance: ibid. 8. 1-2. 
Lycurgus and Numa: Synkrisis 4. 6. 
Philosopher and politician: Cic. Rep. 1.2-3; Stevenson p. 143. Philostratus: Rawson (1989) p. 248-
249; 0CD3 p. 1171; Philostr. VA 5. 36. 
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Other ancient ideas about the nature of power. 
Ancient theorising about the nature of political power was not confined to those 
definable under the broad term 'philosopher'. Ideas from a wider range of sources 
must be considered potentially relevant to the development of the authority of Roman 
emperors. Monarchy, in its various manifestations, appeared as a prominent i f not 
indispensable element in surveys of political thinking within cultures that must have 
influenced developments in Greece and Rome. Dvomik provided sunmiary 
assessments of monarchy in ancient Eastern societies, although his analysis was 
characterised by an alarming 'Orientalism'. More dispassionate accounts also record 
the central role played by kingship in Babylon from the earliest times. Documents, for 
example Sumerian king lists of the early second millennium BCE, may even suggest 
that civilised living required the institution.^^ 
A king's right to rule was certainly a concern of both Homer and Hesiod. Homer 
presented the purpose of monarchs as being to arbitrate in disputes, command in war, 
take the chair at deliberative councils, play the host at feasts and to mediate between 
the people and the gods. In such ways the king may be seen as '...the agent of the 
community principle'. Despite clear and acknowledged failings in his behaviour and in 
the execution of the role, Agamemnon's right to command the Greek host at Troy was 
made clear by Homer. It was true that Menelaus was described as being 'co-
commander', and Agamemnon's authority was challenged in the anger of Achilles and 
in the impudence of Thersites. However, Odysseus and Nestor repeatedly acted to 
bolster the expedition leader's authority. Ultimately this authority may have rested on 
voluntary oaths, and Agamemnon's decisions may have been questioned in a lawfiil 
assembly. Nevertheless, Nestor made it clear to Agamemnon that, 'Whatever (another) 
may initiate, action is yours'.^' 
In practice, to what extent could this authority be characterised as coercive? At an 
early stage in his saga. Homer portrayed Agamemnon as testing the resolve of the 
Greeks by insincerely suggesting that they should give up the siege of Troy and return 
"^ Orientalism: for example, p 53-54 and 127-8. Sumaria: Kuhrt p. 30. 
" Arbitration: IliadlT,. 482-487. War leader: 9. 95-98. Councils: 2. 100-109, 9. 89. Host 4. 342-344. 
Gods: 2. 480-483. Community principle: Redfield p. 92; see also Finley p. 82-96 for discussion of the 
place of the king within Homeric Greek society. Agamemnon: for example, //. 2. 474-483, 14. 133-134. 
Menelaus: 4. 205. Achilles: 1. 149-152. Thersites: 2. 211-242. Odysseus: 2. 244-264. Nestor: 9. 98ff 
Oaths: Graves 160b; Assembly: 9. 32-49. Action: 9. 102. 
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home. The host, taking their chief at his word, stampeded towards the ships and were 
only turned back by the prompt action of Odysseus. Armed with Agamemnon's 
sceptre of command, he accomplished this in two ways. To the leaders of the 
detachments he explained that they had misunderstood what was intended, 
emphasising that it would be inappropriate to 'frighten' any of them 'as i f they were a 
coward'. Odysseus nevertheless hinted at the punishments likely to inflicted by 
Agamemnon i f he were to be angered. The rank and file, however, he simply struck 
with the sceptre, disdainflilly telling them that they were ' . . .to be counted neither in 
war nor in counsel' and ordering them to obey 'others who are better men'. From this 
incident, a clear picture emerges of physical coercion as the ultimate basis of 
Agamemnon's power. The point was picked up by Dio Chrysostom, who drew from it 
material appropriate to his chosen stance as upholder of Hellenic traditions in a context 
acceptable to elite, and even Imperial, Roman interlocutors. He had Alexander defend 
the value of lessons that could be drawn from Homer by a monarch. These included 
the importance of soldiers behaving in a disciplined manner, silently obeying orders 
' in fear of their commanders'; sentiments that chimed well with Roman military 
ideals.^ ^ 
Hesiod's interest in kings appeared to centre on their ethical values, while in the 
'constitutional debate' Herodotus came out firmly in favour of rule by a single 
monarch, 'provided he is of the best'. This debate was perhaps the first 
'unambiguously visible' account of organised political theory, as opposed to ad hoc 
political thinking. Herodotus associated the power given to a nation by a single ruler 
with a people's unity of purpose. For Thucydides, revealing the real bases of power in 
particular regimes formed an element in his over-all explanatory programme. Details 
of what these authors, and other Greek and Roman historians, had to say about the 
coercive nature of power wil l form much of the subject matter of later sections of this 
thesis. Tacitus' decision to open his Annales with the declaration that, 'The City of 
Rome from its inception was held by kings', emphasised the centrality of kingship in 
his consideration of the role of the emperors. It has been argued that the historian's use 
of 'from' rather than 'at' the City's beginning strengthened the statement of continuity. 
" Odysseus: 11. 2. 188-203. Alexander: Dio Chrys. Or. 2. 52; //. 4. 431. 
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In order to place the ancient views into an appropriate interpretive framework, 
attention will first be given to modem theories of social power.^ ^ 
" Heslod: Op. 261-263. 'The best': Hdt. 3. 82. Debate: Cartledge (2000) p. 21. Unity: Hdt. 5. 3. 
Thucydides: 1.9-10. Continuity: Tac. Ann. 1.1.1; Clarke p. 84-85. 
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3. The Sociology of Power 
Introduction 
'The History of Rome is the most fascinating historical laboratory 
available to sociologists.' 
Without attempting any precise definition of History it must be clear that its subject 
matter includes significant aspects of human social behaviour. It is therefore not 
surprising that historical explanations often share perspectives and data with 
sociological descriptions of human activity. In fact, although perhaps not so 
fashionable now, a perfectly respectable argument can be put forward to suggest that 
the two disciplines have so much in common as to render their academic division 
largely irrelevant. The attraction of Roman history expressed in the quotation at the 
head of this chapter was identified by Mann as relating to the subject's longevity, its 
adaptability within a set of consistent core values and the quality of its documentation. 
Closer study wil l reveal problems in these ascribed features, particularly when 
subjected to the inevitable generalisations of 'grand theory'. However, it is equally true 
to say that a positive assessment of the availability, range and stability of Roman 
material is not out of place when compared with that available for the study of any 
earlier and many later empires.^ '* 
Analyses of Roman history that utilise recognisably sociological material are not 
difficult to identify; nor need they be of recent years. For example, it has been noted 
that von Premerstein was the first to suggest that Augustus developed a network of 
patronage to underpin the authority of the principate. Such a view has received support 
and been developed into more detailed analyses of the role of gift giving as an engine 
of social organisation. The study of inscriptions has identified a nuanced flow of goods 
and favours between commanders and their subordinate officers within the Roman 
army. In relation to the emperor, Paul Veyne has argued that benefits bestowed by the 
sovereign on his subjects lay outside any general system of exchange between 
Laboratory: Mann, M . (1986) p. 250. History and Sociology: For arguments uniting the two 
disciplines see Abrams p. 10 or Giddens (1979) p. 230. Focussing on the possible use of History in 
Sociology, Goldthorpe (p. 211-214) argued that the two are distinguished by History's necessary 
reliance on incomplete 'relics' for its data, while Sociology has the opportunity to generate new 
evidence through fieldwork. Critical views of this approach can be found in the debate recorded in the 
British Journal of Sociology 45 (1) and in Kiser and Hechter (1998). 
29 
individuals. Instead they reflected his role as an agent of the state, thus forming a 
special case of euergetism, and revealing an element of the reciprocal relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled.^^ 
It is unfortunate for my analysis that Roller's perceptive account of this issue did not 
consider in detail the emperor's accession donative to the soldiers, confining itself 
instead to gift exchange at elite dinner parties. Nevertheless, the same author did note 
examples of the political ramifications attendant upon a ruler's operation of the social 
mechanism of patronage. Writing in the early third century CE, Cassius Dio used his 
narrative of a long discussion between Livia and Augustus about plots as an 
opportunity for a wide-ranging review of how a ruler can best negate actual and 
potential opposition. The importance of distributing material and honorific largesse in 
an effective manner was seen to go beyond its positive impact on the direct recipient. 
The ancient author clearly understood the wider social process at work: 
'A man...is persuaded not only by the kindness with which he himself 
is treated, but also by the benevolence he sees extended to others'. 
The high status of the generosity/gratitude ethic was made clear by Tacitus, albeit 
within a narrative of simulated moral outrage. He described the senate as concealing its 
real motivation (care not to offend Vespasian) in its disingenuous condemnation of 
Caecina's desertion of Vitellius. Nevertheless the catalogue of base errors ascribed to 
Caecina was said to be that of 
'...the consul who had betrayed his counfry, the general who had 
betrayed his commander-in-chief, the friend who had betrayed his 
benefactor to whom he owed all his riches and distinction.' 
As a final example, a significant element of Velleius Paterculus' explanation of the 
downfall of Julius Caesar was a perception that the Dictator had made catastrophic 
errors in his calculation of the generosity/gratitude sum in relation to Brutus and 
Cassius.^ *^  
Roller underlined the importance of this sociological perspective in examining the 
authority of the Roman emperors. From the point of view of a classicist he did so in 
Von Premerstein: Roller p. 131. Army gift exchange: Sailer p. 157-158; Plin. £p. 2. 13. 
Euergetism: Veyne p. 341-351. 
Generosity/gratitude: Roller p. 175ff; Cass. Dio 55. 14. 1-22. 3, especially 19. 5; Tac. Hist 3. 37; 
Veil. Pat. 2. 56-57. Patronage: see pages 179-180. 
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relation both to ancient attestation and to the more usual modem historiographical 
focus on the constitutional shape of an emperor's power. Other ancient historians have 
gone further in an explicit examination of the sociological roots underpinning analyses 
of the Roman Empire. Hingley, for example, has considered the social context of 
historically prevalent views of Roman rule in Britain. He identified a progressive and 
positive characterisation of the dissemination of Roman culture among the indigenous 
population as being rooted in the ideology and social structure of Britain before the 
First World War. This was well illustrated by Haverfield's statement that 
'...the men of the (Roman) Empire wrought for the betterment and 
happiness of the world.' 
That such a view sat snugly within the context of elite attitudes towards the 
contemporary British Empire is clear enough. However, Hingley went on to suggest 
that there are continued echoes of this outlook in the still current, although now 
challenged, concept of 'Romanisation'. He argued that these resonances could be 
detected in an unquestioned assumption that the indigenous elite perceived intrinsic 
positive value in the acquisition of Roman culture. Perhaps such adoption was 
motivated purely by political calculation. Supporting this possibility is the speed with 
which most signs of Imperial culture disappeared m the early fifth century, surviving 
not much longer than the fading footprints of Roman soldiers. The same general point 
was made by Webster in relation to the readiness with which the concept of Pax 
Romana was absorbed into British scholarship.^^ 
It is supportive to the general thrust of my thesis that these sociologically coloured 
revisionist ideas find a prominent place for the pervasive and coercive role of the 
Roman soldiers. Alongside manifestations of the city, the legions have been given 
pride of place as key elements in the imposition of Roman ideology, even in relatively 
demilitarised parts of the Empire. Integrating these two factors, the military's technical 
and administrative resources were necessary to any large-scale urbanisation. In the 
context of these analyses, the grid pattern of Roman cities can be viewed as being 
more than a Greek inspired ideal of town planning. Its practical consequences come 
into sharper focus, reflecting both the layout of a Roman army camp and the 
surveillance/control advantages of clear lines of sight and fields of deployment. 
" Sociological perspective: Roller p. 286-287; Hingiey p. 82-84; Haverfield (1923) p. 10; Webster p. 4-
5. 
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However, it is at the theoretical level that sociological analyses are most interesting in 
the present context. At the widest focus, the role of military activity has been identified 
as a 'constitutive element' in the very formation of the earliest states; while, in a more 
precise formulation, it was Max Weber who placed interpretations of gift giving into a 
more general consideration of the nature of authority in pre-industrial societies. For 
example, he outlined the features of modem bureaucracy, suggesting that today's 
depersonalised control through administrative/ bureaucratic guidelines 
'...stands in extreme contrast to the regulation of all relationships 
through individual privileges and bestowals of favour...which is 
absolutely dominant in patrimonialism', 
(patrimonialism being one of the theorist's characterisations of typical government in 
the pre-modem state). Elements of this type of political authority can be seen reflected 
in the rule of Roman emperors.^ ^ 
Sociological Theories of Power 
From Marx and Weber onwards, one strategy for those seeking to construct scientific 
accounts of the operation of contemporary society has been to use interpretations of the 
past as indicative types, possible models and aetiological explanations. By the 1960s 
sociological methods and tools had been developed that were sufficient to permit the 
reverse of this process. In the use of specifically sociological methods and theories to 
make wide-ranging studies of the past, Eisenstadt's The Political Systems of Empires 
and Barrington Moore's The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy are 
fi"equently cited as a seminal works. In his chosen field of bureaucratic empires, 
Eisenstadt described the task in which he was engaged as an attempt to identify 
'...some patterns or laws in the structure and development of such political systems.' 
These and subsequent works employing similar methods share an important 
characteristic in their treatment of the state as a central and independent 'actor' in 
social systems. As such, they follow in broad terms the sociological agenda set by 
Weber, whose concentration on the nature and operation of power within a state, rather 
than between states, adds to the relevance of his work. It is this factor, allied to Marx's 
Army and city: Whittaker (1997) p. 143-144; Hanson p. 75-76. Grid pattern and sight lines: 
Hingley p. 90; Foucault (1977) p. 200-206; This feature of town planning was clear, for example, to 
Baron Haussmann in the rebuilding of central Paris after the risings of 1848 (Robertson, I p. 22.). State 
formation: Haldon p. 5. Gift giving: Weber (1968) p. 958. See Millar (1992) chapter IV for detailed 
accounts of Imperial gift giving and subsequent chapters for the reciprocal acts of senators, equestrians 
and other sections of the population. 
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concentration on economics (control of the means of production) as the crucial element 
of social analysis, that explains why sociology derived from Weber is the more 
relevant to this thesis."'^  
In his definition of the state, Weber emphasised the coercive aspects of its power. In 
the context of post-First World War Germany he said that 
'...a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory'. 
He went on to spell out the behavioural consequences of this definition, explaining that 
' . . .the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported 
by means of legitimate (i . e. considered to be legitimate) violence'. 
In equally fundamental terms other theorists have come to similar and related 
conclusions about, for example, the rulers of such human communities. Poggi provided 
a characterisation of the 
'...prototypical political figure...as a warrior, availing himself of the 
military superiority he and his retinue enjoy over an unarmed, militarily 
ineffective population, not just to terrorise the latter, but to rule over it. ' 
Michael Maim perhaps went furthest down this road. In his sweeping and influential 
historical/sociological analysis of power relations he suggested that civilisation (by 
which he meant the most basic social structures) was itself 'an abnormal phenomenon' 
in human development. For him it represented a situation in which the earliest people 
had been '...caged into particular authority relations' when the state and social 
stratification became unavoidable through the coercion of economic and physical 
compulsion."**^ 
While these ideas tend towards a similar direction, further enquiries about the power in 
these processes have diverged with regard to its nature and components. Weber 
identified the probability of certain behaviours as the basis of his definitions. He saw 
'social power' as existing when an individual was likely to be 
" Sociological methods: Tilly (1981) p. 43; Goldthorpe p. 220. Patterns and laws: Eisenstadt p. vi i -
vi i i . Weber's intra-state focus: Ickenberry and Kupchan p. 289. Marx and Weber: Jameson p.4; 
Kelly, D. (2000) p. 216. It must be noted that Kelly argued here that there were many similarities 
between the two scholars' approaches to the theory of the state. 
Political power and physical force: Weber (1948) p. 78; Poggi p. 5; Mann, M . (1986) p. 124; Munz 
p. 262. 
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' . . . i n a position to carry out his own wil l despite resistance, regardless 
of the basis on which this probability rests'. 
Accompanying the phenomenon of social power were others, 'domination' and 
'discipline', again given behavioural definitions. The former indicated the likelihood 
that a command would be obeyed, the latter that such obedience would become 
habituated into prompt, automatic and stereotyped forms. Following Parsons, Maim 
widened this perspective. Weber's definition he saw as restricted to what could be 
characterised as 'distributive' power, that is, power as a finite quantity to be shared by 
the actors in a given social situation. This was contrasted with 'collective' power, by 
which 
'...persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third 
parties or over nature'. 
Mann went on to distinguish between four sources of power; ideological, economic, 
military and political. Each of these were differentiated by the intensity with which it 
was felt by individuals subject to it, and by the extent to which its parameters were 
accepted and seen as mutually advantageous by all the parties involved. Runciman 
identified what he called 'dimensions' of power. These were three in nimiber and 
included the first two of Mann's 'sources', while as his third he rolled up the latter's 
concepts of the military and political into a single 'coercive' dimension. Runciman's 
argument for doing so is of some importance to this thesis. Political power, he felt, 
had no fundamentally separate identity from that of the military. He acknowledged that 
'...states are not the same things as armies', but held that political structures provided 
a form in which the three basic dimensions of power could be operated as opposed to 
those structures possessing some specific type of authority. This argument tends to 
bring the coercive element of social power closer to the front of the stage and is 
exemplified in a real society, that of Ancient Greece, in the next section.'*' 
Fundamental to all these definitions is that social power must be institutionalised i f it is 
to operate effectively over any geographically dispersed population and for any 
substantial length of time. Institutionalisation takes the form of confrol over the norms 
and laws of the relevant social group. This factor has been prominent in a widening of 
the very concept of power. Lukes was critical of earlier definitions because of what he 
Probability of behaviour: Weber (1968) p. 53. Distributive and collective power: Parsons p. 219-
225; Mann, M . (1986) p. 6. Four sources: ibid. p. 7-9, 22-28. Three dimensions: Runciman p. 12-15. 
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saw as their concentration on discrete behaviours, such as actions and decisions. He 
characterised as 'one dimensional' explanations couched in terms of the powerful 
obliging others to act in certain ways. Even adding a second dimension, that of 
controlling the agenda of decisions to be considered, was inadequate. Like Runciman, 
he added a third dimension. This comprised the capacity of the powerful to shape the 
basic landscape of social discourse. In this way the actual desires and aspirations of the 
powerless are determined by the powerful. Plato clearly had such a dimension in mind 
in his discussion of the control available through the 'Noble Lie'. Similarly, this 
approach to power resonated in Polybius' approval of the manipulative use of Roman 
religion (see pages 166-178). The totality of the Augustan transformation of Roman 
politics, culture and society provided another example of such power. Once achieved, 
such complete power cannot be opposed successfully by any individual who is without 
the backing of substantial collective organisation. This was well known to Roman 
emperors. Trajan cautioned Pliny about the potential political dangers of allowing the 
creation of any formalised citizen groups, even for such practical purposes as fighting 
fires. Although the Emperor might be judged to be over reacting in this instance, it is 
as well to recall that the popularity of the dissident Rufus Egnatius in 19 BCE was 
reported to have been based on his success in organising just such fire brigades in 
Rome. The volatile relationship between Roman power structures and the collegia is 
surely relevant here (see pages 133-135).'*^ 
Like Weber, the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, viewed political power as an 
element within the wider landscape of social intercourse. He conceived the social 
relations of civil society as power relationships. This power was characterised as 
having more than one facet; in his terms consisting of 'hegemony armoured by 
coercion'. Although an imprecise concept in Gramsci's usage, 'hegemony' subsumed 
elements of an ideological outlook involving 
'...the organisation of consent - the process through which 
subordinated forms of consensus are constructed without recourse to 
violence or coercion.' 
Earlier definitions: Lukes (1986) p. 1-18. Three dimensions: Lukes (1974) p. 11-12, 16,23. Noble 
lie: PI. Resp. 414b-415d; Schofield p. 218. Manipulation of religion: Polybius: 6. 56. Augustus: for 
example, Zanker (1988). Trajan: Ep. 10. 34. Egnatius Rufus: Veil. Pat. 2. 91. 3 
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Tacitus' famous description of the 'benefits' of Romanisation (Latin, togas, 
colonnades, baths and banquets) readily springs to mind; 'The Britons...called it 
civilisation, although it was a part of their enslavement'. Perhaps Polybius was also 
exploring this conceptual territory when he discussed the transformation of primitive 
monarchy into true kingship. In the former, obedience was based on fear, while the 
latter implied the ruler's use of reason and virtue. For Gramsci, violence and coercion 
were generally packaged as 'domination' in contrast with hegemony. However, it has 
been noted that Gramsci was inconsistent in his handling of hegemony. Sometimes 
coercion was excluded from its workings, sometimes it was seen as a necessary 
element in the process.'*"' 
This sampling of the ideas of sociological and political theorists regarding the nature 
of power has served to illustrate the ubiquitous role of coercion in the definition of 
social power. In considering the bases of the power of Roman emperors it is clearly 
difficult to avoid the role of military and other coercive factors. However, it is equally 
clear that there has been some reluctance to consider the politics of coercion in detail, 
notwithstanding the significance of its role in theoretical definitions of power. Gramsci 
expressed the relationship between coercive and non-coercive aspects of power in 
terms of the primacy of the former: 
'Ultimately the ruling bloc retains power because of its control of the 
'repressive apparatuses'...which enable it to keep other classes in 
subjection even when it has lost hegemony over them.' 
I f the issue has not already occurred to the reader, the language used in this quotation 
must beg the question of whether these analyses of power in the modem world can be 
relevant to ancient Rome. It must be accounted for that a scholar such as Fergus Millar 
deliberately eschewed a consideration of such studies. However, he recognised and, in 
his 1991 afterword, appeared to regret the resultant loss of 'percipience'. In addition, 
Millar's original reasoning, that as a 'proper objective historian' a use of modem 
sociological studies would undermine his wish '...to subordinate himself to the 
evidence and to the conceptual world of the past', was surely self-deluding. I am 
certainly not arguing that Marxist perspectives on class struggle or any other analyses 
of contemporary political systems have a straightforward application to pre-industrial 
Hegemony and coercion: Gramsci p. 263; Simon p. 27; Forcey p. 18-19; Tac.Agr. 21. Organisation 
of consent: Barrett p. 238-239; Polyb: 6. 6-7. Inconsistency: Hahm p. 468. 
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societies. Nor am I proposing that the Roman Empire can readily be equated with the 
concept of the modem state. Such topics have been discussed elsewhere and are not 
central to my concems. Rather I am interested in the efforts of these theorists to define 
the nature of power itself and that within those ideas there is a consistently central role 
for coercion. It would be hard to argue that the mle of Roman emperors lacked at least 
elements of coercion. Therefore, the prominence of coercion in definitions of political 
authority must support the relevance of a systematic study of their operation in the 
Roman world. I f such a study indicates a fundamental and consistent role for coercion, 
it may provide a pointer towards a definition of power that has wider historical 
applicability.'*'' 
The Sociological study of empires 
The move from a consideration of coercion in modem theories of power to reflections 
on its workings in relation to Roman emperors is assisted by broader 
historical/sociological studies of empires, in particular those of Eisenstadt and Marm. 
The former, setting out with the explicit aim to '...apply sociological concepts to the 
analysis of historical societies', concenfrated on a comparative study of what he saw as 
bureaucratic elements in the political systems of ancient and modem empires. As a 
prelude to this endeavour, Eisenstadt identified one of the cmcial characteristics of any 
political system to be the imposhion of what he described as '...severe secular 
sanctions in order to implement the society's main collective goals.' These sanctions 
were operated through that society's military resources, the control of which 
necessarily became a major goal of the mling element in any empire. At the same time 
control of military force was vital in order to pursue the main external policy of an 
empire, territorial expansion and conquest. From this position of cenfral importance to 
an empire's mlers it was not surprising that armies came to play a significant part in 
the political process itself Eisenstadt's formulation of the task faced by the mler of an 
imperial state in controlling these coercive forces wil l be explored a little later (see 
page 40). For now it suffices to have established that he identified a vital and 
unavoidable political role for coercive force."*^ 
Repressive apparatuses: Gramsci p. 275-276; Hall p. 68-69. Ancient Rome and the modern state: 
De Ste Croix p. 19-30. Applicable analysis: Gramsci was specific in his application of hegemony to 
contemporary industrial societies (Sassoon p. 113); Millar (1992) p. viii-ix, 637-638. 
Sociological concepts in bureaucratic empires: Eisenstadt p. vii-vii i . Sanctions: ibid. p. 5. Control 
of military force: ibid. p. 130. Political process: ibid. p. 172. 
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Taking a wider perspective Marm saw the historical development of kingship itself and 
of the earliest empires in Mesopotamia as being significantly driven by changes in 
military organisation and technology. Sargon of Akkad was identified by Mann as the 
earliest known ruler to dominate otherwise dispersed peoples. His conquest of Sumer 
took place perhaps in the period 2400-2300 BCE. He was said to have achieved 
success by virtue of his control of an army and its required infrastructure. In this 
analysis later empires were facilitated by the development of chariot warfare, iron 
weapons and intensive forms of military organisation. An interesting element of this 
analysis at once widens the focus from purely military factors and emphasises their 
importance in more general considerations of power structures. It has been argued 
(pages 8-12) that Greek political and cultural developments merit a prominent place in 
this thesis by virtue of their broad influence on Rome. In relation to a specific 
comparison of empires it may seem to be less appropriate to examine the two side by 
side. However, Mann interpreted the macro-political aspects of Greek civilisation 
(alongside that of Phoenicia) as occupying a definable period between the respective 
decline and rise of true empires of domination in the east and in the western 
Mediterranean. In contrast with the empires of domination, the authority wielded by 
Greek rulers was characterised as that of a 'decentralised multi-power-actor 
civilisation'. Without going into detail, the elements of this complex structure included 
the small-scale polis, wider ('federal') influence brought about by sea-going trade and 
colonisation, and the even broader-based power deriving fi-om unifying features of 
language, religion and social organisation. In relation to the role of military factors in 
the operation of social power, it is the polis that commands attention here.'*^ 
As an institution the polis holds a significant place in the consideration of military 
factors as they influenced the development of ancient empires. A statement such as 
'warfare was the polis' may be an over-simplification, but it sums up fiindamental 
truths about the nature of Greek city states. The advent of the hoplite warrior and the 
accompanying deployment of a massed infantry phalanx in the seventh century BCE 
cannot be separated from the development of the polis itself. It is argued that the 
Sargon: Mann, M . (1986) p. 131-133. Military developments: ibid. p. 179ff, 232ff. Relevance of 
Greece: ibid. ch. 7; ibid. p. 223-227. 
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requirements of hoplite warfare, particularly fighting in close, mutually supportive 
ranks, had a profound effect on Greek social organisation. Thus: 
'...the close-packed hoplite line was as strong as its weakest part. 
Arguably the focus of battle was now as much on the weak as on the 
strong, and community morale important as well as community 
numbers.' 
At its most extreme in Sparta, this factor became a dominant element in determining 
the political and social shape of the Greek city. The most basic family relationships, the 
education of the young, the operation of law and the organisation of the citizen body 
were all in large measure influenced by military requirements. In relation to the self-
identification of the citizen body, participative politics and war were seen as two sides 
of the same coin The former represented '...the city seen from the inside', organising 
what was felt to be conmion to the inhabitants; the latter was '...the same city facing 
outwards', opposing what seemed to be threatening or challenging to the aspirations of 
the populafion'.'*^ 
In a manner that could hardly be given a more different colouring, the armies of the 
Great King of Persia were also seen as more than simply reflecting the political form 
of the state; in a fundamental manner they were the state, embodying the authority of 
the king. Herodotus went to considerable lengths to emphasise the huge numbers of 
soldiers gathered by Xerxes for the invasion of Greece in 480 BCE. He devoted a 
second preface to the historically unique dimensions of the force and a further 39 
chapters to listing the contingents in detail, thereby consciously evoking Homer's 
catalogue of ships. Beyond the sheer dimensions of the army, Herodotus drew 
attention to its role as symbolising the reach of the Great King's authority. In 
assembling the force he 
'...had every comer of the continent ransacked.... Was there a nation in 
Asia that he did not take with him against Greece?' 
Xerxes' ceremonial review of the assembled troops and warships emphasised the 
element of his personal control of the muster. The message was strengthened even 
further as the invasion began. Herodotus recorded that 
Thepolis: Osborne (1996) p. 176. Sparta: ibid. p. 180-184. Politics and war: Vemant ch. 2. 
39 
'...Xerxes marched on towards Greece, pressing into service every 
nation which lay in his path...', 
adding the explanation that '...these areas had earlier been forced into subjection and 
made tributary to Persia' Thus the fabric of the empire was articulated as the Great 
King's ability to assemble its military resources. As expressed by Mann: 
' In fact the Great King's army seems to have had a political purpose 
quite as much as a military one' 
This purpose was to counteract a perennial problem of the Persian Empire, which was 
a tendency for its component satrapies to become independent power-bases and to 
promote a challenge to the monarch's authority; in a phrase, to decentralise rule.''^ 
The importance of this problem formed a crucial part of Eisenstadt's analysis of the 
phenomenon of empire. Having emerged from the existing group of elite families, any 
imperial ruler was faced by the task of retaining his position. A basic method of 
accomplishing this was to concentrate power under his control and to deny it to other 
members of the elite. To achieve this end it was necessary for him to minimise the 
development of alternative sources of authority and to ensure that the existing sources 
were subsumed under his patronage. In Eisenstadt's terms this process involved the 
'universalising' of the ruler's authority within his territory and the creation and control 
of 'free-floating' resources of power, that is, agencies that retained no dynastic or other 
loyalties to alternative sources of authority within their society. Expressed in this way 
the process sounds straightforward. However, when the template is used to examine 
real political systems the difficulties are soon apparent. Consider, for example, the 
delicacy with which Augustus felt it necessary to manage the alternative sources of 
authority within the Roman elite. Equally problematic examples include the 
controversial political role of freedmen within the principate or indeed that of eunuchs 
(perhaps the ultimate free-floating agency) in the Byzantine state. In considering the 
centralisation of power under the Roman emperors part of my argument wil l be that an 
inevitable resolution of these difficulties was a reliance on military coercion.'*^ 
Second preface: Hdt. 7. 20. List of forces: 7. 61-99. Review: 7. 100. Other nations: 7. 108. Homer: 
in. 494-759. Mann: (1986) p. 245. 
Free-floating resources: Eisenstadt p. 118-119, 132-133, 91. Tacitus provided a clear example of 
Eisenstadt's concept of free-floating resources. Nero's powerfial freedman, Tigellinus, addressed tiie 
emperor thus: 'I have no divided allegiance liice Burrus...My only thought is your safety' {Ann. 14. 57. 
2). Here the former slave would have been referring to the Praetorian prefect's loyalty to his troops 
and/or to his original appointment to office by Agrippina. 
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Problems with comparative studies 
Mann argued convincingly for the interdependence of history and sociology in 
explaining processes that take place in time and in the context of particular patterns of 
society. However, the sort of material produced by Eisenstadt and Mann presents 
problems that have not gone urmoticed by critics or indeed by the authors themselves. 
Mann recognised that what he called 'the messiness of human societies', their 
complexity and often unique characteristics, must make comparative analyses very 
difficult. He also accepted that, 'Historical narrative on a broad scale tends towards 
teleology', thus indicating the danger of imposing on events inappropriate patterns of 
relationship and causation. Eisenstadt conceded that a problematic feature of broad 
scale comparative studies such as his own was their necessary reliance on secondary 
sources for the wide range of societies included. In addition, he conceded that data 
from even these sources had to be dangerously condensed to avoid its swamping the 
reader. In acknowledging the discomfort he felt at his awareness 
' . . . o f how contentious the conclusions of even the most respected 
authorities can be,' 
Runciman nevertheless braved it out, declaring that he had where possible 
'...relied on authorities who...would be accepted as such by specialists 
of all schools'. 
He named, for example. Brunt as his main source for Republican Rome, and other 
individuals for medieval Europe, central Asian nomads, later Japan, and elsewhere.^" 
I f the authors of these studies were able to identify difficulties with their comparative 
surveys of empires, critics of such large scale endeavours have viewed those problems 
as being far more serious. In particular Maim's 'huge canvas' has been seen as 
involving intrinsic 'errors and generalisations.' The same critic, this time focusing on a 
similarly broad study by Hall (1986), demonstrated the sharpness of this opinion, 
stating that 
'...confidence in the success of this explanatory strategy is shaken on 
almost every page by a reckless disregard of knowledge and good 
sense'. 
°^ Problems : Mann, M (1986) p. vii, 28-30, 195; Eisenstadt p. viii; Runciman p. xi-xii. 
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Another critic described the use of 'scissors and paste historiography', while 
Goldthorpe broadened the issue, identifying in the ready use of secondary sources an 
inappropriately 'positivistic' view of history. By this he suggested the error of 
assuming that historical events could be reconstructed outside 'problematic literary 
sources'. In what he chose to title a 'sympathetic critique' of Mann, Whitmeyer 
identified a subtler problem in his subject's approach. He saw the large scale, 'grand 
theory', approach as leading to a concentration on the obvious sources of social power, 
that is, governments and armies, at the expense of the perhaps more diffuse, less 
tangible forces that shaped behaviour.^' 
Conclusion 
These problems and criticisms all have substance. It would indeed be surprising i f a 
reader did not apply something like them to this thesis. However, the difficulties do not 
invalidate attempts to systematise the study of empires of domination. Nor do they 
render worthless the search for general theoretical models to explain the shape and 
development of social power in society. Rather they demonstrate the difficulty of the 
exercise and draw attention to factors that must be bom in mind when using such 
material. To an extent the articulation of these problems represents an element in the 
debate about the boundaries between history and sociology (see page 29). In this 
context Mann himself put up a spirited, perhaps overstated, defence of his 
methodology, claiming that practitioners of the former discipline tended to be 
'...far less sophisticated when generalising about the societies they are 
studying, (preferring instead) a pointilliste methodology of piling on the 
quotations and the particularities without trying to arrange their 
evidence in more systematic ways.' 
The difficulties inherent in broad and comparative approaches must also be seen in 
relation to the problems engendered by their opposite. For example, Sailer 
acknowledged in the conclusion to his study of patronage in the early Empire that 
'...a monograph on a single social institution or custom risks distortion 
by its concentration', 
thus recalling the anxiety expressed by Edward Said (page 14). For the purposes of the 
present study the comparative surveys of empires, like the general theories of social 
'^ Criticism of Mann and Hall: Munz p. 263-4, 271. Scissors and paste: Bryant p. 12-13. Positivism: 
Goldthorpe p. 220-221. Grand theories: Whitmeyer p. 212-213. 
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power themselves, have a particular relevance. While acknowledging the necessity that 
coercion be, in Hobson's terms, 'embedded' within wider features of society, the broad 
historical/sociological surveys tend to privilege military force in their analyses of 
power relationships. Specifically, Marm listed Roman rule as one of his 'empires of 
domination', as opposed to those with more complex systems of political authority, 
such as Greece. The coercive features of Rome's military/political structure will be 
examined in chapters four and five. 
In studies of society, war has tended to be seen as an abnormal, marginal and self-
contained phenomenon. The detail of its organisation has generally not been integrated 
into the consideration of wider aspects of social interaction, such as the bases of 
political authority. To explain this phenomenon it may not be necessary to use the 
rather chilling language of Andrzejewski and ascribe it to '...the insidious utopianism 
which pervades sociological thinking'. Writing in the early 1950s he went on to 
contend that 
'...most writers are rather peacefiil by nature and brute force is a thing 
which they would like to see exorcised for ever.' 
Nevertheless, despite this colourful language, he may have identified something real in 
contemporary and later analyses when he suggested an unintentioned alliance between, 
on the one hand, 'chauvinists' who did not want their idols of power to be examined 
and, on the other, liberal optimists whose belief in 'progress' included an eventual end 
to political violence. Thus, he argued, adequate attention was not directed towards 
military coercion as a factor in shaping political authority. The purpose of the 
foregoing section has been to relocate specifically military factors towards the centre 
of analyses of social power. The role of coercion in broad definitions of power and the 
significance of military factors in forming the basic shape of states and empires 
combine to support such a project. 
Mann's defence: 1994 p. 40-42. Problem of specificity: Sailer p. 206. Central place of coercion: 
Hobson p. 293; Sinopoli p. 166-167; Ikenberry and Kupchan p. 293. Empire of domination: Mann, M. 
(1986) p. 534. Neglect of coercion: Andrzejewski p. 1; Roxborough p. 619. 
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4. Coercion: the origins and development of political power in Rome 
'Rome's first walls were drenched with a brother's blood.'^^ 
Introduction 
In relation to elite power politics, John Henderson has written about the centrality in 
the Roman experience of persistent and violent contests for control of the state. He 
introduced his ideas on the subject by noting that civil war had its roots in the very 
founding of the City, as the brothers Romulus and Remus disputed pre-eminence. In 
relation to the Imperial period, Henderson suggested that the grip held on the Roman 
psyche by internecine conflict 
'...provided the terms for the renegotiation of power relations between 
each succeeding emperor and his subjects.' 
It is notable that the founding brothers' dispute was not centred on the straightforward 
issue of which of the two should predominate; rather it concerned the decision about 
the actual site, the very fabric, of Rome itself Deadly political proscriptions were 
certainly an unrelenting feature of Roman disputes for power, as they had been and 
were in the Greek world. Landmark examples included the activities of the Thirty in 
the post-war Athens of 404 BCE. In Rome, a description of Sulla as ' . . .the first to put 
his enemies on a proscription list' referred to the written publication and systematised 
nature of his political reprisals. Violence against political opponents, sometimes but by 
no means always legally based, had been a feature of the Gracchan disputes in the 130s 
and 120s BCE, while Marius had set a more immediate precedent for Sulla by the 
summary dispatch of political enemies in 86 BCE. In the Imperial period the use of 
military force to gain and hold power, and the employment of political violence 
amongst the elite, were such prominent features as perhaps to be taken for granted in 
modem analyses of the sources of social power. They could certainly be reported in a 
most matter-of-fact way by ancient commentators: 
'After his father's death, Caracalla seized power and immediately began 
to murder everyone in the court' (literally, 'starting from the hearth', 
that is, those closest to his father's regime.) 
Quotation: Luc. 1. 95. 
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A consideration of some of the detail of such events, seen in the context of the ideals 
and ethos of the Republic, wil l refocus attention onto these crucial elements in 
understanding ancient Rome and the power of the emperors.^ "* 
The Republic 
Our primary sources mapped out their view of early Rome on a military pattern. The 
consistency with which they did this, allied to that pattern's continuation into periods 
contemporaneous with the later writers, leaves little room to doubt its essential 
authenticity. In addition to evocations of Epaminondas and Xenophon, Plutarch used 
the even more ancient words of Pindar in order to emphasise the strength of Rome's 
warlike ethos, declaring it to be 'a precinct of much-warring Ares'. The usual 
presentation of the two main strands of the City's foundation myth, those involving 
Romulus and his Trojan ancestor, Aeneas, brought into the foreground both war and 
the establishment of authority by violent means. Plutarch, for example, arranged his 
description of Romulus' organisation of the City's population in order to give 
prominence to military affairs: 
'When the city was first buih...Romulus divided all the multitude that 
were of age to bear arms into military companies.. .Such a company was 
called a "legion", because the warlike were selected out of all.' 
The organisation of the people, patricians, senate and other matters then followed. The 
founder's deadly contest with his brother had already been described. Velleius 
Paterculus provided a glimpse into the debates that must have been engendered about 
the practical details of this founding myth. He declared himself to be in accord with 
those who held that, because of the threat from neighbouring tribes, Romulus must 
have been assisted by troops provided by his grandfather, Latinus. In his dense and 
brilliant preface, Livy alluded to the mingling of divine and human elements in 
traditions about the origins of cities. He cited the case of Rome as a specific 
justification for including the gods in such stories. This he did because of what he 
portrayed as the inescapable logic behind the involvement of the deity concerned, a 
logic that underlined Romans' demonstrable military superiority: 
Romulus and Remus: Henderson p. 1;'.. .the brothers' plans for the future were marred by the same 
curse.. .jealousy and ambition' (Livy 1. 6); Herodian provided a catalogue of fraternal power struggles 
(4. 5. 5-6). The site of Rome: Plut. Rom. 9. 4-10. 1. The Thirty: Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 21-56; Arist. [Ath. 
Pol.] 35. 4. Gracchi: Stockton p. 119-120. Marius: OCD3 p. 925. Sulla: App. B Civ. 4. 1. 1, 1. 95-96; 
Henderson p. 15-16. Caracalla: Herodian 3, 15. 4. The historian later added the grisly detail (4. 6). 
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' . . . i f any people ought to be allowed to consecrate their origins and 
refer them to a divine source, so great is the military glory of the Roman 
people that when they profess that their Father and the Father of their 
Founder was none other than Mars, the nations of the earth may well 
submit to this also with as good a grace as they submit to Rome's 
dominion.' 
Thus, soldiers and martial qualities were placed centre-stage in the Romulus myth. 
Even before the establishment of an organised city, aggression and violence were in the 
foreground of ancient accounts. Plutarch decorously indicated that Romulus and 
Remus grew up as part of a community of adventurous and bold young shepherds. 
Amongst their activities was said to be that of 'driving off robbers'. Livy had 
expressed this a little more directly, saying that they '...would attack robbers laden 
with their spoils, and divide up what they took'. By the second half of the fourth 
century CE the legend could be put in blunter manner; Eutropius had Romulus 
'...leadmg the life of a robber among the shepherds' and reported that the Romans of 
that time 
'...because of their habitual warfare, were by now considered robbers 
and semi-barbarians'. 
Thus is laid bare the foundation of Romans' self-image.^^ 
In Livy's account of Aeneas and the generations before Romulus, war and violence 
were the mainsprings of development. The refugees from Troy arrived in Italy with 
'nothing left but their swords and ships'. War and treaties characterised early relations 
with the Latins. Prior to the death of Aeneas, wars were fought against the Rutulians 
and Etruscans. After several generations, the birth of Romulus and Remus was 
prefaced by an earlier occurrence of fraternal rivalry, as Amulius drove out Numitor. 
Virgil's handling of the Aeneas myth necessarily reflected the poet's wide-ranging 
aims, having to incorporate the mythic past of Homeric epic, as well as evocations of 
contemporary politics and propaganda about the fiiture of Rome. Violence, however, 
formed the centre of his story. Unable to prevent the ordained establishment of the 
Trojan refiigees in Italy, Hera was portrayed as scheming to ensure that the process 
would be bloody. Books nine to twelve of the Aeneid are dominated by war, fighting 
Ares: Plut. Marc. 21.3. Romulus myth: Plut. Rom. 13. 1-2; Veil. Pat. 1. 8. 5; Livy praef. 1. 
Robbers: Plut. Rom. 6. 2-3; Livy 1. 4. 9; Eutr. 1.1-3. 
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that a reluctant Jupiter was obliged to sanction. The epic ends with Aeneas' slaughter 
of the defeated Tumus, a character treated more negatively by Virgil than by Livy. It 
seems possible that the factor at work in this distinction was the poet's aim to promote 
relevant Augustan ideology; in this case a desire to legitimise the revenge/civil war 
aspects of Augustus' actions. In this way a handling of Rome's past was used to 
confirm the centrality of war and violence in contemporary politics.^^ 
Alongside accounts of the mythic origins of the Roman state, later authors provided 
explanations of the City's political and sociological development. These placed war 
and violence at the centre of the process. Livy went further, emphasising that war was 
integral even to the establishment of peaceful relations amongst the citizens of Rome. 
He portrayed the organisation of the population carried out by Servius Tullius, the 
legendary sixth king, in terms of the equation of wealth, privilege and political power 
on the one hand, with accompanying military responsibilities on the other. Beyond the 
military details of the census ratings, Livy set these measures in a double context that 
located war and violence at the core of Roman political institutions. First, he described 
the reorganisation as taking place at the same time as a war against Veil; a war 
regarded by the dominant elite as being, 'Most opportune for the tranquil preservation 
of the existing state of things', that is, a distraction from the internal conflict of non-
elite challenges to their power. Second, the reorganisation itself was described as a 
'most important work of peace'. Roman peace, then, was clearly depicted as being 
based on military organisation (see page 105). Livy also illusfrated the central place of 
war in the res publico when he described its role during the power struggles between 
the plebeians and patricians in during the f i f th century BCE. In response to demands 
by the former for access to the latter's political privileges, the patricians 'rejoiced to 
hear' that Rome was threatened by a number of external foes. They hoped that 
'...the proposals of the tribimes might be silenced amidst the din of so 
many wars; and ordered levies to be held'. 
The initial refusal of the plebeians to co-operate in these levies was itself viewed as 
another affront to the vital traditions of the state. A more direct role of military force in 
the political balance within Rome was demonstrated by Valerius Maximus when he 
described P. Scipio Aemilianus AfHcanus' response to unrest after the death of Ti. 
Aeneas myth: Livy 1.1.5, 1.2-3; Griffin, J. p. 626-632. Hera: Aen. 7. 310-320. Jupiter: ibid. 10. 
lOO-l 15. Death of Turnus: ibid. 12. 938-953; Stahl p. 176-177, 202-203. 
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Gracchus. Scipio defied popular sentiment in favour of the Tribune, arguing that his 
own military successes put him above opposition. Valerius Maximus added telling 
editorial comment to the effect that 'the chained necks of two kings' in Scipio's 
triumphal procession 'stopped the mouths of the entire Forum'. The political potency 
of military reputation was also noted in relation to the unusual adoption of consular 
authority in 210 BCE by that later Scipio's adoptive grandfather, also P. Scipio 
Africanus. This was a popular elevation that took place without the general's having 
held all the legally required preliminary magistracies. The established voting system 
that privileged the military elite, and departvires from it could also be portrayed as 
deviant and subversive. For example, Coriolanus was represented as the victim of 
manipulation and plots when the tribunes determined that his trial should be decided 
on the votes of the tribes, dominated by the 'indigent and officious rabble', rather than 
the Servian centuries that favoured the '...wealthy and well known citizens of the 
military class'. In a general way, it does not seem to be exaggerated or unreasonable to 
describe the idealised Republican arrangement as a '...perfect congruity between the 
political and the military structure of the city-state', or to characterise the whole of that 
supposed legal/political constitution as the 'military justification'.^^ 
Of course, it is more than likely that this story of arrangements amongst the original 
inhabitants of the City is just that, a story with no substantial historical basis. This need 
not detract from the relevance of the account to a perception of the military ethos of 
Roman society. Modem attempts to reconcile ancient descriptions of the Servian 
organisation of the Roman population with theories about the likely sociological 
realities of the City's development have come to negative conclusions. The divisions 
in society implied by the Servian system have been thought more likely to represent 
political and fiscal stmctures than to indicate primarily military concerns. Support for a 
multifaceted interpretation can be found in the different meanings of the key Servian 
term 'centuria\ Besides its application to military organisation, it also referred to 
voting units in an assembly and to a measure of agricultural land. In fact, the 
arrangements attributed to the penultimate king have been perceptively identified as 
reflecting rather than shaping later legionary organisation. However, discussion of the 
" Servius Tullius: Livy 1. 42. 2-43. 11; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4. 16-21. Patricians and plebeians: Livy 
4. 1; Richardson p. 5. Scipio: Val. Max. 6. 2. 3; Plut. Mor. 805A. Coriolanus: Plut Cor. 20. 2. 
Political/military congruity: Carrie p. 102; Gabba p. 20. 'Military justification': Brand p. 10-12. 
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matter has tended to focus on the detailed applicability of the Servian reforms to any 
practical form of social organisation. Scepticism about this idea has nevertheless 
placed those changes in the context of earlier forms of military structure, thus 
confirming the centrality of the role of soldiers. Practical demonstrations of the 
inseparable relationship in Rome between political power and military preoccupations 
are readily identifiable. Perhaps the ceremony of the triumph provided the most 
spectacular example; the victorious general, preceded by lictors carrying the fasces, the 
symbols of political authority (see pages 157-164), parading defeated captives through 
the centre of the City, the whole celebration governed by ancient religious ritual. At a 
more mundane level, the procedure marking the official end of an eques' period of 
military participation took place in the forum, thus linking the political heart of the 
City with military organisation. What is more, the importance of such a tradition was 
emphasised by its potential usefulness in politically symbolic acts. This was 
demonstrated in 71 BCE when Pompey, already a double triumphator, recently elected 
consul and soon to be the most powerful man in the state, surprised everyone by a 
show of fidelity to mos maiorum, personally leading his horse before the censors to 
participate in the equites'' ceremony. 
The traditional ideal of a hierarchy of citizens, based on the Servian census, and 
reflected both in political privileges and military responsibilities, should not obscure 
the fact that the whole population of Rome shared a duty to bear arms in some 
appropriate manner. As in so many aspects of Rome's culture, its development in this 
respect is not best viewed in geographical isolation. While there was considerable 
variation between locations and over time, it has been concluded that military training 
and participation for war were strongly related to citizenship in the Hellenistic 
kingdoms. For example, in Boiotia a citizen militia, divided into a number of 
specialized units, remained in existence until domination by Rome was completed in 
the second century BCE. In Rome itself, although excluded from the five classes, the 
proletarii were always expected to fight when needed. Even priests were not excused 
from this duty should the conceivably worst be threatened, that is, an occupation by the 
Gauls, as had happened in 390 BCE. Josephus, whose information about Roman 
Non-military concerns: Kunkel p. 11. Centuria: Schiavone p. 55; Lewis and Short p. 316. 
Legionary organisation: Fraccaro, cited by Cornell (1995) p. 181-183. Military structures: ibid. p. 
189. Triumph: OCD3 p. 1554. Fasces, see pages 157-164. EquUes: Plut. Pomp. 22. 4-6. 
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behaviour was often more flattering than reliable, nevertheless emphasised a general 
preparedness for war, specifically noting that even the camp followers and soldiers' 
servants were a match for most other peoples in military ptowess. The potentially all-
embracing nature of Roman warfare could be evoked in apparently incidental details. 
Thus, during the darkest days of the Social War, characterised by defeats and slain 
consuls, military dress was said to have replaced normal clothing in the City. In the 
general context of ancient warfare it seems quite fair to identify as a Roman ideal that 
of the citizen-soldier, possessing an indivisible mix of duties and privileges linking 
military and political behaviour. First century BCE laws to this effect have been 
exemplified in municipal charters such as that of Heraclea. An inscribed version of this 
law laid down a minimum period of military experience required before a young man 
could hold political office. Far from representing a mere qualification for political 
office, the 'military justification' can be seen to have been at the root of social power 
in Rome. Plutarch gave plausibility to the idea that the effective element in the 
consul's authority was its military dimension. In the opening of his Camillus, he 
described a period during which social tensions in the City made it impossible for the 
post of consul to be filled; instead the authority necessary for the functioning of the 
state was vested in military tribunes. Truly, ' In Roman eyes, a soldier and a citizen 
were the same thing'. However real this model may have been in Rome's early history, 
by the second century BCE it was beginning to be replaced by another, but one equally 
marked by military colouring.^^ 
Pressure for widening the scope of the population's military involvement may well 
have come from the effects on recruitment of longer, less profitable and more 
dangerous campaigns, such as those in Spain, Macedonia and countering slave revolts. 
The property qualification for legionary status, reduced in 214 BCE, was lowered 
further during the second century. The change implied by these adjustments probably 
took place over a period as long as one hundred years. It was most likely as a stage in 
this development, rather than as a dramatic individual initiative, that Marius was said 
to have broken with 'traditional custom'. For his African campaign in 107 BCE he 
officially recruited volunteers from the proletarii. It is important to stress here that 
Hellenistic kingdoms: Chaniotis p. 20-26. Boiotia: ibid. p. 22. Proletarii: Gabba p. 2. Priests: Plut. 
Marc. 3. 2. Camp followers: Joseph. BJ3. 69-70. Military dress: Veil. Pat. 2. 16. 4. Law: Lewis and 
Reinhold 1. 162. Military tribunes: Plut. Ca/w. 1. 1. Citizen-soldier: Nicolet p. 93; Garlan p. 86-89. 
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these changes should not be seen as reducing the association between political power 
and the military ethos of Roman society. A tendency to do so can perhaps be detected 
in the anachronistic language used to describe the military activity of Roman citizens. 
References to individuals being 'called up' to perform 'military service' evoke the 
modem concept of a separation between civil and military roles, the latter generally 
characterised as an exceptional interruption to normal life. Any such distancing of 
politics and soldiers was certainly not reflected in the decades following Marius' 
military reforms. Successive civil wars were fought between Marius, Sulla, Pompey, 
Julius Caesar, his assassins, Antony and Octavian, each employing what amoimted to 
private armies. Eventually, after 31 BCE, the last named established firm personal 
control. The sequence of events during these years is too complex and well 
documented to require repetition here, and it is acknowledged that broad, long-term 
and multifaceted social factors were almost certainly involved. However, the extent to 
which overt military coercion operated as the vehicle of social power can be illustrated 
from a few sketched-in details, while the continued prominence of soldiers as the 
source of political authority in Rome was demonstrated in the methods by which the 
first princeps established and maintained his dominance.^" 
Most representative of the role of military coercion in this period were the occasions 
on which the struggle for political power involved the seizure by soldiers of Rome 
itself Sulla was described as the first to do so 'by force of arms', in fact carrying out 
the coup on two occasions, in 88 and 83 BCE. Between these episodes, in 87, his 
rivals, Cirma and Marius, also besieged and captured the City. The outrageous and 
itnprecedented nature of these events was reflected in Appian's language, as he 
lamented that '...the first army of her own citizens had invaded Rome as a hostile 
country', and in details such as that only one of the senior officers from his six legions 
had joined Sulla in his first attempt to gain confrol of the City; the others ' . . .would not 
submit to the idea of leading an army against their country'. In addition to the uniquely 
violent act of seizing Rome itself, each of these military takeovers was accompanied 
by unusually savage proscriptions. Sulla was credited with the dubious distinction of 
being the first dominant individual to draw up a formal list of political opponents 
*° Less attractive campaigns/reduced property qualification: Campbell (2002b) p. 23-24. Marius: 
Sail. lug. 86; Carrie p. 106-113; Momigliano p. 1. Anachronism: Campbell (2002a) p. 168. Private 
armies: App. B Civ. 1. 34, 1. 55; Shotter p. 31-32; Syme (1939) p. 15. Social factors: Eder (1996) p. 
441-447. 
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condemned to death. Debate, ancient and modem, about Sulla's motives for his 
unprecedented steps has centred on traditionally recognised factors; his response to the 
affront to his dignitas when deprived of the Asian command in 88 and his duty driven 
assumption of supreme authority to bring about changes he saw as necessary for the 
well-being of the res publico. How important these factors may have been, or to what 
extent he was attempting to establish some sort of permanent autocracy, are not the 
issues here. Rather, as identified by Plutarch, what distinguished Sulla were his chosen 
methods; remaining in continuous military command and employing calculated 
violence to coerce opponents and public alike. This pattem was repeated, although 
with less immediate blood-letting, in Julius Caesar's retention of his provincial 
commands, crossing of the Rubicon and occupation of Rome. It is noteworthy that 
Appian's accounts of the various occupations of Rome by soldiers gradually become 
less dramatic and his language more matter-of-fact. Antony's entry in 44 BCE was 
said to have been carried out in a 'haughty maimer'. Although he left some of his 
soldiers outside the walls, those that accompanied him were 'girded as for war', and 
the historian comments that they behaved in the City 'just as in camp.' Less than fifty 
years after the initial seizure of the City by Sulla, the act could be normalised to the 
extent that a low key report appeared appropriate. Thus, 
'...the triumvirs entered the City separately on three successive days, 
Octavian, Antony and Lepidus, each with his Praetorian cohort and one 
legion. As they arrived, the City was speedily filled with arms and 
military standards, disposed in the most advantageous places'. 
However, the atmosphere of military occupation cannot be missed, and it is significant 
that Appian's continues immediately with an account of the triumvirs' proscriptions.^' 
At the level of political symbolism, coercive military representations can be seen to 
have become more prominent during this period, particularly those depicting the 
domuiance of a particular individual. For example, as a special honour, Hellenistic 
kings could be portrayed in the form of a life sized equestrian statue, usually depicting 
the monarch either naked or in military splendour. Although attested by epigraphy. 
*' Sulla: App. BC/v. 1. 57-60, 87-98. Cinna and Marius: ibid. 1. 67-71. Foreign country: ibid. 1. 57, 
60. Proscriptions: Veil. Pat. 2. 22. 1, 28. 3; App. B Civ. 1. 60, 71, 95-96. Plut. Suit. 31. List: App. B 
Civ. 1. 95. Motives: Veil. Pat. 2. 18. 4-19. 1; App. B Civ. 1. 57; Keaveney p. 163-165; OCD3 p. 401. 
Methods: Plut. Synk. Lys. andSull. 1.4; App. B Civ. 2. 32, 35,40. Antony: ibid. 3. 45. Triumvirs: ibid 
4. 7. 
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only miniaturised fragments of these survive. Related Roman examples can be seen in 
the naked first century CE prince in the British Museum (Plate 2 i), while the most 
famous surviving image that gives an idea of such a monument is that of the Emperor 
Marcus Aurelius on the Capitol in Rome (Plate 2 ii). Clearly by Marcus' day this 
depiction of a Roman ruler was perfectly acceptable. It is notable that no similar statue 
had been officially sanctioned before that of Sulla in the 80s BCE, and that the first 
senatorially authorised monument to Octavian, dating from January 43 BCE, was of 
this type.^^ 
The struggles for power during the first century BCE have most usually been portrayed 
as representing a watershed in Roman politics. Depicted as a period in which the 
dominance of military force went unchecked by any other form of authority, these 
events have been seen as demonstrating the failure of 'constitutional' government by 
the senate and people of Rome. This analysis was certainly prominent in our ancient 
sources. A sense of collapse and internal decay is palpable in Lucan's epic poem of the 
res publica undermined by Julius Caesar and his rivals. The overwhelming detail of 
Appian's account of the proscriptions carried out by the second triumvirate contains a 
graphic portrayal of social disintegration. In fact the evidence cited in this section 
demonstrates that the civil wars are more realistically perceived as a different 
manifestation of the coercive principles that had always characterised Roman 
government. The continuity of this process is evident in the already described ethos of 
Roman rule prior to the first century BCE and in the nature of the regime established 
by Augustus and his successors. A single image, as chilling as it is telling and self-
explanatory, demonstrates the span of this continuity. At the outset of Julius Caesar's 
break with the traditional authority structure in Rome, Plutarch described a dramatic 
scene in which one of the general's centurions confronted the senate. On learning of 
that body's refusal to extend Caesar's military command, the soldier 'slapped the 
handle of his sword and said, "But this wi l l give i t ' " . At the other end of the period 
covered by this thesis are images of emperors portrayed in the very act described by 
Plutarch (Plate 3)." 
*J Equestrian statues: Smith (1988) p. 33; (1991) p. 19; Zanker (1988) p. 5-6, 37-38. 
" Failure of SPQR: For example by Syme (1939) p. 100, but note the date of this work and the 
relevance of contemporary European political developments, such as the failure of parliamentary 
government in Germany, Lucan: 1. 70-97; OCD3 p. 94-95. Appian: B Civ. 4. 5-51, 13-14. Sword: Plut. 
Caes. 29. 5. 
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Plate 2 
(i) Naked 
prince 
(ii) Marcus 
Aurelius 
(i) Venice 
Tetrarchs 
r 
Plate 3 
(ii) Ravenna 
unknown 
emperor 
The Empire 
The role of coercion in the development of political authority in Augustan and Imperial 
Rome has an equivocal position in modem scholarship. On the one hand, the 
employment of violence and military force to gain and maintain power forms an 
inescapably large proportion of the substance of the period's history. In addition, the 
evolution from Republic to Empire has been characterised as a transformation of the 
ideals of the Roman ruling elite from those of liberty to those of obedience. While this 
description is clearly an over-simplification, it may well be reasonable to view any 
such a change in terms of the dominance/subservience imperatives so embedded in the 
Roman ethos. In that sense, the shift from Republic to Empire could be viewed as the 
emperors' appropriation of the traditional Roman psychology of domination over other 
peoples (to be explored in chapter five), transforming it into a psychology of their 
personal domination over all other individuals, Roman and barbarian. On the other 
hand, the role of military coercion in the fiindamentals of Imperial authority has tended 
to be overlain in much modem scholarship by the fiinction of other factors, such as 
religion, art and law (see chapter six). What follows will exemplify the processes by 
which force and coercion were central to the development of the emperors' political 
authority. Continuities will be evident from the Republic, as will be the changes that 
necessarily reflected the emergence of a more openly and legitimised autocratic form 
of government.^ '* 
John Stuart Mill took a dim view of the direction in which Augustus had taken the res 
publico: 
'The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the 
whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two 
generations of that mild slavery, they would probably have had spirit 
enough left to rebel against the more odious one.' 
These sentiments, of course, echoed those of Tacitus. Without doubt a major factor in 
the establishment of this 'despotism' was the transformation that Augustus brought 
about in Rome's military organisation and the political role of soldiers. In outlining the 
first princeps' troop dispositions, Suetonius opened his account with a phrase generally 
translated as some variation of, 'From his military forces'. While it is the case that the 
Liberty/obedience: Gamsey p. 409-410. Other factors: Alston (1999) p. 176. 
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biographer's general method was to personalise all aspects of his subjects' activities, 
the translations emphasise Augustus' personal control even though the Latin contains 
no specifically emphatic possessive pronoun. Perhaps in this respect there has been an 
unconscious recognition that the biographer's perspective represented a new level of 
autocracy. Suetonius also devoted considerable attention to the princeps' bodyguard 
and security forces in and around Rome. The changes made to soldiers' pay and 
conditions of service were described in terms of their effect on securing Augustus' 
position and the establishment of a regularised taxation based system of payment and 
veteran settlement. Sociological analysis has characterised such arrangements as a 
bureaucratisation of the army. Crucially this pattern involves a shift from the 
duty/privilege of individual soldiers to arm and equip themselves to the assumption of 
this role by the 'state'; in turn this is associated with the military fiinction passing from 
the propertied to those without property in any society. As we have seen (pages 50-51), 
aspects of these changes had been underway in Rome for a century or more. 
Nevertheless there is no denying the extent to which the alterations were systematised 
under Augustus. Note should be taken of the manner in which Augustus cemented the 
political loyalty of soldiers to himself, his family and to a generalised Imperial 
awareness. The pronounced military character of the decoration of his new forum can 
be cited, as can the adoption of military religious rites centred on 'Eternal Rome' and 
'Augustan Victory'. It does not seem unreasonable to see in this process the 
propagation among soldiers of '...a generally responsible attitude that we could call 
civic'. More directly, Augustus showed no reluctance to mobilise veterans as voters. 
On a more personal level, he emphasised an association with the military by his 
adoption in 38 BCE of the praenomen imperatoris, while in the arrangements of 23 
BCE the distinction was blurred between military and civil power when his imperium 
proconsulare was extended to the City of Rome.^ ^ 
In the light of this evidence, it would appear to be misleading to describe Augustus' 
military changes as amounting to a 'depoliticisation' of the army. In the context of the 
preceding civil wars such an assessment can seem plausible. There is no doubt that 
Augustus intended to make it harder for any aspiring rival from within the elite to use 
" Augustus/Tiberius: Mi l l p. 53; Tac Ann. 1.1-11. Reorganisation: Suet. Aug. 49; OCD3 p. 1592. 
Bureaucratisation: Weber (1968) p. 980. Gradual change: Raaflaub (1980) p. 1006. Forum: 
Richardson p. 9. Religion and 'civic' attitude: Carrid p. 111. Veterans: Raaflaub (1980) p. 1007. 
Imperator and imperium procomulare: Eder (1990) p. 94, 106-107; OCD3 p. 752. 
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soldiers to challenge his newly established political authority; hence the greater use of 
equestrian officers and family members in positions of military command. However, 
Augustus' aims and actions cannot be characterised as taking the army out of politics; 
rather they represented a refinement of the army's role in politics, limiting it to the 
active and reliable support of the new regime. Although he was described, predictably 
enough, as not being deficient in the kingly virtues of clemency and moderation, the 
same accounts indicated that Augustus had not hesitated to employ the violence of 
proscription and torture when he felt threatened. It is indeed quite likely that he became 
more magnanimous as his position became more secure; near contemporary 
assessments could be positive. However, presented as the opinion of others, Tacitus' 
judgement was severe, citing 'proscription' and 'killing' as characteristics of the 
regime. In as much as any over-all judgement can encapsulate the complexities of his 
44 years of domination, it does not seem unreasonable to describe the rule of Augustus 
as '...an authoritarian regime founded on absolute control of the army'.^ ^ 
Whether or not the above is a fair summary of Augustus' regime, during his period of 
domination political power in Rome steadily took on more of the features of an 
autocracy. One of these was fear of assassination, some of the general aspects of which 
will be treated later (see pages 121-123). For the moment it suffices to point out that 
Augustus and his successors increasingly took measures ostensibly to protect their 
persons from direct attack, measures which also provided Roman rulers with an 
enhanced capability for the offensive employment of violence in political contexts. 
Attached to an account of Augustus' purge of the senate in 28 BCE, Suetonius 
described the princeps as nervously wearing a cuirass and surroimding himself with 
ten strong senatorial friends. In the same context, the biographer also referred to 
Cremutius Cordus as reporting of Augustus that 
'...no member of the senate was allowed to approach him unless on his 
own and once his toga had been searched'. 
At the end of his rule, Augustus could appear so secure in his control that Tacitus 
commented of the princeps that he was 'without a single adversary'. Can it be 
coincidental that by then he had established a formidable force of soldiers and 
'Depoliticisation': Raaflaub (1980) p. 1009. Restricted commands: Crook p. 114; Raaflaub (1980) 
p. 1016-1019. ClemencyA^iolence: Suet. Aug. 51, 53, 27. Magnanimity/positive assessments: Yavetz 
(1990) p. 34; Veil. Pat.2. 86. 2. Murders: Tac. Ann. 1. 10. Authoritarianism: Carrie p. 102. 
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paramilitary personnel in the City of Rome? In fact, reign by reign, there was a steady 
increase in both the fear of the assassin and the consequent militarization of the 
emperor's entourage.^ ^ 
The offensive side of this militarisation was represented by proscriptions of the 
emperors' political opponents, increasingly defined as anyone who actually challenged 
or who might be thought capable of challenging their authority. This theme provided a 
substantial part of the sombre tonality of all Tacitus' accounts of the Julio-Claudian 
principates. The deliberateness of this characterisation is clear from the intentional 
repetition of his descriptions of political executions, and from their placement at the 
very outset of different regimes and of the extant openings of his Books. As i f the 
scheme needed underlining, at a point of dramatic and literary significance within his 
narrative, Tacitus provided a typically arch apology for the dullness and monotony of 
his depictions of executions and assassinations (see pages 181-2 for further 
discussion). Certainly, violent death within the elite in general, and amongst the 
reigning emperor's family or other potential successors in particular, might be said to 
have overshadowed other aspects of Tacitus' narrative. The desire of the emperors to 
eliminate all real or perceived rivals seemed to be matched by their power to effect this 
outcome. The fact that most of the Julio-Claudians were themselves assassinated, or at 
least had their deaths hastened by violent means, need not detract from a view that 
their political authority was principally characterised by defensive and offensive 
physical coercion. It is the concern of this thesis to demonstrate the nature of Imperial 
Roman regimes, not to comment on their success or failure.^^ 
It had been Augustus who had harnessed the previously rather vague application of the 
maiestas laws (concerning crimes that 'diminished the majesty of the Roman people'), 
attaching the concept to the person of the reigning princeps. Trials under those laws 
increased under Tiberius, initially involving the substantial prosecution of defendants 
who were probably or at least possibly guilty, such as Piso and Libo, but later 
extending to the summary condemnation of the clearly innocent, for example Quintus 
Servaeus and Minucius Thermus. Amidst the apparently indiscriminate and capricious 
Fear of assassination: MacMullen (1966) p. 2; Suet. Aug. 35; Cass. Die 54. 12. 3, 58. 18. 5, 60. 3. 2; 
Nippel (1995) p. 92-93. No opposition: Tac. Ann. 1. 2. 1. Military in Rome: see pages 128-137. 
Deaths as openings: Tac. Ann. 1. 6. 1, 12. 1. 1, 13. 1. 1. Repetitious deaths: ibid. 4. 32. 1-33. 3. 
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slaughter of the elite attributed to Gains, he was still credited with an awareness of the 
source of his power. The Emperor was said to have warned his exiled sisters that 'he 
possessed swords as well as islands'. Claudius earned lasting condemnation because of 
his proscriptions of senators and equites, while neither fiiends nor family of Nero, let 
alone his political opponents, were safe from attack. When circumstances indicated 
that his fears of opponents were justified, such as the discovery of C. Calpumius Piso's 
plot in 65 CE, Nero could be described as substantially occupying Rome and the 
surrounding area with troops.^ ^ 
Subsequent regimes, such as that of Domitian, were portrayed in similarly bloody 
terms. Tacitus and Pliny the Younger survived what they described as 'the killing of so 
many consulars' and '...the massacre and destruction of (Domitian's) most 
distinguished subjects', so perhaps their condemnations were laced with more than the 
usual amount of personal feeling. Thirty years after the events, Suetonius concurred 
with the depiction of proscriptions within the same Imperial family and wider elite, as 
did Cassius Dio a hundred years later. The reign of Trajan could be presented plainly 
as the positive alternative to Domitian's excesses of coercion. However, it must be 
remembered that even the adulatory Pliny had openly employed the Imperial epithet 
'Optimus\ with its traditional application to Jupiter himself, thus acknowledging the 
Emperor's overwhelming power, while modem scholarship has suggested that 
'...Trajan's mle was no less and perhaps more autocratic than that 
espoused by the detested Domitian.' 
Although fewer of the elite died in proscriptions, executions did occur at his accession 
in 98 CE (see page 119). At the outset of his own reign, Hadrian denied involvement in 
the condemnation and execution of four consulars accused of plotting to assassinate the 
Emperor. This summary justice may have been in response to actual treason and may 
indeed have been carried out by the order of the senate, although Hadrian's 
involvement must be suspected. 
^'^ugustus aniwia/e*/fl*:-Levick-(1999a)p. 183-194; Cass. Dio 56. 27. 1; Tac. Ann. 1. 10. 3. Increase 
under Tiberius: Levick (1999a) p. 195. Libo and Piso: Tac. /<««. 2. 27-31; 3. 10-15. Servaeus and 
Thermus: ibid. 6. 7. 2. Gaius: Suet. Ca/: 29. Claudius: Sen. Apocol. 14. Nero: Rudich p. xxvii; Tac. 
Ann. 15. 58. 2. 
™ Domitian: Tac. Agr. 25; Plin. Pan. 48. 3; Suet. Dom. 10, 15; Cass. Dio 77. 14. 1-3. Contrast with 
Domitian: Bennett p. 56. 0/;/»nHs/autocracy: Plin. Pan. 88. 5-8; Liebeschuetz (2000) p. 988; Bennett 
p. 208. Executions: Cass. Dio 78. 5. 4. Hadrian: HA Hadrian 1. 1-2; Birley (1997) p. 87-88. 
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Within the pattern of response described here, it must be conceded that an emperor 
could behave in a quite different manner. However, it is equally clear from our sources 
that such an aberration confirmed rather than undermined the general model. In the 
aftermath of the revolt of Avidius Cassius in 175 CE, our ancient accounts agree that 
Marcus Aurelius made explicit efforts to avoid any major reprisals against those 
thought to be involved. At the crucial time, the Emperor was campaigning on the 
Danube. From the standpoint of this thesis it is interesting that Cassius Dio appeared to 
be perfectly at ease in reporting the substance of Marcus' response as a long speech to 
the assembled troops, thus raising the political profile of soldiers, while merely 
mentioning that a letter to the senate had contained the same injvmction regarding 
clemency. That Marcus should have taken such a forgiving attitude to the revolt could 
have reflected his opinion that it was not a serious affair. However, the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Even another story illustrating the Emperor's restraint suggests the 
potential seriousness of the situation. Marcus was said to have burned unread letters of 
the rebel that could have incriminated others, their existence confirming the 
widespread nature of the plot. Avidius had been governor of Syria, with the control of 
powerful legions entailed in that post (evoking Vespasian and G. Licinius Mucianus in 
69 CE); in addition since 172 Avidius had had enhanced powers over the whole of the 
eastern Empire. News of the revolt had caused Marcus to make a hasty and unwilling 
peace with the lazyges and to summon to his side from Rome his son, Commodus. Our 
sources and later historians give more emphasis to the Emperor's unique general 
character in explaining his merciful approach. It was consonant with his Stoic 
philosophy, with the virtuous nature ascribed to him and with his own recorded words: 
' I f a man makes a slip, admonish him gently and show him his mistake. 
If you fail to convince him, blame yourself, or else blame nobody'. 
Some later assessments perhaps contained the seeds of doubt as to whether such a 
determinedly virtuous man was indeed the model for a successful emperor. However, 
the consensus was and remains positive about Marcus' exceptional qualities, and in 
respect of clemency he was used as a positive exemplar by, for instance, Ammianus. 
Yet it should be added that non-senators did suffer the death penalty for their 
complicity in Avidius' revolt and measures were put in place to protect the autocracy 
embodied, however worthily, in the person of Marcus Aurelius. Note was taken of the 
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Syrian origins and power base of Avidius; it was decreed that no one should be 
appointed as governor of his native province.'' 
In general, subsequent emperors did not emulate the lenient, forgiving attitude of 
Marcus towards real or potential threats to their rule; certainly not his son, Commodus. 
He was said to have gone to the other extreme after the abortive assassination attempt 
by Quintianus in 182 CE. During his assault on the Emperor, this young member of the 
senate had declared that he was acting in the name of that body. According to 
Herodian, Commodus '...now considered the entire senate his collective enemy'. 
Cassius Dio chose to confirm this assessment, and the Emperor's savage response, at a 
significant point in his history, that at which he claimed first hand observation to be his 
source rather than the accounts of others. Commodus was accused of killing 
'...practically all those who had attained eminence during his father's 
reign and his own.' 
The same historian ascribed a similar attitude to Septimius Severus. He was said to 
have promoted his dynastic credentials by styling himself as not only encouragingly 
'son of Marcus', but more alarmingly as 'brother of Commodus'. This was in marked 
contrast, for example, to the rejection of any Flavian legacy by the successors of 
Domitian, as evidenced by their coinage. Severus defended the actions of Commodus, 
openly praising the '...severity and cruelty of Marius, Sulla and Augustus as the safer 
course', rather than the clemency of other rulers. In line with these sentiments, Severus 
began by executing those of the plotters against Commodus who remained alive, then 
continued with 'harsh vengeance for Albinus' revolt by putting many men to death'. 
On arriving in Rome, according to Cassius Dio, Severus had taken the now standard 
oath not to kill any senators but immediately broke it '...and made away with many 
senators'; a round figure of fifty was identified in the SHA. Executions of senators 
followed throughout the reign. Although an incomplete sentence in our source, the 
construction used by Cassius Dio referring to these killings does so in a way that 
justifies an emphasis on the translation's first word. 
J' Marcus' response: Cass. Dio 71. 24. 1-27. 2. Avidius' threat: Amm. Marc. 21. 16. 11; OCD3 p. 226. 
lazyges and Commodus: Cass. Dio 71. 17, 22. 2. Stoicism and virtue: Birley (1987) p. 192; Cass. Dio 
71. 34. 2- 5; Herodian 1. 2; Julian Caes. 328D, 335C; M . Aur. Med. 10. 4, (see also 9. 42). Later 
doubts: 'a man one might more easily admire than praise' (Eutr. 8. 11). Exemplar: Amm. Marc. 21.16. 
11; Kelly, G. p. 409. Deaths and counter measures: SHA Marc. 25. 7; Bu-ley (1987) p. 192. 
60 
'...some of them after they had been duly accused before him, had 
made their defence, and been convicted...' 
with the missing, though presumable, continuation that others had not been dealt with 
by such regular legal process. As a fitting climax that reflected the prevailing 
atmosphere of his account, the historian told the story of Baebius Marcellinus. He was 
condemned in 206 CE at least in part because he possessed the physical characteristic 
fitting a vague accusation that had been made against an otherwise unidentified 'bald 
senator'. Dio milked the black humour of the event with the detail that, as a senator 
himself, he had fiirtively felt his own head for reassurance that he was not the 
accused. 
Beyond the use of political murders, other aspects of Septimius Severus' rule serve to 
introduce illustrations of the typically coercive nature of Imperial regimes. At the 
outset of his reign, he made it abundantly clear that his power rested on his control of 
the soldiers and that he meant that control to be total. Before even entering Rome in 
193, Severus discharged the Praetorian Guard, accusing its members of disloyalty in 
the overthrow of Pertinax earlier in the same year. The new Emperor replaced them 
with a bodyguard drawn from his own Illyrian troops. Severus then entered the City 
with his entire army in battle array. Cassius Dio attempted to soften the message of this 
behaviour (indicating that the Emperor himself dismounted and put on civilian dress, 
and that the citizens viewed the occasion in a festive maimer). Other accounts seem 
more credible. Herodian referred to the 'fear and panic' engendered by the situation, 
while the SHA described 'hate and fear' as the soldiers 'threatened to lay the City 
waste'. Caracalla went further than his father, fijrther perhaps than any other emperor 
not emerging from the legions themselves, in his active cultivation of the political 
goodwill of his soldiers. This was achieved by a combination of activities identifying 
himself with their lifestyle, and by actions that clearly signalled their importance to his 
authority. In the first category were included such extreme behaviours as carrying the 
legionary standard, and emulating the low quality dress and minimal personal hygiene 
of soldiers. In the second, he frequently appeared to go out of his way to demonstrate 
to the senators that he relied not on them, but on the support of his.soldiers to maintain 
Commodus: SHA Comm. 4. 2-3; Cass. Dio 72. 4. 1-2. Severus and Commodus: Cass. Dio 75. 7. 4-
8. 1; ibid. 74. 16. 5. Albinus: SHA Sev. 12. 7. Oatli: Cass. Dio 75. 2. 1-2; SHA Sev. 13. 1-8. senators-
Cass. Dio 76. 7. 3-9. 2. 
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his power. On one occasion he wrote to the senate a mocking explanation of his 
behaviour, saying that he was well aware that it would displease its members 
'...but that is why I have weapons and soldiers, so that I may disregard 
those that are talking about me'. 
The effect on the soldiers of this sort of attention fi-om their leader has been identified 
as enhancing their self-perception as power brokers, an awareness that sharpened 
during the following century.^ ^ 
It should be added that for Roman rulers, as for others in a similar position, there were 
dangers in the use of proscription and a need to clothe their domination in socially 
acceptable garb. In the most direct terms, Domitian's assassination was said to have 
been precipitated by a leakage of information that the Emperor had plans to execute 
those plotting his downfall. The provincial legions, and particularly their commanders, 
must have been all the more ready to overthrow Nero in 68 CE after he had forced the 
most renowned soldier of the day, C. Domitius Corbulo, to commit suicide two years 
previously. The pattern continued, as illustrated by the SHA's comments on the rule of 
Aurelian in the second half of the third century. The praise he had earned for his w£irs 
against barbarians was negated by his violent and vengeful proscription of senators. As 
a result '...men ceased to love and began to fear an excellent prince'. Herodian had 
made similar comments about the reign of Maximinus fifity years earlier, adding the 
rider that an emperor could act against individuals with relative impunity, but risked all 
when his excesses enraged the general citizens. As a theoretical axiom of coercive 
power, the ruler will act to favour those upon whom he relies for his domination, and 
will be relatively exploitative of others. However, in relation to Maximinus, Herodian 
indicated the limitations of this approach. He stated that the Emperor could not even 
ensure his security by disproportionately favouring the interests of soldiers over those 
of civilians, since: 
'The soldiers too were disgusted with his activities, for their relatives 
and fellow citizens complained that he was acting solely for the benefit 
of the military.' 
" Praetorians: Cass. Dio75. 1.1-2; Herodian 2. 13. Entry to Rome: Cass, Dio 75. 1. 3-5; Herodian 2. 
14. 1; SHA Sev. 7. 3; Birley (1988) p. 103-104; Campbell (1984) p. 402. Caracalia: Herodian 4. 7. 4-7, 
12. 2; Cass. Dio 77. 20. 2. Soldiers privileged over others: Campbell (1984) p. 229. Power brokers-
James (1999) p. 15-16. 
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Although not emphasised by the author, there is a clear indication here of soldiers 
acting to some extent as a responsible constituency of the res publica, rather than 
wholly out of short-term self-interest. In addition to the security of his regime, an 
emperor risked loosing his posthumous reputation through excessive use of 
proscription. In practice this could mean, for instance, that the senate could be reluctant 
to grant a dead emperor 'the usual honour' of deification. This occurred in the cases of 
Tiberius and Hadrian.^ '' 
The difficulty of securing a regime by employing proscription and at the same time 
dealing with the problems that attended its use had long been recognised. In the first 
quarter of the fourth century BCE, Isocrates provided theoretical guidance to a young 
mler, advising him to act firmly, but in a self-confrolled and restrained manner, when 
faced by recalcifrant subjects. An historical model of such government had perhaps 
been available to the Romans in the form of the empire of the Seleucids. In its diverse 
geographical and social make up, that regime was perhaps the nearest approximation to 
Imperial Rome among the Hellenistic kingdoms. Based on the policies of their 
predecessors, the kings of Achaemenid Persia, the Seleucid monarchs attempted with 
some success to manage potential political rivals. This was achieved by a judicious 
mixture of greints of high status allied to limited independence of action, and an 
efficient network for the centralised gathering of information. In terms of the basic 
theory of government, this 'socialising' of coercive power has been described as an 
identifying feature of the organised political state. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in 
relation to the distribution of power in a society, any such 'socialising' is essentially a 
secondary process; the actual bases of authority retain their coercive essence. The 
importance of the control and display of weapons as signs of power has been 
discussed, for example, by Foucault. Physical manifestations of this phenomenon could 
hardly have been more prominent in Imperial Rome (Plate 4). In relation to the base of 
Trajan's Column it seems imlikely to be coincidental that the Trajanic orations of Dio 
Chrysostom included a fictional exchange between Alexander the Great and his father 
in which the former specifically endorsed military architectural decoration, in 
preference to gold or other ornament. The second century CE rhestoric of Aelius 
* Domitian: Cass. Dio 67. 15. 2-4. Nero: Tac. Hist. 2. 76; GrifFm (1984) p. 178. Aurelian: SHA Aurel. 
21. 5-7. Maximinus: Herodian 7. 3. 1-6. Theory: Levi p. 439. Deification: Price (1987) p. 86-87; Cass. 
Dio 59. 3. 7, 69. 23. 3. 
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Aristides could not have been clearer in its characterisation of the army as the Empire's 
'greatest work of perfection'.^^ 
Conclusion 
Coercive rule and a military ethos have been identified as twin characteristics of the 
developing political process in Rome. Although our direct evidence in no way extends 
to the begitmings of the City, there seems to be little reason to question this aspect of 
the basic story told in the extant sources about early Roman political organisation. 
From these and from the accounts of the Imperial period there is a continuity of 
essentially military regimes. These were manifested in varying forms, all based on the 
coercive power of soldiers, harnessed and manipulated by an elite, whose members 
were driven by the psychological need to compete with and to dominate their peers. 
These two elements, soldiers and would-be dominators, combined to feed a culture of 
coercion in which an emperor could brook no rival. As we will see (pages 88-90), even 
in circumstances when there were two or more co-emperors it was always clear that 
one was pre-eminent. In modem sociological analysis, to attain this end the ruler had to 
monopolise control of the forces of coercion. It was the achievement of Augustus that 
he reorganised and systematised the state's relationship with its soldiers in such a way 
as to create a durable basis for the rule of succeeding autocrats. Over time, the 
increasingly transparent nature of this autocracy can be seen to have a direct impact on 
the emperor's bond with his soldiers, for example, increasing the importance of his 
personal leadership on campaign. 
The emperors' reliance on military coercion to establish and maintain their dominance 
developed within a political culture in which a far wider group of individuals had 
previously competed for a limited version of that dominant position. To an extent the 
early forms of this competition had been regulated within the collective confrol of the 
Republican oligarchy. However, during the first century BCE this regulation had 
largely broken down, adding yet more value to an aspiring leader's direct control of the 
forces of coercion, and therefore to the soldjers' status as a„p.olitical constituency. One 
result of this situation was that an ernperor , could seldom Teel safe from« c 
Restraint: Isoc. AdNic. 23. Seleucids: Shipley p. 293-294. 'Socialising' coercion: Poggi p. 5; 
Foucault (1974) p. 41. Dio Chrysostom: Or 2. 34. Aristides: Or 26. 72-89; Birley (1997) p. 303. 
Sociological analysis: Levi (1981) p. 448-449. Emperors on campaign: Campbell (1984) p. 419-
420. 
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which in turn provoked his use of coercive force to protect his position. As we have 
seen, even such apparently secure emperors as Marcus Aurelius could face serious 
threat. In fact, Herodian was led to comment on the 'complete security' experienced 
during the short reign of Macrinus just because of the rarity of such a situation. As a 
contemporary political paradigm, the emperors' violent proscription of perceived 
political rivals may well be over-represented in our sources because their authors were 
members of or close to the targeted social group. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests a 
pattern of sufficient clarity to be regarded as the norm.^' 
" Macrinus: Herodian: 5. 2. 2. 
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5. Coercion: explanations, justifications and mechanisms. 
Imperium, glory and coercion - Can they be separated? 
Any view of the emperor's use of coercion in the establishment of his authority cannot 
reasonably be divorced from the operation of those factors in Roman society as a 
whole. The recourse to violence in pursuit of glory and status was personified by 
Sallust in the figure of Catiline. In a speech to potential followers, the revolutionary 
reminded his listeners that their natural desire for honour and glory had been stifled by 
those in charge of the state, obliging them to '.. .drag out lives of misery and dishonour 
as the playthings of other men's insolence'. He even stated that ' . . . i t is always they 
who receive tribute from foreign kings', thus linking motives of financial gain and a 
requirement for deference at the cenfre of legitimate ambition. From the point of view 
of soldiers' involvement in politics, it is noteworthy that in Plutarch's later account 
Catiline was said to have been specifically supported by the veterans of Sulla. 
Although described as being motivated by the desire for plunder, the former soldiers 
were portrayed as gathering in Rome, on their own initiative, with the express purpose 
of using their votes to help Catiline in the consular elections of 63 BCE.^ * 
Examining the issue from a positive perspective, Cicero identified imperium (defined 
as the legal exercise of executive power) as a key element in his perfect state. While 
the wielding of active authority had to be moderated by consilium (guidance based on 
auctoritas) and be in accordance with the basic libertas of the Roman people, it was 
nevertheless importiint that 
'...the leading man of a state must be fed on glory, and the state can 
stand firm only so long as honour is given by all to their leader.' 
The exercise of imperium, particularly by extending Rome's domination over more 
peoples, was seen as the surest route to such honour. In fact in his 'dream', Scipio was 
depicted as feeling scomfiil even of Rome's dominion on earth when he was led to 
contemplate the vastness of the starry heavens. In the parade of future Romans shown 
to Aeneas in the Underworld, Virgil emphasised the XhemQ_of imperium. The scene 
was climaxed by the active exhortation rather than passiye.prediction that to rule others 
was to be Rome's task. To achieve this it would be necessary 
Violence/Glory: Sail. Cat. 20; Plut. Cic. 14. 1-2. 
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' . . .to impose a settled pattern upon peace, to pardon the defeated and war 
down the proud.' 
Peace, perhaps, was to come; however, the prophecy left no doubt about the methods 
that were to be used in its attainment or upon whose terms it was to be established. Just 
as significant for the present thesis were Virgil's references to the origins of authority 
within the Roman state itself The power of Bmtus, as the first consul, was 
immediately defined in relation to the 'rods' and 'stem axes' of office. 79 
Dominance and subservience 
Another reflection of this reality can perhaps be discerned from a passage in Suetonius 
regarding Nero Dmsus, younger brother of Tiberius and father of the emperor 
Claudius. As Tacitus had also maintained, Dmsus was said by the biographer to have 
had the open ambition of returning the State to the politics of the Republic. Suetonius, 
however, provided this information immediately after reference to another of the 
young man's supposed ambitions, his desire to win the spolia opima, traditional 
reward for a Roman commander who personally killed an opposing barbarian leader in 
battle. Scholarly debate about this passage has centred on the veracity of the two 
claims. For my purposes it suffices that, whether deliberate or not, the juxtaposition of 
the two ideas links the status to be gained from a supremely violent act and thoughts 
about the nature of the Roman state.^ " 
Augustus' Res Gestae provided significant, i f not unconfroversial evidence on the 
importance of honours and the role of imperium. It can hardly be contested that one of 
the main elements of the work, perhaps its unifying thread, was the account of the 
offices held by Augustus and the honours granted to him by the grateful population of 
Rome. At the outset he seemed happy to discuss his military imperium in the context 
of what he characterised as his stmggle for justified vengeance and foreign conquests. 
Indeed the work's subtitle made the immodest claim that his exercise of such authority 
had '...brought the world imder the empire of the Roman people'. However, it has 
been noted that one of the major titles/honours denoting his authority, that of imperium 
proconsulare mdius, taken after 23 BCE, was absQXA from X\\e ,Res Gestae. While it is 
Imperium and law: Cic. Leg. 3. 6. Glory: Atkins p. 491; Cic. Rep. 5. 9; Ramage p. 57. Scipio's 
dream: Cic. Rep. 6. 16. Rome's task: Aen. 6. 851-853. Brutus: ibid 6. 818. Rods and axes: see pages 
157-164. 
*" Nero Drusus: Tac. Ann. 1. 33. 3,2. 82. 3; Suet. Claud. 1. 4. Debate: see for example Rich (1999). 
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true that some scholars have seen nothing sinister in this omission, it has also been 
suggested that the absence of the overtly military terminology was congruent with the 
first princeps'' gradual attempt to play down any coercive aspect of his rule. This 
argument is strengthened by the uniquely unmilitary characterisation of Augustus' 
position at the climax of the Res Gestae. There imperium was superseded by 
overwhelming auctoritas and an apparent absence of overt power. Interpreted in this 
maimer, the Res Gestae appears to support the importance to Augustus of honours and 
deference. The significance of coercive power is also highlighted by the carefiilly 
nuanced way in which it is given prominence with respect to Augustus' claimed 
exertions on behalf of the state. 
Honour and deference as important elements in the Roman system of status and power 
come into sharp focus even where they seem to be singularly lacking. At first glance, it 
is hard to imagine circumstances further from their operation than those in which an 
individual suffered damnatio memoriae. Although the phrase itself is not of ancient 
usage, i f a person was judged by the senate to be an enemy of the state it could be 
decreed that action be taken to remove all traces of him from the public record. One 
individual to be so treated was Cn. Calpumius Piso, condemned in 20 CE for, amongst 
other things, involvement in the suspicious death of Germanicus in Syria. Copies of 
the senate's decree, discovered in Spain in the late 1980s, informed readers of Piso's 
fate. However, the very existence of the inscribed decree clearly perpetuated rather 
than erased the memory of Piso, the circumstances of his crime and its judicial 
consequences. A similar i f less sophisticated instance of this apparent paradox was 
recorded by Cicero. In response to the rapacious behaviour of Gains Verres, the people 
of Tauromenium destroyed the statues of their former governor. However, they 
deliberately left in place the inscribed bases of the monuments in order to memorialise 
the disgrace. Clear visual evidence of damnatio memoriae can be seen today on the 
Arch of the Argentarii in Rome. When originally dedicated in 204 CE, the relief of 
Septimius Severus, his wife and two sons, Caracalla and Geta was complete. However, 
on assuming the throne jointly with his brother in 212 CE, Caracalla had Geta 
murdered, the image of the latter being removed from the monument (Plate 5). 
Honours: RG 7, 9, and 11. Imperium: 1. 2 and 4. 1. Importance of imperium proconsulare: Syme 
(1939) p. 38. Innocent omission of imperium proconsulare: Yavetz (1984) p. 10. Suspicious omission 
of imperium proconsulare: Kienastp. 178. 
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Plate 5 
However, as in the Tauromenium example, Geta's name is retained in the architrave 
inscription and the space left in the image must have proclaimed his presence at least 
as loudly as his absence. In all these examples the importance of signalling the active 
repudiation of certain individuals and/or their behaviour could only be sufficiently 
achieved by the demonstrable provision of a negative form of honour and deference. 
Merely consigning them to oblivion was not sufficient. 
Coercion as the underlying method by which status and honour were established can 
also be detected in its apparent absence, perhaps as the original negative from which 
various poshive images of Roman ideology were formed. Wallace-Hadrill argued 
persuasively from coin evidence that: 
'The justification for the emperor's possession of power becomes his 
willingness to abstain from using it to the detriment of those concerned.' 
Obverse images and legends indicating the emperor's protection of property, personal 
security and social standing were prominent alongside others proclaiming his diverse 
virtues (see pages 192-195). Such messages clearly reflected the concerns and 
priorities of individuals who were interested in their ruler's ideology. However, it is 
equally clear that they relied for their potency on the real prospect that an emperor had 
it in his power to unleash the opposites of those comfortable concepts. This fear was 
expressed in Arrian's account of the sayings of Epictetus: 
'No one is afraid of Caesar himself, but he is afraid of death, exile, loss 
of property, prison, disenfranchisement...'^ ^ 
By any of the definitions considered in chapter three, Rome's territorial control 
qualified it to be an empire. However, while it is clear that such domination is a 
necessary feature of an imperial state, a wide ranging review of comparative 
anthropological research into ancient empires concluded that: 
'The motives for imperial expansion are much more difficult to identify 
than is the end result'. 
It has been suggested that any or all of a desire for material gain, security concerns and 
ideology might be involved. Focussing on Rome's external relations, Mattem has 
Definition: 0CD3 p. 427. Piso: Potter (1999b) p. 27; Bodel p. 43-44. Verres: Cic. 2 Verr. 2. 160. 
Arch of Argentarii: Claridge p. 259-261. 
" Coins: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 317-319. Fears: Arr. Epict. diss. 4. 1. 60. 
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described the ethos of the Roman Imperial elite as one in which '...status and security 
depended on one's perceived ability to inflict violence.' Polybius made it clear that 
such an approach long predated the emperors and characterised at least all levels of the 
military. In the capture of New Carthage by Scipio Afiicanus, he described the troops' 
systematic slaughter 'of every form of life they encountered', including dogs and other 
animals. Chillingly the historian noted that this behaviour was a controlled and 
deliberate part of standard practice 'adopted to inspire terror'. Polybius was clear about 
the purpose of such terror. In the preface to his Histories he had announced the 
intention to explain how the Romans had come to bring '...under their rule almost the 
of the inhabited world.' Later he clarified this as being a situation in which it was 
'...recognised that the whole world must accept the authority of Rome 
and obey her commands.' 
In his account of Alexander, Plutarch ascribed to the Macedonian king a similar 
calculation to explain the particularly savage sack of Thebes in 335 BCE: 
'This was done, in the main, because Alexander expected that the 
Greeks would be terrified by so great a disaster and cower down in 
quiet.' 
Ancient and modem sources have provided differing accounts of these events at 
Thebes and the reasons behind them. Some agreed with Plutarch, others suggested that 
the sack was more of an accident or shifted the blame fi'om Alexander. In fact, 
evidence is lacking elsewhere in Alexander's campaigns to support the idea that he 
employed a broad policy of political terror. It is just as likely that Plutarch had 
retrojected the Roman strategy familiar to him and described by Polybius. The latter's 
analysis has been characterised in such stark terms as, 'On the one side there are orders 
and on the other obedience.' Such a relationship could be said to have been developed 
and refined within Rome's political response to the Hellenistic world after 200 BCE. 
In so defining the conclusion of his researches, Polybius specifically distinguished this 
domination fi-om one based on 'nothing more than the outcomes of battles'. Elsewhere 
the basic Roman attitude has been summed up as a desire 
'...that her will should be obeyed by other nations - the fimdamental 
concept behind the word imperium.'^'* 
Definition: Sinopoli p. 160-161. Motives: ibid. p. 162. Imperium: Mattem p. xi i . New Carthage: 
Polyb. 10. 15. Domination: ibid. 1. 1 and 3. 4. 2-3. Alexander at Thebes: Plut. Alex. 11. 5; Arr. Anab. 
1. 10. If ; Died. Sic. 17. 14; Hamilton p. 30; Meckel p. 192; Homblower (1991) p. 263. The explanation 
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When describing campaigns in Greece in 200 BCE, Livy emphasised the fear 
engendered in opponents by the unfamiliar savagery of Roman fighting methods. 
Marcellus was credited with controlling the savagery of the sack of Syracuse in 212 
BCE. However, Archimedes was killed despite Marcellus' expressed distaste for the 
deed, and the Roman commander allowed his troops to slaughter the city's slave 
population, besides looting it of its artistic and religious treasures. Seriously or not, for 
this behaviour Plutarch credited Marcellus with being the first Roman to demonstrate 
to the Greeks a capacity for the 'civil virtues' of 'gentleness and humanity'! Again, 
during the sack of Athens in 86 BCE, only the exercise of Sulla's personal command 
brought to an end a slaughter of its inhabitants. However, this was not before gore had 
flowed into the Cerameicus such that it 'deluged the suburb', the number of the dead 
being only calculable from 'the space that was covered with blood.' The operations of 
Germanicus in Germany during 14 and 16 CE provided Tacitus with two opportunities 
to detail the violence of Roman arms and the terror it engendered. In the first, troops 
were ordered to ravage an area of the territory of the Marsi fifty miles wide. This task 
they set about with enthusiasm: 
'Neither sex nor age aroused pity, things profane and sacred alike, 
including those people's most sacred temple...were levelled to the 
ground.' 
In the second, the Cherusci were defeated and fi^om 
'.. .the fifth hour of the day until night the enemy were slaughtered, and 
their corpses and arms covered ten thousand paces.' 
The mopping up included the amusement of archers as they shot dovm those who had 
climbed trees in their flight. In a later phase of the campaign Germanicus was said to 
have eschewed the taking of prisoners and proclaimed that '...only the annihilation of 
the race would bring an end to the war'. The significance of this portrayal of 
Germanicus' savagery is enhanced by his broad role for Tacitus as the ideal emperor 
that Rome never had.^ ^ 
of Roman 'contamination' could also, i f true, be relevant to Diodorus' iiiiputatibh of similar motives to 
Philip regarding the sack of Olynthus in 348 BCE (Diod. Sic. 16. 53. 3). Orders/obedience/imperium: 
Derow p. 4-5; Lintott (1993) p. 22; Lintott (1981) p. 54. 
" Greece: Livy 31. 34. Syracuse: Plut. Marc. 19. 1-20. 1; Livy 25. 23. 9, 31. 9-10. Athens: Plut. Sull. 
14. 4-5. Marsi: Ann. 1.51.1. Cherusci: ibid 2. 21. 1-2. Germanicus as Tacitus' ideal: Syme (1958b) p. 
254, 492. Roman aggression in general: Harris p. 51. 
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Appian's second century CE expositions of Roman history and institutions, aimed at a 
Greek audience, were often inaccurate, although based on Polybius amongst other 
Greek and Latin authors. Thus, the apparent straightforwardness that he brought to a 
consideration of this issue may not be entirely trustworthy. Nevertheless, his account 
of Sulla's sacking of the town of Aeculanum in 89 BCE at least demonstrated what 
must have been a plausible portrayal of Roman policy to the author's audience. After 
giving the town a chance to surrender, the general set its wooden walls on fire. When 
the terrified inhabitants offered to capitulate, 
'Sulla plundered it because it had not been delivered up voluntarily but 
under necessity. He spared other towns that gave themselves up, and in 
this way the entire population of the Hirpini was brought under 
subjection.' 
Appian's Greek readers could well have related such an approach to the savage 
injunction of Agamemnon regarding the Trojans: 
'Not one of them must escape stark destruction at our hands, even the 
boys still carried in their mothers' wombs - not even they must escape , 
but all be extinguished together, wiped fi-om Ilios without sight or 
ceremony.' 
Cassius Dio adapted this Homeric passage to describe Septimius Severus' stated 
intentions towards British rebels. A story in the SHA adds to the portrayal of such 
brutality as being deliberate policy rather than merely something uncontrollably savage 
in the nature of ancient warfare. Aurelian was reported to be so upset about the 
resistance of Tyana in 271 CE that he declared, "In this tovm I will not leave even a 
dog alive!" When the place had been captured, the Emperor was reminded of his 
determination by troops who were eager for the plimder that would accompany any 
slaughter. However, Aurelian had changed his mind and quipped, "...well, then, kill all 
the dogs." As the SHA author commented: 
'Notable, indeed, were the prince's words, but more notable still was the 
deed of the soldiers...(who) took up the prince's jest, by which both 
booty was denied to them and the city preserved intact'. 
Whatever the degree of historical truth in the story, it provides a late fourth century 
description of a presumably credible situation in which an emperor could contemplate 
the use of terror, but subordinate its imposition by victorious soldiers to the concerns 
of higher policy; in this case, Aurelian's wish to appear as the rescuer of the east fi-om 
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the illegitimate power of Zenobia at Palmyra. However, during a later episode in which 
he crushed a rebellion in Palmyra itself, the same emperor used sterner methods and 
spelled out their meaning: 
"We have not spared the women, we have slain the children...For it is 
our belief that the few (survivors) have been chastened by the 
punishment of the many".*^ 
In the High Empire, Aristides talked glowingly of the impregnable defensive circuit of 
troops surroimding Rome's possessions. However, the anonymous early fourth century 
panegyrist of Constantine gave a sharper edge to this deployment. In addressing the 
Emperor, he too described the frontier defences, but characterised them as '.. .the terror 
aroused by your name' and '...an impenetrable wall which the reputation for courage 
erects.' Clearly carried away by his literary conceit, the author went so far as to 
describe more tangible elements of military presence, the Rhine forts, as 'more an 
ornament for the frontier than for protection.' Writing perhaps a little before Aristides, 
Appian also alluded to the idea of Rome and its possessions being defended as one 
entity. The emperors, he wrote, 
'...surround the empire with great armies and they garrison the whole 
stretch of land and sea like a single stronghold'. 
Although Appian placed this image within a rather more sober review of Rome's place 
in the world, he nevertheless left no doubt about that nation's perception of superiority. 
He described the Empire as having physical limits, but stressed not only that Rome 
possessed 'the best part of the earth and sea' in terms of quality, but also that other 
'.. .poverty-sfricken and profitless tribes of barbarians' were deliberately left 
imconquered even though they offered themselves to the emperors as subjects. Beyond 
this, the importance of the deference/domination relationship was emphasised by 
Rome's declining to give up some provinces that were costly to maintain, 'deeming it 
dishonourable' to do so.*' 
Rome's assumption of superiority and requirement for deference were clear in 
accounts of its early dealings with other powers. Livy proyided one of the more 
'^Aeculanum: A p p . f i C/v. 1.51;OCD3 p. 130. Tyana: SHAAurel. 23. 2-3; Watson p. 71-72. 
Agamemnon: 11. 6. 57-59; Cass. Dio 76. 15. 1; Birley (1988) p. 188. Palmyra: SHA/lwre/. 31. 5-6. 
Defensive circuit: Aristid. Or. 26. 84. Impenetrable wall: Pan. Lat. 6. 11. 1-5. Single stronghold: 
App. Pref. 7; Brunt (1990) p. 476. 
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colourful illustrations of this in his account of the diplomatic mission of Popilius 
Laenas in 168 BCE. He had been sent by the senate to Alexandria in order to meet the 
Seleucid king, Antiochus IV, and to dissuade him from occupying Ptolemaic Egypt. 
On being informed of Rome's demands concerning this matter, the King asked for 
time to consider his response. Popilius made no comment; instead he indicated the true 
nature of his diplomatic mission by using the rod he carried as symbol of his authority 
(see pages 157-164 on the fasces) to draw a line in the sand around Antiochus. The 
Roman envoy then declared that he required an answer before the king stepped out of 
the circle. Antiochus 'hesitated for a moment, astounded by the violence of the 
command', but agreed to end his invasion of Egypt. Livy concluded the story wdth the 
report that: 
'This commission achieved high renown among the nations, because 
Egypt had undoubtedly been taken away from Antiochus when he was in 
possession of that country and the ancestral throne had been restored to 
the house of Ptolemy.' 
Thus, the episode provided no specific material benefit to the Empire; rather it 
enhanced Roman prestige by the humiliation of a powerfiil king and by confirming 
Rome's power to dispose of foreign thrones as it saw fit.^^ 
An avenue along which to explore Roman attitudes to territorial expansion may be 
provided by the history of the pomerium. Although its precise meaning and use is lost 
to us, this ancient perimeter of the city was clearly of considerable significance in 
Roman religion and in state symbolism. Of particular relevance here is the tradition 
that its circumference may have somehow represented the physical extent of Roman 
authority, since legitimate extensions to the pomerium could be made only by those 
who had been responsible for increasing the size of the Empire. In this respect Tacitus 
provided interesting and puzzling information. He suggested that since the time of the 
kings only Sulla, Augustus and Claudius had actually carried out the ceremony of 
extending the pomerium. Other sources indicated that Julius Caesar, Vespasian and 
Aurelian should also be included. Within even this select group it must be doubted 
whether either Augustus or Aurelian did in fact undertake the ritual, which brings into 
Popilius: Livy 45. 12. 3-8; Veil. Pat. 1. 10. 1-2. 
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sharper focus the issue of why more emperors did not utilise such an apparently potent 
source of prestige and renown.^ ^ 
One possible response may be to bring into question the extent to which purely 
territorial expansion was a highly prized achievement. Based on his claim that Numa 
was the first to build a temple to Terminus, and that god's eponymous association with 
boundaries, Plutarch discussed the problematic features of fi'ontiers. He argued for 
their essentially pacific nature, rooted in their use to delineate agricultural areas. The 
fact that Romulus, the first and most aggressive of Roman kings, refused to recognise 
such legal and physical limits to his authority was used by the author to strengthen his 
case. It has also been noted that Strabo never once mentioned frontiers in his wide 
ranging descriptions of the Roman Empire. Thus, Vitruvius' flattering dedication to 
Augustus addressed the princeps directly, describing him as 'acquiring the right to 
command the whole world' and claiming that 'all foreign nations were in subjection 
awaiting your beck and call.' Velleius Paterculus introduced his survey of Rome's 
conquests as a 
'...brief synopsis of the races and nations which were reduced to 
provinces and made tributary' 
As Plmy elaborated on the triumph that he foresaw for Trajan, his focus was not on the 
lands to be conquered by the Emperor or other material gains; rather it was on captured 
kings: 
'...the high sounding titles of chieftains whose persons are not 
unworthy of such names', 
and on the spolia opima that would assuredly won ' . . . i f any king would dare to match 
himself against you'. If the personal nature of such glories was not clear enough fi-om 
these elements, Pliny made the point quite obvious by suggesting that the enemy kings 
would be left 
'...shuddering with terror...when confronted not only by your weapons 
but by a glance from your threatening eye.' 
Sallust emphasised that kings and previously free peoples had been defeated and-
forced by Rome to pay tribute, while after the victory of Aemilius Paullus at Pydna in-
Pomerium: OCD3 p. 1213-1214; Tac. Ann. 12. 23-24. Augustus: Syme (1958b p. 378) lists the 
inclusion of Augustus as one of Tacitus' rare factual errors; the first princeps' omission of such a claim 
in his Res Gestae is persuasive. Aurelian: SHA Aurel. 21. 10; OCD3 p. 1213. 
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168 BCE, Velleius Paterculus made a feature of the fact that the general '...led in 
triumph the greatest and the most illustrious of kings (Perseus)'. Tacitus coldly 
summed up the Roman attitude as exemplified by the treatment of a king who was a 
loyal ally. He commented on the grant of lands to Cogidumnus: 
'It is an ancient...practice of the Roman people to use even kings as 
mstruments of enslavement'. 
Visual representations of the dominance/submission relationship are prominent in 
Roman imagery of power. The frequency with which barbarian captives were 
portrayed in images of abject submission or supplication gives a strong indication 
about the centrality of the idea in Roman ideology (Plate 6). It perhaps helps to gain a 
true impression of that ideology to observe that modem susceptibilities do not favour 
the depiction of the enemy on war memorials at all. On one of the Boscoreale cups a 
seated Augustus is portrayed with the hand of clemency ostentatiously outstretched to 
supplicating barbarians. Subtler elements, such as the relative position of hands, could 
be used to illustrate differences in power and status (Plate 7 i).^' 
The psychological dimension of Roman dominance was also emphasised by our 
sources' concentration on the conquest of peoples and nations rather than territory. In a 
wide ranging review of the extent of the Roman Empire Appian chose to describe the 
distant boundaries of the territory, such as Ocean and the Pillars of Hercules. Within 
these few geographical markers he then listed the peoples subject to Roman rule. In a 
more specific context Josephus described Gains' problems with the Jews in similar 
terms, since they were the one exception when 
'.. .all the subject peoples of the Roman Empire had dedicated altars and 
temples to Gains'. 
In honour of Trajan's successes in the east, the senate voted that his subsequent 
triumph could celebrate the subjection of as many nations/peoples as he wished. The 
point could not be made any sharper than by the epitomator of Cassius Dio in 
describing Marcus Aurelius' attitude towards the Quadi in 179 GE. Harassed by 
Numa and Romulus: Plut. Num. 16; Whittaker (1994) p. 10. Strabo: ibid. p. 26. Augustus: Vitr. 1 
Pref. 1. Velleius Paterculus: Veil. Pat. 2. 38. 1. Trajan: Plin. Pan. 17. 1-3. Kings forced to submit: 
Sail. lug. 14. 1, 31. 9. Aemilius Paullus: Veil. Pat. 1. 9. 5. Cogidumnus: Tac. Agr. 14. 
" Submission: Brilliant p. 189-195. Frequency: Bradley p. 298-299. Modern war memorials: Rose p. 
21. Boscoreale: Pollitt p. 274; Brilliant p. 74. Lucius Verus: ibid p. 152. 
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Roman soldiers stationed in forts throughout their territory, the tribe attempted to 
migrate. In blocking their flight Marcus prolonged a situation in which the Quadi's 
normal agricultural activities were impossible. As the author commented: 
'This showed that he desired, not to acquire their territory, but to punish 
the men themselves.' 
It has been concluded that this aspect of Roman ideology can be traced without 
significant change from Augustus to Constantine. An inscription on one of the latter's 
forts at Cologne announced 'the subjection and control of the Franks'. 
A focus on self-image and psychology as defining aspects of imperium should not of 
course entirely eclipse territorial aggrandisement as a factor explaining Roman 
attitudes towards other peoples. For example, it is clearly possible to assemble 
numerous coin legends and other inscriptions that indicated continued territorial 
expansion as at least a rhetorical aspiration. Pompey's third triumph, held in 61 BCE 
following his victory over Mithridates, provided interesting evidence as detailed by 
Plutarch. The full description began with a list of conquered nations and then 
progressed through captured strongholds, cities, and pirate ships, cities founded, 
revenue generated and booty won. The royal captives and battle trophies were recorded 
next. As a rhetorical conclusion to the account, Plutarch noted that Pompey had held a 
triumph to celebrate victories in each of the world's three continents, Alrica, Europe 
and now Asia. However, more than the geographical aspect itself, the biographer 
stressed the fact that this was an achievement that no other Roman had attained. Thus, 
the focus returned to individual psychology. The elements of territory and 
psychological domination were both manifested in prayers used on that most solemn 
occasion, the ludi saeculares. Attested epigraphically for their celebration by Augustus 
in 17 BCE, the prayers linked requests that the gods might '...increase the empire and 
majesty of the Roman people' and ensure 'that the Latin may always obey'. That the 
focus was on the obedience of the Latins, effectively ruled by Rome since the second 
half of the fourth century BCE, has been used to argue for the possibility that the 
prayers had been used in earlier ludi saeculares. Again both parts of the phrase orbem 
terrarum, used in the subtitle of Augustus' Res Gestae to denote Rome's control of 
Peoples and nations: Vitr. De arch, pref 1; Isaac (1992) p. 395. Appian: Prefl-5. Josephus: AJ 18. 
258. Trajan: Cass. Dio 68. 29. 2. Marcus Aurelius: Cass. Dio 71. 20. 1-2. Constantine: Whittaker 
(2004) p. 46. 
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'the whole world', were grounded in the physical reality of the Empire. Plausible 
analyses using archaeological data have sought to demonstrate that the practicality of 
supply routes from the Mediterranean littoral were relevant to the process of territorial 
expansion. The use of the globe on coin types indicating the power of particular 
emperors reinforced this point (Plate 7 ii and iii). It might be possible to argue that the 
globe, as a symbol, could have been used to represent the otherwise difficult to portray 
abstract concept of psychological domination. However, in the context of a general 
survey of ancient imperialism, Gamsey and Whittaker provided the caution that 
conquerors seldom explain their behaviour by simple reference to a desire to conquer 
and dominate. Far more likely are the use of 'ritual justifications and pretexts', often 
involving retaliation for real or manufactured injuries, a need to establish security or 
even a desire to bring the gifts of civilization to those perceived as lacking them.^ ^ 
These complexities have provided the basis for analyses that viewed the Roman 
Empire as the accidental result of defensive and reactive actions, rather than of a 
deliberate imperialism. Such ideas can be traced back to Mommsen in the nineteenth 
century and have been much debated. While it is fair to caution against a view that 
seeks to establish either aggression or defence as the explanation for all Rome's wars, 
the underlying dominance/subservience thesis would certainly suggest that the former 
was the norm. In fact, in the wider terms of that thesis, as it applies to the nature of 
Roman politics, competition within the elite could lead to arguments against war, or 
for its delay, in order to finstrate a particular individual's attempt to gain glory from 
military conflict. This competition is discussed in the next section. Looking beyond 
Roman imperialism, to the deeper springs of political action, even such a renowned 
proponent of the 'accidental Empire' thesis as Badian was in little doubt about the 
underlying ethos: 
'Nothing could be fiirther from the truth than to suppose that the Roman 
oligarchy felt a moral repugnance towards aggression and domination or 
believed in the co-existence of equal and fiilly sovereign states'.^ '' 
- Ihscriptions: Wann, J.E. (1979) p. 177. Triumph: Plut. Pomp. 35. LudiSaeculares and the Latins: 
Harris p. 120-122, 265-266; OCD3 p. 821. Orbem terrarum: Lintott (1981) p. 53. Supply routes: see 
Fulford. Ritual justifications : Gamsey and Whittaker p. 4. 
Debate: North (1981); Rich (1993) p. 38-44. Caution: ibid. p. 65. Arguments against war: ibid. p. 
53. Ethos of aggression: Badian (1968) p. 4. 
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Whatever the precise role of territorial expansion, it is clear that the acquisition of 
moveable wealth played an important role in Roman conquest. Descriptions of 
Republican and Imperial triumphs emphasising booty are reinforced by prominent 
depictions such as that on the Arch of Titus (Plate 8). However, the principles that 
underlay Rome's imperialist ideology can be illustrated from Plutarch's biography of 
Cato the Censor. That sternest and most austere of moralists was said to have been 
inspired by the example of the early third century consul, Manius Curius. Offered gold 
as a bribe by the Samnites, (who had not unreasonably been encouraged to do so when 
they came upon him cookirig a meal of turnips!), Curius had responded by declaring 
that 
'...he thought that a more honourable thing than the possession of gold 
was the conquest of its possessors.' 
The basic point was reinforced fi-om the entirely different and anything but austere 
standpoint of Scipio Africanus. Attacked by Cato, then a young man, for wasting 
public money, the great general retorted that 
'...he had no time for a parsimonious quaestor when the winds were 
bearing him under full sail to the war; he owed the city an account of his 
achievements, not of its moneys.' 
Besides the declared relegation of financial matters to a minor role, the two stories 
shared another important feature, the elevation of conquest and military dominance to 
be the primary concem.^ ^ 
The establishment of dominance/subservience as the only appropriate relationship 
between Rome and other peoples can be seen from many examples. Its status as an end 
in itself will be seen to reflect the power relationship that existed between Roman 
rulers and all their subjects. The diplomatic contacts during 58 BCE between Julius 
Caesar and the Suebic king, Ariovistus, provided a good example of the pursuit of 
domination/subservience as a goal. In following an established pattern of acting in 
defence of an ally of Rome, in this case the Aedui, Caesar recorded his view that their 
enslavement by Ariovistus was 'a disgrace to himself and his country'. In addition to 
the physical danger posed to Roman territory by the powerful monarch, Caesar listed 
as a reason for action that, 'Ariovistus personally had behaved with quite intolerable 
Booty : Plut. Aem. 22. 5 ; Tac. Ann. 2. 41. 2. Cato and Scipio: Plut. Cat. Mai. 2.2 and 3. 6. 
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arrogance and pride'. As far as Rome was concerned, any foreign individual or people 
that was not displaying satisfactorily meek responses to the Empire's greatness must 
have been indulging in arrogance (arrogantia/superbia). The threat or use of force was 
the only suitable response, but whatever was done, the important goal was a restoration 
of respect and prestige. In Caesar's account of a later episode, the revohs of 54-53 
BCE, intimidation, persuasion, personal prestige and tribal reputation were given 
prominence as motives and methods of operation. A refusal by the leaders of the 
Senones to obey Caesar's personal command to appear before him was crucial both in 
determining his own reaction and in emboldening the Gauls. Even the flight of a 
potential opponent could be interpreted as an affront that required the most violent 
response. Thus, when Ambiorix of the Euburones 
'...fled in terror and so could not be forced into submission, Caesar 
thought that the next best way of obtaining the satisfaction that his 
honour demanded was to strip the country of inhabitants, cattle and 
buildings'. 
Perhaps it can be argued that it was resentment at Caesar's personal appropriation of 
this attitude and his application of it to Roman politics that led to his death.^ ^ 
Personal honour and conflict: the individual 
Our ancient sources were far readier than modem historians to represent history as 
being impelled by the ambitions, fears and calculations of individuals or of groups. 
Examples range from the collective emotions of whole communities to the cravings of 
particular characters. In the former category mutual fear was identified as the adhesive 
holding together the competing elements of the tripartite Roman constitution; it is 
interesting that works as far apart in date and type as Polybius and the SHA draw 
attention to this factor. Velleius Paterculus laid an emphasis on fear as a driving force 
of political developments. He suggested that alarm at the prospect of further civil war 
in 82 BCE overcame the people's dread of a dictator's powers; thus, it sanctioned the 
revival of an office last used in other fearfril times, namely those of Hannibal's 
invasion of Italy. As a Greek model, another sort of fear, that of disgrace, was seen to 
function for the Spartans as 'the chief support of their civil polity', A third variety,Tear^ 
of domination from outside the community, was identified as the Spartans' overriding 
Julius Caesar: Mattem p. 182; B.Gail. 1. 33. Superbia and the Roman response: Mattem p. 175. 
Senones:B. Gall. 5. 54; Doyle p. 30. Ambiorix: ibid. 8. 24. 
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reaction to the growth of Athenian power in the mid fifth century BCE. A good 
example of the emotions of a single person being seen as the driver of events was 
Antony's 'mad desire to be first and greatest', an all-consuming personal ambition 
'...which led him to war against all mankind, as it had led Alexander 
before him, and Cyrus of old...an insatiable love of power'. 
In the prefatory comments to his sweeping survey of Roman civil conflicts in the 
period between the Gracchi and Augustus, Appian could hardly have been clearer in 
his focus upon individual ambition and the ruthless pursuit of glory as motivators for 
the politics of the whole era. He commended his history, stating that it 
'...is well worth the study of those who wish to know the measureless 
ambition of men, their dreadful lust for power, their unwearying 
perseverance, and the countless forms of evil.'^^ 
The strength and ubiquity of these emotions and desires were emphasised by Plutarch. 
Marius, rival to Sulla over the leadership of the campaign against Mithridates, was 
described as being '...possessed by ambition and a mad desire for fame, those never 
ageing passions'. It does not seem unreasonable to advocate the integration of emotion, 
reason and action as features of the Roman world-view. Polybius certainly seemed to 
be heading towards such an analysis in the opening chapters of Book 3, in which he 
expanded on his initial preface regarding the scope of his work. He stated as a fact that 
wars were not undertaken without a purpose. To explain this he drew a parallel with 
other activities, such as the arts and crafts or sailmg on the sea, which he claimed were 
only taken on '...for the sake of the pleasure, honour or advantage' to be gained. 
Unfortunately, despite his advertised intention to examine these factors as they applied 
to Roman expansion, Polybius never really got beyond the obvious fact of that 
expansion; he largely failed to illuminate its stimulus. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
reasons of personal drive and ambition could have fallen within the boundaries of the 
author's proposed motivations. Plutarch certainly placed these elements in the 
foreground of his characters' reasons for action. He linked noble deeds on behalf of the 
state with a desire for personal glory. As an exception that proved the rule, Cato the 
" Fear: Polyb. 6. 18; SHA Tac. 2. 2; Veil. Pat. 2. 28. 2; Hahm p. 474; Plut. Cleom. 8; Thuc. I . 23, 88. 
Ambition: Plut. Anl. 6. 3; App. B Civ. 1. 6. 
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Younger was described as being unusual in wishing to emulate his great grandfather's 
service to Rome without the accompanying desire for personal recognition.^ ^ 
Rivalry between individuals for personal honour could be viewed as a mechanism 
driving towards the goal of virtue. Plutarch ascribed to natural philosophers the notion 
that 
' . . . i f strife and discord should be banished from the universe, the 
heavenly bodies would stand still, and all generation and motion would 
cease in consequence of the general harmony.' 
In order to counteract this stagnation, so it was claimed, Agesilaus, the Spartan law-
giver had 
'...introduced the spirit of ambition and contention into his civil polity 
as an incentive to virtue, desiring that good citizens should always be 
somewhat at variance and in conflict with one another'. 
Relevant here is an attempt by Velleius Paterculus to analyse a phenomenon he 
claimed to have identified; namely, that the most eminent men in a number of fields of 
endeavour, such as philosophy, literature and oratory, tended to appear during the same 
narrow period of time. Neither the truth of this perception nor the examples that he 
cited need detain us. Of interest is his speculation about the psychological mechanism 
that could be in operation. Fuelled by a combination of envy and admiration, a man 
would attempt to emulate a genius. However, finding the task to be impossible, he 
would divert his efforts into another area, being unable to tolerate anything less than 
pre-eminence. Lack of debate, struggle and effort could indicate weakness and 
complacency rather than true concord. On the other hand, Plutarch also warned that 
'...excessive rivalries are injurious to states, and productive of great perils'. Ostensibly 
the problems alluded to were those of first century BCE Rome, as evidenced by 
Plutarch's consistently apocalyptic references to them. However, as always, an 
analysis of contemporary political realities must also be assumed.^ ^ 
A perspective that focuses on personal motivation and emotion can lead to what 
appears to be rather over-heated language. Barton, for example, described emotions as 
'Mad Desire': Plut. Sull. 7. 1. Possible motives: Polyb. 3. 4; Harris p. 1; Raaflaub (1996) p. 278-
279. Desire for glory as the norm: Plut. Cat. Min. 8. 1-2. 
" Rivalry as a positive force: Plut. Ages. 5. 3-4; Veil. Pat. 1. 16. 2-17. 7. Dangers of excessive rivalry: 
see, for example, Plutarch's broadside at 5M//. 12. 6-9. 
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'...moving forces, motives, the sources of energy and action'. Nevertheless, perhaps 
the temperature of the prose is appropriate to the object of warming up the debate and 
giving enhanced attention to the passions of individuals as motives for political 
actions. This must certainly have been the view of Bertrand de Jouvenel as he argued 
for the role of egoism in the conceptualisation of power. In commenting on attempts to 
remove it from academic debate on the matter, he declared: 
'The chimera of elimination (of egoism) has been increasingly pursued 
by minds whose limited range is only equalled by their good intentions'. 
While such language may not be altogether necessary, attention to the role of 
psychological domination as an underlying motivator should refocus analysis of the 
ancient material.'*"' 
The rivalry between Julius Caesar and Pompey provides a fiiiitful area to explore this 
idea. Both Lucan and Plutarch explained the reasons for the conflict between Caesar 
and Pompey in the clearest of personal terms. Plutarch indicated that the clash had long 
been inevitable and that after the third contender, Crassus, had been killed by the 
Parthians in 53 BCE 
' . . . i t remained for him who would be greatest to put down him who 
was, and for him who was the greatest, i f he would not be put down, to 
take off in time the man he feared.' 
In the more succinct language of a poet, Lucan encapsulated the same idea: 
'Caesar cannot now bear anyone ahead 
nor Pompey any equal'. 
With a focus upon Pompey, Velleius Paterculus commented that the general 
'...from the time when he first took part in public life, could not brook 
an equal at all. In imdertakings in which he should have been merely the 
first he wished to be the only one. No one was ever more indifferent to 
other things or possessed a greater craving for glory...' 
Caesar at the Rubicon has been characterised as no less dominated by personal 
motivation. Appian had him express this in the most extreme manner: 
'"...to leave this stream uncrossed will breed manifest distress for me; 
to cross it, for all mankind." Thereupon, he crossed in a rush.' 
Language: Barton p. 2 and passim; de Jouvenel p. 109-110. 
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The sources certainly provide support for the idea that Caesar took this step 
reluctantly, forced into it by the perceived certainty of prosecution in the courts i f he 
laid down his military command. However, this argument does not reflect the reality of 
his ambition and behaviour both before and after he became dominant. Plutarch 
indicated the emotional temperature of the political struggle, describing Caesar as 
crossing the stream '.. .with a sort of passion, as i f abandoning calculation'.'*" 
Elsewhere in his Lives Plutarch gave prominence to the theme of personal rivalry as a 
driver of political action. In fact his chosen format of paired subjects itself promoted 
the idea of competition; each individual given a separate treatment, followed by a 
synkrisis (comparison) of the two. Examples of rivalries abound. Themistocles and 
Aristides were depicted as in conflict fi-om the beginning about the 'desire to be first'. 
Even when they put their differences aside when facing the Persian invasion of 480 
BCE their reconciliation was such as to recognise and redirect their competition. 
Themistocles is made to say; 
" I should not have wished, O Aristides, to find thee superior to me here; 
but I shall try to emulate thy fair beginning, and to surpass thee in my 
actions". 
Marcus Manlius was said to have attempted to pervert the political process expressly 
because legitimate politics were dominated by his rival, Camillus. Pericles adjusted 
both his political outlook and style of life in order to facilitate his rivalry with Cimon. 
Pompey's 'innate ambition and love of power' was ftielled by his 'enmity towards 
LucuUus', thus demonstrating a view of political aspiration and personal rivalry as two 
sides of the same coin. That 
'...bitter and incurable hatred between Marius and Sulla, which nearly 
brought Rome to ruin...' 
had its origins in jealousy over personal glory. Coriolanus' pride and the challenge of 
perceived ingratitude to his sense of personal worth could impel him to turn on his 
own City.'"^ 
"" Caesar and Pompey: Plut. Caes. 23. \ ;Luc. 1. 125-126; Veil. Pat. 2. 33. 3. Rubicon: App. B Civ. 2. 
35; Suet. Jul. 30; Stanton p. 68-69; Plut. Caes. 32. 
'"^  Themistocles and Aristides: Them. 3. l;Anst. 8. 2-5. Marcus Manlius: Cam. 36. 2-7. Pericles: 
Per. 7. 3-4. Pompey and Lucullus: Pomp. 30. 6. Marius and Sulla: Mar. 10. Coriolanus: Livy 2. 35; 
Plut Cor. 23. 
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In some contexts the idea that a prominent man could have a rival was introduced 
without explanation, presumably because it was deemed to need none. If competition 
with another could not readily be identified, individuals could be portrayed as being 
motivated to surpass their own earlier achievements. Objects of rivalry could be quite 
vague, but nevertheless pursued with strong emotion. Sulla's '...inexorable passion for 
the capture of Athens' was explained by his '...fighting with a sort of ardour against 
the shadow of the city's former glory.' The robustness of psychological domination as 
a motivator and focus of self-identity can be demonstrated from a different angle in the 
case of Fabius Maximus. During his dictatorship in 217 BCE, the Romans appointed 
the master of horse, Minucius Rufus, to be a second dictator. This amounted to the 
clearest of political rebuffs as 
'...the people supposed that (Fabius) would feel shorn of strength and 
altogether humble'. 
However, Fabius simply refiised to perceive the action as a personal rejection, 
preferring to view it solely as a mistake on the part of the citizens. Thus his sense of 
psychological supremacy was undamaged. The drive to surpass both others' and his 
own achievements was thus portrayed as an expected element in the persona of any 
great man. For Plutarch this rule was demonstrable in its rare exceptions. He made 
much of co-operation between the Thebans, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, in sharing 
the leadership of their state without the usual '...mutual dissensions, envyings and 
jealousies'. Brutus was described as being exceptional in the political purity of his 
motives for assassinating Caesar; his fellow conspirators were involved because 'they 
hated and envied' the dictator. This last example is interesting in that Plutarch felt the 
need to add a discussion of the ethical balance between personal and public motives. In 
the Synkrisis of Brutus and Dion, the author explicitly asked whether Caesar's evident 
goodwill towards Brutus and the lack of a personal cause made the assassin's act more 
or less praiseworthy. Although Plutarch came down in favour of the public rather than 
the private grievance, the fact that he asked the question at all showed the power of 
personal rivalry as an accepted motive.'**^  
No explanation: Cat. Mai. 11. Motivation to surpass own achievements: Cim. 13. 3; Caes. 58. 2. 
Sulla: 5M//. 13. 1. Fabius Maximus: Fab. Max. 10. 1-2. Drive to excel: Cor. 4. 1. Exceptions: Pel. 4. 2-
3; Brut. 29.5; Synk. 3. 3-6. 
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Plutarch's early second century CE account of the Hellenistic ruler Demetrius strongly 
accented the desire for personal domination over rivals, and its operation in war and 
dynastic struggles. Demetrius was defeated by the more experienced Ptolemy, who 
promptiy returned to the young man his captured friends and personal possessions. The 
motivation provided to Demetrius by this reverse was said to be the feeling of 
indebtedness it engendered, rather than any desire for revenge or concern about the 
strategic situation. His father, Antigonus, specifically '...not wishmg to humble or 
curtail the spirit of his son' allowed Demetrius to fight again. Ptolemy's general, 
Cilles, portrayed as '...looking down upon him because of his previous defeat,' was 
nevertheless surprised and himself defeated by the young man. Demetrius was 
described as being: 
'...delighted, not so much with the wealth and glory which his victory 
brought, as with the power it gave him to recompense the kindness and 
return the favour of Ptolemy.' 
Again, the wealth gained by Antigonus and Demetrius in wars against barbarians was 
used to win glory and honour from the Greeks, the goodwill of the Athenians being 
seen as more valuable than physical possession of the city. To drive home the point, 
Plutarch applied this analysis to the rivalry between Julius Caesar and Pompey after 
the death of Crassus in Parthia in 53 BCE. In a rhetorical flourish, the author, quotmg 
Homer, recounted that even the chief gods, Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto, had divided 
authority over the universe into three domains; the rival generals, however, '...did not 
think the Roman dominion enough for themselves, who were but two'. Elsewhere 
Plutarch had Caesar suggest that the ambition to exceed the achievements of others 
was the driving force, rather than any depersonalised political aims. When passing 
through a particularly impoverished looking village in the Alps the Roman leader 
remarked, ' I would rather be first here than second at Rome'. Clearly, this example 
demonstrates that all such statements should be handled with care. Whether the 
comment was authentically Caesar's or was mvented by Plutarch, its purpose was to 
add rhetorical weight to any estimate of the fiiture dictator's ambition, rather than to be 
taken literally. At a more specific level the fruits of victory were also subsidiary to 
more directly psychological matters in Plutarch's accoiint of the behaviour of Nicias 
after defeating the Corinthians in 425 BCE. Contrary to the report of Thucydides that 
the Athenian general set up a trophy after his victory, Plutarch stated that he did not do 
so. The reason given was that he had had to petition the beaten Corinthians in order to 
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obtain the bodies of two Athenians left behind on the field after the normal truce for 
the collection of the dead. The biographer spelled out the issue as being that 
'...by usage and unwritten law...petitioners do not possess the field, 
since they cannot take what they want'. 
It is perhaps significant that Thucydides, from a purely Greek and closely 
contemporary perspective, made nothing of this matter, while it did seem important to 
Plutarch fi-om his perspective as a witness to Roman power at its height. To illustrate 
his understanding of Rome, the biographer recorded the care and sensitivity with 
which he studied Latin literature. However, he claimed that this had only been possible 
after he left the City and Italy, because while there he had been occupied with official 
duties. Such a claim, alongside his du-ect writings on political matters, reinforces 
confidence in him as an observer of Roman politics. It also adds weight to 
interpretations of his Lives as being likely to reflect those observations.'"'* 
Cassius Dio was another Greek commentator on Rome who was informed by an 
intimate acquaintance with its elite politics. He, too, demonstrated the extent to which 
personal rivalry was embedded in that system. One way in which he did this was to 
illustrate its relevance even to the excesses of the apparently most self-absorbed 
emperors. Thus Gains was described as boasting that his pointless bridge of boats in 
the Bay of Naples exceeded the length of those built by Darius and Xerxes, and that 
the calm weather in which it was constructed indicated his mastery over Neptune 
himself Suetonius suggested a range of other possible motives and his choice of the 
term 'spectacle' to describe the enterprise perhaps gives it a saner colouring. 
Nevertheless, arguments that details of the affair suggest Gains' desire to emulate 
Alexander seem convmcing and bring us back to the central idea of rivalry. Nero, said 
to have deliberately set out to surpass Gains in immorality, was provided with an 
explicit justification in the language of personal rivalry: 
'...for he held it to be one of the obligations of the imperial power not 
to fall behind anybody else even in the basest deeds'. 
Demetrius and Antigonus: Plut. Demetr. 5. 2-6. 3 and 8. 1-2; Kralli p. 117-118. Pompey and 
Caesar: Pomp. 53. 6-7. Caesar in the Alps: Caes. 11.2. Nicias: Nic. 6. 5-6; Thuc. 4. 44. Plutarch and 
Rome: Dem. 2. 2-3. 
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Perhaps the unreasonable extreme of a desire to excel beyond all others was reached in 
the description of Commodus' desire to be termed ^Exsuperatorius\ As explained, 
with appropriate editorial comment, the purpose of this title was 
'...to indicate that in every respect he surpassed absolutely all mankind 
superlatively; so superlatively mad had the abandoned wretch become.' 
In relation to Galba, Cassius Dio made the same general point about an emperor's 
requirement to surpass all others, this time in a positive context. The new ruler was 
praised for suppressing Nero's bodyguards, refusing Praetorian demands for more 
money and for resisting clamour to execute particular henchmen of Nero. The terms of 
this praise centred on both personal characteristics and the need to dominate. By his 
actions Galba was said to have shown commendable vigour and his belief that '...an 
emperor should submit to compulsion in nothing'. In the course of writing about 
Roman affairs, yet another Greek made the ubiquitous nature of rivalry perfectly 
explicit. At the first sign of threat to the joint rule of Balbinus and Pupienus Maximus, 
Herodian commented: 
'...so great is the desire for sole rule and so contrary to the usual 
practice is it for the sovereignty to be shared that each undertook to 
secure the imperial power for himself alone.' 
It may also be possible that in some instances our ancient sources failed to indicate the 
relevance of personal rivalry as a motivator of imperial actions. For example, both 
Cassius Dio and Herodian emphasised Septimius Severus' general desire for glory. 
However, neither author related that emperor's forlorn efforts to capture the fortress 
city of Hatra to the earlier failed attempts of a model conquering emperor, Trajan. The 
plausibility of this suggestion must certainly be reinforced by the date in 198 on which 
Septimius chose to take the title 'Parthicus Maximus'' (1%^ January). This was the 
precise centenary of the accession of the optimus princeps.^^^ 
In relation to the foregoing account of ancient rulers' determination to monopolise 
power, and of Roman emperors' inability to countenance rivals, some consideration is 
called for of the circumstances in which the Imperial authority was apparently shared 
between two or more individuals. Perhaps rooted in the Roman tradition of double and 
Gains: Gas. Dio 59. 17. 11; Suet. Calig. 19; Malloch (2000b) p. 215. Nero: Cass. Dio 61. 5. 1. 
Commodus: ibid. 72. 15. 4. Galba: ibid. 64. 3. 2-3. Balbinus/Pupienus: Herodian 8. 8. 4. Severus and 
glory: Cass Dio 75. 2. 3-4; Herodian 3. 9. 1. Hatra and Trajan: Birley (1988) p. 130-133. 
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multiple magistracies, the supremacy of the emperors had shown itself capable of 
manifestation in more than one person at a time since the latter part of the dominance 
of Augustus himself On his adoption in 4 CE, the exceptional powers granted to 
Tiberius, a wide imperium and tribunicia potestas for ten years, effectively made him 
'co-regent as well as heir' to the sixty-six year old princeps. There can be little doubt 
that Titus, twenty-nine years old in 69 CE and already an experienced military 
commander, played a substantial political role in the accession of his father. In 71 he 
was granted similar powers to those of Tiberius. With a setting at the siege of 
Jerusalem in the previous year, Josephus gave the younger man a speech in which he 
referred to Vespasian and himself as emperors. Pliny recorded 'the sharing of 
authority' between Nerva and Trajan. The complex dynastic arrangements dictated by 
Hadrian meant that Marcus Aurelius was effectively marked for the succession from 
the beginning of the reign of Antoninus Pius. In 147 CE he received from his adoptive 
father the Imperial titles and powers noted above. From that point, and probably even 
more so on the death in 156/157 of the long-serving Praetorian prefect, Gavius 
Maximus, Marcus was de facto co-emperor. Lucius Verus went one step further and 
held the formal position of joint emperor with Marcus Aurelius. As a final example, 
and demonsfration of the apparent practical sharing of power, first Maximian in 286 
and then Galerius and Constantius in 293 joined Diocletian to form a Tefrarchy of 
emperors. 
However, in all of these cases there can have been no contemporary doubt and there is 
no historical uncertainty that one individual was dominant. Regardless of titles and 
honours, Augustus and Marcus Aurelius clearly possessed greater auctoritas, that 
diffuse but decisive quality of authority and influence, than their colleagues. The first 
princeps could hardly have stressed more this featvire of his rule, making it part of the 
climax of his Res Gestae. In all the examples cited, there was a 'senior' partner who 
had initiated the elevation of a colleague or colleagues. It is true that in the case of 
Nerva the adoption and appointment to full powers of Trajan came about after a year of 
the former's militarily unsteady and brief reign. Nevertheless, for the final year before 
his death, Nerva retained the formal trappings of power and was freated with the 
Double magistracies: Williams, S. p. 48-49. Tiberius: Levick (1999a) p. 49. Titus: Levick (1999b) 
p. 185; Joseph. BJ 6. 341. Trajan: Plin Pan. 6.4-5. Marcus: SHA Marc. 6. 6; Birley (1987) p. 103, 
112. Lucius Verus: SHA Verus. 3. 8-4. 1. Tetrarchy: Williams, S. p. 64; Aur. Vict. Caes. 39. 
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utmost posthumous respect. In relation to honours and position, it must also be noted 
from coin and epigraphic evidence that the dominant individual held the position of 
pontifex maximus, a position almost never granted to or usurped by a 
colleague/successor until the death of the principal emperor. While a possible 
exception, again suggested by coin evidence, was Diocletian's colleague, Maximian, 
this general rule may have obtained some of its strength from Augustus' refusal to take 
on the role before the death of the incumbent in 13 BCE. In addition to the blood or 
adoptive relationships of father and son that identified the seniority of Augustus, 
Vespasian and Nerva, religious and other imagery could unmistakably indicate the 
dominant individual. Thus, while the ideology of the Tefrarchy associated Diocletian 
with Jupiter, the king of the gods, Maximian was coupled with Hercules, a mere 
demigod.'^ ^ 
Reference to earlier, non-Roman examples may provide clues to the cenfral roles of 
war itself and of dominance/subservience in rulers' attitudes to their status in the eyes 
of others. At its most basic. Homer could refer to death at the hands of another as being 
brought 'to a shameful fate'. In the heat of argument, Achilles reminded Agamemnon 
that the Greeks had joined the expedition to Troy in order to win back the honour 
{time) lost by Menelaus when his wife had been abducted by Paris. In a Roman 
context, Suetonius described Caesar's dying wish to cover the lower half of his body in 
order to fall in a decent manner. To do so, the author chose to use the adverb 
'honestius', with its meanings of social and moral dignity beyond mere bodily 
propriety. Similar meanings could be conveyed by the antithesis of the Caesar 
example. In sculpture, the complete nakedness of a fallen barbarian warrior was clearly 
no accident of artistic expression. It reinforced the inferiority and moral subservience 
of the defeated enemies of Rome (Plate 9).'°^ 
It is not possible to leave the topic of rivalry between individuals without adding a 
particular caution about the nature of our literary sources. It is an inescapable feature 
of all historiography that the character and content of its material is profoundly shaped 
Auctoritas: RG 34. 3. Senior partner: Bennett p. 34-41; Cass: Dio 68. 3. 3-4. I ; Plin. Pan. 11. SHA 
Varus 4. 1; Williams, S. p. 68. Pontifex maximus: Beard, North and Price p. 188,252; Aug. RG 10. 2; 
Bennett p. 48; Birley (1987) p. 117. Religion: Pan. Lat. 10.13. 3; Williams, S. p. 58. 
Shameful fate: //. 4. 396. Menelaus' honour: //. 1. 159-160. Julius Caesar: Suet. Caes. 82. 
Honestius: Lewis and Short p. 861; Suetonius used the phrase virginis honestae vaticinatione ('the 
predictions of a noble virgin') in Galb. 9. 
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Plate 9 
Naked fallen Gauls 
by the social, political and literary context in which it is written. Focussing on the last 
of these elements, it is also reasonable to add that the historiography of Greece and 
Rome was probably at least as affected by the influences of genre as that of any other 
period. Characteristics such as deliberate evocation, emulation and competition were 
integral to its form in all eras. In the present context, again it is the last of those 
characteristics that is most relevant. Its reach can be demonstrated fi-om our earliest 
surviving fi-agments of Greek historiography. Thus, it was the unconvincing and 
inconsistent nature of earlier accounts that exercised Hecataeus: 
' . . . I write what follows as it seems to me to be true; for the stories of 
the Greeks are varied and, as is manifest to me, ludicrous'. 
Thucydides accused Hellanicus of inappropriate abbreviation and inaccuracy, while 
Herodotus backed his own view of the Trojan War as being more accurate and credible 
than Homer's. Dionysius criticised the accuracy of both his Greek and Roman 
predecessors, '...including some of the highest reputation', and claimed to provide 
new information. Polybius devoted more space and energy than most to attacks on 
other historians. Even though his preface opened with an apparent fanfare for his 
historiographical predecessors, Polybius soon had them in his sights for failing to 
provide the necessary breadth of focus. Thereafter, they are seldom safe fi"om his 
censure. He devoted most of the surviving half of Book XII to particular criticisms of 
Timaeus, employing his blunderbuss on subject matter, methodology, expression and 
bias. In passing, it is worth noting that, in a review of Greek historians, Cicero had 
Antonius praise Timaeus for being well informed, thoughtfiil and stylish. He did not 
even mention Polybius! If nothing else, this must be a reminder of the particular and 
limited perspective allowed to us by the largely random survival of such a small 
proportion of ancient historiography.'*'^  
Among Latin writers, individualized polemic was less widespread. In his artfiilly self-
effacing preface, Livy seemed keener to establish the credentials of his history in 
relation to the wide spectrum of mythological, poetic and historical genres, than to 
limit comparison to individual historians. He even included a unique call upon the 
gods to ratify his efforts. In the preface to his non-historical work, Pliny the Elder 
Genre influences: Wiseman p. 27-28. Hecataeus: FGrHist IF la, quoted in Marincola p. 225. 
Hellanicus and Trojan War: Thuc. 1. 97; Hdt. 2. 120. Dionysius: Ant. Rom. 1. 4. 2-3 and 1. 6. 1-3. 
Polybius: 1. 4. Praise of Timaeus: Cic. De or. 2. 58. 
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directly attacked a lost preface of Livy for apparently emphasizing the benefits 
accruing to the author from his writing rather than the good done to Rome. In the 
prefaces to the Annals and Histories, Tacitus worked to place in the mind of the reader 
a view of general decline in the veracity of historiography to match the decline in 
society's morals that he wished to porfray, although he rarely named other writers. 
Writing perhaps a little under three hundred years later, the author of the SHA had no 
such inhibitions. He displayed his literary credentials by evoking the language of 
Sallust to roundly condemn Gallus Antipater's flattering account of the pretender 
Aureolus. This otherwise unknown historian was described as '...the handmaiden of 
honours and the dishonour of historians'. Velleius Paterculus listed the literary 'greats' 
of earlier generations. Although this appeared to be done in a generally positive frame 
of mind, elements of rivalry could not be avoided. Catullus was described as being 
'second to none' as a poet, while it was noted of Sallust that he was 'the rival of 
Thucydides.' To express the idea of rivalry, Velleius had used the term aemulatio. 
While this can carry both the positive and negative connotations of striving to emulate 
and envious hostility, it is notable that Velleius had earlier used the same word in the 
definitely negative context of the attitude of the Carthaginians towards Rome. 
Interestingly, i f only for assessment of the author's literary merits, his comment on 
Carthage reflected none other than that of Sallust himself'"' 
Examples could be multiplied, all indicating that competition for supremacy, stated 
and un-stated, was integral to ancient historiography. Plutarch discussed this 
potentially embarrassing matter with seeming candour, while at the same time ensuring 
that an impression was left of his superiority. He devoted one of his prefaces to the 
issue, taking to task the historian Timaeus for attempting to outdo '... what Thucydides 
has inimitably set forth'. However, while decrying as 'undignified and pedantic' 
competition with other writers' language and diction, Plutarch nevertheless quietly 
claimed his own superiority in presenting 
'...those details which have escaped most writers, and which others 
have mentioned casually'. 
'" Latin polemic: Marincola p. 236. Livy : Moles (1993) p. 155-156. Call on the gods : Livy Pref. 13. 
Attack on Livy: Plin. NH. pref. 16.Antipater: SHA Claud. 5. 3-4; Sail Hist. 1. 48. 22. Velleius 
Paterculus: Veil. Pat. 2. 36. 2-3,2. 1. 1. Sallust Cat. 10; Lewis and Short p. 55; Wiedemann (2000) p. 
525. 
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Josephus was less subtle in his approach. He provided a critique of Greek historians in 
general that was comprehensively damning. They were said to lack documentary 
evidence, to be more concerned with style than accuracy, to mix mythology and 
encomium with history, and to chose their subjects for the opportimity that they 
provided 'of outshining their rivals'. It can hardly be surprising, then, that rivalry and 
competition for honour featured so heavily in the subject matter of ancient 
historiography. This begs the question of whether the literary art was narrowly 
influencing the historical accounts or whether both literature and history were 
themselves shaped by competition and personal rivalry as wider features of 
contemporary culture. While the relevance of the purely literary factor must be 
acknowledged, the evidence of this thesis would certainly support the more general 
operation of a cultural dynamic of rivalry. Other evidence of the embedded nature of 
rivalry and the need to excel in ancient society is not hard to identify. Pindar had 
celebrated the victors, not those who came second, and wiiming was the transcendent 
goal of Greek and Roman sport. It is not without significance that the vocabulary of 
sporting and military victory was indistinguishable.'" 
Personal honour and conflict: the state 
The pressing need for members of ancient elites to enhance personal honour and 
distinction made it inevitable that a matching imperative would operate between 
nations. As expressed by Brunt, 
' . . . i f glory was a proper objective for the individual, it was such no less 
for the state.' 
Ancient states jealously guarded their perceived honour, being quite willing to go to 
war in its defence. Examples could include the insult felt by Darius because of the 
Athenians' burning of Sardis, and in 395 BCE Sparta's wish to punish the 'insolence' 
of Thebes. A further example, again related to Sparta, illustrated both the connection 
between personal and 'state' honour, and the religiously based limits beyond which a 
desire for revenge should not go. After the Greek victory at Plataea in 479 BCE the 
proposal was made that the body of the dead Persian general, Mardonius, should be 
impaled in order to avenge the treatment given to the corpse of Leonidas at 
Thermopylae. The Spartan commander, Pausanias, indignantly refiised the suggestion. 
Competitive historiography: Plut. Nic. 1.1-5; Joseph. Ap. 1. 1.2-5. Sport and language: Pind. Ol. 
10. 59-75; McCormick (1986) p. 5. 
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citing both the number of Persian losses in the battle as adequate reparation for 
Thermopylae and a religious repugnance at the idea of desecrating a dead body.' 
Of course, death itself, heroic death, could be a source of honour and glory for both the 
individual and the state. In the context of Roman myth/history, the archetype was 
Marcus Curtius, who averted disaster for the city by voluntarily plunging into a chasm 
that had opened in the Forum. Significantly described as '...a young soldier of great 
prowess', it was clearly in that characterisation that he represented the necessary 
sacrifice of '...the chief strength of the Roman people.' I f the carrots of honotir and 
glory proved inadequate to motivate the desired behaviour in soldiers, then some heavy 
sticks were at hand. As part of his explanation of Roman military strength, Polybius 
duly described the system of public praise, awards and decorations that operated for 
soldiers. However, these positive motivators were outlined only after he had detailed 
the gruesome practices of court-martial and decimation. Serious indiscipline and 
desertion by individuals could be punished by the offender being beaten to death. Even 
i f as the result of 'exfreme pressure' in battle, the fleeing of a whole section of froops 
could result in the random selection of one in ten of the survivors to meet the same 
fate. Polybius commented that this was 
'.. .the best possible practice both to inspire terror and to repair the harm 
done by any weakening of their warlike spirit.' 
In the second century CE Appian could still emphasise and probably exaggerate 
decimation's positive effects on the morale and success of legions in subsequent 
combat. He indicated that a decision to decimate a large body of men, (such as Julius 
Caesar's sentence on the mutinous Ninth Legion at Placentia in 49 BCE), could lead to 
the execution of only a dozen soldiers. Nevertheless, it must be correct to view such 
practices as being mtegral to the aggressive and warlike Roman psyche. Appian went 
so far as to claim that a group of Caesar's officers actually requested that decimation 
be applied to themselves, so ashamed were they about a defeat by Pompey at 
Dyrrhachium in 48 BCE. It must be indicative of the psychological aims of both 
processes that in court-martial and decimation it was the victims' colleagues who 
carried out the brutal sentence. To emphasise the importance of military discipline on a 
smaller scale, Valerius Maximus provided the story of a consul who had a blood 
States' honour: Brunt (1990) p. 442; Hdt. 5. 105; Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 5; Lendon (2000) p. 1-2. 
Mardonius: Hdt. 7. 78-79; Lendon (2000) p. 13-14. 
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relation flogged and demoted to the infantry because a section of the camp wall for 
which he was responsible had been set on fire by the enemy. As an explanation for the 
even stricter action of T. Manlius Torquatus, who executed his own son for fighting 
victoriously, but against orders, Cicero could moralise that, 'Honour and esteem are 
the strongest guarantees of security in life.' In a similar vein, Sulla conveyed moral as 
well as practical advice to his troops when he said '...the less you strive to avoid 
danger the safer you will be.' At the level of the individual soldier, Josephus provided 
an example of Roman expectations. A cavalryman, who had been captured by the Jews 
during the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE, managed to escape. On returning to his own 
side, he was judged to be '...unfit to be a Roman soldier after being taken alive', and 
was dismissed from the legion, '...a penalty to one with any sense of shame severer 
than death.' The correct Roman behaviour in such circumstances was firmly 
established in the story of M. Atilius Regulus. Defeated and captured by the 
Carthaginians in 255 BCE, he was sent back to Rome by the victors to offer peace and 
a prisoner exchange. Under oath to return to Carthage with the senate's response, 
Regulus argued successfully against any such settlement. He then duly returned to 
Afiica where he was tortured and killed. In his poetic rendition of the tale, Horace 
encapsulated its military moral: 
'... Wool with dye once doctored 
Never regains its initial colour; 
True valour likewise once it is thrown away. 
You'll never replace in the degenerate.'"^ 
The behaviour of the senate after the disaster at Cannae in 216 BCE perhaps provided 
the clearest indication that this moral lesson had been internalised and that even defeat 
could be used to establish psychological supremacy. Hannibal had captured 8,000 
Roman troops and returned a delegation of them to negotiate a ransomed release. After 
heated debate it was decided not to ransom the captives and to return the delegates to 
Hannibal. In Polybius' account the senate was credited with having deliberately 
coimtered the Carthaginians' hope, not only for money, but for a diminution of Rome's 
fighting spirit. He offered the view that 
Marcus Curtius: Livy 7. 6. 1-5; Val. Max. 5. 6. 2. Military motivators: Polyb. 6. 36-39; App. B 
Civ. 1. 118-119, 2. 47, 2. 63; Shelton p. 349-350. Camp wall: Val. Max. 2. 7. 4. Manlius Torquatus: 
Flor. 1. 14. 1-2; Cic. Fin. 1. 35. Sulla: Sail. lug. 107. Jerusalem: Joseph. BJ6. 360-362. Regulus: Livy 
Per. 18; Eutr. 2. 25; Hor. Cam. 3. 5. 27-30. 
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'...Hannibal experienced less joy from his victory than disappointment, 
when he saw with amazement the unshaken resolve and the lofty spirit 
which the Romans showed in their resolutions.' 
Polybius used this story as a fitting conclusion to his detailed analysis of the strengths 
of the Roman constitution. Although he did not make the point so explicitly, Livy also 
underscored the story's implied significance for Roman morale and its focus on 
psychological dominance. He achieved this in three ways: firstly by identifying the 
main senatorial speaker against the ransom as T. Manlius Torquatus, clearly evoking 
the steadfast spirit of that individual's iconic ancestor; secondly by stressing the fact 
that military manpower was precisely what Rome lacked after Cannae, thus focussing 
attention on the senate's higher motives; and thirdly by recording the positive 
reception given to the remnant of the army that had fought its way back to Rome after 
the battle. Livy concluded his account of these events by stressing the psychological 
dimension, stating that the consul, C. Terentius Varro, who led these troops, was 
praised for '...not having despaired of the commonwealth'. As expressed by Valerius 
Maximus, Hannibal '...battered the Romans' strength rather than broke their spirit'. 
Plutarch stressed the psychological aspect of an earlier Roman setback. After defeat by 
Pyrrhus, the senate refused to sue for peace, instead agreeing that the Greek monarch 
must be 'punished for his insults' and for '...having enabled Tarantines and Samnites 
to mock at Romans'. As after Cannae, Roman prisoners who had been returned to the 
City were sent back to their captivity, thus symbolising Rome's refusal to submit.""* 
Just as defeat by a rival could become an opportunity for the restatement of Rome's 
refiisal to accept a subservient position, so too complete a victory could be identified as 
undermining the moral fibre that underpinned the City's honour and success. The 
conflict with Carthage again supplied a clear illustration. The final and complete defeat 
of the Afiican city in 146 BCE provided Sallust with a turning point in the history of 
Rome; the ethics of 'hard work and just dealing' by which: 
'Mighty kings were vanquished, savage tribes and huge nations were 
brought to their knees' 
dissolved through the subsequent easy access to wealth and leisure. The point was 
consciously echoed by Velleius Paterculus, who used it to mark the important division 
Cannae: Polyb. 6. 58; Livy 22. 62; Val. Max. 3. 2. 11; Nicolet p. 90-91. Pyrrhus: Plut. Pyrrh. 19. 3 
and 20.5. 
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between the two books of his historical work. He explicitly pointed to the lack of an 
external threat and significant rival as being the cause of decline. The requirement for 
powerful adversaries was sufficiently established that it could be used by historians to 
bolster a particular contention. Josephus supported his claims about the scale of the 
Flavian Judean war by reference to Rome's demonstrable glory and the axiomatic 
argument, ' I fail to see how the conquerors of a puny people deserve to be accounted 
great', hi the same context he underlined the strength of the Roman desire to dominate 
by a typical piece of exaggeration. The author had Titus encourage his soldiers by 
suggestmg that the Jews' motivation in fighting for 'liberty and coimtry in jeopardy' 
was inferior to that of the Romans' desire for glory and 
'.. .the determination, after having dominated the world, not to let the 
Jews be regarded as a match for ourselves.'' 
The motive of psychological domination remained much to the fore as Rome 
confi-onted a more serious opponent. With a focus on the Augustan period, Brunt 
perceived the impossibility of peacefial co-existence with Parthia. He characterised 
earlier historical judgements to the contrary as being unrealistic and '...penned in the 
heyday of League of Nations Union idealism'; Rome's right to rule was 
unquestioningly assumed by the City's elite. Thus the '...mere existence of an 
independent power was menacing in its eyes' and constituted a just cause for war. A 
recent detailed survey of Roman Imperial iconography related to Parthia has suggested 
a more nuanced and relationship. Nevertheless, Septimius Severus' motive for an 
attack on Parthia was said to have been '...a desire for glory (rather) than any real 
necessity'. In 212 Caracalla was described as the aggressor in launching such a 
campaign under a pretext, when he was '.. .in reality eager to get the Parthian kingdom 
...for himself. Perhaps the only clear exception to this analysis was Artaxerxes' 227 
CE campaign to restore the traditional maritime boundary between Asia and Europe. 
The psychological dimension of this situation was emphasised in that Severus 
Alexander, described as being predisposed to peace, 'found these affronts 
unendurable'."^ 
Defeat of Carthage: Sail. Cat. 10; Veil. Pat. 2. 1. 1. Jewish war: Joseph. BJ\.%, 3. 480. 
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The persistence of this outlook was clear, even in the face of adversity. The successes, 
diplomatic and military, of Augustus, Trajan and Lucius Verus were real but costly 
and temporary. They certainly did not match the scale of Crassus' fatal defeat at 
Carrhae in 53 BCE or the losses suffered by Antony's army in 36 BCE. Macrinus, 
although not formally defeated, was forced to come to terms after suffering severe 
losses in 217 CE. Severus Alexander's armies were badly mauled in 233. Fighting 
against Sasanid Persia during the third and fourth centuries CE involved the Roman 
Empire in a string of heavy defeats. Between the accession of Sapor I in 240 and the 
unfavourable partition of the Transcaucasus in 387 agreed by Theodosius I , a number 
of Roman emperors had tried to impose their will in the east. In spite of periodic 
successes, Gordian, Valerian, Cams, Galerius £md Julian had all experienced major 
failure and some even death in the attempt. Although control over Armenia was, as in 
earlier centuries, a particular focus of conflict, neither the territorial imperative 
represented by that area, nor any other potential material benefits appear to justify the 
effort and cost involved. 
The precise causes of individual outbreaks of war are often unclear. The emperor 
Julian, in discussing the campaigns of Constantine I , referred vaguely to the Persians 
as needing to be punished because of a '...peace they somehow contrived to disturb'. 
An explicit desire for personal glory and for the domination of a proud opponent was, 
however, clearly cited in relation to the campaigns of Julian himself in 361-363. He 
was described as being 'aroused' to punish the Persians for their past 'misdeeds' and, 
'inflamed besides with...a longing for war', it was said that he '...burned to add to the 
tokens of his glorious victories the surname Parthicus.^ This assessment of motive 
paralleled that of Cassius Dio's judgement regarding Trajan's eastern ambitions. The 
not unusual 'pretext' of Persian wrong-doing in Armenia was dismissed and the real 
reason stated as the Emperor's 'desire to win renown'. The prominence of a desire for 
personal domination and glory as motivators for Rome's relations with other nations is 
particularly clear when an overview is taken of the actual conflicts with Parthia/Persia. 
As illustrated above. Brunt portrayed the relationship between two empires as that of 
Augustus: Suet. AuglO. Trajan: Cass. Dio 68. 28. 4-29. 4. Lucius Verus: Cass. Dio: 71. 3. 1. l ; 
Birley (1987) p. 141-142. Crassus: App. B Civ. 2. 18. Antony: Cass. Dio 49. 28. 1-4; Veil. Pat. 2. 82. 
1-3. Goodman p. 36-37. Macrinus: Herodian 4. 15. Severus Alexander: Herodian 6. 5.9-6.3. Defeats 
by tlie Sasanids: Howard-Johnston p. 161-162. Armenia and unclear causes: Isaac (1998) p. 438. 
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inevitable competitors. Other commentators have stressed the Roman perception of 
their eastern neighbours as potentially treacherous and requiring consistent monitoring. 
Others again have been more explicit about the direct threat perceived by the Romans. 
However, it is instructive to note that the Romans were preponderantly the aggressors, 
a role consonant with their general motivation as outlined here. In this instance Brunt 
again noted the difficulty experienced by some earlier historians in accepting the 
unequivocal ancient attestations for this type of explanation. He went on to suggest 
that the glory to be won by dominating others was so far the most prized goal that it 
could often be left un-stated. Thus when in 6 CE a revolt in Pannonia caused Tiberius 
to delay a planned campaign against Maroboduus, King of the Marcomarmi, Velleius 
Paterculus could state without commentary that: 'Thereupon, glory was sacrificed to 
necessity'. In relation to motivation, it is worth noting the personalised nature of the 
projected war and that it had been introduced by Velleius with the apparently adequate 
reasoning that: 
'Nothing remained to be conquered in Germany except the people of the 
Marcomanni.' 
This characterisation of the basic Roman outlook is consonant with the conclusions 
reached by students of the detail of the Empire's frontiers. Whittaker has suggested 
that Roman initiatives were usually accompanied by some resource planning, 
calculation of gain to be made and the establishment of immediately limited goals. 
However, he indicated that the primary drivers of action were the more general desires 
for glory and dominance. 
From outside the Greek world instances of the link between honour, war and revenge 
can be found, also invoking an important religious element. An inscription of the 
Babylonian king Ashumasirpal II proclaimed that 
'.. .the kings of all surrounding countries came to me, embraced my feet 
and I took hostages from them', 
while in similar circumstances a text of his son and successor, Shalmaneser III , gave 
prominence to the fact that he '...paid homage to the greatness of all the great gods.' 
This link between the homage paid to kings by subjects/other rulers and the required 
Constantine: Julian Or. 1. 18B. Julian: Amm. Marc. 22. 12. 1-2. Trajan: Cass. Dio 68. 17. 1; Brunt 
(1990) p. 441. Overview: Campbell (1993) p. 216-220; Luttwak p.18-19; Cornell (1993) p. 144; Isaac 
(1992) p. 28-33. Tiberius: Veil. Pat. 2. 110. 3,2. 108. 1; Brunt (1990) p. 454. Frontier studies: 
Whittaker (2004) p. 33-37. 
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respect given to the gods may have operated in two ways. Firstly, it evoked the idea of 
the special personal relationship between the king and his people's gods or at least the 
divine source of the monarch's authority. Secondly, regardless of any actual or implied 
claims to personal divinity on the part of a monarch, the fact remained that paying 
honour and homage to the gods was the only real medium of respectful relationship 
open to humans. A god could not benefit from the tangible 'gifts' made to him, all such 
offerings being ultimately symbolic of deference/subservience. Thus, for a human ruler 
to be in receipt of such personal deference from other humans was indeed the highest 
possible form of honour. The psychological point may have still resonated in relation to 
the Roman people's demand for subservience from other nations. Although he is not 
generally credited with profound insights, Velleius Paterculus may have had this idea 
in mind, however unconsciously, when documenting the presumably fictitious account 
of the lone German's homage to Tiberius. This individual asked for and was granted 
permission to cross the River Elbe and to see the Roman ruler. The speech provided for 
the barbarian might be read as illustrating the relationship described above; the emperor 
as god, deference as his due, and resistance is pointless: 
"Our young men are insane, for though they worship you as divine 
when absent, when you are present they fear your armies instead of 
trusting to your protection. But I , by your kind permission, Caesar, have 
today seen the gods"."^ 
The primacy of military success and domination over others may be supported by the 
fact that Victoria was the most commonly depicted personification on Roman coinage. 
However, the thesis can also be illustrated through Rome's response to defeat and the 
negative assessments of emperors who failed to establish dominance over foreign 
peoples. It had clearly impressed Polybius that, following the disaster at Cannae in 216 
BCE, the senate had judged the psychological advantage to be handed to Hannibal by 
ransoming the captured Roman troops too high a price for their return. Again in the 
aftermath of that defeat, and in spite of the threat to Rome itself, scarce military 
Babylon: Pritchard p. 275-277. Divine authority: Seneca suggested that Nero should reflect on the 
rhetorical question: 
'Have I of all mortals found favour with heaven and been chosen to serve on earth as 
vicar of the gods?' (Clem. 1. 1.2.) 
Tiberius and the German: Veil. Pat. 2. 107. 1-2. 
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resources were expended on the reduction of Capua and other Italian cities that had 
gone over to the Carthaginians. As expressed by Livy: 
'The enemy were compelled to admit the power of Rome to exact 
punishment fi-om treacherous allies.' 
After a matter-of-fact description of the various non-military means by which Tiberius 
maintained control over frontier states, Suetonius described the failures of this strategy 
after the Emperor's retirement to Capri. The author noted both the dangers of this 
situation and 'the disgrace to the Empire'. Cassius Dio condemned the sham victories 
of Domitian in Dacia, ridiculing his crowning of Diegis 
'.. .just as i f he had truly conquered and could give the Dacians anyone 
he pleased to be their king.' 
At its most serious, the failure of an emperor to establish a reputation for dominance 
over other nations led to his downfall. Compounded by the impression of his being 
ruled by his mother, the troops' discontent with Severus Alexander focussed on the 
opinion that he had 
'...directed the campaigns carelessly and timidly. They reminded each 
other of the defeats in the East which had resulted from the Emperor's 
negligence and of his failure to do anything courageous or vigorous 
when he faced the Germans.' 
Severus Alexander was overthrown by the troops. Perhaps it is no coincidence that they 
replaced him with arguably the most soldierly of all emperors, Maximinus. He spent 
the whole of his three year reign with the army, never going to Rome or meeting the 
senate. In the late fourth century, the author of the SHA demonstrated, perhaps as 
clearly as anyone, the link between military success and legitimate Imperial authority. 
He had the defeated Zenobia explain to her captor, Aurelian, the reason for her 
assumption of power in Palmyra: 
'You, I know, are an emperor indeed, for you win victories, but 
Gallienus and Aureolus and the others I never regarded as emperors. 
Believing Victoria to be a woman like me, I desired to become a partner 
in the royal power...'. '^ "^  
Victory: Mattem p. 168. Cannae: Polyb. 6. 58; Livy 26. 16. Tiberius: Suet. Tib. 37,41. Domitian: 
Cass. Dio 67. 7. 2-3. Severus Alexander: Herodian. 6. 8. 3. Maximinus: Herodian. 6. 8. 1-2; Campbell 
(1984) p. 53-55. Zenobia: SHA Tyr. Trig. 30. 23. 
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The emperor and the state 
Initiated by Augustus' gradual and carefiil progress towards an unchallenged 
monopoly of power, a process was set in train that enabled the emperors to establish a 
synthesis of their own and Rome's status and an expectation of subservience. The 
combined narratives of Tacitus and Cassius Dio exemplified this process. They 
described the problem presented to Rome by the Parthian monarch, Artabanus III . 
Loyal to Rome while he remained 'in dread of Germanicus', the king was emboldened 
by success elsewhere to despise 'Tiberius' old age as defenceless' and to 'assume 
arrogance (superbia) against us'. In a direct challenge to Rome, he installed his son as 
King of Armenia and boasted that he would match the conquests of Cyrus and 
Alexander. Responses through diplomacy and subsidy, said by Tacitus to be typical of 
Tiberius' foreign policy, partially restored the situation. However, as described by 
Cassius Dio, Artabanus was plarming to attack Syria '...since he had suffered no 
punishment for his invasion of Armenia', and the issue was only satisfactorily resolved 
under the new emperor, Gains. The legate, Lucius Vitellius, 
'...terrified the Parthian by coming upon him suddenly... and 
then...compelled him to sacrifice to the images of Augustus and 
Gains'.'^' 
A focus on Rome's assumption of dominance can help to explain actions that 
otherwise appear to defy logic. Some of the claims made about other nations can 
certainly seem extraordinary if not excessive. The idea that defeated enemies, nations 
that had become allies or even foreign rulers who had entered into treaties had in fact 
become part of her empire could be pursued to absurd lengths. Augustus' claim about 
the recovery of standards from the Parthians was elevated to one of military victory by 
its placement in the text of the Res Gestae amongst the record of conquests. Coin types 
of 20 BCE proclaiming 'Armenia Capta' similarly exaggerated any reasonable 
assessment of the situation on the ground. The idea of psychological dominance as an 
overriding motivation may also contribute to an understanding of the apparently 
disproportionate effort put into some of Rome's military exploits. For example, by 73-
74 CE the Judean revolt had been crushed. Jerusalem was destroyed in 70 and in the 
following year Vespasian and Titus had held a magnificent triumph. Nevertheless, 
Artabanus: Tac. Ann 6. 31. 1-32. 1; Cass. Dio 59. 27. 2-3. 
102 
three years later the Romans spent months besieging a few hundred remaining fanatics 
at Machaerus and on the rock of Masada, operations that required the building of 
special siege engines, encircling walls and in the latter case a massive ramp still clearly 
visible today. As far as Machaerus was concerned Josephus stated that: 
'It was absolutely necessary to destroy this fortress, for fear that its 
strength might tempt large numbers to revolt...'. 
However, he had stated only a few lines earlier that Vespasian had already established 
peace in the Empire and that the Jews were clearly beaten, a contention backed by the 
detail of the triumph. So why did the Romans expend so much effort? Josephus, 
although he does not ask himself the question explicitly, perhaps provided an answer. 
He confirmed the Roman drive to extinguish all opposition. After the fall of Masada 
'...nowhere was there an enemy left: the whole country had been 
subdued in the long war which had made itself felt by many even of the 
remotest inhabitants and had endangered their peace.' 
That such a situation was intended to be a signal to any potential rebel can hardly be 
doubted. Psychology still seems to have been the best explanation for the action at 
Masada, even from the anachronistically modem perspective of international military 
strategy. Thus, 
'...the lesson of Masada was that the Romans would pursue rebellion 
even to the mountain tops in remote deserts to destroy its last vestiges, 
regardless of cost'. 
Beyond its explicit context, such overwhelming application of force may also have 
been an example of a mindset that contributed to the ethos and reputation of Roman 
armies. It has certainly been suggested that Rome's contemporary power and influence 
seemed greater than the numerical strength of its forces would indicate. At another 
level the long pair of final speeches provided by Josephus for the Jewish leader at 
Masada, Eleazar, found him pitting the authority of the Romans against that of the 
Hebrew god. Only by committing suicide, he successfially argued, could his followers 
establish their obedience to an ultimately victorious deity and thus avoid domination 
by the Romans. Josephus appeared to be suggesting that the power of Rome could be 
matched only by that of a deity. "^ ^ 
'^ ^ Claims: RG 29.2; Lintott (1981) p. 65; Cas. Dio 54. 9. Jerusalem: Joseph. BJ 6. 403ff. Triumph: 
ibid 7. 121-157. Machaerus: Joseph 7. 163-209. Masada: ibid 7. 304flF; Luttwak p. 4. Suicide: Joseph. 
7. 320-388, especially 386-387; Hansen p. 68-69. 
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Pliny the Younger deplored the situation in which the enemies of Rome had 'lifted up 
their heads' and dared to propose peace on equal terms. Trajan, the subject of his 
panegyric, had rectified this state of affairs: 
'Now once more terror is in their midst; our enemies are afraid and crave 
permission to obey commands...The prayers and entreaties are on the 
other side, for us to grant or refuse at wi l l . . . ' . 
The longevity of the values here on show can be illustrated by the circumstances of the 
death of Valentinian I in 375 CE. He was reported to have been struck down by a fit of 
apoplectic indignation at the audacity of a delegation of Quadi voicing complaints 
about the building of Roman fortifications on the tribe's land. In a reversal of normally 
accepted Romem values, Tacitus had his British resistance leader, Calgacus, 
characterise as 'theft, murder and rape' the imperium that threatened the liberty of the 
island. Making the most of his rhetorical coup, the historian emphasised the upturned 
ideals of empire as, 'They make a desert and call it peace'. Set the right way up, the 
Roman ideological formulation had no difficulty in this area. Seneca suggested for 
Nero the thought that 
'...all those many thousands of swords which my peace restrains will be 
drawn at my nod', 
while Pliny the Elder encapsulated the thought as the '...boundless grandeur of the 
Roman peace'.'^ ^ 
Composed during the confident period of the High Empire, Plutarch's biographies 
must necessarily reflect contemporary Imperial attitudes. It is therefore significant that 
he emphasised psychological dominance as a major aspect of his subjects' motivation 
and successes. In relation to achievement he compared Cimon unfavourably with 
LucuUus because whereas the former had 
'...easily conquered the bodies of men whose spirits had been defeated 
beforehand...when Tigranes encountered Lucullus, he had known no 
defeat in many battles, and was in exultant mood'. 
Writing in direct praise of Imperial achievements, the late second century CE historian 
Florus gave a clear indication of the Roman attitude towards other peoples. The 
Trajan: Plin. Pan. 11. 5-12.2. Valentinian: Amm. Marc. 30. 6. 2-6. Reversed values: Tac. Agr. 30. 
Nero: Sen. Clem. 1.1.2. Roman peace: Plin. NHIT. 3; Woolf (1993). 
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conquest of territories that 'served no practical purpose' (which he identified as 
Armenia and Britain), was nevertheless worthwhile in that it added to Imperial 
prestige. He referred to 
'.. .the proud and haughty necks of the nations, not yet accustomed to the 
reins of servitude...' 
and to the fact that the Germans, on the eve of Varus' disaster in 9 CE, '...had been 
defeated rather than subdued'. Accentuating the underlying motives of Roman 
conquest, Florus mused in relation to Germany that '...its loss was a disgrace which 
far outweighed the glory of its acquisition.' However, having reviewed the campaigns 
under Augustus, Florus still permitted himself a ringing conclusion. Not only did he 
list the territories actually under Roman rule, but he declared that 
'...the other nations too, who were not under the rule of the empire, yet 
feh the greatness of Rome and revered its people as the conqueror of the 
world'. 
The establishment of psychological domination was thus acknowledged alongside 
military conquest. In the narrative of Florus, such domination was manifested in the 
embassies, gifts and tribute proffered by peoples outside the Empire. Augustus himself 
had, of course, brought the record of his foreign achievements to a similar climax, 
including the specific claim that barbarians not subject to direct military control had 
been forced '...to submit to the commands of the Roman people'. Even peace was 
defined in unmistakable terms of Roman domination. The word pax itself had roots in 
the idea of a pact after successfiil conflict, while the post-Augustan concept of Pax 
Romana is given a dictionary definition of 'dominion, empire, of the Romans'. It can 
be no coincidence that in Augustus' usage it was directly juxtaposed with 'victoriis\ In 
giving expression to retrospective criticisms made about Augustus, Tacitus described 
the peace established by the first princeps as 'gory'. The historian emphasised that, 
'Peace there had been without doubt after that...', where the 'that' referred to was 
Augustus' vanquishing of Antony. The same meaning of Roman peace could be 
evident from a situation in which Rome was not dominant; thus, Commodus was said 
to have initially refiised the overtures of the Buri to end hostilities 'because they were 
strong', relenting only when they were exhausted.'^ '* 
'^ ^ Cimon and Lucullus: Plut. Synk. 3. 5. Florus: 1. 47. 4, 2. 21. 12, 2. 30. 21;2. 34. 61- 62. Augustus 
and pax. RG 30. 2 and 33; ibid. 13 and note by Brunt and Moore p. 54-55; Weinstock (1960) p. 45; 
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Without military victory to provide the necessary substance, even the most grandiose 
shows of psychological dominance could be made to seem hollow. Cassius Dio gave 
Nero's reception of Tiridates, ruler of Armenia, all the trappings of Roman supremacy 
over a subservient foreigner. Before he arrived in Rome in 66 CE the king's nine 
month progress was described in glossy fashion. At Rome he was received with lavish 
ceremony, although he was obliged to approach Nero through a corridor of heavily 
armed troops. Twice Tiridates made obeisance to the Emperor and was given the most 
obsequious speeches of obedience. Nero was portrayed as behaving in proper Imperial 
fashion, declaring: 
'King of Armenia I now declare thee...I have the power to take away 
kingdoms and bestow them'. 
Despite the public location of these formalities in the Forum, Cassius Dio had Nero 
stress the personal nature of Tiridates' deference: 
'Well hast thou done to come hither in person, that meeting me face to 
face thou mightest enjoy my grace'. 
Cassius Dio was not subtle in undermining the sham glory of this occasion. Tiridates 
was said to be 'quelling his pride' and playing a part suited to what he wanted. His true 
superiority was allowed to surface in his revulsion at Nero's public singing and play-
acting as a chariot driver. The point was emphasised as the author followed this 
account by referring to the refiisal of another eastern ruler, Vologaesus I of Parthia, to 
pay similar homage to Nero. In particular Cassius Dio noted that the angry Emperor 
failed to take military action in response to the snub. Tacitus had already recorded the 
unacceptable results of this type of situation. Weakness and military defeat combined 
to expose Roman froops to humiliation, possibly in its traditionally ultimate form of 
being obliged by an enemy to pass under the yoke.'^ ^ 
Britain as an example 
Of course, wars fought essentially for glory and psychological domination need not 
exclude financial profit. The advantages to be gained from Arabia could be clearly 
outiined by Strabo. Although the same author identified usefiil resources on the island 
of Britain, he concluded that military occupation was not necessary and that there was 
Woolf (1993) p. 171-194; Lewis and Short p. 1320. Antony: Tac. Ann. 1. 10. 3-4. Commodus: Cass. 
Dio 72.3. 1. 
Tiridates and Nero: Cass. Dio 63. 1. 2 - 7. 2; Tac. Ann. 15. 15. 2. 
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'...nothing at all to fear from the Britons, for they are not powerful 
enough to cross over and attack us'. 
It appeared to Strabo that the Britons' isolation on their island put them outside the 
sphere of necessary Roman domination. In fact the history of Roman interventions in 
Britain is best explained in terms of ambition for glory and the requirement for 
subservience. Julius Caesar portrayed the expedition of 55 BCE as a reconnaissance in 
force. He emphasised the Romans' psychological domination, for example, noting the 
Britons' fear of unfamiliar ships. After initial warfare 
'...the chiefs began to come from all parts to solicit Caesar's favour for 
themselves and for their tribes. Peace was established...' 
on the basis of submission and hostages. From the perspective of the early third 
century CE, Cassius Dio reflected on the alarm experienced by the Britons at the 
Romans' having 'dared to cross over at all' and expressed the view that Caesar 
'...had gained nothing from Britain except the glory of having led an 
expedition against it.' 
Tacitus confirmed this assessment of the expedition.'^ ^ 
Without fiirther elaboration of his motives for the campaign in the following year, 
Caesar prefaced his account by the comment that only two of the British tribes had sent 
their promised hostages. Perhaps this indicated a need to re-establish Roman 
dominance, although Cassius Dio suggested that Caesar 'coveted the island' and the 
involvement of all but three of his eight legions in Gaul might be interpreted as 
implying longer-term goals. Against this possibility can be ranged Caesar's own 
account of the campaign. Having recorded geographical and ethnographical 
information, he described the piecemeal subjugation of the tribes in south-eastern 
Britain, giving prominence to their promises '...to surrender and obey Caesar's 
commands.' Hostages and tribute were determined, and a Roman stamp was set on 
relationships between tribes. Finally, Caesar portrayed himself as withdrawing to Gaul 
at the onset of winter. Suetonius briefly dealt with Caesar's activities in Britain in a 
way that stressed Roman initiative, the exoticism of the location and the practical 
deference forced from the population. Plutarch emphasised the second of these points, 
at the same time carefully noting the hostages and tribute. In addition, he questioned 
Arabia: 16. 4. 22. Britain: 4. 5. 2-3, 2. 5. 8; Isaac (1992) p. 384, 389. Reconnaissance: B. Gall. 1. 
20. Ships: B. Gall. 1. 25. Peace: B. Gall. 1. 27-28, 36. Assessment: Cass. Dio 39. 51, 53; Tac. Agr. 13. 
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the value of the whole operation. Perhaps by so doing he confirmed both the 
deference/domination thesis and Strabo's assessment of the island. Contemporary 
references in Cicero's letters also made these points.'^' 
Augustus was said to have planned an expedition to Britain. The motives provided for 
him in our sources fitted clearly into the glory by dominance/subservience model. He 
was described as having desired success there 'in emulation of his father (Julius 
Caesar)' and '...since the inhabitants were unwilling to come to terms'. Without 
suggesting that it was second best in relation to the failure of these schemes to 
materialise, Augustus claimed that British kings 'sought refuge with me as suppliants'. 
That Britain represented the exotic and an ideologically charged focus for Roman 
ambitions was confirmed by its appearances in contemporary poetry. Thus: 
'Look after Caesar who is about to attack 
The world's-end Britons' 
and: 
' Augustus will prove a God 
On earth by adding to the Empire 
Troublesome Parthians and Britanni.'*^^ 
Perhaps at its most extreme this psychological supremacy needed little manifestation 
outside the minds of emperors or other Romans. The accounts we have from Suetonius 
and Cassius Dio depict the military activities of Gaius as being quite eccentric i f not 
actually the products of madness. However, despite distracting details such as a cavalry 
attack on a grove of trees and the collection of sea shells by legions drawn up in battle 
line, the Emperor's antics may still reflect the fundamental Roman world view. Making 
the most of an apparently fortuitous submission offered by a renegade British prince, 
Adminius, Gaius sailed a short distance on Ocean. He then ordered that the triremes so 
employed should be sent back to Rome in preparation for a triumph, clearly signifying 
the deliberate symbolism of the sailing trip as an extension of Roman imperium to 
Britain. Support for the Emperor's adherence to the proper ideals of 
dominance/subservience can even be found in explanations of the apparently senseless 
Hostages: B. Gall. 4. 38. Cassius Dio: 40. 1. Legions: B. Gall. 5. 8. Geography, etc: B. Gall. 5. 12-
14. British surrender and Roman withdrawal: B. Gall 5. 20-22. Suetonius: /«/. 25. Plutarch: Caes. 
23. 3. Cicero: 4. 18. 
Augustus: Cass. Dio 49. 38. 2, 53. 25. 2; RG 32. 1. Poetry: Hor. Carm. 1. 35. 29-30, 3. 5. 2-4. 
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shells incident. It has been suggested that this detail was the product of our sources' 
hostile view of Gaius. Those authors may have misinterpreted or deliberately distorted 
their own sources' accounts of the rational collection of small boats, inventively 
substituting shells to reinforce the image of Gaius' behaviour as being outside Imperial 
norms.'^ ^ 
Suetonius' accoimt of the Claudian invasion left no doubt about the Emperor's 
motives. Dissatisfied with his previous military honours, Claudius was said to have 
sought a full triumph by an easy success in Britain. Briefly noting the surrender of the 
island, 'Without a battle or a drop of blood being shed', the biographer concentrated on 
a description of the resulting triumph. Cassius Dio gave the Emperor a larger role in 
the military aspects of the invasion. Although he made no direct allusion to Claudius' 
motives for the expedition, the author had noted earlier that he became Emperor 
'...without having been previously tested at all in any position of authority'. Like 
Suetonius, Cassius Dio gave prominence to the Emperor's journey to the remote island 
and to the domination gained '...over numerous tribes, in some cases by capitulation, 
m others by force'. In a later episode, the dominance/subservience theme was 
individualised by Tacitus in the person of the captured Caratacus. Claudius was 
described as deliberately exaggerating his prisoner's merits in order to 'enlarge his own 
reputation.' The historian gave Caratacus his own part in the discourse by having the 
conquered Briton recognise that his own fall necessarily brought glory to the Emperor: 
'My present lot is as much a source of glory to you as it is degrading to 
myself. 
Of course the official account underlined all the positives in the Emperor's actions. The 
inscription on his triumphal arch emphasised the victory over British kings and the 
extension of Roman dominance over peoples 'beyond Ocean'. A modem account of 
the invasion's importance for Claudius is explicit about its particular value to the 
Emperor: 
'For Claudius...his invasion of Britain was the greatest event of the 
reign and one of his prime claims to rule, as his systematic exploitation 
of it shows.' 
Gaius: Suet. Calig. 44-47; Cass. Dio 59. 25. 2-3; Malloch (2000a); Woods p. 85-86. 
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However, the same author appears to be largely oblivious to the island's continuing 
role as a source of vital glory to subsequent Roman rulers. Instead she repeats the 
rather tired calculation of material costs and benefits of occupation, on the basis of 
which the invasion was deemed to be a 'mistake'.'""^ 
It was in consideration of the potential loss of glory, i f only that of his 'father', 
Claudius, that Nero was said to have changed his mind about abandoning Britain. As 
governor from 58 CE, G. Suetonius Paulinus was popularly regarded to have been 
motivated to conquer more of the island by a desire to match the glory won by Corbulo 
in Armenia. In this, as in the Boudiccan revolt, modem scholars have looked to play 
down the personal element in motives, but within the framework presented here, 
perhaps alternative perspectives are unnecessary. Again, Tacitus' account of Agricola's 
campaigns included the fame and glory won by his father-in-law, even if not actively 
sought, and Calgacus' characterisation of Roman motivation as being driven solely by 
a desire to conquer, indifferent to practical gain. Agricola was provided with a speech 
straightforwardly linking the enemy's existence with its subservience: 
'The fiirthest point of Britain is no longer a matter of report or rumour: 
we hold it.. .Britain has been discovered and subjugated' 
Tacitus explained the necessity of Agricola's unusual reticence in claiming the glory 
that naturally fell to him as a result of these successes. Emphasising the political 
significance of psychological supremacy, the panegyrist gave a dismal account of 
Domitian's own military exploits, adding that: 
'What he dreaded most of all was for the name of a subject to be exalted 
above that of the emperor.' 
A relatively blank period in the record of Roman Britain then followed, providing little 
evidence to illuminate Imperial politics. With the reign of Hadrian, the Emperor 
appeared to have settled for peace and security rather than the glory of expansion. 
However, some indications, including of course the Wall itself, may suggest more 
military activity than is clearly reported. Thus, for Judea, where Hadrian certainly 
Claudius' motives: Suet. Claud 17; Cass. Dio 60. 2. 1, 21. 2-4, 23. 1; Mann, J.C. (1979) p. 178. 
Inscription: Ireland 56. Modern account: Levick (1990) p. 147-148. 
Nero: Suet. Ner. 18. Suetonius Paulinus and Boudicca: Tac. Ann. 14. 29-31. Alternative 
perspectives and support for Tacitus: Ireland p. 63; Cass. Dio 62. 1-2; Syme (1958b) p. 62-66. 
Unsought fame: Tac. ^ g r 18. Calgacus: ibid. 30. Subjugation: ibid. 33. Domitian: ibid. 39. 
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showed no sign of reluctance to demonstrate Roman dominance, we are told that he 
required his best generals. That the 
'...first of these, Julius Severus, (was) dispatched from Britain where he 
was governor' 
at least hints at military activity there. Certainly we have tantalising glimpses of war in 
Britain having added to the military tasks of Marcus Aurelius. Even though the record 
appeared to be one of Roman response to attacks from outside the Empire, the 
language used included the standard indications of defeating powerfiil enemies and 
complete domination. In relation to the Danube 
'...he conquered these exceedingly fierce peoples, accepted the 
surrender of the Marcomanni, and brought a great number of them to 
Italy.' 
The record of British involvement during the reign of Commodus concentrated on the 
turbulent relationship between that emperor and his generals. However, when enemy 
fribes 'crossed the wall', one of these generals, Ulpius Marcellus, was said to have 
responded in a manner that '...inflicted major defeats on the barbarians', the language 
yet again focusing on the establishment of supremacy rather than regaining territory. 
On the assassination of Commodus, the last years of the second century CE saw Britain 
and the legions stationed there as significant factors in the resultant civil wars.'^ ^ 
Once firmly on the throne, Septimius Severus was said to have responded to news of 
unrest in Britain by a clear restatement of the island's role as a source of potential 
military glory: 
'Severus.. .being a natural lover of glory.. .wanted to raise some victory-
trophies at the expense of the Britons to add to the victories and titles 
won in the east and north'. 
There is ample evidence that on major expeditions the Emperor had made a habit of 
taking with him large portions of his family and court, for example to Parthia in 197 
and to Afiica in 202. Nevertheless, Cassius Dio claimed that the Emperor hoped m 
particular that an expedition to Britain would help to instil necessary martial spirit into 
his sons, Caracalla and Geta. In pursuit of these aims, Severus rejected British offers of 
Hadrian: Cass. Dio 69. 13. 2. Marcus Aurelius: SHA Marc.%. 7,22. 1-2. Commodus and his 
generals: SHA Comm. 6. 1-2; SHA Pert. 3. 5-10; Cass. Dio 72. 9. Marcellus: Cass. Dio 72. 8. Civil 
wars: Cass. Dio 73. 14. 3; Herodian. 2. 15. 1-5. 
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peace until he had marched his army to 'the extremity of the island'. Only then did he 
feel that he had 'forced the Britons to come to terms'.'^^ 
In the second half of the third century Britain became an element in various Roman 
elite and army-based secessions from central authority. Panegyrics referring to the re-
establishment of control over the island laid stress on both the physical and ideological 
value of Britain. Constantius Chlorus was praised for recovering the material goods of 
Britain, but the eulogy evoked Julius Caesar, who 'had discovered another world'. 
Elsewhere, each of the Tetrarchs was recognised for his achievements in crushing 
various barbarian races, making them subject to hnperial clemency or, in Britain's 
case, '...raising up their muddled heads from woods and waves.' The author of a 
panegyric to Constantine neatly reversed the usual pattern of attributing glory to the 
conqueror of a territory when he exclaimed: 
'O Britain, fortunate and happier now than all the lands to have been the 
first to have seen Constantine Caesar!' 
Britain was given a prominent place in another panegyric to Constantine that used the 
theme of the surrender of enemy peoples. Domination of nature and of the Britons 
reappeared as a theme in relation to Constantine's son, Constans, during an unusual 
winter visit to the island: 
'Sous vos rames a tremble I'onde d'une mer qui nous est actuellement 
presque inconnue, et le Breton fut pris de panique a la vue d'un 
empereur qu'il n'attendit pas. Que voulez-vous de plus? Vaincus, les 
elements se sont inclines devant votre valeur.' 
In 367 CE, during the reign of Valentinian, Theodosius (the father of the ftiture 
emperor) campaigned in Britain. At this stage the island and its loyal inhabitants could 
be discussed by our sources as a settled element of the Empire, 'us' rather than 'them'. 
Accordingly, Theodosius '...rendered the greatest aid to the troubled and confiised 
fortvmes of the Britons'. However, the basic ideology of dominance/subservience 
remained central, its focus shifting to those now regarded as operating outside the 
authority of Rome. Thus, Theodosius 
' . . .routed and put to flight various tribes which an insolence fostered by 
impunity was inflaming with a desire to attack the Romans.' 
Septimius Severus and glory: Herodian. 3. 14. 2-3. Family and court: Birley (1988) p. 129, 146. 
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Ammianus' rhetoric suggested that it was the very failure of Rome to impose its wil l 
that had incited the marauding Picts and Scots to greater excesses of impudence and 
daring. In these writings of the late fourth century CE there is an unmistakable echo of 
sentiments expressed over 400 years earlier by Julius Caesar.'^ '* 
Roman militarism: the authority and behaviour of emperors 
An imderlying factor in the general reputation of an emperor and in assessments of his 
dealings with other peoples was the importance of military discipline in the self-
perception of Romans. The importance of this concept has aheady been touched upon 
in the reference to the fate of the son of Manlius Torquatus (see page 95). Livy 
appeared to be particularly interested in this theme. He had introduced it in the context 
of one father executing a disobedient son (Aulus Postumius), elaborated it in the better 
known story of Torquatus, and developed it fiirther in the more detailed storyjof the 
similar dispute between the dictator, L. Papirius Cursor and his master of horse, Q. 
Fabius Maximus Rullianus. On his own initiative, the latter had successfully attacked 
the Samnites, despite the fact that the former had ordered him to take no action in his 
absence. In response the dictator invoked Manlius Torquatus in a demand that Fabius 
be punished. Livy painted a vivid picture of Fabius as a hero favoured for his exploits 
by the senate, soldiers and people of Rome, while Papirius was portrayed as arharsh 
and isolated disciplinarian. Nevertheless, with mutiny and civil disorder threatening, 
only an appeal for clemency by the assembled people and an admission of error by 
Fabius allowed the dictator to relent. Even then he was at pains to underline the 
sacrosanct nature of military discipline by insisting that Fabius retained his guilt and as 
such he was '...offered as a gift to the people of Rome'. In fact the story did not end 
there. Livy added a postscript that subtly indicated a requirement that such harshness 
needed to be moderated to ensure success. On his return to the army Papirius found that 
the soldiers '...held back and deliberately prevented a victory' because of resentment 
about the treatment of Fabius. Livy had Papirius involve himself in the clearly 
symbolic act of personally tending to sick soldiers in order to regain the goodwill of the 
troops. In this way Papirius re-established the necessary balance, so much so that when 
Constantius Chlorus: Pan. Lat. 8. 11. 1-4, 17. 3. Tetrarchs: ibid. 9. 21. 1-2. Constantine: ibid. 6. 9. 
1, 12. 25. 1-2. Constans: Firm. Mat. Err. Prof. Rel. 28. 6. Theodosius: Amm. Marc. 28. 3. 1-2. Julius 
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'...the army was restored, (it) so completely defeated...the Samnites 
that this was the last day they ever joined battle with him'.'^^ 
The pervasiveness of military discipline as a valued characteristic is illustrated by the 
fact that it was a commonplace among ancient historiographers and other writers to 
proclaim and expound Roman success predominantly in terms of martial qualities. In 
his preface, Polybius first introduced the general idea of tyche as guiding events. 
However, when he turned towards human causes he quickly cited the Romans' 
'...martial valour and their consistent success in the field', describing them as 
'...veritable champions in the art of war (in which) they showed great courage'. Note 
has already been made of Livy's use, in his preface and Book 1 of his history, of the 
Romulus myth in order to characterise Rome's military qualities. In yet other prefaces, 
Appian described the success of the Roman people as stemming fi-om the fact that they 
'...excelled all others in bravery, patience, and hard labour', while Florus simply 
equated the Empire with the Roman people having '...extended their arms throughout 
the world'. The importance to Aemilius Paullus of Roman military tradition was 
emphasised in Plutarch's account. The general was said to be so keen to disseminate 
the necessary virtues and discipline that he considered 
'...the conquest of his enemies hardly more than an accessory to the 
training of his fellow citizens'. 
The effects on others of specific aspects of Roman military discipline have been used to 
emphasise the martial qualities of the City's inhabitants. Pyrrhus, a figure as soldierly 
as any of Plutarch's subjects, was said to have been impressed by its order and 
discipline when he encountered a Roman camp for the first time.'^^ 
Mattem has explored military domination as an aspect of Rome's relationship with 
peoples outside the Empire. She did this in a way that may also provide a useful 
perspective on the emperor's over-all authority. In essence, her analysis presented 
Rome's response to external nations as a reflection of one of the core elements of 
Roman elite society. Thus the Romans 
Torquatus: Livy 8. 7. Postumius: ibid. 4. 19. 5-6. Papirius and Fabius: ibid. 8. 30-36. 
Commonplace: Val. Max. 2. 7. praef; Polyb. 1. 4, 6; Livy (see pages 45-46); App. Pref. 11; Flor. 1. 
1; Plut. Aem. 3. 4; Piut. Pyrrh. 16. 4-5. 
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'...perceived foreign relations as a competition for honour and status 
between Rome and barbarian peoples; by proving its superior force 
through war and conquest, Rome extorts deference and reverence from 
other nations, who then remain submissive, refraining from revolt or 
attack.' 
Such a view is broadly reinforced by studies of Roman policy in areas where the 
Empire was contiguous with non-Roman centres of power. In this context it is a fair 
summary to describe the approach as one motivated by a desire for honour, glory and 
domination. In establishing a link between Roman imperium in relation to foreigners 
and the authority of the emperor it is possible to call upon sociological theorising. 
Max Weber considered the socio-political factors in the operation of government and 
noted that: 
'A tendency towards centralisation of power goes very readily with a 
chronically conquering imperialism''^^ 
Violence, peace and the behaviour of emperors. 
The SHA recovinted a story in which Hadrian and the renowned rhetorician, Favorinus, 
disagreed about an instance of linguistic usage. Although the intellectual consensus 
was reported to support the opinion of Favorinus, the sage nevertheless gave way to 
the emperor, justifying his concession by remarking, '...suffer me to regard as the 
most learned of men the one who has thirty legions'. Although the quotation was 
described as a joke, the immediate literary context of the story was far from comic. It 
followed a grizzly account of Hadrian's suspicious and vengefiil behaviour towards 
friends, officials, freedmen and even soldiers. In particular this account detailed the 
harsh treatment of those about whom there was any hint of challenge to his authority in 
general or aspiration to the throne in particular. As i f to underline this point about the 
Emperor's nature, the SHA author had used the Favorinus incident to show how far 
Hadrian would go in jealous defence of his supremacy, extending even to matters both 
trivial and patently beyond his competence. Cassius Dio had written in a similar vein, 
juxtaposing allusions to Hadrian's execution of suspected rivals and to his intellectual 
arrogance. To illustrate these elements of the emperor's character, Dio deployed the, 
story of his spiteful exectitidn of ApoUodorus. Apparently Hadrian held a grudge. 
External relations: Mattem p. 171; Isaac (1992) p. 387-392. Sociology: Weber (1948) p. 162. 
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having been slighted by the architect as a youth and for his disagreeing with him over 
the plans for a temple when emperor. Hadrian was also said to have 'abolished 
Homer', replacing him at the pirmacle of the literary canon with Antimachus. Although 
the latter was not without admirers (Plato and, in a qualified way, Quintilian and 
Plutarch), there does seem to be something clunactic in Dio's choice of this act to 
demonstrate the Emperor's overblown sense of physical and intellectual 
omnipotence.'^^ 
Minor as some of these incidents may appear, it is one of the main tasks of this thesis 
to investigate the extent to which the idea underlying Favorinus' quip could be said to 
permeate the political ideology of both rulers and ruled in Imperial Rome. To consider 
this issue a number of general and specific questions need to be addressed. How 
significant was the threat and reality of coercion within the totality of whatever it was 
that underpinned the authority of Roman emperors? For those exercising power and 
those subject to it, how close to the surface were thoughts of the violent consequences 
of disobedience? How were such considerations rationalised within the ideology of the 
time? What aspects of political and other behaviour demonstrated the operation these 
factors? 
Although the preserved text does not contain the fiiU argument, Cicero's Republic 
articulated the standard Roman view of the justice of the strong ruling over the weak. 
The weak were said to benefit from such a situation in the same way that man, the 
body and the baser instincts were in turn favoured by submission respectively to god, 
the mind and reason. The naturalness of this state of affairs was reflected in Aristotle's 
argument: 
'For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only 
necessary, but expedient'. 
Thucydides had his Athenian delegation articulate a similar idea during the debate at 
Sparta; ' I t has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong'. The 
same speakers applied this idea to the concept of empire, declaring its acquisition and 
retention to be in accordance with 'human nature', motivated by desire for,'security,, 
honour and self-interest.' The argument was taken a step fiarther in the Melian 
Favorinus: SHA Had. 15. Apollodorus: Cass. Dio 69. 2.5-4.6. Antimachus: OCD3 p. 106; Birley 
(1997) p. 193-195. 
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dialogue. There Thucydides' Athenians declared that ' . . . i t is a general and necessary 
law of nature to rule whatever one can.' To justify this position, a particular ethical 
position was invoked: 
'...the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel 
and . . . in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the 
weak accept what they have to accept.' 
In a Roman Imperial context these ideas could be expressed in ways that both justified 
empire and individual subservience to the emperor. Aelius Aristides declared that the 
Romans 'alone are natural rulers.' He contrasted the rule of Rome with that of earlier 
empires on the basis that only Roman government specifically benefited all those 
subject to it. Evidence for this was cited as the willingness of local elites to participate 
in Roman administration, general economic benefits and the common defence of the 
whole empire as i f it was a single city. Aristides went so far as to declare that through 
the operation of law and proper administration, the Romans ' . . .were the only ones ever 
to rule over free men.' 
Of course, a clearly perceived problem arose in conceptualizing such freedom in the 
context of the sole rule of emperors. As in so many of the political issues that attended 
the development of Roman Imperial government, precedents can be identified here in 
the regimes of the diadochoi. In episodes that found later counterparts in both the 
Republic and the Empire, rival Hellenistic kings, Antigonus and Ptolemy, declared in 
314 BCE policies of freedom (autonomia) for the Greek cities. Antigonus was 
portrayed as subsequently 'liberating' Athens in 307 BCE, but his imposition of a 
governor and prescriptive restoration of 'democracy' clearly troubled Plutarch. 
Epictetus pointed to the contradictions inherent in this situation by recalling an oath of 
the inhabitants of Nicopolis, where he taught his second century CE version of Stoic 
values. The oath ran, 'Yea, by the fortune of Caesar, we are free'. His analysis 
demonstrated that on such a basis everyone, including a man of noble family who had 
been consul twice, was in fact a slave. Pliny attempted to solve the problem in his 
panegyric of Trajan. The panegyrist simply added to the list of the Emperor's merits 
Roman/Athenian attitudes to empire: Brunt (1978) p. 161-162. Strong rule the weak: Cic. Resp. 
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presented to the senate that he '...exhorted us, individually and collectively, to resume 
our freedom'. The point was sharpened as, 'You bid {iubes) us to be free, and we shall 
be free'. Pliny added the interesting comment that, ' A l l your predecessors had said the 
same, but none had been believed' in the previously prevailing atmosphere of suspicion 
and terror. Although it of course raised another problem, that is, the relationship 
between the king/ruler and the divine, an attempt could be made to porfray 
subservience to an all powerfiil ruler as being acceptable by having recourse to 
Cicero's analogy of god's authority over man. Dio Chrysostom made the direct appeal: 
' . . . h is natural for the stronger to govern and care for the weaker. 
However there could be no more striking or beautifiil illustration than 
that government of the universe which is under the control of the first 
and best god.' 
It was also true that such arguments could be challenged i f not slyly subverted. 
Plutarch elaborated Livy's story of the Gauls' attack on Clusium in the early fourth 
century BCE. In both versions the Romans were said to have come to the aid of their 
allied city and to have asked the Gauls what wrong they had suffered that justified their 
attack. The reply fashioned by the biographer had Brennus, king of the Gauls, point out 
that while the citizens of Clusium were rich and held much land, the Gauls were poor 
and needed room to expand. Having cited 
'...that most ancient of all laws which gives to the stronger the goods of 
his weaker neighbours', 
Brennus pointedly reminded the Romans that their disapproval of the Gauls' behaviour 
belied their own history of expansion at the cost of less powerfiil neighbours.''*' 
The pervasiveness of military elements in Roman ideology could be demonstrated by 
their appearance in some less expected places. In his speech giving fulsome praise to 
the majesty of Roman peace, Aristides feh the need to make the closest possible 
connection with war. He directly acknowledged the paradox involved in Rome's 
warlike nature leading to a situation in which, 'It is no longer even believed that wars 
ever took place'. Again, 'Such great peace do you have, even i f war is native to^^you' is 
immediately followed by 18 chapters of detail about the peerless organisation and^ 
Diadochoi: Shipley p. 73-74; Austin (1981) 29, 31; Plut. Demetr. 10. 2. Nicopolis : Arr. Epict. diss. 
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operation of the Roman army. It is perhaps less surprising that Polybius, in an earlier 
age, should also have stressed the strength of Rome's military heritage as integral to its 
internal stability and external achievement. He elevated these two features to become 
the bases of any people's success, since 
'...every state relies for its preservation on two fundamental qualities, 
namely bravery in the face of the enemy, and harmony among its 
citizens.' 
In the task he set himself, that of explaining how Rome came to be so dominant, 
Polybius emphasised the prominence given to exemplars of military bravery, for 
example in his famous description of the fimerals of 'celebrated men.' As Aristides was 
to do more than two hundred years later, he supported these general points with detail 
about Roman military organisation. In fact, this section of the extant text follows 
directly upon chapters describing the Roman constitution as providing the city with 
'...an irresistible power to achieve any goal it has set i tself It does not seem 
unreasonable to speculate that a linking section, now missing, would have cemented the 
connection between Polybius' assessment of Roman general success and the City's 
military ideology. While it may be reasonable to interpret Polybius as emphasising 
Roman moral superiority, the virtue on the mind of the historian was surely that chiefly 
displayed during the described elite fimerals, that is, manly virtus. '"^^ 
Coercion and terror can also make some rather unexpected and apparently out of 
character appearances. As his first act on becoming emperor, Trajan had promised the 
senate '...that he would not slay nor disenfranchise any good man.' In Cassius Dio's 
accoimt, his very next action was to trick into attendance on him, and then have 
executed, Aelianus and other Praetorians who had rebelled against Nerva. While it is 
clear that these individuals were meant to be seen as the opposite of 'good men', the 
demonstration of power and the example to all who might rebel could hardly have been 
more pointed. The Emperor's gesture to Aelianus' successor as Praetorian Prefect, 
Attius Suburanus, in handing to him his sword of office with the declamation, 
'Take this sword in order that, i f I rule well, you may use it for me, but 
i f i l l , against me', , . -
Aristides: Or. 26. 70-89. Warlike focus: Polyb. 6. 52. Bravery and harmony: ibid. 6. 46. Roman 
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appeared sufficiently theatrical to be a deliberate counterweight to this incident of 
terror. In the context of the loyalty or otherwise of the Praetorians, it is also worth 
noting that Trajan replaced them as his personal guard with a force of mainly Batavian 
cavalry. The optimusprinceps intended to be protected.'''^ 
At the same time a fairly commonplace distinction was drawn in antiquity between 
kingship and tyranny. Both the distinction and an element of its consequences were 
outlined by Aristotle: 
'For kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants 
over involimtary; and the one are guarded by their fellow citizens, the 
others are guarded against them.' 
Plutarch demonstrated the recycling of this literary contrast in his didactic aphorism, 
'For, in reality, kings fear for their subjects, but tyrants fear their subjects.' At least 
giving him credit for a good turn of phrase, Suetonius had Domitian quip that 
'...the situation of emperors was a most wretched one, for everyone 
thought their suspicions of conspiracy groundless until they were 
killed.' 
In explaining the purpose of his Cyropaedia, Xenophon stated his thesis that Cyrus 
remarkably '...excelled in ruling human beings.' Perhaps that was why the Persian 
appeared to combine all the features of Aristotle's analysis. He was said to have ruled 
through fear and intimidation on the one hand and on the other by inspiring willing 
loyaUy. Nevertheless, the King's recorded methods of coercion provided an 
imaginative list that would not have been out of place in the repertoire of any 
calculating and harsh tyrant. He employed eunuchs as his personal bodyguard, on the 
basis that, of all men, they were least likely to have ties with family or elsewhere and 
thus threatening their loyalty to the king (see page 40). Cyrus sought to breed 
competition between his officers and courtiers, for example, in proximity to the king 
during banquets. As modelled by Herodotus' Deioces, he employed a sophisticated 
network of spies and informers, 'the eyes and ears of the king.' In addition Cyrus saw 
the intimidatory value of grand military parades. That obedience to Cyrus as a king 
Aelianus: Cass. Dio 68. 5. 2-4. Suburanus: Cass. Dio 68. 16. 1; Bennett p. 51. Bodyguards: Birley 
(1997) p. 38-39 
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could be enforced by physical violence had been noted during the games of his 
youth 144 
Xenophon also described the negative effects of the tyrant's necessary preoccupation 
with physical security, going beyond this to suggest that a ruler without checks on his 
power gained no pleasure from his position. His Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, argued that 
such a ruler had less access to basic physical pleasures than an ordinary citizen. Fears 
for his safety and of revolts restricted his travel to see interesting things at home and 
abroad. His hearing was sated by applause and flattery, his appetite for food and drink 
by over-familiarity with abundance and unnatural delicacies. Even the tyrant's pleasure 
in sex was dulled by too ready availability and by the subservience of all partners. In a 
similar vein, any prestige or respect that a tyrant might obtain from his subjects is 
devalued because it is based on fear rather than recognition of true value in the ruler 145 
These arguments were regularly taken fiirther in philosophical/didactic contexts. 
Isocrates had advised the young Cypriot monarch, Nicocles, to: 
'Consider the most secure physical defence to be the virtue of friends, the 
goodwill of the citizens, and your own wisdom.' 
Plutarch imparted a similar lesson when he described Demetrius coming into his 
father's presence inadvertently armed. The biographer portrayed Antigonus as drawing 
his son's behaviour to the attention of visiting ambassadors, with the claim that it 
demonstrated the trust and goodwill that existed in his court. However, Plutarch used 
the incident to illustrate the opposite conclusion, that Antigonus' kingdom must have 
been 'utterly unsociable' and ' fu l l of i l l -wi l l ' for a father to ' . . .make it a thing of glory 
that he was not afraid of his son'. In recounting the colourful story of the precautions 
taken by Aristippus of Argos, Plutarch elaborated on the discomfort experienced by 
tyrants on this head. Besides sleeping in a small room accessible only by a ladder that 
he had removed each night, Aristippus was said to have ' . . .kept many guards to protect 
his person' and to have spearmen camped aroimd his palace. To underline the point, 
the biographer contrasted this situation with that of Aratus of Sicyon, whose security 
was said to be that of the '...steadfast goodwill on the part of the mled.' ,In,his. literary . 
Kingship and tyranny: Arist. Pol. 1285a; Plut. Mor. 78IE; Suetonius, Dam. 21. Coercion and 
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attempt to mould the behaviour of Nero, Seneca used an account of Augustus' response 
to plots against his life. The author provided the first princeps with an extended 
internal debate about how he should treat the exposed plotter, Cirma. This was placed 
in the context of the young Octavian's involvement in killings and proscriptions before 
he had secured his sole authority. The mature ruler wrestled with the conflicting claims 
of justice and clemency, reaching an anguished conclusion that, ' I f so many must 
perish in order that I may not, my life is not worth the price'. However, after Augustus 
had spared and even honoured Cinna, with the gratifyingly convenient result that, 'No 
one plotted against him ftirther', it is noteworthy that Seneca drew the moral for Nero 
that: 
'Your great-grandfather spared the vanquished; for i f he had not spared 
them, whom would he have had to rule?' 
Thus, even in the course of counselling clemency, there was no escaping the emperor's 
physical domination of subjects. '''^ 
A similar message emerged from Dio Chrysostom's laudatory/didactic/display oratory. 
He defined the good king as one whose security was based on his subjects' 
acknowledgement of the justice of his rule, a lesson that the orator had the sage 
Diogenes impart to Alexander. The tyrant, on the other hand, was bound to be 
threatened by plots. However, the good king was to be feared, i f only by his enemies, 
and to be '...peaceful to the extent that there was nothing left worth his fighting for.' 
Thucydides had provided more detail on the tyrant's insecurity, declaring that 
'...the tyrant's first thought was always for himself, for his own 
personal safety...Consequently security was the chief political 
principal in these governments.' 
He contrasted tyranny with the 'established rights and limitations' of hereditary 
monarchy, although his analysis of why the former tended to replace the latter in post-
Trojan War Greece was both cryptic and schematic.'''^ 
Whatever the ethical, philosophical and legal issues, our sources left little doubt about 
the actual response of Roman emperors to the question of bodyguards. Cassius _Dio.„ 
Nicocles: Isoc. Evag. 43; Antigonus: Plut. Dem. 3.3; Aristippus : Plut. Arat. 25. 7-26. 4; Nero: Sen. 
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Peaceful: ibid. 1. 27. Political principle and contrast: Thuc: 1. 17, 13. 
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made the direct association between Augustus' desire to ensure that his bodygviard was 
well rewarded and his desire for monarchical power. In the aftermath of the fall of 
Sejanus, Tacitus had Tiberius make a grim joke of the suggestion that a group of 
senators be appointed to provide him with armed protection in the curia. Life did not 
mean so much to him, he was said to have replied, i f it had to be protected by arms. 
Describing the early days of his reign, however, the same historian indicated of 
Tiberius that '...soldiery accompanied him to the forum, soldiery to the curia'. Cassius 
Dio also made it clear that Tiberius was well guarded. He conveyed this information 
within an elaborate charade played out between Emperor and senate; the one simulating 
confidence, the other flattering concern. The same author credited Claudius with 
introducing soldiers as guards at dirmer parties. Such evidence impelled even Fergus 
Millar, not renovmed for his focus on the role of the Roman military, to conclude, 
however grudgingly, that: 
'No conception of the emperor's relation to his subjects would be 
complete without taking into accoimt the fact that he was almost always 
escorted by soldiers'.'''^ 
Beyond the behaviour of individual rulers, Thucydides had supplied arguments against 
harsh and coercive rule by one state over another. In the debate over Mytilene, 
Diodotus warned the Athenians that threatening death, never mind carrying out the 
threat, to the inhabitants of rebel cities would simply make them more likely to revolt 
and less likely to come to terms; they would feel they had nothing to lose by pursuing a 
desperate course. In urging mercifijl rule upon Nero, Seneca painted a detailed and 
gruesome picture of the counterproductive and dangerous consequences of ruling by 
fear. In imagery of the vigorous growth of a pruned tree, opposition to a ruler would 
only increase i f it was cut off. Feelings of hopelessness and recklessness bred by 
extreme fezir and oppression risked an explosive reaction, as illustrated by slaves 
murdering their masters. Lessons of brutality and disloyalty taught by a vicious ruler 
would not be lost on their subjects, often being reflected in their treatment of him. 
Although not stated in De dementia, the behaviour and fate of the Emperor Gains 
seemed close to the surface in these remarks. Underlining his point and again„wijthjhe_ 
instruction of Nero as one plausible motive, Seneca's Apocolocyntosishad as its climax 
Augustus: Cass. Dio 53. 11. 5. Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 6. 2. 4.: Ibid. 1. 7. 5; Cass. Dio 58. 17. 3-18. 6. 
Claudius: Cass, Dio 60. 3. 3. Millar: (1992) p. 61. 
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the rejection of Claudius by the gods, chiefly because of his judicial killings. Amongst 
these were enumerated thirty-five senators and three hundred and twenty-one 
149 
equites. 
A view from Tacitus of the nature and direction of Imperial terror is provided in a 
speech of Petillius Cerialis to rebel Gauls. This speech was one of two matched 
rhetorical addresses, similar in form and some content to his earlier pairing at the Battle 
of Mons Graupius. In the case of Cerialis, the Roman general provided answering points 
to accusations by the delegates of the Tencteri that Roman rule meant slavery. The 
speech included an appeal to the provmcials based on the idea that whereas they as much 
as Romans enjoyed the benefits of a good emperor, the oppression of a bad emperor 
went no wider than his immediate circle. While the SHA noted that Commodus had put 
to death not only senators and wealthy Roman women, but also that '...not a few 
provincials, for the sake of their riches... were plundered or even slain,' the fact that this 
behaviour was recorded by way of illusfrating the extremes of that emperor's behaviour 
suggested that such widespread terror was rare. Modem scholarship appears divided on 
the reach of coercion in Roman society. That our ancient literary sources would be 
largely uninterested in its operation outside the elite is acknowledged, leaving room for 
the unrecorded suppression of other dissent. Evidence concerning the manpower and 
capacity of enforcement agencies has been used to support the idea of limited 
application, although it has also been suggested that such evidence may underestimate 
the use of magistrates' slaves and ad hoc militias. Incidental details, although cryptic, 
may be of relevance here. For example, Appian recorded that during the uncertainties 
immediately following the assassination of Julius Caesar, 
'Antony ordered the magistrates to have the City watched by night, 
stationing guards at intervals as in the daytime'. 
In a system characterised by potential and actual physical threat, even leniency and 
restraint could precipitate violence. Vespasian's refiisal to take a frill toll of Nero's 
informers may well have fi^sfrated the desire for justice/revenge on the part of Helvidius 
'•"Mytilene: Thuc. 3. 44-46: Pruning: Sen. Clem 1. 8. 7. Reaction: ibid. 1. 12. 4, 1. 13. 1-2. 
Counterproductive: ibid. 1.26. \ ;Apocol. 14-15. 
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Priscus, contributing to the motivation of the latter's provocative opposition. In turn this 
lead to his execution by the Emperor.'^^ 
It need not siuprise us that the elite status of the authors of almost all of our literary 
sources led them to a preoccupation with the well-being and fate of members of that part 
of Roman society. However, what may need to be emphasised is the way in which this 
factor coloured their, and to a large extent our, over-all assessments of individual 
emperors. More specifically for the present thesis, the ancient handling of evidence in 
the course of a general characterisation of some emperors as 'bad' and others as 'good' 
must have obscured the actual level of coercion at any particular time. This wi l l apply 
whether the focus is on vmderlying patterns within the Empire or on the behaviour of 
individual rulers. 
Soldiers in the provinces 
Our sources outlined the role of the army as an occupying force in the provinces. It may 
well be correct, guided by Brunt, to doubt MacMuUen's assertions about the application 
of a 'common pattern' in such occupations. For example, the systematic disarmament of 
conquered peoples seems unlikely to have been a regular practice. However, instances 
occurred in which such disarmament appeared as an incidental detail to an author's main 
point, perhaps giving some credibility to the idea of a general pattern. Cicero provided 
an account of the stem devotion to duty of L. Domitius, who condemned to death a 
Sicilian shepherd for killing a boar with a hunting spear. Although the man's crime was 
stated as possessing a weapon in contravention to local edict, the emphasis of the story 
was on Domitius' behaviour, identifying it as a severe adherence to the law rather than 
cruelty. Valerius Maximus repeated the story; from his Tiberian perspective, he drew a 
moral of clearly political resonance: 
'...consideration of public authority does not allow us to regard 
(Domitius) as too harsh.' 
In Augustus' arrangements for the provinces, Cassius Dio had him promise to the senate 
that by his administration he would 'establish order' and ensure that the areas he 
controlled were 'pacified'. In the Res Gestae Augustus referred at this point to his 
Mons Graupius speeches: Agr. 30-34. Cerialis: Hist. 4. 74. Tencteri speech: Hist. 4. 64. 
Commodus: SHA Comm. 5. 12-13. Limited reach of coercitio: Nippel (1995) p. 12-14. Wider 
application: Alston (1996) p. 320; App. B Civ. 2. 125. Helvidius Priscus: MacMullen (1966) p. 
55;.Arr. Epict. diss. 1. 2. 19-23. 
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having 'extinguished civil wars'. Tacitus claimed to echo a similar outline to the senate 
by Tiberius, listing the allocations and tasks of the army. By these arrangements the 
provinces were to be 'safeguarded'. This process appeared as a mixture of coastline and 
border protection, for instance in Gaul, and attention to 'recently pacified' areas, such as 
in Spain. In addition, towns of Roman Italy, such as Puteoli, felt the power of the 
military. It has been suggested that the location by Nero of veteran colonies in that town 
and in nearby Capua and Nuceria was impelled by civil unrest.'^' 
In his hymn to Imperial harmony, Aelius Aristides played down the extent of the army's 
intrusion into the daily lives of the Empire's inhabitants. Dio Chrysostom suggested the 
image of soldiers as shepherds, faithfiilly supporting their emperor's care for his sheep. 
In a similar vein of eulogy, Josephus suggested that its '...perfect discipline makes the 
army an ornament of peace-time.' Such images of sweetness and light are clearly at odds 
with those gained from sources more distant from Imperial ideology. The New 
Testament included advice from John the Baptist to neophyte soldiers, 'No bullying; no 
blackmail; make do with your pay!' Josephus could give a sense of the military 
oppression felt by provincials. He had the Herodian king, Agrippa I I , attempt to 
persuade the Jews to abandon hopeless rebellion against Rome. The monarch's method 
was to outline the thoroughness and ease with which the legions held the various 
territories of the Empire. In apparent contradiction, but in fact also illustrating the central 
role of military control in the provinces, Trajan's inability to retain his Eastern conquests 
may well have been caused by a lack of sufficient manpower to suppress revolts. 
Nevertheless, as the same emperor earned his title as Dacicus, that region had felt the 
ful l weight of the Roman military machine, being '...depopulated in the lengthy war 
with Decebalus.' Less extreme measures, such as the unleashing of troops on city 
populations, the physical abuse of individuals, and the denial of justice for the victims of 
soldiers' wrongdoing, can all be widely illusfrated.'^^ 
Occupation: MacMuUen (1974) p. 35; Brunt (1975); Cic. Verr. 2. 5. 7; Val. Max. 6. 3. 5. Augustus: 
Cass. Dio 53. 13 and RG 34. Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 4. 4. 3. Nero and the senate; Ann. 16. 27. Puteoli: 
Ann U.M- Colonies: Wiedemann (1996) p. 246. 
Soldiers as shepherds or oppressors: Aristid. Or. 26. 67 '...many provincials do not know where 
their garrison is.'; Dio Chrys. 1. 28; Joseph. BJ'i. 105; Luke 3. 14; Joseph. BJ2. 366-383. Trajan's 
difficulties: Cass. Dio 68. 29.4; Mattem p. 103-104. Dacia: Eutropius 8.6; Bennett p. 101. Soldiers' 
violence on civilians: Isaac (2002) p. 182-190; Lib. Or. 47. 33. 
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The question arises as to whether oppressive behaviour on the part of troops was a 
symptom of weak civil administration or was a deliberate policy to coerce the 
population at large. Supporting the former could be cited the apparentiy low number of 
civilian Imperial officials. Based on the Notitia Dignitatum and other sources, it has 
been suggested that the manpower of the Imperial civil administration, estimated at its 
probable maximum in the fifth and sixth centuries CE, may have been below 31,000. It 
is intriguing that a broad comparison indicates that administration of the Chinese 
Empire of the twelfth century CE involved a workforce of officials perhaps twenty-five 
times greater. Although any such calculations must be highly speculative, where they 
have been attempted the results consistently identify the involvement of a relatively 
small number of civilian officials in running the Roman Empire. For example, it has 
been estimated that in 249 CE there were perhaps only one hundred and eighty non-
senatorial high-ranking administrators in the whole of the Empire. In relation to 
sociological studies of different types of regime, it is worthy of note that Imperial 
Rome has been '...widely held to be the antithesis of Weber's bureaucratic style of 
government'; that is, one characterised by large numbers of officials administering 
complex and exclusive procedures. It may also be legitimate to interpret evidence of 
the limited impact of Roman government on provincials as bringing into higher relief 
our sources' relatively few examples of the involvement of troops. In the context of a 
close study of surviving Egyptian documentation it has certainly been concluded that 
'...Roman provincial administration was actually government by an 
army of occupation,' 
Also in an eastern context, evidence has been cited of the army's role in maintaining 
communal order and in enforcing the will of the central authority. Blurred distinctions 
between the military and civil records have been interpreted as indicating soldiers' 
central role. Arguments that the army played a limited role in the enforcement of 
Roman political will have been based on 'the comparatively small size' of military 
forces in the Empire. However, this view seems to overlook the extent to which troops 
were embedded within their localities and the variation in geographic distribution of 
these soldiers. The question must also arise as to what would constitute 'big' or 'small' 
troop deployments in the particular circumstances of Roman rule. Ancient evidence 
does seem to imply that soldiers were a significant element in the lives of provincials, 
whether perceived as a positive or negative factor. Tacitus made this clear in comments 
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about soldiers' presence in both eastern and western provinces. In the latter case he 
went so far as to say: 
'The provincials were accustomed to the soldiers' company and liked to 
have them quartered there, and many were bound to them by ties of 
intimacy and kinship'. 
While on the march, soldiers could certainly cause problems. The disruption might 
even be highlighted in its absence. Thus, the good behaviour of Severus Alexander's 
army en route to Parthia was emphasised by the author of the SHA's remark that 
'...you would have said that senators, not soldiers, were passing that way.' The 
potential complexity of the legions' relationship with the locality of its postings was 
exemplified by accounts from Syria. There incidents were reported in which villages 
near Antioch made use of friendly Roman soldiers to intimidate rival villages and to 
drive off tax collectors. On the other hand, straightforward warnings such as that of 
Plutarch about '...the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head' have the ring of 
authentic experience. The integration of administrative and coercive roles within the 
Roman military has been emphasised in comparative sociological studies of state 
power. In fact the extent to which magistrates' powers were associated with military 
affairs has been described as '...a characteristic of the Roman polity unknown to any 
other people'."^^ 
Soldiers in the city of Rome 
The traditional Roman constitution, represented as that devised by Servius TuUius, the 
sixth of the seven mythic kings, did not allow armed soldiers inside the pomerium, the 
religiously defined edge of the City. The 'tribal assembly', at which the population met 
to decide non-military matters, was convened within the limits of the City; the 
'centuriate assembly', which represented the population gathered in military units, took 
place on the Campus Martius beyond the pomerium. A military commander had to 
relinquish that authority before crossing the sacred boundary. These restrictions and 
ancient legal stipulations help to cultivate an image of the City of Rome as haven of civil 
Weak administration or policy: Campbell (1984) p. 253-25. Civil ofTicials: Jones, A. H. M . (1964) 
p. 1057, 1411 n. 44. China: Hopkins (1980) p. 121. AdministrationJn,249XE: Heather p. 190r - ~ 
Bureaucratic style Ti-oop involvement: Lendon (1997) p. 2. Egypt: Fink p. 1. 
Eastern evidence: Pollard (1996) p. 214; Isaac (1992) p. 112-113, 115-118. Size of military presence: 
Maier p. 710-712; Pollard (2000) p. 2. Local ties: Tac. Am. 13. 35. 1. On the march: SHA Alex. Sev. 
50. 1-2. Complex relationship: Hist. 2. 80; Pollard (2000) p. 89-90; Plut. Prae. Ger. Reip. 815E. 
Integration of roles: Weber (1968) p. 970-971. 
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proprieties, an inviolable centre of majestic peace from which the provinces were 
governed. In the Imperial period this impression was strengthened by images of the 
armies operating in the provinces as a ring of steel to guard the City, effectively 
unprotected by walls, as it was until the late third century CE. Clearly, this portrayal of 
Rome was defaced many times by the force of arms, usually in civil wars. However, 
even outside such exceptional events, a picture of Rome as an essentially demilitarised 
zone could not be further from the truth. In fact, the routine military presence was 
greater there than in any other city, larger even in terms of numbers than in the normal 
complement of any single military camp. Precision about the military presence within 
Rome is made difficult by uncertainties about the city's population and the perennial 
problem of distinguishing between the paper and actual numerical strength of all units of 
the Roman army. Focussing on the early principate, Griffin took a wide view of the 
manpower available to enforce the will of the authorities. She included the cohortes 
vigilum, urbanae and Praetoriani, and produced the perhaps surprisingly large estimate 
of one such officer for every fifty to one hundred inhabitants. The statistic is perhaps 
easier to accept when it is noted that the vigiles, whose normally accepted role was that 
of fire fighters, were not only organised on military lines (like their modem 
counterparts), but carried weapons and possessed legionary style standards. In a more 
detailed, archaeologically based study, Coulston suggested a somewhat lower proportion 
of military personnel to the Augustan civilian population, but one that rose steadily 
throughout the early Empire, reaching a maximum of one to forty-five or perhaps even 
twenty-five under Septimius Severus. During the Imperial period, the topographical 
distribution of military units in Rome showed elements of both sensitivity to the 
appearance of tyrannical force and awareness of the practicalities of population control. 
Thus, while the Praetorians were garrisoned in their camp at a respectfiil distance from 
the City proper, and efforts were made to place non Italian troops on the outskirts, 
cavalry units were stationed closer to the Imperial residences.'^ "* 
Within the city of Rome this muscle was not infrequently used, even, for example by 
Nero, to intimidate the senate. Did such intervention constitute the maintenance of order 
amongst a volatile population or could it be indicative of more general political 
Pomerium: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 59. 3; Beard. North and Price p. 179; Brand p. 11. Inviolable 
Rome: Aristid. Or. 26. 84. Military presence: Griffin (1991) p. 40; Coulston p. 76-81. Vigiles: Dig. 37. 
13. 1; Coulston p. 89. Placement of camps: Coulston p. 82-86. Praetorians: see pages 137-138. 
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repression? Differing circumstances may suggest one explanation rather than the other. 
However, it must be relevant to comment that the nature of our evidence and the 
portrayed outlook of our sources both tend towards an unsympathetic view of the 
populace, particularly whenever they were involved in mass action outside official 
control. Nevertheless, there was a long tradition in Rome of elite sensitivity to the 
possibility of plots and disorder among the populace. Such fears were manifested, for 
example, in a distrust of nocturnal gatherings. This could be retrojected to the earliest 
period of the Republic, playing a role in secret plans to restore the kings. Sallust had 
Catiline meet with his co-conspirators 'at dead of night'.'^^ 
It has been argued that the senate and consuls of the Republic had neither sufficient 
political authority nor the available manpower to engineer the permanent repression of 
the Roman populace. When our sources reported the adoption of oppressive measures it 
was invariably in the context of a 'crisis'. Even then it appeared necessary for the 
authorities to be confident of the support of a significant proportion of that populace. 
Thus it was the recourse to armed insurrection in 122 BCE by C. Sempronius Gracchus 
that brought about in response the senatus consultum ultimum, authorising the relevant 
senior magistrates to use what physical force they deemed necessary to restore the 
security of the State. It was notable that, in that first instance, use was made of Cretan 
archers, who just happened to be there at the time. However, in considering such 
evidence, the outlook and biases of our literary sources must be brought into focus. The 
instances they reported of military and other coercive forces being used in the course of 
Republican political conflict shared a common feature; that bemg the existence of a 
claimed challenge to the established political order perceived to be of sufficient 
seriousness to threaten its stability. Although an examination of those sources has 
identified forty-six such occasions between 287 and 44 BCE, like many such 
calculations, it leaves open the question of whether this was a significantly large or small 
number! Nevertheless, it must be reasonable to maintain that the adherence of ancient 
authors to that established order made h unlikely that they would express an interest in 
any routine coercive measures employed by the regime. Such elements would be viewed 
Nero: Tac. Ann. 16. 27. Kings: Livy 2. 3. 7. Sallust: Cat. 27. 
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as part of the normal political scene and therefore beneath the horizon of interest among 
the authors and their readers.'^ ^ 
Roman historians had less reason than their Greek counterparts to devote their energies 
to explaining the workings of the City's political system. Authors from both traditions 
shared a perspective that concentrated on the behaviour of individuals to explain 
historical events, in fact as often as not reversing this process and using historical 
exempla for the purpose of demonstrating the ethical values of individuals and their 
actions. However, Greek historians from Herodotus onwards represented at least in part 
a tradition of general enquiry and philosophical debate. Not only were these features 
either weak or altogether lacking in their Roman counterparts, the Latin authors had the 
fiirther limiting characteristic that they were writing for other Romans, rather than for 
Greeks in a wide variety of city and other cultural contexts. They were therefore likely to 
take for granted rather than explain the normal state of affairs. Illustrating the point in 
another area of study, that of religion, Herodian gave as his reason for digressing on the 
Romans' dedication to Cybele that 'it is unknown to some of the Greeks'. He used a 
similar explanation for detailing the Romans' deification of their emperors. Tending 
towards the same result (our relative ignorance of the details of what was typical in the 
political landscape of Rome) was ancient authors' concentration on what they saw as 
being unusual or innovative, or the inclusion of everyday political information only as 
circumstantial detail. Thus, Tacitus provided the first record of troops keeping order at 
the theatre and games as a detail incidental to material depicting differences in character 
between Drusus and his father, Tiberius. Tacitus also recorded the removal of these 
guards by Nero as a measure to obtain popular approval and their later reinstatement by 
the same emperor in order to ensure a reliable claque for his own performances.'^ ^ 
It cannot be surprising, therefore, that our sources seldom indicated that the use of 
coercion in defence of the established order went beyond the repertoire of measures 
open to the political authorities (assembly, senate and magistrates) acting in properly 
constituted form. It could be argued that individuals were justified in taking, and 
'^ ^ Repression.only in crisis: Nippel (1995) p. 57ff; Liritott (1968/1999) p. 89-92. Cretan archers: 
VlaLC Gracchus 16. 3-4. Outbreaks of political violence: Lintott (1968/1999) p. 209-216. 
Limitations of our sources: Mann, M . (1986) p. 262. 
Roman and Greek historians: Wiedemann (2000) p. 523; Herodian 1. 11. 1,4. 2. 1. Theatre 
g u a r d s : 1 . 7 7 . 1, 13.24. 1, 14. 15. 4;Nippel(1995)p. 93-94; GrifFm (1996)p. 111. 
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possibly actually under a duty to take, any actions they felt to be appropriate if they 
perceived the state to be under threat. For example, in 133 BCE the consul, P. Mucins 
Scaevola, declined to take direct action against T. Sempronius Gracchus. In response the 
pontifex maximus, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, used his own initiative to lead an ad hoc 
group of senators and their followers to defeat the rebellion. He made no pretence at 
doing so as the representative of some official or unofficial group. Rather he backed his 
own judgement about the threat to the res publica. Another story attached to the same 
Nasica confirmed the point. In 138 BCE he had opposed a tribune's dubiously legal 
attempt to fix the price of grain, commanding others to listen to his arguments on the 
explicitly stated basis that " I know best". The importance of this precedent was 
predictably emphasised by Cicero in relation to his similarly independent actions in 63 
BCE. In another example, the consul, C. Claudius Marcellus, proposed to divert forces 
against the supposed approach to Rome of Julius Caesar in 49 BCE. Against strong 
opposition in the prevailing atmosphere of dissention, he declared that, 
" I f I am prevented by the vote of the senate from taking steps for the 
public safety, I will take such steps on my own responsibility as 
consul."'^ ^ 
Sulla's military occupation of Rome in 88 BCE could be portrayed as being in the public 
interest, as opposed to being motivated by personal ambition, fear or the desire for 
revenge. However, ancient and modem commentators have suggested that the 
circumstances surrounding this radical act formed a watershed in the growing use of 
military force in Roman politics. Plutarch made the latter point, but in terms of his 
analysis of individual human behaviour rather than social change or the development of 
political systems. He used the event to rehearse the general question of whether the 
accompanying cruel and violent behaviour was an inevitable product of the acquisition 
of supreme power or whether the attainment of such a position merely unleashed 
otherwise latent tendencies in certain people. It is interesting that Plutarch here provided 
another example of the ancient focus on individual psychology to explain what modem 
analysis might view as a feature of wider political or social activity. Whether or not 
either of Plutarch's alternative explanations might more nearly approach the truth, our 
evidence indicated the onset of a period in which troops and other force were now 
Individual initiative: Nippel (1995) p. 63. Nasica: Wiedemann (2000) p. 517; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 19; 
Val. Max. 3.7.3. Cicero: Tusc. 4. 51. Claudius Marcellus: App. B Civ. 2. 31. 
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regularly and openly used to gain or defend power in Rome. According to the standard 
tradition, this era of the rule of force and coercion came to an end in 28/27 BCE.'^ ^ 
Our sources seldom focused on this evidence in the context of routine political 
repression. However, it is possible to demonstrate an undercurrent of the established 
order's perception that the Roman populace could form a threat to stability. Fear of 
plebeian mobilisation in favour of the imprisoned Catilinarians was strong enough to 
bring equites and citizen volimteers to the defence of the Capitol in 63 BCE. It also 
contributed to the decision to carry out summary executions of the conspirators. In the 
50s BCE P. Clodius Pulcher obtained political power by championing causes favoured 
by the plebs, including in 58 BCE the first lex frumentaria establishing a free com dole. 
His activities have been described as being an irmovative attempt to forge the urban mob 
into a distinct political constituency. In an atmosphere characterised in our sources as 
one of communal and mob violence, the supporters of Clodius were opposed by those of 
Milo, neither man operating within the constraints of standard magisterial powers. 
Freedmen, slaves and hired gladiators were all used in these disturbances. Something of 
a climax was reached with the plebs' burning of the Curia after their patron's murder in 
52 BCE. In response Pompey was empowered by the senate to levy troops in Italy and to 
use them against the populace of Rome. As pointed out by Nippel, the shock value of 
these events portrayed by our sources should not distract our attention from their reality 
as an extension of the use of violence in political dialogue. A major element of this 
increased violence was the established authority's willingness to employ military 
repression.'^ " 
A feature of Clodius' activities had been his use of the collegia. The origins of these 
associations were probably lost even to the Romans of the late Republic, although they 
were later recorded as being referred to in the Twelve Tables. In their most official 
manifestation collegia appeared as groupings of the major priesthoods. Plutarch's 
allocation of this phenomenon to the time of the second king of Rome, while presumably 
not historical, nevertheless underlined the importance of collegia to Roman tradition and 
Public interest: App. B. Civ. 1. 57; erawford p. 146-147. Watershed: ibid. 1. 60; Plut. Sull. 30. 5; 
Nippel (1995) p. 66. 
Catiline: Nippel (1995) p. 67-68; Cic. Att. 2. 1. 7; Cic. Sest 28. Clodius and Milo: Cassias Die 39. 8. 
1; Cic. Att. 4. 3; Plut. Brut. 20.4; Lintott (1968) p. 195; Nippel p. 78-79. Pompey: Cass. Die 40. 53. 
Increased violence: Nippel p. 83. 
133 
identity. However, it is as that rare phenomenon in Roman social panorama, an 
organised manifestation of plebeian collectivity, that they are of particular interest here. 
As such, collegia appeared to have fiinctioned broadly as mutual aid societies based 
around the often overlapping features of religious cult, locality and occupation. Much of 
our information about collegia has been derived from inscriptions and from legal 
codifications, a fact underlining their remoteness from ancient historians' interest in high 
politics. These sources have confirmed the role of collegia in supervising cult, arranging 
festive dinners and as burial clubs; membership involved fees that ensured some 
respectability. An inscription from Lanuvium, dated 136 CE, provided much information 
about the conduct of such an organisation, indicating the mixed slave and free 
membership. Its specificity about penalties for unruly activity at meetings may, of 
course, be interpreted either as evidence for the orderly intent of the group or for the 
need to confrol manifestly unacceptable behaviour. Their popularity is undeniable, as 
chronicled in the comprehensive documentation by Waltzing. Varro, wTiting in 37 BCE, 
described 
'.. .the club dinners which are now so countless that they make the price 
of provisions go soaring.' 
The collegia's political potency (real or imagined) was demonstrable through their 
association with a cuh of the dead Gracchi and their banning by the senate in 64 BCE. 
Clodius had acted to bring about their reinstatement as legal organisations and to 
strengthen their role within the vici. He attempted unsuccessftilly to enhance their role in 
the distribution of his recently established com dole. Among the extensive measures 
taken by Julius Caesar to restore order and prosperity to the City of Rome was the 
dissolution of all collegia '...apart from those of ancient foundation.' The exception 
made for long-established organisations again suggests a perception that their more 
recent political activity had been unacceptable. Despite his efforts at regulation, plebeian 
unrest during the Dictator's own funeral in 44 BCE was seen to be coimected with the 
collegia. This negative view of the collegia could hardly be better summed up than by 
Cicero's comment that they were formed from the 'slave-dregs of the City'.'^' 
Collegia: Lintott (1999) p. 177-178; Plut. Num. 17. 1; Nippel (1995) p. 70-75; Dig. 47. 22. Nature: 
Gamsey and Sailer 156-158; Lintott (1968) p. 78-83. Inscriptions: Waltzing Vol. 1 p. 3-4; Hopkins 
(1983) p. 211-217. Popularity: Varro Rust.3. 2. 16. Political threat: Plut. C. Grach 18. 2; Nippel 
(1995) p. 71-72; Cass. Dio 40. 49. 2-3. Corn dole: Nippel (1995) p. 76. Julius Caesar: Suet. lul. 41-42. 
Funeral: Val. Max. 9. 15. 1. Negative view: Cic. Pis. 9; Purcell p. 801. 
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On the basis of this history, it carmot be surprising that Augustus brought about 
profound changes in this aspect of Roman life. Equally, it must be plausible to argue 
from the fimdamental nature of these changes to a perception of the continuing political 
relevance of the plebeians in general and the collegia in particular. The first princeps 
placed generosity to the Roman plebs alongside his other self-advertised achievements. 
Beyond his physical transformation of their City, Augustus radically overhauled the 
organisation of its adminisfrative divisions. He apportioned the City into regiones and 
within these, smaller vici. Designated magistrates and other officials were appointed to 
oversee individual areas and to be responsible for 'night watches and guards', ostensibly 
with the task of protecting against fires, although the military nature of these vigiles has 
been discussed (page 129). This organisation was said to be still in operation in the early 
third century. Significantiy, the process involved control of the collegia and their 
absorption into Rome's regular adminisfrative and ideological structure. The frrst of 
these aims was accomplished by a Lex Julia, possibly of 7 CE, requiring official 
sanction before a collegium could be established. The second aim was achieved in no 
small part by the transformation of the locally based Compitalia festival. This measure 
was t£iken in 7 BCE, as part of a reorganisation of the City. Originating, as the name 
suggests, in rites in honour of the Lares at crossroads, the responsible collegia were 
harnessed to transform them into a religious celebration of Augustus and his family. 
Clearly reflecting a desired political effect, these changes '...symbolised the fact that 
Augustan order had come to the city hself. Restored by Gaius in a populist frame of 
mind, the collegia were again harmed by Claudius in 41 CE. It is indicative of the 
perceived role of these organisations that Cassius Dio's account of their renewed 
suppression is provided in the context of moves against meetings by Jews and even the 
closing down of taverns; all were associated with fears of the population gathering for 
seditious purposes. It is also suggestive of the continued significance of collegia that 
Elagabalus and Severus Alexander were still tinkering with their organisation in relation 
to the general adminisfration of the City of Rome. The potentially dissident nature of 
these plebeian organisations was confirmed by references in the law codes. The 
punishment for settmg up an unauthorised collegium was to be equivalent to that of 
someone 'occupying public places or temples with armed men'.'^ ^ 
Generosity: RG 15. Reorganisation: Suet. Aug. 30; Cass. Dio 55.8; OCD3 p. 352-353. Official 
sanction: Dig. 47. 22. 3. 1. Compitalia: Beard, North and Price p. 184-185; Nippel (1995) p. 72-73, 86; 
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With or without the contmued role of the collegia, incidents of urban unrest m Rome 
continued to be recorded. In the context of his account of Gains' tyranny, even Cassius 
Dio could show an understandmg of the inequality of power in Rome and a sympathetic 
awareness of the imbalance of coercive ability on which it relied. He described the 
general situation as being 
'...an angry ruler on one side, and a hostile people on the other...The 
contest between them, however, was not an equal one; for the people 
could do nothing but talk and show something of their feelings by their 
gestures, whereas Gains would destroy his opponents...' 
Specifically, Cassius Dio depicted an occasion on which the populace assembled in the 
Circus Maximus in order to protest against Gains' tax demands. The demonstration was 
suppressed by ruthless force as the Emperor '...had them slain by the soldiers; after this 
all kept quiet'. In 61 CE '...the muhitude which clustered round and menaced with rocks 
and torches' initially prevented the mass execution of 400 household slaves of a City 
Prefect, Pedanius Secundus, sensationally murdered by one of their number. We are 
informed that this outburst represented a clash between a traditionally harsh law and the 
plebs' perception of natural justice. It is instructive that during the senate's debate on the 
matter, the call for the enactment of the ftiU rigour of the law was argued on the basis 
that it was only the fear of such severity that enabled 'individuals', (that is, members of 
the elite Roman families), to live safely among a much larger slave and general 
population. The form of the official response to the protests, although sketched in a 
sentence, may be seen to indicate a number of significant features: 
'Thereupon Caesar berated the people in an edict and lined with military 
detachments the entire route along which the condemned were to be 
lead to punishment.' 
Nero's personal involvement presumably demonstrated the importance of the issue and 
was perhaps required for a large-scale troop deployment within the city, thus underlining 
the attachment of the soldiers to his person. The fact that an edict was read as a prelude 
to the military deployment suggests that such a response by the authorities was part of a 
known legal process rather than an ad hoc reaction. Finally the effectiveness of the 
Liebeschuetz p. 70-71. Gaius/Claudius: Cass. Dio 60. 6. 6-7. Elagabalus/Severus Alexander: SHA 
Heliogab. 20. 3; ibid. Alex. Sev. 33. 2. Punishment: Dig. 47. 22. 2. 
136 
repressive measure is suggested by the fact that its description formed the conclusion to 
the main part of a lengthy account of this incident.'^ ^ 
The Praetorians 
The ability of the princeps to exercise legalised military control within the city of Rome 
had been an important part of Augustus' careful shaping of his powers. In particular, an 
element of the arrangements made in 23 BCE gave him the right to retain proconsular 
authority inside the pomerium. By this measure a repeat of military occupation, such as 
Sulla had imposed in 88 BCE, could have been legal. On a smaller scale, the predilection 
of subsequent principes for soldiers as bodyguards was predictably viewed by Tacitus as 
'the reality of Imperial power.' However, it had been normal for military leaders of the 
Republic to be allocated escorts of soldiers. These took their name, cohors praetoria, 
from the commander's tent, the praetorium. Faction leaders of the first century BCE 
civil wars retained large bodies of personal troops and Augustus introduced Rome to the 
permanence of military occupation by stationing nine cohorts (4,500 or perhaps 9,000 
men) in and around the city. Tiberius concenfrated this force in the Praetorian camp on 
the north-eastern edge of Rome, leading Tacitus to comment that '...the City was 
occupied by its own troops'. Suetonius recorded that this was part of a more general 
garrisoning of Italy 
'...for the purposes of securing relief from bandits and robbers, as well 
as from lawless rebellions'. 
Juvenal associated these troops with murderous repression and insecurity during the 
period of Sejanus' power. Tacitus was more explicit still, claiming that the massing of 
the Praetorians was intended to bring about '...a rise in their own confidence and in 
others' dread'; or, as the Penguin translation puts it, to 'intimidate the population'. 
Cassius Dio provided an unambiguous example of this role of the Praetorians. Tiberius 
was said to have drilled his guards in front of the senators 
'...as i f they were ignorant of the power of these troops; his purpose 
was to make them more afraid of him, when they saw his defenders to 
be so numerous and so strong.' 
In spite of the link with Sejanus, it is later stressed that control of these troops is 
exclusively in the hands of the emperor. Tacitus provided an instance of Tiberius 
Gaius: Cass. Dio 59. 13. 4,28. 11. Slave executions: Tacitus Ann. 14. 42-45. 
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angrily demanding why a sycophantic senator was involving himself in a question 
about their privileges (see page 266). In confirmation of this sentiment the superior 
status, pay and conditions of the Praetorians reflected their role as guarding the person 
of the emperor, while the diplomas granting them the privileges due after they had 
completed a specified number of years' service were signed by the emperor rather than 
by the prefect directly in command of the unit.'^ 
Coercion depicted in satire 
Although in satire we certainly have a different reflection of Roman culture and society, 
the distortions and uncertainties of the glimpses permitted are no less problematic than 
those of history. Authors such as Lucilius, Horace and Juvenal, while lacking the 
political careers of a Tacitus or a Cassius Dio, were nevertheless either themselves 
members of the privileged elite or had powerful fiiends. More directly, one of the 
clearest elements in the far from clear definition of Roman satire must be the varied and 
often uncertain personas adopted by the writers. These were unpredictably any or some 
of 
'...civic watchdog, sneering cynic, mocking or indignant observer, and 
social outcast.' 
Thus the task of extracting genuine political or social comment from the genre is 
difficult at best, fruitiess at worst. It must be assumed that authors' personal and mdeed 
political ties may undermine any claimed '...ideal of unequivocal freedom of speech'. 
Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to hope that the general shape of incident and detail, 
if not its vibrant colour, intensity and absurdity, was based to some extent on real 
experience.'^ ^ 
Assuming this to be the case, Juvenal reflected a sullen resentment of the position and 
behaviour of soldiers. Perhaps responding to specific measures taken by Hadrian to 
enhance the status of legionary service, the unfinished sixteenth satire complained about 
soldiers' rights regarding wills and appearance in legal proceedings. He even bemoaned 
the impossibility of a private citizen obtaining legal redress for an assault by a soldier. 
Proconsular power : Cassius Dio 53. 32; Nippel (1995) p. 91. Bodyguards: Hist. 4. 11. 1; as a sign 
of tyranny, see pages. 122-123. Praetorians: OCD3 p. 1241; Keppie p. 384-387; Suet. Aug. 49; Tib. 37; 
Sejanus: Tac. Ann. 4. 2. 1; Juv. 10. 94-98; Drill: Cass. Dio 57. 24. 5. Priviiiges: Tac. Ann. 6. 3. 1; 
Campbell (1984) p. 111. 
Nature of satire: OCD3 p. 1358; Braund, (S. H.) p. 2; Morgan p. 4. 
138 
One of the misadventures of Petronius' hero, Encolpius, was to be carrying a sword 
when he bumped into a soldier. Even though the account suggested that the soldier was 
in fact 'a deserter or a thug' (satirical pique?), the authority of the military man over the 
civilian was clearly portrayed as the former confiscated the weapon. This incidental 
detail adds to the evidence about the state's monopoly of the means of coercion (see 
pages 33 and 125). Apuleius invented a complicated account of an encounter between a 
vegetable grower and a soldier. The soldier, apparently able to converse in both Latin 
and Greek, demanded the use of the farmer's ass to transport his officer's equipment. 
Although the civilian responded to being struck by beating up the soldier and then 
hiding, the military man involved his colleagues and reported the matter to the civil 
authorities. The soldiers, impressing the magistrate by oaths involving the emperor, 
eventually succeeded in having the vegetable grower arrested and possibly executed. 
Having gained possession of the ass, the soldier was described as arranging its load of 
weapons 'in a striking manner' (conspicuam), 
'...not because such was the rule of arms, but to the end he might make 
fear those which passed by'.'^^ 
Democratic violence 
Of course, there is no suggestion in this assemblage of evidence that physical coercion 
and terror were the sole preserves of regimes that could be designated as personal 
tyrannies or monarchies. Thucydides recorded the use of physical force and security 
measures beyond the rule of single tyrants. He noted the role of the 'one hundred and 
twenty Hellenic youths' in carrying out the 'rough work' of Athens' Four Hundred in 
411 BCE. At an earlier stage, shortly after the launch of the Sicilian expedition, the 
Atheiuan democracy itself had become 'inflamed' by suspected sacrilege; '...every day 
showed an increase in savagery and led to more arrests being made.' Thucydides 
perhaps transmitted to Aristotle this view of the coercive nature of the more exfreme 
manifestations of democracy. The latter saw the brutal Athenian regime of the Thirty as 
a result of the irresponsible actions of the demos. Violence in the more democratic 
elements of politics in Republican Rome could be played down, for example by Appian. 
He presumably wished to highlight the contrast between his descriptions of civil conflict 
Wills and justice: Juv. 16. 25, 53-55. Legal proceedings: ibid. 13-17; Campbell (1984) p. 231-236, 
257. Assault: ibid. 7-12. Sword: Petron. Sat. 82. Soldier and vegetable grower: Apul. Met. 9. 39-42 
and 10. 1; see Mitchell p. 114-115 for evidence of the military commandeering and misusing transport. 
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in the first century BCE and an earlier era of supposed restraint. Admittedly within the 
period leading to the disorder of civil war, even Appian described violence in the 
workings of Rome's legislative assemblies.'^ ' 
The place of coercion in modem analyses of emperors' authority 
Modem analyses of Roman ideology usually acknowledge the role of military force 
and physical coercion in establishing the emperor's authority. However, they generally 
leave the area only partially explored. I suspect that this is because it is deemed to be 
less mteresting than other aspects of ideology. Momigliano broadly confirmed such a 
view in his study of the Greek and Roman historiography of warfare. Although he 
smgled out as exceptions the accounts of civil wars by Thucydides, Sallust and Tacitus, 
he suggested that modem writers generally follow their ancient counterparts in viewing 
wars as inevitable (and therefore uninteresting), while politics is seen as reflecting 
individual character and choice (and is therefore more attractive as a subject). In the 
course of introducing his masterly exploration of Augustus' use of visual images, 
Zanker included the brief statement that, 'Augustus's imagery would have been useless 
without his legions and enormous resources.' As he continued, the importance of 
military imagery was of course explored in some depth alongside religious, dynastic 
and other forms. However, it was examined exclusively as an ideology of power and 
conquest that eventually 
'...perpetuated itself and transcended the realities of everyday life to 
project onto future generations the impression that they lived in the best 
of all possible worlds in the best of all times.' 
Zanker suggested that early busts of Octavian portraying an '...ambitious and power-
hungry young man' (Plate H i ) would '...appeal (in a positive sense) to the masses' 
rather than represent the negative face of coercion. 168 
Without necessarily challenging the drift of Zanker's general analysis of the workings 
of imagery, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that among the 'realities of 
everyday life' that impinged on the mled could have been uncomfortable perceptions of 
intimidatory and coercive aspects of military power. Zanker gave no space to such 
Hellenic youths: 8. 69. Democratic savagery: 6. 60. The Thirty: Arist. [Ath. Pol.] 34-35; Segno p. 
342-343. Roman politics: App. 5C/v. 1. 1-5, 1. 30-33. 
Modern interest: Ando (p. 26) says this more or less directly. War/politics: Momigliano p. 120-
124; Campbell (2002b) p. 1-2. Augustan imagery: Zanker (1988) p. 3-4, 41-42. 
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considerations. In this respect, he was supported by at least one major reviewer, and it 
has to be admitted that he seems to be in good company. According to Tacitus, and 
followed by Syme, opposition to Augustus had ceased to exist and he was 'without a 
single adversary' once he was firmly in control. Again largely following Tacitus, 
reasons to explain this state of affairs may be seen to include: the heavy toll of the civil 
war period on the political elite; from that same period, a weariness of conflict and a 
perception that the previous system of government was not working; and the skilfully 
managed ambiguity of Augustus' constitutional position - although clearly sole ruler, 
nevertheless retaining enough Republican form to avoid the fate of Julius Caesar. 
However, neither Tacitus nor Syme made any attempt to hide the violence and 
intimidation by which Octavian had come to exercise power. Reflecting the era of his 
analysis, Syme could even characterise the long reach of 'judicial murders' and 
proscriptions involved in this process 'to resemble a class-war.' Evidence to support 
the imposition of authority by the use of force can be found in Appian. He provided a 
particularly graphic account of the use of the military to suppress political 
demonstration in the Rome of the Triumvirs. It should also be added that despite 
suggesting a lack of opposition to Augustus, Tacitus had even the reportedly positive 
commentators on the rule of the princeps indicate that '.. .just a few things had been 
handled by force to ensure peace for the rest.' Perhaps more significantly for a thesis 
wishing to bring into sharper focus the coercive aspects of Roman Imperial rule, his 
accoimt of Augustus' fiineral must weigh against any general picture of authority free 
of such features. Having published an edict warning the population against any repeat 
of the disturbances that had accompanied the fiineral of Julius Caesar, Tiberius ensured 
that: 
'On the day of the funeral soldiers stood as i f forming a garrison, much 
to the derision of... (onlookers who)... said, an elderly princeps, after a 
powerfiilness lasting so long and having even provided resources for 
the state in the form of heirs, would evidently require protecting by 
military assistance to ensure a peacefiil burial.''^^ 
Review of Zanker: Wallace-Hadrill (1989b) p. 154. No opposition: Ann. 1.2; Syme (1939) p. 372, 
479. Reasons for the lack of opposition: Ann 1.2; Raaflaub and Samons p. 451-454. Violence of 
Octavian's rise to power: Ann. 1. 10; Syme (1939) p. 187fr; App. B.Civ 5. 67. Class war: Syme (1939) 
p. 193. Minimum use of force: Ann 1. 9. Funeral: Ann. 1. 8. Although Cassius Dio's initial account of 
the funeral suggested that the involvement of troops was ceremonial (56. 42. 2), Tiberius' fears of 
disorder emerged later (57. 2.2). 
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It may be significant that this passage was not discussed by Syme in either his Roman 
Revolution or Tacitus. It has been noted that Syme gave little attention to the military in 
his analysis of Augustan Rome. He did consider the various plots against Augustus. On 
these, he reflected the view of Cassius Dio about the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
information. His general conclusion, as evidenced by Suetonius and shared by Raaflaub 
and Samons, was that the threat posed by conspiracies against Augustus was probably 
at the same time both small and exaggerated by the regime. However, as suggested by 
Tacitus' account of the fnst princeps' funeral, this assessment may not necessarily 
imply a lack of military controls; it may even be evidence for their general 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, i f only in acknowledgement of the general drift of modem 
scholarship, this might be an appropriate juncture at which to give specific attention to 
factors other than coercion that could be said to form a foundation for the authority of 
Roman emperors 170 
'™ Syme and the military: Linderski p. 46. Plots - lack of information: Syme (1939) p. 479; Cass. Dio 
53. 19. Small and/or exaggerated threat: Syme (1939) p. 479; Suet. Aug. 19. l;Raaflaub and Samons 
p. 432. 
142 
6. Bases of power other than coercion 
Introduction 
It is not the contention of this thesis that coercion was the sole basis upon which 
Roman emperors ruled. It has indeed been argued that physical force and the power of 
the military were central to authority in Rome; also that they were recognisably integral 
parts of the political culture, in spite of the distaste for this reality expressed in our elite 
literary sources. However, it will be of value to place the coercive and military features 
of authority in the wider context of those characteristics that delineated the social 
power of the emperors. For the purposes of this thesis, such a process will have 
particular explanatory utility where it appears that other features in fact revealed a 
coercive and military underpinning. Therefore, prior to a concentration on the 
characteristics of Roman emperors that will emphasise a personal relationship with 
their soldiers, a survey will be made of other general factors that have been associated 
with their authority. These will include some detail on law, religion, and art, symbol 
and ceremony, alongside brief allusion to other factors. 
Law 
No doubt speaking with the prejudice of a lawyer, Cicero declared that nothing more 
pleased 
'...that supreme God...than the assemblies and gatherings of men 
associated with justice, which are called states.' 
In an echo of Cicero, Gibbon drew a distinction between the Roman Empire of Trajan 
and the Antonines on the one hand, and the territories of later and earlier conquerors 
on the other. The former, he claimed, were 'united by laws'. This perspective appears 
to privilege law as a defining element of organised states. From a modem perspective 
it is not so easy to be sure about the role of law as a basis for political authority in 
Greek and Roman society. 'Law, the king of all, men and gods alike,' proclaimed 
Plato's Callicles, alluding to an apparently similar statement by Pindar. In his fable of 
the hawk and nightingale, Hesiod put forward 'sfraight judgements' and 'justice' as the 
bases of relationships, and as features that distinguished men from wild animals. 
Ancient authors sang the praises of law and justice, particularly as facets of the 
behaviour of rulers and of government in general. Herodotus' fancifiil account of 
Mycerinus had the Egyptians praise him more than any other pharaoh because of the 
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equity of his dealings, while the Athenians of the late sixth century BCE were said to 
have gone from 'strength to strength' after replacing rule by tyrants with equality 
before the law. However, these and other examples of the status of law are 
problematic. The meaning of Pindar's praise for law/custom in his fragmentary poem 
is far from clear. The interpretation put upon it in the Platonic dialogue, essentially that 
might is right, is possibly incorrect. Nevertheless, while Herakles' theft of the cattle of 
Geryon may well have been the act of a demigod and a character that was 'the 
touchstone of excellence', it was still murderous robbery by the archetype of sfrength 
and power. Mycerinus' justice did not save him from the wrath of the gods and the 
literary context of Herodotus' tribute to the Athenians was their ultimately disasfrous 
conflict with Sparta. 
For any expressed view that rulers were in some way subject to external laws, others 
bring the idea into question by equating the will of the ruler with law. This equation 
can become a correspondence between ruler and law such that the former was the 
embodiment of the latter, thus rendering void any notion of legal accountability. In 
dramatic form, Euripides had Theseus argue the theoretical case for a ruler being 
subject to the law. Agesilaus was praised as an 'assiduous servant of the laws', while 
Arrian argued that even Alexander could not be above law. Set against these examples 
must be counsels of perfection such as those of Aristotle. The philosopher indicated 
the rightness of authority being possessed by a man, or men, of 'surpassing 
excellence', in which case social power would rest on the manifestation of that 
excellence, rather than on law. Following Aristotle's lead, Dio Chrysostom specifically 
identified monarchy as being 'based on law and justice' and as 'the most practicable' 
form of government. In such a system there would be 
'...a city, or a number of peoples, or the whole world, well ordered by 
one good man's judgement and virtue.' 
The process by which the role of a ruler as lawmaker could be transformed into 
personal and unaccountable authority was illustrated by Herodotus' account of 
Deioces. On the basis of his renown as a settler of disputes, this Mede progressed from 
being a notable personage in his village to a fifty-three year reign as king. He was said 
to have ruled from a remote and unapproachable position, which was justified by the 
Laws and the state: Cic. Rep. 6. 13; Gibbon p. 33; Ando p. 9. Law, king of all: PI. Grg. 484b; Find. 
Fr. 169a; Hes. Op. 200ff. Mycerinus: Hdt. 2. 129-133. Athens: ibid. 5. 78. 
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supposed threat from jealous rivals. A further stage in the absorption of law into the 
personal authority of a ruler was outlined by Isocrates in the early fourth century BCE. 
He exhorted subjects to: 
'Obey also the laws set down by the kings, but consider their conduct 
the strongest law', 
thus associating the standards of equity with the person of the king. There may be hints 
of kings as the source of perfect, changeless law in Plato, but by the Hellenistic era the 
idea of a king as the physical embodiment of law was fully formed. Of that period or 
perhaps later, a peri Basileias work ascribed to Diotogenes has been referred to as 
defining a king as the personification of law, while various pseudonymous texts 
addressed to the Macedonian and Egyptian monarchies explained the theory behind the 
concept. This suggested that a monarch, possessed of the right virtues and education, 
could serve the same fiinction as that ascribed to the law in a democratically controlled 
city. Law was certainly no guarantee against the arbitrary power of a monarch; in fact 
there was a strong tradition of specific laws granting just such licence, for example to 
the kings of Persia.'^ ^ 
From this perspective it is possible to consider evidence concerning the relationship 
between the authority of Roman emperors and the law. In any such review, even one as 
necessarily cursory as this, a central position must be held by the lex de imperio 
Vespasiani. A unique inscription records the concluding part of this decree of senate 
and people, probably dated January 70 CE, devoted to the powers of Vespasian. Its 
details seem most likely to reflect aspects of the authority assumed by/granted to 
earlier emperors dating back to Gaius or Tiberius, although some of its provisions must 
have related to the particular circumstances of the new emperor's accession. In the 
former category can be placed clauses that recognised Vespasian's right to make 
freaties, convene the senate, propose candidates for the elective offices and to extend 
the boundary of Rome. The overwhelming personal power of the emperor was made 
clear in clauses that indicated his prerogative to carry out any act ' . . . in matters 
religious or secular, public or private' that he deemed to be ' . . .of advantage to the state 
'^ ^ Rulers under law:.Eur. 5u/7/7.430ff; Xen. Ages. 7. 2; Arr. Anab. 4. 9. Rulers beyond the law: Arist. 
Pol. 1288a-b; Dio Chrys. Or. 3. 43-45. See Murray (1965) p. 176-177 for general discussion. Rulers as 
embodiment oflaw: Hdt. 1. 99-101. Isoc. AdDem. 36; for Plato see Rowe (2000b) p. 307-309; for 
Diotogenes see Dvomik p. 248 and OCD3 p. 485; for pseudonymous Hellenistic texts see Hahm p. 458-
459. Persia: Hdt. 3. 31. 
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and its majesty'. He was placed above law in the sense that he could be excluded from 
the provisions of any enactment. However, it is in a further clause that we see the most 
likely reflection of Vespasian's specific situation, and in which the reality of Imperial 
power was manifested most starkly. This declared to be legal 'all actions, decrees or 
commands' made by or on behalf of the Emperor before the promulgation of the new 
law. Two related aspects are of particular interest here. Firstly, the clause contained the 
clear implication that acts of the senate and of Vitellius taken after 1st July 69 were 
illegal, thus illustrating the extent to which such a law could be tailored to suit the 
political and ideological requirements of the moment. Secondly, and explaining the 
significance of that date, it was the occasion on which Vespasian had first been 
proclaimed emperor by the troops in Alexandria. The importance of that event was 
imderlined because the Emperor used it to date his accession to the throne. Thus, for all 
its carefiil drafting and language of senatorial self-importance, the Lex in fact reflected 
with brutal clarity both the personal authority of the emperor and the military 
derivation of his political power.'^ ^ 
Despite the realities described above, it should come as no surprise, in a society as 
wedded to mos maiorum as that of Rome, that emperors should adopt ideologies 
stressing their adherence to tradition; law was clearly a major source of established 
precedent. The subsequent attractiveness and status of these ideologies would 
undoubtedly have been boosted by their adoption out of necessity by the model for all 
Rome's Imperial rulers, Augustus. He had emerged triumphant from a lengthy period 
of civil war in which the traditional political structure of the City had fractured under 
the strain of its successful territorial expansion and the now ill-contained personal 
rivakies among its elite. Augustus required the co-operation of that elite in order to 
ensure his own safety and the stability of his control over the state. In any case, the fate 
of the would-be autocrat, Julius Caesar, may well have indicated that after 31 BCE 
there was no other practical way of ruling Rome than through ostensibly 
'constitutional' means. This analysis would explain the care with which Augustus 
accepted only 'legal' and assiduously avoided 'illegal' honours and offices. Prominent 
themes of the Res Gestae were Augustus' obedience to the will of the senate and 
people of Rome, and a repetition that all his actions were carried out in their name. He 
Lex: Sherk 82; Brunt (1977); Levick (1999b) p. 86, 175; Bennett p. 104-105. 
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took care that the more irregular aspects of his position, such as his Ufetime tribunician 
power, were recorded as being 'enacted by law'. The strength of this ideology can be 
illustrated by the use made of apparent lapses in its operation. Thus, Ovid attempted to 
bolster his appeal against banishment by pleading that his condemnation had not been 
'...through a decree of the senate nor...ordered by a special court' but by Augustus' 
own words. 
Observance of the law was a criterion frequently employed to praise or condemn later 
emperors. Pliny described the situation under Trajan as one in which, 'We are ruled by 
you and subject to you, but no more than we are to the laws'. Vespasian, Titus, and 
even, at the start of his reign, Domitian were corrmiended for their fair administration 
of justice. The last-named was condemned for his later cupidity in making illegal 
seizures of property, while the recorded excesses of Gains included the active 
manipulation of law in order to satisfy his desires. However, even in praising Trajan's 
submission to the law, Pliny appeared to reveal that the true state of affairs was quite 
different. In recording that Trajan submitted himself to the laws, the panegyrist 
immediately added that, 'No one had intended these laws to apply to the emperor'. The 
extent to which even an emperor such as Trajan was actually beyond legal 
accountability was contained in Pliny's statement of the opposite; 
'..."the law is above the prince", Caesar bows to the same restrictions 
as any other consul'. 
Thus it was as consul that the Emperor submitted himself to the jurisdiction of statute, 
presumably reverting to unlimited powers, such as those indicated in the lex de imperio 
Vespasiani, on relinquishing the office.'^^ 
In the sixth century CE Justinian presided over the production of a compilation of 
previous Roman law, now commonly referred to as the Digesta. Reflecting the 
inevitable development of a complex legalism alongside the increased 
bureaucratisation of the later Empire, the Digesta covered a multitude of topics. One of 
these concerned the relationship between the powers of emperors and the law. 
Augustus' adherence to law:.RG .1. 3-4,2, 5. 1, 5. 3, 6, 10. 2; Honor6 p. 3; Yavetz (1984) p. 26. 
Tribunician power: RG 10. 1. Ovid: Tr. 2. 129-134. 
Trajan praised: Plin. Pan. 24. 4. Flavians praised: Suet. Vesp. 15, Tit. 8, Dom. 8. Domitian and 
Gains condemned: Plin. Pan. 50. 1-2; Suet. Calig. 40-41. Trajan's real power: Plin. Pan 65. 1; 
Bennett p. 105-106. 
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Although perhaps not as clear cut as is often supposed, the most direct statements on 
this subject broadly confirm the notion of the emperor as both source and embodiment 
of law. The early third century jurist, Ulpian, is quoted as the main source in his 
statement that 
'...whatever the emperor has determined...(by variously defined 
formal means).. .is undoubtedly law'. 
Ulpian's account received support from a pronouncement of the second century legal 
author, Gains. His albeit cryptic contribution to the issue was that it had never (sic) 
been doubted that the emperor could make law, '...seeing that the emperor himself 
receives his imperium through a law'. It must be reasonable to suppose that the law 
referred to was the lex de Imperio Vespasiani. It should also be noted that doubts have 
been expressed about the general applicability, precise context and care in drafting of 
the Ulpian exfract. Quite reasonably attention has been drawn to the qualifying formal 
circumstances that he attached to Imperial law making, while it has also been asserted 
that the jurist's use of language on this point was careless, the provision merely raising 
the emperor to the same legislative level as the senate and people, rather than replacing 
their authority with his.''^ 
Other accounts of the relationship between Roman law and political authority stressed 
the subservience of the former to the latter. From his analytical viewpoint of 
condemning the personal power of the principes, Tacitus devoted a gloomily Sallustian 
review to the development of Roman legislation. The content of this digression 
suggested that, in Rome's long history, legislation had functioned as a vehicle in the 
pursuit of political disputes between social groups and individuals. In terms of its 
placement within the text of the Annals, the review was used by Tacitus to emphasise 
the indelible stamp that Augustus had placed on the res publica, eclipsing all other 
sources of authority, including that of law. During the first century CE Musonius was 
already referring to the princeps as 'law animate', while the subordination of law to the 
will of the emperor can be illustrated from among those Imperial rulers usually viewed 
as least autocratic. Marcus Aurelius, for example, set aside the provisions of the lex 
annalis, the law determining minimum ages for holding political office, allowing the 
Emperor as source of law: Dig. 1. 4. 1. 1; Gai. Inst. 2. 5. Formal circumstances and context: 
Brunt (1977) p. 111; Johnston (1989) p. 152. Ulpian and Careless language: Millar (2002) p. 69-87; 
Campbell (1984) p. 410-411. 
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15 year old Commodus to become consul in 177 CE. The SHA biographer praised the 
respect shown by Marcus for the senate, noting that he transferred legal business there. 
However, the same passage recorded that the Emperor '...enrolled in the senate many 
of his friends'; clearly Marcus was leaving little to chance! In 171 the military needs of 
the Empire took precedence over the legal arrangements governing the provinces when 
the Emperor had the senate cede Baetica to his direct control in exchange for the then 
peacefiil Sardinia.'^ ^ 
It seems fair to conclude that law was more a conduit for than it was a foimdation of 
the authority of Roman emperors. The relevance of law to the initial acquisition of 
social power in Rome will be revisited when more detailed consideration is given to 
the accession of emperors (page 224ff). For now, an example from Cassius Dio will 
suffice on this point. Following his account of the death of Claudius in 54 CE, the 
historian noted that in terms of 'strict justice' the throne should have passed to the 
Emperor's legitimate and sufficiently mature son, Britannicus. The historian added that 
'by law the power fell also to Nero because of his adoption'. However, from his early 
third century CE perspective, Cassius Dio irrmiediately cut through this diletmna by 
commenting that 'no claim is stronger than that of arms'. This conclusion has a more 
substantial feel than the courtroom assertions of Cicero that law should be seen as the 
opposite of and potential alternative to violence. This is certainly the conclusion that 
appears foremost in modem studies of power. Foucault emphasised the operation of 
'domination' rather than 'right' (defined as legal limits on power), although his 
analysis went beyond the normally perceived boundaries of political authority, instead 
considering power and domination in more basic aspects of human interaction. Others 
have considered the roles of law and power in straightforward terms. Bourdieu 
appeared in no doubt about their relationship: 
'Law does no more than symbolically consecrate - by recording it in a 
form that renders it both eternal and universal - the structure of power 
relations among the groups and classes.' 
In doing so, law was seen to reflect the domination of force, but to 
Tacitus' review: Ann. 3. 25. 2-28. 2; Wiedemann (2000) p. 529-530. Musonius: Dvomik p. 535-
536. Marcus and Commodus: SUA Marc. 22. 12; Comm. 2. 3-4; Birley (1987) p. 195-196. Marcus 
and the senate: SHA Marc. 10. 1-5; Birley (1987) p. 179, 168. 
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'...render it superfluous constantly to reassert power relations through 
the overt use of force.' 
It may be fair to suggest that Romans of the Imperial period had available to them 
models indicating both the domination of law by autocratic power and limitations of 
that power through legal restraints. Plutarch, for example, illustrated the differing 
approaches of Hellenistic kings. Antigonus Monophthalmos was said to have declared 
that only kings of barbarians were above the law. However, when such generalities 
collided with a monarch's specific desires, a different outcome resulted; thus, Seleucus 
Nicator divorced his wife and married her instead to his son (against both law and 
custom), proclaiming that '...what a king orders is always just'. The second exemplum 
was certainly more frequently reflected in the political and personal behaviour of 
Roman emperors.''^  
Art, symbol and ceremony 
After describing the manner in which Cyrus had established himself in supreme power, 
Xenophon turned his attention to matters of art, symbol and ceremony in the ideology 
of the new ruler. The historian focused on Cyrus' organisation of the royal parade, 
commenting that 
'.. .it seems to us that the majesty of the procession itself was one of the 
arts contrived so that his rule (should) not be easy to hold in contempt.' 
Aristotle expressed a similar view in an analysis of the positive aspects of oligarchy £is 
a form of government. He suggested that those taking higher magisterial office imder 
such a system should 
'...on entering office.. .offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public 
edifice...decorated with votive offerings', 
the purpose being twofold; to persuade the population that no change in government is 
necessary and to memorialise the munificence of those in power. Again, 'Once firmly 
on the throne', Deioces, Herodotus' judicially renowned King of the Medes, 
'.. .introduced for the first time the ceremonial of royalty'. Plutarch, perhaps influenced 
by his contacts with the 'bread and circuses' aspects of Rome under Trajan and 
Hadrian, stressed the role of pageants, civic statuary and building programmes in 
™ Succession to Claudius: Cass. Die 61. 1. 1. Cicero: Caecin. 5; Harries p. 65. Modern studies: 
Foucault (1980) p. 95-96; Kelly (M) p. 33; Bourdieu (1980) p. 132. Antigonus and Seleucus: Plut. A/or 
182c; Plut. Dem. 38; Billows p. 62-63. 
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influencing the mass of the population. He did so in the context of describing the 
measures taken by the already dominant Pericles to balance the political pressures 
exerted by the various social forces within Athens. A feature of all these examples is 
the characterisation of art, symbol and ceremony as ancillary structures of political 
power rather than as its basis. Other examples and analyses can give those aspects 
greater prominence. Introducing a broad view of ancient and modem examples in a 
book subtitled 'Power and Ceremonial in Traditional Societies\ David Cannadine 
could conclude that, 'Ritual is not the mask of force, but is itself a type of power'. 
Indeed, in the ominous context of 1936, John Maynard Keynes could write that, 
'The failure of the twentieth century democracies is in part attributable 
to their failure to invest the state with ceremonial' 
However, noting the political economist's limiting phrase of 'in part', this review will 
seek to give due weight to art, symbol and ceremony as elements in social power, 
while at the same time recognising their essentially aiixiliary role.'^ ^ 
In the Classical world, the interaction between the two was certainly complex. 
Architecture, in the shape of entire townscapes, could express clear power 
relationships. The central prominence of the agora and bouleuterion, alongside the 
standard sized building plots and houses of fourth century BCE Priene can be seen as 
expressing Greek '...ideals of active citizenship and political equality'. The various 
historical forms of buildings and layout in Pompeii, on the other hand, manifested the 
social and political hierarchy of Republican Rome and the values of the Augustan 
monarchy. The first was represented by the gradation in size and opulence of dwellings 
in relation to their proximity to the forum, while the second was unmistakably present 
in the temples and adornments of that forum in its appearance before the earthquake of 
62 CE. Wider analysis of Roman Imperial cities has suggested that in their fora up to 
60% of the statues were of the emperor, directly related to his cult, or of Victory. 
Returning to Pompeii, however, there may be a caution against over-interpretation of 
this evidence in the focus given by its citizens to repairs following this disaster. 
Although recent archaeology has provided new, possibly contradictory data, it appears 
that restoration of public structures after 62 concentrated on the amphitheatre, baths 
and other places of entertainment rather than the more overtly political structures of the 
™ Cyrus: Xen. Cyr. 8. 3. 1. Aristotle: Pol. 1321a 35-40. Deioces; Hdt. 1. 98-99. Plutarch: Per. 11.2-
13.3. Ritual as power: Cannadine p. 19 Keynes: The Listener 26 August. 
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forum. Individual buildings could also be used in complex political ways. There can 
have been little doubt that the Parthenon was constructed to represent and perhaps in 
some way to justify political domination by Athens, besides any explicitly religious 
purpose. The combination of the two in armual ceremonies, of which it was the centre, 
served to highlight its central role. Multifaceted political reasoning must explain the 
otherwise eccentric decision by the then thirty-year-old Augustus, still not in secure 
sole control of Rome, to devote large resources to the construction of a personal 
mausoleum. Its size, larger by far than any preceding Roman tomb and diplomatically 
never exceeded by later emperors, could hardly have failed to draw comparisons vsdth 
the monuments of Hellenistic kings, particularly that of Mausolos himself at 
Halicamassus. Balancing this clear but perhaps risky declaration of individual 
domination was the mausoleum's location. Situated within Rome, it provided physical 
reinforcement for the immediately needed ideological campaign against Antony. His 
will, made public by Augustus, included the politically damaging stipulation that he be 
buried with Cleopatra in Egypt. Such an interpretation certainly points to architecture's 
role as a specific tool in the construction of social power. 
At least as a declaration of power, there can be no mistaking the use of monumental 
sculpture. Crucially these, 'Works of art worked; they worked in public', none more so 
than the colossal images of Egyptian pharaohs, whose meaning of domination must 
have been as unmistakable to the ancient Greeks and Romans as it is today. Certainly it 
can have been no coincidence that the Hellenistic monarchs were the most important 
new clients of art in their era. No doubt drawing strength and authority from their 
association with the depiction of the gods, statues played a significant role in defining 
and advertising the nature of their new regimes (Plate 10). Their apparent importance 
in this function for Roman rulers cannot help but be exaggerated for us by the fact that 
the 120 or so life sized royal portraits surviving from the 300 years between Alexander 
and Augustus are exceeded by double that number of the latter ruler alone. Thus it is 
not surprising that monumental sculpture formed a significant part of the evidence 
allowing the most authoritative study on the subject to declare that. 
Priene and Pompeii: Zanker (1998) p. 3-6. Wider analysis: Whittaker (1997) p. 145-146. Repairs: 
Zanker (1998) p. 129-132. Parthenon: Plut. Per 12; Boardman (1993) p. 84; Osborne (1998) p. 174. 
Mausoleum and Antony: Zanker (1988) p. 72-77; Claridge p. 181-184; Cass. Dio 50. 3. 5. 
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Plate 10 
Terme Ruler 
'Rarely has art been pressed into the service of political power so 
directly as in the age of Augustus.' 
From this large source, limited examples must suffice to draw out the relevant points. 
Broadly, the Augustan use of statuary in a political context can be illustrated by the 
conventional view that his sculpted image was made in at least three basic types, each 
of which is said to reflect specific changes in ideology (Plate 11). The earliest statues, 
representing Octavian as youthfiil, subdued and with a light beard, appear relevant to 
his mourning for the recently dead Caesar, thus evoking the Dictator's memory (i). 
After Actium a clean-shaven, more dynamic image became the norm, perhaps recalling 
Hellenistic monarchs m the tilt of his head (ii). In turn, this was replaced after the 
political settlement of 27 BCE by what became the standard, essentially ageless image. 
Significant elements in this settled image of the first princeps included the simpler 
hairstyle, calmer expression and level gaze, all tending to distance him from the 
appearance of Hellenistic royalty; clearly important for an individual keen to be seen as 
restorer of fraditional Roman values (iii). These later features were prominently 
exemplified by the Prima Porta statue (Plate 12 i). At the same time, his bare feet and 
the accompanying Eros on a dolphin (ii), together with the more explicitly divine 
imagery of the upper part of his breastplate, combmed to elevate Augustus above any 
possible human rivals. In the rising sun and sinking moon there was a suggestion of 
timeless power (iii). Overlaying even the potency of all this iconography, however, 
was the general appearance of the statue as that of a 'radiant conqueror'. The staff of 
authority and outstretched arm of direction reinforced the central detail of the 
breastplate. There the depiction was of the Parthian surrender in 21 BCE of captured 
Roman standards, thus elevating the whole into an immistakable image of military 
victory. It is impossible to know i f copies of this statue were made and, i f so, how these 
were displayed. Even so, the ideological effectiveness of the image should not be 
underrated because of its discovery in the private villa of Livia's retirement. Offsetting 
this relative seclusion, we are told that successive Julio-Claudian emperors frequented 
the villa and its laurel grove, obtaining from that source foliage for their own 
ceremonial wreaths and planting new trees to which their names were attached. The 
comprehensive nature of Augustus' monopolisation of the symbols of power has also 
been identified in the gradually increasing inclusion of his head on the obverse of coins 
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(ii) 25 B C E 
(iii) Posthumous 
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(ii) 
issued by the regime and in the exclusion after 19 BCE of all save his family from the 
celebration of triumphs.'^' 
The triumph must provide a major focus in considering the relationship between 
ceremony and power in Rome, although its details demonstrate that the relationship 
was not straightforward. Of unclear but probably Etruscan origin, the ceremony in 
which a victorious general paraded through Rome was highly charged with symbols of 
personal domination and political authority. The glamour and status of the triumphator 
was made clear by his exotic dress and religious make-up, and his role at the centre of 
an event that absorbed the whole City. The chained captives and glittering booty that 
followed his chariot demonstrated his exercise of personal domination, while the 
accompanying soldiers, tableaux and representations of his victories indicated the 
manner in which that domination had been attained. The general was preceded in the 
procession by his magisterial lictors, thus linking his military and civil political 
authority. In this respect, however, it is significant that the whole procedure was only 
possible by virtue of a vote of the people and senate. Important too were ceremonial 
details that specifically checked the triumphator's ego; the slave reminding him that he 
was mortal, the soldiers' ribald chanting to deflect the envy of the gods, the bell and 
whip attached to his chariot to indicate that he was not invulnerable to prosecution and 
public scourging. Far from a role indicative of the general's untrammelled power, the 
triiunph was used by Polybius as an example of the manner in which the Roman 
constitution provided checks and balances between the various sources of political 
authority in the Republic.'^ '^  
Such limiting features, i f they continued in use at all, must have lost all significance 
following the Augustan and Imperial monopoly of the triumph. Certainly, they were 
not mentioned in the few surviving detailed accounts of those events. Josephus 
(Vespasian and Titus, 71 CE) and the SHA (Aurelian, 274 CE) emphasised the 
spectacle, the demonsfration of victory and dominance over conquered peoples, and the 
Monumental sculpture: Osborne (1998) p. 12, 78. Hellenistic monarchs: Smith (1993) p. 151; 
(1988) p. 1,32. Survivals: ibid. p. 2. Augustus and art: Zanker (1988) f). v. Changing Augustan 
i m a g e f S m t i r o M ) ^ 137-138^ Zanker (l988) p. 43, 5 (V^8^. Prima Porta: Smith (1988) p. HS; 
Zanker (1988) p. 188-192; Klynne and Liljenstoipe p. 127; Plin. N H 15. 137. Coins: Wallace-Hadrill 
(1986) p. 85. Triumphs: Lewis and Reinhold 1. 1 n. 1. 
Republican triumph: Zonar. 7. 21 = Lewis and Reinhold 1. 90; Plut. Aem. 32-34; Mattem p. 166fr; 
OCD3 p. 1554; Polyb. 6. 15. 
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happy response of the populace to the beneficence of their rulers. Tacitus 
characteristically used his description of the triumph of Germanicus in 17 CE to make 
dark hints about the popular prince's likely fate at the hands of Tiberius. However, the 
detail he gave about the event concentrated on the spectacular appearance of the 
triumphator, the victories achieved and the conquests he had made. The references to 
triumphs made by Cassius Dio and his epitomators are not fiill, and, perhaps 
significantly, later roll up those celebrations with other festivities designed to glorify 
the emperors. Thus, any previously precise meaning of the triumph was melded into 
the emperors' general monopoly of glory. However, in relation to Claudius' British 
triumph of 41 CE, he did mention another humbling aspect of the event in that the 
Emperor 'followed precedent' in 'ascending the steps of the Capitol on his knees'.'^ ^ 
Dio's account of Domitian's celebrations in 89 CE after the Dacian wars included a 
theme that recurred in the ancient treatment of Imperial triumphs and other ceremonies. 
This focused on the bogus nature of victories on which triumphs were based, allied to 
the general unworthiness of the celebrant. Tacitus was more than once scathing about 
Domitian's 'sham triumph' held in 81 after his campaign in Germany, although 
modem scholarship has suggested that the Emperor's success was real. Suetonius 
mocked the bizarre triumphal aspirations of Gains, and Cassius Dio pointedly claimed 
that it reflected well on the veracity and authenticity of his history that he did not 
suppress the outrageous exaggerations of Nero's subversion of triumphal values on his 
return from Greece in 68 CE. A retrojection of this view of the problematic 
relationship between power and triumphal ceremony can also be seen in Plutarch. He 
argued for the appropriateness of Publicola's spectacular addition of a quadrigae to his 
triumphal car, but held that Camillus had gone too far, in that his four horses were 
white and therefore sacred to Jupiter. The biographer made a similar point in more 
general terms when he contrasted the reputation of Pyrrhus with that of other 
Hellenistic kings. Whereas the victories of the former were said to have earned for him 
legitimate comparison with Alexander, others, particularly Demetrius, '...did but 
assume Alexander's majesty and pomp, like actors on a stage.' Plutarch discussed the 
dynamics of the relationship in more explicit terms when he gave an account of the 
furore surrounding Pompey's first triumph in 81 BCE. Doubly disqualified because he 
Imperial triumph: Jos. BJ. 7. 120-157; SHA Aurel. 23-24; Tac. Ann. 2. 41. 2; Cass. Dio 50. 23. 1, 
67. 1. 1-5, 57. 7. 2-8. 4; McCormick (1986) p. 17-18. 
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was not a senator and was aged only 25, the yoxmg lieutenant of Sulla had demanded of 
his mentor that he be granted a triumph for his victories in Afiica during the previous 
year. Plutarch couched the ensuing debate in overtly political rather than legal terms. 
Sulla was said to have been sensitive to the danger to his government and honour that 
could come from such an inappropriate celebration. Pompey was reputed to have 
responded to initial opposition by suggesting that, 'Sulla reflect that more worshipped 
the rising than the setting sun'. When his boldness won Sulla's support, Pompey 
proceeded to use the occasion to show his contempt for senators who still objected and 
to establish control over his soldiers. Since the whole affair was said to have 
'...contributed not a little to win him the favour of the multitude', Plutarch had thus 
harnessed the issue of the triumph to Pompey's domination of all the traditional 
sources of Roman political power. 
Other varieties of royal ceremonial had a relationship with political power. In fact, all 
the public actions of a ruler relate in some way to his position of domination. In the 
ancient world, the religious aspects of the ceremonies and of the ruler's general role 
enhanced this connection. Occasions of the transference of power, such as an 
emperor's funeral or his adoption of a successor, clearly showed this conjunction, 
although even the former was not immune from satirical mockery. Other formal events, 
perhaps less directiy related to the mechanics of authority, nevertheless displayed a 
relevance to political power. For instance, the gruesome ceremony of crucifixion has 
been interpreted with specific reference to the deliberately public exhibition of the 
state's coercive power. This connection is strengthened by sociological explanations of 
the fate that could befall those who threaten the person of the monarch. The point is 
illustrated by the remarkably gruesome execution of Damiens in 1757 after a failed 
attempt to kill Louis XIV. However, an example pre-dating the Romans indicated the 
complexity of the relationship between ceremony and power, cautioning against too 
straightforward a conclusion that the former was always a means to obtain or 
strengthen the latter. Babylonian priests were said to have devised a ritual by which the 
city could welcome new conquerors, so introducing an idea to which I will return; that 
art, symbol and ceremony could serve as a means by which the ruled shaped and 
Domitian: Tac. Agr. 39; Germ. 37; Jones, B. p. 129. Gaius: Suet. Calig. 47. Nero: Cass. Dio 63. 20. 
Quadrigae: Pub. 9. 5-6; Cam. 7. 1. Pyrrhus and Demetrius: Plut. Dem. 41. 3-4, 53. 1. Pompey: Plut. 
Pomp. 14. 
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limited the power of the ruler, thus protecting themselves from its potential threat. 
Before considering this notion (see page 165), attention will be given to the use of 
particular artefacts as symbols of power, with a special emphasis on the fasces 
Towards the end of his account of human social development, Lucretius lamented 
man's inherent tendency to seek new pleasures and to outdo his fellows; 
'Skins yesterday, purple and gold today - such are the baubles that 
embitter human life with resentment and waste it with war'. 
For the Roman philosopher, purple dyed cloth and gold were primary symbols of 
power and domination, with a history traceable at least to Persian royalty. Others, the 
crown, sceptre and throne, had long and varied provenances, being directly inherited 
by the Romans from the Etruscans. The radiate crown, traceable on the coinage of 
Augustus (Plate 13 i), but certamly used by Nero, explicitly evoked the sun god, and 
can be related to the sacred fire (Hvarena) of the Persian kings. With earlier 
manifestations as a symbol of power in Egypt, the eagle had a prominent place in the 
mythology of the Achaemenid dynasty, and was identified as the standard of the 
Persian king. Its association with Zeus made it irresistible to the Greeks and Romans as 
an emblem of royal authority. However, the archetypal symbol of the Roman state and 
its power was undoubtedly the fasces. 
Almost certainly of Etruscan origin, the fasces dated back in Roman myth/history to 
the kings. They have been straightforwardly defined as '...symbolising the 
magistrate's power to inflict physical punishment'. Limits to this authority (the 
removal of the axes from the consuls' regalia when in Rome itself and a citizen's right 
of appeal against capital punishment) may or may not have been established by a 
doubtfiilly historical Lex Valeria in 509 BCE. Livy certainly suggested that the impact 
of '...this dreadfiil symbol of the power of life and death' was deliberately lessened by 
being allowed to only one consul at a time. He also described the origins of the 
ceremony in which the fasces were lowered before the population gathered in formal 
assembly, this being portrayed as a magistrate's gesture towards the supposed basis of 
' Ceremony and religion: Cannadine p. 15. Funerals: Price (1987); Sen. Apocol. 12. 3-13. 1. 
Adoption:'Birley (1997) p. 290. Crucifixion and leifecutibn: Marshall p. 127; Foucault ( 1977) p. 3-6. 
Babylon: Shipley p. 278. 
Lucretius and symbols: 1412-1425; Dvomik p. 117; Fowler p. 144. Radiate crown: Dvomik p. 
119, 524; BMC Augustus. 39. 1; Mattingly (1936) p. xxiii. Eagle: Dvomik p. 116-117; Xen. Cyr. 7. 1. 
1-4. 
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his authority. Nevertheless, Livy was brutally frank about the original purpose of the 
fasces. In describing the processes by which Romulus founded Rome, he gave pride of 
place to religious observance, followed by the decision to put the population under the 
rule of law. However, Romulus was said to have perceived that any laws would only 
be respected i f he were to '...invest his ovm person with majesty, by adopting 
emblems of authority.' Foremost amongst these were the lictors carrying their fasces. 
Livy made clear the practical effect of this measure in his account of the first 
appointment of a dictator; 
'...the solemn sight of his progress through the streets, preceded by the 
ceremonial axes, had the effect of scaring the commons into a more 
docile frame of mind.' 
Cicero had also been clear about the symbolism of the fasces. In an account of an 
apparently prophetic dream, they were associated with the dangerously over powerful 
Gains Marius. Cicero used them to represent undesirable aspects of coercive authority 
when advising his brother on how to behave as propraetor of Asia. The fasces have 
been described as '...the most striking visual feature of magisterial authority'. It may 
not be accidental that a lictor featured on the Ara Pads relief is looking outwards, 
perhaps ready to meet the gaze of any potentially oppositional viewer (Plate 13 ii). 
Augustus' authority both in Rome and over other peoples was emphasised in one of 
the Boscoreale cups. In accepting the surrender of barbarian chiefs, he is depicted as 
being surroimded by both soldiers and lictors. 
Three episodes in Livy gave prominence to the fasces in relation to poUtical struggles 
between the elite and commons: in the troubles surrounding the early tribunate the 
'consular rods' were given first place in a list of official regalia; Appius Claudius and 
the other decemvirs terrified the populace by appearing each with twelve lictors; and 
the people's response to the attempted arrest of the popular leaders, Horatius and 
Valerius, was to seize and smash the rods. A fiorther incident clarified the role of the 
lictors as manifestations of the consuls' power. In a significant prelude to the Romans' 
humiliation at the Caudine Forks in 321 BCE, the lictors were pointedly '...told to 
move away from the consuls' before the latter were stripped of their generals' cloaks 
Origins and dennition: Livy 1. 8. 3; OCD3 p. 587. Symbolism: Cornell (1995) p. 166. Lex Valeria. 
ibid p. 226. One consul at a time: Livy 2. 1. 8; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 2. 1. Lowering of iht fasces: 2. 
7. 7. Romulus and the law: 1. 8. 1-3. Dictator: 2. 18. 8. Cicero: Div. 1. 59; QFr. 1. 1. Magesterial 
authority: Marshall p. 129. Boscoreale cup: Zanker (1988) p. 228-229. 
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Plate 13 
(i) Augustus: radiate crown 
(ii) Lictor: Ara Pacis 
and sent under the yoke. Lictors and fasces could be associated with power beyond 
even that of the consuls. When the consul, Gaius Flaminius, was defeated and killed by 
Hannibal at Lake Trasimene in 217 BCE, Fabius Maximus was appointed dictator. In 
order 
'...that the citizens might be more submissive and obedient to his 
commands.. .He appeared in public attended by a united band of twenty-
four lictors with their fasces'. 
To emphasise the message, Fabius ordered the remaining consul to 
'...dismiss his lictors, lay aside the insignia of his office, and meet him 
as a private person'. 
The fasces as symbols of physical power and coercion were important in Plutarch's 
account of Publicola. In the context of concern about the extent of his personal power, 
Publius Valerius, as he was originally named, decided to 
'...make not only himself but also the government, instead of 
formidable, submissive and agreeable to the multitude.' 
His chosen method was to initiate the already mentioned removal of the axes from the 
bundle of lictors' rods, and to have these symbols of intimidation deferentially lowered 
whenever they were carried into the popular assembly. Such was the impact of this 
charm offensive that Valerius was rewarded with his new name, with its meaning of 
'people-cherisher'. In representing the legitimate power of the state, the violence 
inherent in the fasces could be used to amplify the actual violence involved in attempts 
to subvert that authority. Catiline's conspiracy included a plan to '...assassinate the 
new consuls (and) seize the consular fasces'. The terror imposed by Marius could be 
graphically summed up as he oppressed the Roman people '...with his axes at theu-
necks and his rods at their backs'. During the disorders involving Gaius Gracchus his 
comrades and guest friends were described as being 'dragged off by the lictors'. The 
authority represented by fasces and by their bearers could represent that embodied in 
the most senior magistracies. When Aemilius PauUus was sent in 191 BCE to fight the 
Seleucid monarch, Antiochus III , he held the office of praetor. However, in place of the 
usual six lictors he was allocated twelve 'so that his office had a consular dignity'. 
Tribunate: 2. 54. Decemvirs: 3. 37. Horatius and Valerius: 3.49. Caudine Forks: 9. 5-6. Fabius 
Maximus: Plut. Fab. Max. 4. 1-2. Publicola: Plut. Pub. 10. 1-6. Catiline: Sail. Cat. 18. Marius: Piut. 
Flam. 21.7. Gracchus: Plut. C. Gracch. 12. 2. Aemilius Paulius: Plut. Aem. 4. 1. 
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The accumulation of this evidence supports the view that: 
'Roman society was therefore unusual in that the central magisterial 
regalia remained directly functional: the fasces continued as both symbol 
and instrument of executive power' 
It is perhaps all the more surprising that this link has not been emphasised in some 
clearly relevant modem analyses. Admittedly in a primarily Greek context, 
Homblower, for example, discussed the relevance of sticks to actual and threatened 
violence offered to Scythians and Spartan helots. He extended his evidence to cover 
Negro slaves in America, but did not mention the corporal punishment embedded in 
the imagery and reality of the fasces. In fact the place of the rods and axes in the 
Roman polity could be seen as fitting neatly into Foucault's analysis of the role of 
punishment, particularly capital punishment, in the relationship between the ruler and 
the ruled. In that context, the use of the fasces as instruments of public execution 
demonstrated the required 'dissynmietry' of power between the subject and the state. 
As such, they represented '...a spectacle, not of measure, but of imbalance and 
excess'.'*^ 
This background is significant in the fasces' enduring role in the symbolism of the 
Roman State. Their use as markers of stability and traditional correctness in 
government served to amplify the significance of the association between that 
normality and the physical coercion that lay at its base. When setting out his stall as an 
upholder of traditional values, Valerius Maximus invoked the potency of this particular 
aspect of authoritative regalia, emphasising both religious and secular power: 'Praise is 
due to the religious obedience of the twelve fasces'. Elsewhere the same author 
demonstrated his attraction to the fasces as symbols, not only of authority in general, 
but of the oppressive aspect of power. In repeating Livy's story of T. Manlius 
Torquatus' warning to the Roman people that i f they made him consul they would 
suffer under his harsh rectitude, the later author added the comment, 'How heavy 
would his consular fasces have proved!'. Cassius Dio gave the fasces pride of place in 
his description of Augustus' strenuous efforts to demonstrate that order and customary 
authority had been re-established in 28 BCE. Consul for the sixth time, the new ruler 
Symbol and function: Marshall p. 130. Modern analysis: Homblower (2000) p. 68-70. 
Punishment as demonstration of power: Foucault (1977) p. 48-49. 
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'...performed all the other duties according to the traditions which have 
been handed down from the earliest antiquity. In particular he handed 
over one set of the fasces to Agrippa, his colleague in the consulship, as 
it was his duty to do, while he himself used the other set'. 
Illustrations abound of the deference due to the dignity of the fasces. Livy described 
the story of Fabius Verrucosus, sent as a legate to his son when the younger man was 
consul. The old man was upset that he managed to ride past eleven of the lictors before 
his son instructed the twelfth to order him to dismount, as was the custom. Valerius 
Maximus repeated this tale, added a similar one about an earlier father and son of the 
same family, before he had Verrucosus explain that he had been deliberately testing his 
son's adherence to proper behaviour: 
' I did not flout your supreme authority...Neither am I unaware of the 
claims of respect due to a father, but I consider that public institutions 
take precedence over private duty.' 
The role of the rods and axes as symbols of correct authority can also be illustrated in 
circumstances when that authority was clearly in peril. At the beginning of the process 
closed off by Augustus in 27-28 BCE, in the aftermath of the assassination of Julius 
Caesar in 44 BCE, Dolabella, as consul designate, was described as trying to grasp the 
initiative; the terms used were that he '...seized the fasces and the insignia of that 
office'. During the same turbulent period, when Antony, Octavian and the senate were 
jockeying for position and legitimate authority was in doubt, soldiers loyal to Octavian 
attempted to make his imofficial power seem more lawful. They 
'...furnished him lictors provided with fasces and urged him to assume 
the title of propraetor...since they were always marshalled under 
magistrates.' 
Ovid exploited the power of the bundled sticks and axes to evoke both the image and 
reality of authority. In his account of the grand ceremonies accompanying the opening 
day of the official calendar '.. .the new rods of office lead the way...', heading a list of 
consular regalia. He also employed the fasces as the most potent representation of an 
unequivocal demand for physical attention and precedence, alluding to the lictors' 
traditional cry of 'animadvertite' ('give heed'). That processional role of the fasces 
was depicted in Gordian's ill-fated parade as Emperor in 238 CE; the rods and axes 
were given precedence during the aged usurper's display at Carthage. In an otherwise 
straightforwardly horticultural review of Gallic trees, Pliny the Elder felt impelled to 
161 
draw attention to the birch as '.. .a cause of terror as supplying the magistrates' rods of 
office.' In his second century CE accounts of Sulla's dictatorship, Appian was able to 
deploy references to the fasces that evoked their potency as symbols of threatening and 
legitimate power. Although the description of the Dictator's appropriation of all 
twenty-four lictors was based on legal precedent, Appian deliberately connected the 
event to the practices of Rome's hated kings. However, he also gave prominence to 
Sulla's dismissal of the lictors in the Dictator's voluntary relinquishment of personal 
control of the state in 79 BCE. The status and symbolism of the fasces found a place 
even in the account of Caligula's unpredictable and arbitrary violence. He was said to 
have manufactured reasons to dismiss the lawful consuls in 39 CE, 
'.. .first breaking in pieces their fasces; whereupon one of them took it so 
much to heart that he killed himself 
Their appearance in omens and dreams is often instructive, confirmmg both their 
importance and representation of fraditional power and authority. In Tacitus' account, 
the first of a series of bad omens disregarded by Caesennius Paetus before his 
inconclusive invasion of Armenia in 61 CE involved the loss of the horse that carried 
his consular insignia. Preceding the revolt of Galba, Suetonius declared the appearance 
of twelve axes after a thunderbolt to be '...a clear portent of imperial power.' Plutarch 
exploited the symbolism of the fasces in his account of a difficuU meeting between 
Pompey and LucuUus. Wreathed with laurel, the regalia were '...carried before both 
commanders in token of their victories'. The fact that Lucullus' men provided 
Pompey's with some fresh laurel was interpreted as an omen of that the achievements 
of the former would aid the latter. As straightforward symbols of power, the fasces 
were lowered by Pompey '...out of deference to Metellus as his superior in rank'. 
Much later, emphasising their role as traditional symbols of the Roman state, Julian 
was said to have referred to the fasces in his criticism of Constantine. The pagan 
emperor accused the founder of the Christian empire of being '...the very first to 
advance barbarians even to the rods and robes of consuls.' Yet again, the fasces had 
been given precedence, conveying a consistent reminder of the openly coercive basis 
iftiigiiDus/seiS^ VairMax. 1.1. 3. torqualus: Livy 26. 22^2=9; VariVlkxr6; 4^ 1 b: ~ 
Augustus: Cass. Die 53. 1; Marshall p. 132. Verrucosus: Livy 24. 44. 9-10; Val. Max. 2. 2. 4a-4b. 
Dolabella: Veil. Pat. 2. 58. 3. Octavian: App. B Civ. 3. 48. Calendar: Fast. 1. 81-82. "animadvertUe ": 
Tr. 5. 6. 3. Gordian: Herodian 7. 6. 2. Birch: HN 16. 75. Sulla: App. B Civ. 1. 100, 104. Caligula: 
Cass. Die 59. 20. 3. 
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of the Roman state. Valerius Maximus provided a suitably grand summary of the status 
and centrality of the fasces as symbols of the authority of Rome. He recounted the 
rebuke given by Cinciimatus, when dictator, to the consul, L. Minucius after the latter 
had allowed himself to be besieged in his own camp by the Aequiculi. The author 
personified the shamed consul in the form of his principal regalia: 
'So the lordly twelve fasces, in whom resided the highest glory of the 
senate and the order of knights and the entire people, and by whose nod 
Latium and the powers of all Italy were governed, bruised and broken 
abased themselves before dictatorial correction.''^' 
It is appropriate to end this section on art, symbol and ceremony while discussion of 
the fasces is still in the forefront of our attention. As an icon of the state, the fasces'" 
dominance and longevity was such as to mark Rome's unique emphasis on physical 
force as the basis of authority. Although art, symbol and ceremony were of subsidiary 
importance in the establishment and maintenance of power, the fact that the City's 
primary emblem had such a directly coercive form underlines the orientation of Roman 
thinking on the matter. The primary symbols of other ancient states, in so far as they 
can be identified, generally stand in clear contrast. Personal (royal) and civic emblems 
in the form of cylinder or stamp seals had been employed for thousands of years in the 
Near East. From Archaic to Hellenistic times, engraved gems, rings, coins and shield 
devices served that fimction in Greece. Some, such as the eagle and thimderbolt badge 
of Ptolemaic Egypt or the ubiquitous archer motif of Persia in the fifth century BCE, 
express power and even imperial aggression. However, this imagery lacks the explicit 
reference of the rods and axes, backed by law and custom, to physically coerced 
obedience. With coins as the best guide, the emblems of most early Greek states 
comprised mythological/religious aspects of civic identity. These could range from the 
obvious (Poseidon representing the South Italian city of Poseidonia) to the allusive 
(Pegasus as the symbol of Corinth, referring to the city as the location of 
Bellerophon's taming of that mythical beast). Naxos underlined its identification with 
Dionysus and its fame for wine production by combining his obverse portrait with the 
image of a bunch of grapes on the reverse. The owl of Athens combined the religious 
"evoca:tioh of ^ atixihess clarity of a modeiii corporate logo, ^ hile^^ 
Omens: Tac. Ann. 15. 7; Suet. Galb. 8; Laurel: Plut. Luc. 36. 2-3. Deference : Plut. Pomp. 19. 5. 
Julian: Amm. Marc. 21. 10. 8. Cincinnatus: Val. Max. 2. 7. 7. 
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others, such as the turtle of Aegina and the quadrigae of Syracuse, suggest activities 
for which those territories were notable, seamanship in the case of Aegina, Olympic 
chariot racing for Syracuse. Some insignia made punning references to a city's name, 
for example the apple of Melos and the celery leaf of Selinos. Others appear to defy 
certain explanation, including the use of the crab on the coinage of Akragas, the cow 
and calf by Corcyra, and the dolphin and rider employed by Taras for 300 years. Also 
uncertain in meaning is the double axe of Minoan Crete. Any speculation about some 
distant relationship with the fasces is without evidential support. Despite the frequent 
depictions of the axe, the art of that society lacked images of soldiers and war, and is 
better typified by scenes of nature.'^ ^ 
In conclusion, then, what can be said about the over-all relationship between art, 
symbol and ceremony, and the bases of the Roman emperors' power? A review of the 
evidence and arguments suggests that the connection was significant, complex and 
subsidiary. Its significance is established by, if nothing else, the unfailing use of those 
factors by all Roman regimes. Exposed to unavoidable models, the Egyptian pyramids, 
the Athenian Parthenon, the imagery and ritual of the Persian and Hellenistic 
monarchies, Roman rulers and eventually its emperors employed the full range of art, 
symbol and ceremony to bolster their authority. This usage developed in complex 
ways and was mediated through traditional Roman mores. It was transformed by 
Augustus and his successors as new language and symbolism were required to 
articulate the reality of gradually increasing personal domination. For example, the 
introduction of proskynesis and the controlled hierarchical right to approach the throne 
in order to kiss the purple hem of the Imperial robe, ceremonies introduced by 
Diocletian in the late third century CE, symbolised increased distance between the 
ruler and the ruled. At a practical level they also served to protect the Emperor from 
assassination.. This submerged accommodation to the political realities of a regime 
established by coercion had been anticipated as early as Herodotus. He had described 
the elaborate court ceremonial of Deioces as ensuring that 
-—History of emblems: Spier pf l 07-108: Egypt: Hdwgego (1995) p. SSrPersia: Carradice and Pfice: 
p. 85. Poseidonia: Rutter (1983) p. 18. Corinth: Howgego (1995) p. 63. Athens: Robertson p. 150. 
Naxos: Rutter 91997) p. 110-111. Aegina: Carradice and Price p. 77. Syracuse: Rutter (1997) p. 114-
116. Melos: Carradice and Price: p. 77. Selinos: Spier p. 119. Akragas: Howgego (1995) p. 67. 
Corcyra: Spier p. 121. Taras: Rutter (1997) p. 53. Crete: Robertson p. 4-8. 
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'...those who were in fact his peers should come to regard him as 
different in kind from themselves and so refrain from plotting against 
him.'''' 
Of course, Deioces, like Diocletian, had attained dominating power before these 
measures had been put into place, thus lessening their relevance as bases of authority. 
At least three other features of art, symbol and ceremony argue for their subsidiary role 
in the establishment of social power in the ancient world. These are: their general 
limitations as instruments of change; that their use was vulnerable to condemnation as 
indicators of moral weakness; and, an aspect already touched upon, their nature as a 
'bottom-up' phenomenon, reflecting the fine-tuning of the relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled (see page 157). In relation to change, the power of images may be 
'...to illustrate what exists, to make visible the ideologies behind the 
reality, and to amplify sentiments as well as faint identities.' 
A prime example of this process was the Augustan use of building and decoration to 
cement Roman control over recently conquered areas of Gaul and Iberia. It seems less 
clear that images and symbols can create new ideas and identities, reinforcing the 
truism that, " One only sees what one knows". The moral attack on the use and 
therefore the utility of art, symbol and ceremony can be illustrated from Plutarch's 
essay. To an Uneducated Ruler. He suggested that in order to fulfil his role as a 
conduit for law and justice in the image of the gods, a ruler '...needs no Pheidias nor 
Polycleitus nor Myron to model him', rather, it is '...by his virtue he forms himself in 
the likeness of god.' Elsewhere the author had that sternest critic of ostentation and 
presumption, Cato the Censor, argue that self-glorifying images served only to inspire 
envy and opposition. In characteristic fashion, he declared, ' I prefer to have people ask 
why there is not a statue of me than why there is one.' Statues, buildings £ind even coin 
imagery raise the issue of who was responsible for their design and production. In 
relation to coins, there is strength in the argument that, whoever was actually 
responsible, the ideological importance of their images and legends depended on a 
perception of the ruler's personal endorsement. Evidence for central direction, 
including the operation of specifically political motivation, has already been cited. 
l^cieM^foiifceFsuggHrthe^ iconography of coiiis. 
Complex development: Wallace-Hadrill (1990) p. 166. Diocletian: Price (1987) p. 98; Dvomik p. 
521; Lendon (1997) p. 135. Deioces: Winton p. 107-108; Hdt. 1. 98-99. 
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Examples include Augustus' decision to create a type bearing Capricorn, the star sign 
under which he was bom, and Nero's desire to mint an issue depicting him wmning the 
Olympic crown as a player of the lyre. However, it would not be safe to over-interpret 
the language of Suetonius on such a matter. It was characteristic of his approach to 
personalise responsibility for events occurring in the reigns of the emperors about 
whom he wrote. In fact, for the first three centuries of its existence we have no 
unequivocal literary evidence about how the machinery of Roman Imperial image 
making and dissemination was organised. A comment by Arrian regarding a statue of 
Hadrian at Trapezus suggests Imperial interest in such installations, but is hardly 
definitive. There is more extensive information about the confroUed copying and 
distribution of images in the later empire, and there is no lack of evidence about the 
destruction of Imperial images after hostile changes of regime. Nevertheless, it is still 
reasonable to view as anachronistic the idea of ancient image making as centralised 
propaganda; that characterisation too closely reflects twentieth century and current 
experience of media manipulation. The initiative of individuals and provincial cities 
probably played a significant role, although most likely increasingly doing so in 
response to specific or perceived Imperial wishes as the autocracy of the Empire 
developed.'^ '* 
Religion 
In 336 BCE Philip II of Macedon was murdered while parading alongside a statue of 
himself in the guise of the thirteenth Olympian god. In 337 CE the Emperor 
Constantine was laid to rest in the Church of the Holy Apostles, unmistakably 
identified as the thirteenth of their number; his coffin was placed in the midst of the 
church's eponymous dedicatees, their monuments 'ranged six on either side'. 
Examples such as these could be muhiplied from the ancient sources to demonstrate 
the relevance of religion to those in possession of dominating power. What linked the 
cases of Philip and Constantine, besides the near numerical correspondence, was that 
both monarchs were pushing at the edges of acceptable religious behaviour. Individual 
megalomania probably accounted in some measure for this conduct. Of interest here, 
however, is the extent to which such behaviour can be traced to a standard ideology 
Change: Eder (1990) p. 84; Mierse p. 308-309, 318. Morality: Plut. Adprinc. iner. 780E-F, Prae. 
ger. reip. 820B. Coins: Ando p. 212. Suet. Aug. 94, Nero 25. Evidence on image production: Arr. 
Perpl. M. Eux. 1. 3-4; Zanker (1988) p. 102; Ando p. 228-231. Propaganda or 'bottom-up': Wallace-
Hadrill (1986) p. 67, 72-74; Levick (1982) p. 104, 107. 
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linking religion and social power in the sense of the latter being based on the former, 
even when the proposed relationship appeared to be sfretched beyond tolerable 
limits.'^^ 
Homer and Hesiod provided early and authoritative support for such a link. The latter 
wrote of men that it was 'from Zeus that they are kings', and of 'Aeetes...that Zeus-
fostered king'. Homer combined the divine origins of a monarch's command and its 
potency in human terms: 
'There's passion in kings; they hold power from Zeus.. .Let there be one 
commander, one authority holding his royal staff and precedence from 
Zeus'. 
However, the context of Homer's pronouncements needs to be borne in mind. They 
were words given to Odysseus during the latter's desperate efforts to bolster the 
position of Agamemnon as leader of the Greek expedition during an all-out mutiny. In 
such a situation exaggerated claims for the authority of a leader would not seem to be 
out of place. Nevertheless, elsewhere in calmer circumstances Homer described the 
provenance of Agamemnon's staff of office, indicating that it had been fashioned by 
Hephaestus and passed from Zeus via Hermes to the human ancestors of the King. 
Early in his account, Herodotus recorded divine sanction for the rule of Gyges, and 
examples of apparently divine intervention on behalf of pious rulers, such as the priest-
pharaoh, Sethos. Interestingly for the cenfral argimient of this thesis, that pharaoh was 
said to have been threatened because he '...neglected the warrior class of the 
Egyptians'. Recourse to the aid of Hephaestus resulted in victory when the bowstrings 
and other consumable equipment of the invading Assyrians were eaten by mice. It 
should be noted that alongside these stories of divine endorsement and rewards for 
genuine piety Herodotus placed accounts of the explicit manipulation of religious 
sentiment to reinforce the social power of rulers. The author porfrayed himself as 
amazed by the Athenians' credulity in allowing Pisistratus to use the very human Phye 
as an impersonation of the goddess Athena. On the other hand, Herodotus appcEwed to 
admire the wisdom of Pharaoh Amasis, who legitimised his transformation from lowly 
origins to supreme niler by the trick of creating a statue of a god from gold melted 
Philip II: Died 16. 92. 5. Constantine: Euseb. Vit. Const. 4. 60.2-3, 71. 2. Unacceptable 
behaviour: Homblower (1991) p. 260; Eusebius worked hard to make Constantine's scheme tolerable, 
making the disarming suggestion that the Emperor's purpose was that 'he might benefit from the 
worship which would be conducted there in honour of the Apostles' (Vit. Const. 60. 1). 
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down from an ornate footbath. He then pointed out to his subjects that they appeared to 
have no difficulty in revering as sacred an object whose materials had once formed a 
very humble object. 
By the fourth century BCE the relationship between gods and kings was portrayed as 
being more complex £md ambivalent. In the course of explaining the superiority of 
monarchy over other forms of government, Isocrates was explicitly reluctant to employ 
divine imagery. He stressed that these were imcertain matters about which we could 
only speculate, although the orator alluded to the idea that Zeus ruled the other gods. 
By analogy, he argued, 'we all hold monarchy in high regard'. Despite the second 
century CE Arrian's attempts to suggest otherwise, it seems probable that Alexander 
the Great did regard himself to be divine; mention has already been made of his 
father's apparent aspirations. However, it was not until the 290s BCE that Alexander 
was honoured as a god. As could be noted of the Herodotean examples given above, it 
was perhaps no coincidence that this event and the first deification of a living 
Hellenistic ruler in 279 both occurred in Egypt, reflecting that country's ancient 
tradition of god-pharaohs. The relationship between kings and gods was an element in 
philosophical debate about ethics. While distancing the person of the monarch from the 
gods, the divine order was used as a model and exemplar to be copied by the 'good 
king'. It was accepted that such emulation could go only so far. The rule of the good 
king on earth did not parallel that of Zeus in heaven. Rather, in the quintessentially 
unified conception of the stoics, the human and divine operated in a single cosmos, 
characterised by stable relationships governed by the rule of Zeus. It was within this 
ethical structure that Seneca advised the young Nero that he would one day have to 
account for his actions to the immortal gods, and that in the meantime he should aspire 
to behave towards his subjects in a manner similar to that which he hoped he would be 
treated by the gods. The gulf that could be seen to exist between an emperor and the 
divine was made even clearer in the same author's satirical treatment of Claudius. 
Seneca went so far as to introduce the argument that the deification of such an 
individual could undermine the logic of worshipping any of the gods.'^ ^ 
'^-Hesiod:-7'i^eog. 96r993."Homer://. 2.-195-198;-Redfield p 
141. Pisistratus: ibid. 1. 59 Amasis: ibid. 2. 172. 
Isocrates: Nic. 26. Alexander: Arr. Anab. 3. 3,4. 11-12, 7. 19-20; Shipley p. 159. Zeus and the 
'good king': Dio Chrys. Or. 3. 82; Swain (1996) p. 195-200. Nero: Sen. Clem. 1.1 4, 1. 7. 1; Sen. 
Apocol.l. 3,9.3, 11.4. 
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Practical models available to the Romans for the relationship between rulers and the 
divine had been constructed by the diadochoi. The stress that they laid on religion and 
divine patronage probably should be seen as part of a relationship of mutual 
obligation; divine benefaction earned at a cost of ritual honours. At the strongest end of 
the spectrum, the development of Hellenistic ruler-cult was a complex process, 
involving a variety of culturally and geographically associated features. More 
generally, monarchs in the period demonstrated a variety of methods that could be said 
to have associated aspects of the divine with political authority. Coins of Attains I , the 
founder of the Pergamene royal dynasty, showed the monarch in a helmet adorned 
with the horns of a bull, thus representing his chosen deity, Dionysus. Horns can also 
be seen on images of Antigonus Gonatas, this time evoking Pan, the god who was said 
to have aided the Macedonians in defeating the Celts in 277 BCE. An accession decree 
of Antiochus I recorded the claim of Seleucus I to be a descendent of Apollo. The 
adoption of a titular name could evoke the divine/regal relationship. Antiochus I again 
provided an example, being known as Soter ('Saviour'), an epithet of Zeus. Other 
relevant assumed names included the straightforward Theos ('God') of Antiochus I I , 
and Epiphanes, taken by a number of kings, (with a useful double meaning of 
'eminent' and 'manifest', suggesting the presence of a god amongst humans). A direct 
expression of this latter idea can be seen in the behaviour of Demetrius Poliorcetes. He 
perhaps lived for a time in Apollo's temple on Delos and is attested to have resided in 
the Parthenon during 304-303 BCE.'^ ^ 
In what ways, i f any, did the authority of Roman rulers reflect these ideas and political 
models? This question must be seen in relation to the fact that: 
'As part of Roman public life, religion was (and always had been) a part 
of the political struggles and disagreements in the city'. 
Sallust could not have made this religious dimension clearer than in the speech he 
reported of Gaius Memmius during the political disputes that accompanied the 
campaign against Jugurtha of 109 BCE. While inciting the Roman populace against the 
privileged members of the oligarchic elite, Memmius accused the latter of strutting 
''^ Mutual obligation: Lund p. 161-171. Hellenistic ruler-cult: Shipley p. 156-163. Attalus and 
Antigonus: ibid. p. 64-65. Seleucus: Austin (1981) 139. Adopted names: Shipley p. 65-66; Fears p. 
875-876. Demetrius: Nock p. 4; Plut. Dem. 23. 3. 
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'...proudly before your faces fiaunting their priesthoods and consulships'. Livy's 
analysis of the clashes between patricians and plebeians in the early Republic was 
given strongly religious colouring, although the extent to which his accounts reflected 
the religious aspects of contemporary Augustan ideology, described below, must be 
recognised. The relationship between control of religion and political power was a 
constant theme, at least as seen from a late Republican perspective. During the first 
century BCE, Sulla and his enemies engaged in a legislative battle about senatorial and 
popular authority over the priestly colleges; religious issues, language and symbolism 
were significant elements in the political disputes between Cicero and Clodius, and in 
the rebellion of Catiline.'^^ 
In the context of the Hellenistic examples already cited and of religious content in the 
tradition of Roman political disputes, it was perhaps a short and logical step for the 
rulers of the City to move from the evocation and use of the divine to its personal 
appropriation. The idea that humans could take on divine form, at least posthumously, 
could be given at least some orthodox credence by the examples of Hercules and 
Romulus. To characterise living Romans as divine was problematic and vulnerable to 
attack from the forces of religious conservatism, philosophical scepticism and, most 
powerfully, from accusations of contravening the traditions of mos maiorum. Therefore 
it is perhaps both unsurprising and illustrative of the political manipulation of religion 
that individuals renowned for sfretching the traditions of the divine were also 
remarkable for the challenges that they presented to political orthodoxy. During his late 
third to early second century BCE prominence, P. Scipio Afiicanus was said to be 
famous for his attachment to Jupiter. In Livy's subtle account, elements are woven 
together of the general's personality and convictions, his deliberate management of the 
perceptions of others, the evocation of desirable historical exemplars (in this case, 
Alexander the Great), and the gullibility of public opinion. Sulla's claims to a 
relationship with Fortune merited detailed discussion by Plutarch. He portrayed Sulla 
as being remarkable in the extent to which he presented himself as '...entirely the 
creature of this deity' and, of his achievements, '...to attribute more to Fortune than to 
his own excellence'. The sfrength of the association was represented by Sulla's 
Politics and religion in Rome: Beard, North and Price p. 134-135; Lintott (1999) p. 182; Sail. lug. 
31.10; Livy, for example, 10. 6. 1-9. 2. Sulla: Cass. Dio 37. 37. 1-2. Cicero, Clodius and Catiline: 
Beard, North and Price p. 139-140. 
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adoption of Felix ('lucky', 'fortimate') as an additional name. Another Roman leader, 
Q. Caecilius Metellus, coincidentally consul with Sulla in 80 BCE, also acquired an 
extra name with strong religious overtones; in his case, Pius. These ascriptions of 
religious qualities to living persons raise the associated topic of virtues as attributes of 
individuals (see pages 193-195). Here it suffices to record the comment that there was 
'deliberate ambiguity' in the assumed status of such qualities, leaving open the 
question of the literal nature of the claims to divine associations.^ *'*' 
Ambiguity was clearly manifested in the person and public image of Julius Caesar. 
Few if any ancient Romans have been subjected to such close academic scrutiny with 
regard to the nature and political significance of their links with the gods. His claims to 
divine association went beyond those of others in that he identified Venus as an 
ancestor rather than as a mere patron. Some of the honours granted to Caesar, for 
example, the public celebration of his birthday, and attaching his name to a calendar 
month and an electoral tribe, had specific resonance with divine tributes made to 
Hellenistic monarchs. There can be no doubt that Caesar saw himself and was seen as 
exceptional in having moved beyond the role of a political leader in the Roman 
tradition. His posthumous deification stood as testament to the uniqueness of his 
position. Demonstrable in the prelude to the Ides of March was the conjimction 
between his subversion of political convention, the establishment of his personal 
domination and the use he made of religion in these processes. Shortly before his 
assassination, Caesar was said to have received a delegation of senators at the portico 
of the Temple of Venus Genetrix. Tellingly, this temple had been buih by the Dictator 
in honour of his claimed ancestress within the forum constructed in his name. In 
addition to these unmistakable general demonstrations of Caesar's assumption of 
divinely sanctioned domination, the message was underlined by his refiisal to rise from 
his seat to greet the senators, even when reminded of the necessary protocol. The 
amalgam of political, personal and religious elements in this reported incident is 
representative of the dilficulty in isolating Caesar's approach to religion. Whether or 
not he had wished to be recognised as a god before his death there can be no doubt that 
Posthumous deification: Price (1987) p. 73. Problematic: Eden p. 9. Scipio: Livy 26. 19. 3-9. Sulla 
and Fortune: Plut. Sull. 6. 2-7; Keaveney p. 40-42. Metellus: Fears p. 877. Ambiguity: Wallace-
Hadrill(1981)p. 77. 
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religion played a large part in his political ideology, a part taken up and amplified by 
his eventual successor.^ * '^ 
Certainly religion held a prominent place in the ideology of the Augustan regime; even 
the new name adopted by Octavian in 27 BCE evoked the idea of a ruler who was 
specifically favoured by the gods. He drew on the legacy of his adopted father in this 
respect. In statuary and coins Augustus promoted the divine association between a 
comet seen in 44 BCE and games being held at the same time in honour of Caesar. A 
coin of 17 BCE depicted the deceased dictator on the obverse, complete with the 
'divine' star, while the reverse carried an image of Augustus and the straightforward 
legend ' D I V I F(ilius) AUGUSTUS' (Plate 14). Religious imagery was employed 
throughout the long period of the first princeps'' domination, both directly in images of 
Augustus, and in more generalised contexts. In the Res Gestae, prominent note was 
made of temple building and restoration, and as part of the climax to the account of his 
achievements piety was given a place as one of the princeps' virtues inscribed on the 
clupeus aureus. Although a great deal more has been said elsewhere and could be 
added here about religion in Augustan political ideology, the examples already cited 
serve at the same time to illustrate its significance and to caution against over 
interpretation. Viewed in the specific context of the bases of Augustus' domination 
and of the ideology that supported his rule, the potency of religion, as of the other non-
coercive factors considered in this chapter, can be seen to diminish.^"^ 
The general point to be made here is that Augustus' domination did not rely on 
religion as a major support; rather it was only natural in the Roman context that his 
pre-eminence, (established and maintained through overwhelming force, and 
developed over so long a period), would be reflected by and sublimated into religion, 
as it was into all important aspects of social life. In relation to the specific examples 
cited above, it was notable that for all its ground-breaking importance, the religious 
and other ideology of Julius Caesar was gradually dropped by the Augustan regime. 
Studies of Julius Caesar: Yavetz (1983) Ch. 1. Venus: Suet. lul. 6. Divine honours: Beard, North 
and Price p. 141. Caesar's unique position: Yavetz (1983) p. 55; Suet. lul. 88. Temple incident: 
-Yavetztl983) p; 197-^ 198; Zankef (1988) p. 44; Suet, ful: 78. Caesar aiid'ireligionf^eftorSca^^ 
Weinstock (1971), Beard, North and Price p. 140ff, Price (1987) p. 71 and Yavetz (1983) p. 45fr. 
Augustus' name: Suet. ^Mg. 7. Caesar and Augustus: Zanker(1988) p. 34-35; BMC Augustus 71. 
Temples: RG 20. 4, 21. 1. Clupeus Aureus: ibid. 34. 2. Discussion elsewhere: Liebeschuetz (1979) p. 
55-101; Price (1996). 
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BMC Aug 71 
Plate 14 
(i) Julius Caesar and star 
(ii) Augustus: DIVI F 
For example, the princeps' adoptive father received scant mention in the Res Gestae. 
Besides references to the execution of his wil l and to gifts made to the Temple of the 
Divine Julius, filial revenge was cited as a secondary justification for the civil wars 
fought by Augustus after 44 BCE, secondary, that is, to his demonstration of military 
pre-eminence in raising an army with which he '...championed the liberty of the 
republic'. Temple construction and restoration were recorded as items in a long list of 
other building activity, while work on the more overtly political Curia and Capitol had 
pride of place. Similarly, piety was placed fourth in the list of Augustan attributes on 
the 'Golden Shield', being preceded by both clemency and justice in a list headed by 
the martial quality of virtus?^^ 
A central feature of the relationship between religion and the authority of Augustus 
and his successors was that of ruler cult. As in all aspects of Augustan ideology, there 
was change and gradual refinement of the proclaimed relationship between the 
princeps and the gods. This development has already been alluded to in the use made 
of Julius Caesar's legacy. In his own right, Augustus can be seen to progress from 
rather loose religious interpretations and behaviour, evoking the world of the 
Hellenistic monarchs, to much tighter and more controlled formulations. The earlier 
stage can be represented by Suetonius' account of 'stories' concerning Octavian 
dressing as Apollo at a 'dinner of the Twelve Gods' during his dispute with Antony. 
By 27-25 BCE Agrippa's plan to place an effigy of Augustus within the newly 
constructed Pantheon was rejected by the princeps; instead it was Julius Caesar who 
was represented among the Olympian gods inside, while statues of Augustus and 
Agrippa were positioned in an ante-chamber. Images of Augustus as a priest and as 
leading communal acts of piety were more typical of his mature ideology (Plate 15), as 
was the mixture of central control and cultural sensitivity with which locally based 
more direct manifestations of emperor worship were managed. Between 29 and 2 BCE 
examples can be cited from Asia, Spain, Gaul and Germany of altars dedicated as 
centres for some unclear combination of the cults of Roma and Augustus. In relation to 
the use of religion to bolster political power, it is of interest that the last three of these 
instances were specifically designed as focal points for unifying local tribes in their 
acceptance of Roman mle. Starting in the City of Rotne itself, Augustus can be seen to 
Caesar in the RG: 1. 1, 2, 15. 1, 21. 2. Building: RG 19-21. 
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(i) Augustus as priest 
'I 
Plate 15 
(ii) Augustus and priests: Ara Pacis 
have moved carefiilly to place himself and his family at the centre of religious practice. 
Having waited, as demanded by tradition, for the death of the incumbent, he took on 
the role of pontifex maximus in 12 BCE. Instead of moving to the official residence 
associated with that office, he made over part of his home on the Palatine to public 
land, on which he dedicated a shrine to Vesta. Within that shrine he also placed his 
household gods, the lares and penates. Such measures demonstrated the conjunction of 
religious reform, political control and individual domination that characterised the 
personal and enduring rule of Augustus and his successors.^ '^* 
Our view of the extent to which those successors incorporated divine elements into 
their personas and within their political ideologies is inevitably clouded by the 
attitudes of our ancient sources. Although the Augustan precedent ensured that religion 
had a significant place, there can be little doubt that the form it took in the different 
regimes varied widely. The loyalist Velleius Paterculus suggested that it was genuine 
piety rather than the exercise of political domination that led Tiberius to deify 
Augustus. However, we are told by Tacitus that that emperor tried to limit the use of 
his step-father's divinity as subject matter in personally or politically motivated legal 
proceedings. Suetonius recorded Tiberius' refusal of various divine honours, and while 
some provincial inscriptions could be addressed directly, 'To the god Tiberius Caesar 
Augustus, son of the deified Augustus', others indicated his reluctance to be seen as 
anything but human. By contrast. Emperors such as Gaius were portrayed by ancient 
authors as subverting proper behaviour and as being deranged in their claims to 
personal divinity. Cassius Dio's account of Gaius' excesses contained an interesting 
detail with regard to the perceived political status of the Emperor's posings as a god. 
The author recounted a story in which a Gallic shoemaker laughed out-loud at the 
spectacle of Gaius, in the guise of Jupiter, uttering oracles from a public platform. 
Summoned by the Emperor to give an answer to the question, "What do I seem to you 
to be?", the artisan readily responded, "A big humbug". Beyond recording that the man 
'met with no harm', Dio added the editorial comment that: 
Octavian as Apollo: Suet. Aug. 70; Beard, North and Price p. 209. Pantheon: Cass. Dio 53. 27. 3. 
Tribal loyalty: Beard, North and Price p. 352-353. Pontifex maximus and household gods: 
Liebeschuetz (1979) p. 70-72; Beard, North and Price p. 184-189. Tradition and change: Zanker 
(1988) p. 174; Price (1996) p. 820. 
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'Thus it is, apparently, that persons of such rank as Gains can bear the 
franicness of the common herd more easily than that of those who hold 
high position.' 
The historian's observation indicated at the same tune the relevant political context in 
which to place Gaius' religious posturing and the ever present sensitivity to personal 
rivalry among the Roman elite.^^^ 
Imperial deification could cause difficulties for our ancient authors. For example, Pliny 
had appeared comfortable in recording that Trajan had given Nerva 'his place among 
the stars' simply because he 'thought he was a god'. However, the panegyrist 
immediately went on to suggest anachronistically that the proof of the latter's divinity 
lay in his choice of the former as his successor, thus clearly subordinating any 
specifically religious focus to a concern with political realities. Later he compounded 
the problem as he attempted to evoke the joy that must be felt by deified Nerva as he 
stood 'second in comparison' to the still human Trajan. A 'bad' emperor, such as 
Domitian, was widely criticised in our ancient sources for misusing religion m the 
cause of personal glorification; in his case, for example, by requiring his subjects to 
refer to him by the formula, 'master and god'. However, modem analysis has 
suggested that even 'good' emperors, such as Trajan, manipulated religious sentiment 
and practice in order to pursue the goals of political success and individual renown. 
The optimus princeps may have engineered the then unique deification both of his 
biological father and sister in order to promote a public mood favourable to his desired 
emulation of Alexander's conquests in the East. Again, whereas Tacitus was clearly 
critical of the senate's 'customary sycophancy' in placing a statue of Nero in the 
Temple of Mars Ultor, Pausanias could display his general favour towards Hadrian in a 
disarmingly matter-of-fact report of seeing an image of that emperor in the Parthenon. 
That Pausanias' attitude reflected the then contemporary norm receives support from 
evidence about temple dedications. Recently it has been suggested that a number of 
provincial temples thought to be to Hadrian with, or in the guise of, Zeus were in fact 
intended for the worship of the Emperor alone. Hadrian provides a good example of a 
trend towards the emperors' increasingly personal focus on religion, in addition to it 
being^iewed or used as a substantive supporf for political power. His initiation at 
Ancient sources: Price (1987) p. 81-82. Tiberius: Veil. Pat. 2. 126. 1; Tac. Ann. 1. 73. 2-4; Suet. 
Tib. 26; Sherk 31. Gaius: Suet. Cal. 22; Cass. Dio 59. 26. 8-9. 
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Eleusis and many endowments made to Greek religious sites are best seen as a 
manifestation of his general admiration of Greek culture. At the same time, the 
Emperor's policy of unifying the City of Rome and its provinces was fiirthered by the 
attention paid to the construction of the temple of Venus and Roma in the City. 
Worship of the goddess Roma had long been a symbol of the wider Empire's 
reverence for the Imperial centre, so Hadrian's action was clearly intended to 
strengthen this bond. At the extremes, the promotion of an emperor's personal religion 
could actually undermine his political authority. Nowhere was this better illustrated 
than in the wild excesses of the teenage Syrian, Elagabalus. His brief reign in the early 
third century was brought to an end at least in part because of his adherence to eastern 
cult rather than the traditional state religious practice of Rome.^°^ 
Other political uses of religion included the symbolism of Vespasian's decision to 
rebuild the Temple of the Divine Claudius, pulled dovra by Nero to make way for his 
Golden House. In this way Vespasian signalled at once his adherence to the line of 
'legitimate' emperors, his repudiation of the Neronian regime and, in returning to 
pious communal use land appropriated by Nero for personal pleasure, an appreciation 
of the traditional relationship between religion and the res publica. Without any very 
specific political meaning, beyond a general heightening of the Emperor's status and 
mystique, the so-called thunderbolt and rain miracles of Marcus Aurelius were given 
prominence both by our sources and monumentally in the Column erected in his 
memory. Diocletian used the model of the Olympian hierarchy to articulate the 
differential power held by members of the Tetrarchy. His identification with Jupiter, as 
opposed to the Hercules of his colleague Maximian, can have left no doubt as to where 
supreme authority lay. More generally, Diocletian's determined conservatism with 
regard to the divine has been said to demonstrate the role of religion as a 'strong social 
and political cement'. This takes us back to the Roman ideal, expressed most famously 
by Virgil, of a conjunction between Romans' reverence for the traditional gods and 
those deities' watchful fostering of the City's success. However, the fragility, or 
perhaps better, the malleability of this link was to be made clear within a very few 
years of Diocletian's retirement in 305 CE. Emerging to dominate first the western half 
Trajan and Nerva: Plin. Pan. 11.2-4, 89. 2. Domitian: Suet. Dom. 13. Trajan's manipulation: 
Bennett p. 188-190. Nero: Tac. Ann. 13. 8. 1. Hadrian: Paus. 1. 24. 7; Liebeschuetz (2000) p. 988-989. 
Temple dedications: Burrell p. 31 -32. Elagabalus: Cass. Dio 80. 11. 1; OCD3 p. 221 -222. 
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of the Empire in 312, and to become supreme over all by 324, Constantine established 
a new religion, Christianity, as the state's view of the divine. It is true that a Christian 
apologist such as Eusebius could couch the relationship between the Emperor and his 
god in terms very similar to those of Virgil's traditional reciprocal deal, that is, 
reverence and worship in exchange for victory and earthly domination. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the move of Christianity to the centre of Roman political life can 
profitably be examined from the angle of that religion's gradual 'conversion' to 
Roman Imperial ideals. Nevertheless, the advent of state Christianity altered the over 
all dynamics of the link between Imperial authority and religion too profoundly to be 
considered by this thesis.'^ "^ 
Brief as this review has been, certain features of the relationship between social power 
and religion have been illustrated sufficiently to indicate its closeness, without 
demonstrating that the former was necessarily based on the latter. One of the main 
reasons for this conclusion was the very ubiquity of religion in the ancient world. 
Thales was said to have declared that everything was ' fu l l of gods', a view that can be 
confirmed in some apparently unlikely places. At the outset of his treatise on How to 
be a Good Cavalry Commander, Xenophon had exemplified the inescapable role of 
the divine; 
'Once you have secured the favour of the gods, you next have to recruit 
horsemen...' 
Reflecting its Greek precursor, Roman religion '...was a system ideologically 
committed to the public, not the private, sphere'. Quite specifically, it could be stated 
that the divinity of the emperors was a self-evident matter of public action and 
perception. Indeed, that this idea could be contained in a conventional source such as 
Valerius Maximus adds to its credibility as a commonplace of the prevailing ideology. 
As has already been commented in relation to Augustus (pages 172-174), it is hardly 
surprising that there was a recurring religious element in the emperors' ideology of 
power. Also relevant, and stemming from Greek and Hellenistic practice, was a 
readiness to use religious imagery to honour prominent men. This can be well 
illustrated in Roman terms by the evocation of Jupiter in the triumphator's face 
Vespasian: Levick (1999b) p. 126. Marcus. HA Marc. 24. 4; Cass. Dio 71. 8-10. Diocletian: Pan. 
Lat. 11. 10-12; Williams, S. p. 156; Verg. Aen. 6. 757-889, 8. 337-359. Constantine: Euseb. Fit. Const. 
1. 1. 3,2. 24. 3. 'Conversion' of Christianity: Brown p. 82. 
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painting and dress, itself thought to have its origins in the traditional appearance of the 
Kings of Rome. At the same time, such associations refocus attention onto the military 
core of Roman social power. Again linking the issues of the divine, virtue and 
coercion, Plutarch, in a philosophically coloured diversion from his account of 
Aristides, considered the apparently paradoxical relationship between rulers' 
aspirations and behaviour. Noting that the epithet 'The Just' had been attached to 
Aristides, Plutarch commented that such ascribed royal names were more usually 
coined in the language of violence rather than virtue. This, he lamented, was at odds 
with the association between kings and the divine, of whose attributes (immortality, 
power and virtue) Plutarch declared the last to be the noblest. 
Conclusion 
To the apparently non-coercive bases of Imperial authority considered in this chapter 
could be added a number of others; an emperor's control of patronage and his 
provision for the everyday needs of his subjects would be two. The word limit imposed 
on this thesis is one reason for their omission in any detail, while the danger of using 
more evidence than is necessary to support my basic argument is another. In fact, a few 
words will be said about patronage, largely in order to help illustrate the second of 
these explanations. 
In considering in some detail the factors of law, religion, and art, symbol and 
ceremony, each has been seen to play an important, although subsidiary role as a basis 
for the power of a Roman emperor. In addition, coercion and military domination have 
been shown to pervade those features. Thus, law has emerged largely as a legitimising 
mask of domination, rather than as tool necessary for its establishment. At least in 
relation to the standard view of the emperors as having eclipsed the political power of 
the senate, there must be some irony in the fact that that body gradually increased its 
specifically legal role (at the expense of the people) throughout the Imperial period. As 
i f to emphasise the point, this increased legal activity principally involved regular 
decrees of honour to the emperor and his family. It must also be significant that 
Thales and the public nature of religion: Cartledge p.l4; Xen. Eg. mag. 1. 1-2; Val. Max. 1. praef.; 
Wardle p. 491-493. Religious imagery: Shipley p. 158. Triumph: Beard, North and Price p. 44-45. 
Epithets: Plut. Arist. 6. The biographer listed as examples of the norm: Besieger, Thunderbolt, 
Conqueror, Eagle and Hawk, all associated with Hellenistic monarchs. 
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specifically legal statements of, let alone challenges to, an emperor's power are barely 
traceable in the record. Thus, 
'The Imperial regime simply cannot be adequately characterised in 
constitutional terms.' 
The certainty of this conclusion must be upheld today, even though historians of the 
first half of the last century seemed largely unable to conceive of Ancient Rome in any 
other way. The 1934 edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, reprinted with 
corrections as late as 1971, characterised Augustus' 27 BCE measures concerning his 
powers as 'the act of settlement'. It is surely not too fanciful to imagine the author's 
barely resisted temptation to use capital letters in this description, thus unambiguously 
evoking that 1701 landmark of British constitutional history. As far as religion is 
concerned, the ancient views of Polybius clearly indicated its Roman practices to be 
instrumental to the maintenance of social power, while more modem commentators 
have pointed out the unusually close correlation between Rome's military activities 
and its traditional worship of the divine. Again, in relation to art, its ancillary role has 
been made evident as a form of expression and conduit of already established social 
power. Ruskin's general comment, quoted with obvious regret in a modem context by 
Kermeth Clark, must be relevant to Ancient Rome: 
'No great art ever yet arose on earth but among a nation of soldiers'. 
As an example of how the examination of other potential bases of Imperial power 
would have revealed them also to be both subsidiary to and reflective of coercion, the 
role of patronage wil l be considered in brief. 
The workings of patronage in Roman society have been much studied, and its 
operation has been defined at many different levels of interaction. There can be no 
doubt that patronage remained a vital way of organising the exchange of economic and 
social goods among the Roman elite throughout the Republic and Empire. Between 
those periods its effective weight shifted from the number and status of an individual's 
clients to his proximity to the emperor. Patronage has been described in that context as 
'the dominant and generalised form of institutionalised resource allocation,' that is, the 
basis of social power. As such, the formal power stmctures of the traditional Roman 
Law and the senate: Rowe, G. p. 41-43, 173. Absence of Legal statements: Millar (1992) p. 616-
617. 'Act of Settlement': Jones, H. S. p. 128; Clark, G. p. 190-192. Religion: Polyb. 6. 56. 6-14; Han-is 
p. 9-10. Art: Clark, K. p. 301. 
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state and the operation of private and personal ties of patronage are claimed to be one 
and the same. This system was seen as having been adapted rather than replaced by the 
emperors. Although perhaps a somewhat unreliable source fi-om which to gather 
factual evidence about Claudius, Seneca has been used to provide confirmation that 
that emperor employed patronage rather than coercion to secure his grip on power. 
However, closer analysis suggests that the portrayal is of the former being used as a 
mask for the latter. This is certainly a viewpoint that can be found in sociological 
theorising about patronage. Bourdieu identified the phenomenon as a way of 
establishing domination through the creation of debt. As such, patronage formed a type 
of euphemised violence. The argument continued by pointing out that in pre-capitalist 
societies, lacking depersonalised mechanisms for debt, such as credit and banks, the 
personal nature of economically dependent relationships contained a masked, but 
clearly present, element of coercive power. Certainly Tacitus recorded the danger 
inherent in the development of a high reputation through patronage when the emperor 
claimed all such distinction: '...the greatness of one's reputation began to mean 
extermination'. Thus coercive power could be seen to trump that gained by public 
display, munificence and the development of clients.^'*' 
Patronage, then, takes its place alongside other proposed non-coercive bases of 
Imperial authority, being, in reality, suffused with coercion. Louis Althusser, 
consciously building on the ideas of fellow-Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, positioned all 
these elements in a theoretical framework. He identified a sharper division between 
what he termed the 'Repressive State Apparatus' (RSA) and the 'Ideological State 
Apparatus' (ISA). He located within the former all the agencies of government, 
administration and law enforcement, delineating within the latter those of religion, 
family, education and art. However, while the instruments of physical coercion are 
clearly available to the RSA, Althusser stressed that a repressive, coercive element was 
also integral to the ISA.^" 
Studies of patronage: Eilers p. I . Patronage and exchange of goods: Sailer p. 120, 141. Patronage 
as power: Johnson and Dandeker p. 235"238: eiaiidius: Sen. Cons. Ad Polyb. 12r3; Wallace-Hadfill 
(1996) p. 296. Patronage as coercion: Bourdieu (1972) p. 184-185; (1980) p. 125-126; Tac. Ann. 3. 55. 
3;Braund, D. p. 150. 
^" RSA and ISA: Althusser (1994) p. I l l ; (1971) p. 142-143. Debt to Gramsci: (1971) p. 142 n. 7; see 
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Part Two 
Roman Emperors: Military Leaders and Coercive Rulers 
Part One examined aspects of the nature of coercive power in the ancient world, 
demonstrating the particular ways in which it was integral to the ethos of Roman 
political authority. Part Two wil l focus more closely upon the authority of Roman 
emperors, emphasising its military aspects. After a brief examination of other 
characteristics identified by the ancients as being desirable in an emperor, 
concentration wil l be on their role as military leaders and on the extent to which their 
supremacy depended on a personal relationship with their soldiers. 
7. The Characteristics of Rulers 
Introduction 
In the 'disguised opening' to the second half of his Annals, Tacitus digressed from his 
narrative to apologise for the nature of the historical material he felt impelled to 
transmit. Explaining that there were no great wars and sieges to write about, he 
nevertheless suggested that it contained ' . . .trivialities, from which the movements of 
great affairs spring'. Tacitus' focus here may have been mainly on literary and 
historiographical effect. However, to the extent that his 'apology' reflected genuine 
political analysis, he was also lamenting the fact that that the individual proclivities 
and behaviours of Rome's absolute rulers were now central to the historical narrative. 
In the Histories Tacitus had already expressed his regret at the eclipse of what he held 
to be collective Republican government. In a passage on Galba's adoption of Piso in 
68 CE, he attempted the delicate task of implicitly praising Nerva's adoption of the 
then current-emperor, Trajan, while at the same time articulating regret that Rome had 
now reached.a state in which it was unable to do without ^ dominant ruler. To this end;-
the historian had Galba make a long speech including the foUowmg: 
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" I f the vast bulk of this empire could stand and keep its balance without 
a guiding hand, I was a suitable person to set in motion a republic. As it 
is, things have long ago come to such a pass that neither I in my old age 
can give the Roman people any better gift than a good successor, nor 
you in your prime anything better than a good emperor." 
Probably emanating from the very end of the fourth century, the SHA included what 
would have been for Tacitus depressing confirmation of this view. The biographer 
provided last words for Septimius Severus as he lay dying in 211 CE. Among these, 
referring to his sons, he said: 
' I bequeath to my two Antonini an empire which is strong, i f they prove 
good, feeble, i f they prove bad'.^'^ 
The problematic relationship between the ideal ruler and the reality of individuals who 
wielded power had been recognised by Homer. He explored the issue in the 
characterisations of Agamemnon, weak and uncomfortable in his role as leader, and 
Achilles, too big a personality for the role assigned to him. From a different 
perspective, that of apparently questioning the importance of a particular ruler's 
individuality and behaviour, Agamemnon was again cited by our sources. In the early 
fifth century CE, the Christian bishop, Synesius of Cyrene, wrote that there were local 
African rustics who still imagined that Agamemnon was their emperor and that 
Odysseus was one of his ministers. This statement has been interpreted by some as 
indicating both the literal remoteness of the emperor from his subjects, and the 
significance of general features of a ruler's image, as opposed to the reality of his 
person and actions. Others have recognised the elitist humour in Synesius' comment 
about provincial isolation from events surroimding the emperor's court. However, there 
can be no doubt about the importance of the personality and behaviour of particular 
emperors, as influencing both the events of their reigns and in shaping the gradually 
evolving expectations of the role; sentiments that Synesius, the author of an On 
Kingship, must have shared.^  
Tacitus' apology: Am. 4. 32. 2; Woodman p. 180ff; Clarke p. 92-93; Haynes p. 40-44. Galba: Hist. 
1. 16. SHA: Sev. 23. 3; OCD3 p. 713. 
'^^  Homer: Redfield p. 93. Synesius: Lane Fox p. 48-49; Lendon (1997) p. 14, 16,267 (who takes it 
very seriously indeed); Birley (1988) p. ix (who sees thejoke); OCD3 p. 1463. 
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Before considering the characterisation of rulers in relation to their power and 
authority, attention must be paid to a particular feature of our ancient literary sources, 
that is, the use made by them of deliberate contrast. A basic element in the delineation 
of any ruler was the manner in which he related to predecessors and peers elsewhere. 
Emulations, evocations and contrasts provide a thread that runs through all sections of 
this thesis. It is important to note that the tendency to use and indeed create 
comparisons was strong enough to influence the picture provided of any particular 
ruler. In the course of this process certain individuals acquired established 
characterisations that could be deployed as part of an author's stock in trade. Dio 
Chrysostom deliberately evoked the example of the proverbially dissolute and indolent 
Sardanapallus to point up the active and responsive temperament of Alexander. The 
evocations and associations of such a process could take on a specifically literary form. 
Thus, wider elements of the influential portrait the a ruler in Xenophon's Cyropaedia 
were evoked when Cicero recorded that the work was a favourite of Scipio Africanus 
and when Suetonius indicated Julius Caesar's reaction against certain of its details. 
From a more general literary perspective it is worthy of note that the influential 
rhetorician Isocrates paused in his accoimt of the career of Evagoras to compare him, 
not only with famous predecessors, but also with 'the demigods'. Again, the 
description of the exploits of Evagoras and his small band of followers must have been 
calculated to evoke mythical heroes such as Jason. Therefore from both a Hterary and a 
historical viewpoint it must be vsdse to assume at least exaggeration, i f not fabrication, 
when any two figures were described and contrasted in close proximity. One example 
would be the treatment of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in the SHA. There the 
virtues of the former and vices of the latter were surely emphasised for the literary 
effect of contrast. Another instance can be seen in Pliny's handling of Domitian as he 
described of the career of Trajan. The author was vague about the years prior to his 
subject's adoption by Nerva in 97 CE, glossing over what was in all probability a 
series of distinguished military commands under Domitian. Only a hint of this appears 
in the Panegyricus, surfacing as that 'bad' emperor's jealousy and admiration, 
explaining his judgement that Trajan was '...worthy to conduct a series of 
campaigns.'^''' 
Sardanapallus: Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 3-4. Literary evocations: Cicero Q. Fr. \. \. 8; Suetonius lul. 87; 
Dvomik p. 462-463. Comparison: Isoc. Evag. 33 ff and 70; Jason, ibid 28-29. An element in the 
influence of Isocrates is reflected in his claim (ibid 8) to have composed the first prose encomium of a 
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In addition to the actions or personas of emperors, it wil l be as well to outiine certain 
external or ascribed features that had a bearing on any individual's authority. As wil l 
become clear, in our ancient sources few i f any of these could be said to be fixed, in 
the sense that their presence or absence was always deemed to be a positive or negative 
signal of suitability to mle; rather, the value placed on particular characteristics tended 
to shift in line with the over-all assessment of an individual. Far from being objective 
criteria, the attributed features related to posthumous reputation and to the cultural, 
literary and political outlook of the authors of our literary sources. Thus, they require 
careful interpretation. Nevertheless, examples of other elements used in descriptions of 
ancient mlers will provide an important context in which to view the role of military 
factors. Further, it wi l l be seen that some of the more significant of these apparently 
non-military features were in reality closely related to a view of an emperor as an 
aggressive, dominant and coercive figure. 
Origins, ancestry and family cormections 
That an individual's merits or gifts could be connected to ancestry and family origins 
was deeply embedded in classical culture. Above all and with perhaps surprising 
persistence the idea reflected the mythic relationship between men and gods. 
Prominent in the senses both of his qualities and pervasiveness was the figure of 
Herakles, whose iconic dominance and physical power need no elaboration. The 
pattem of his jointly divine and human parentage was present in Homer and widely 
elaborated in Greek and Roman culture. Herodotus discussed evidence for the worship 
of Herakles in Egypt thousands of years previously and debated the cormection 
between his divine status and heroic deeds. Rulers such as Pisistratus and the Argead 
Macedonian kings claimed him as an ancestor and/or evoked him as a source of 
authority. In the former instance the desired link was straightforwardly between the 
hero, his protecting goddess, Athena, and the city. With this background, it is 
unsurprising that Hercules was used by a number of Roman emperors in their ideology 
and imagery. Trajan's origins in Baetica perhaps provided a special connection in 
relation to the hero's labour of driving the cattle of Geryon fi-om that area to Italy.'Both 
Plihy ahd Dib Clffysbstdm^pply positive^haracteristics of the Herculean myth to the 
ruler. Marcus and Verus: Birley (1987) p. 158. Trajan and Domitian: Plin. Pan. 7-8, 14. 5; Bennett p. 
43-45; Eck (2002) p. 213-215.. 
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Emperor, while one of the two new legions raised for the second Dacian war was given 
the hero's sign as its standard. In accounts of 'bad' emperors, the evocation of 
Hercules could be given violent and megalomaniac colouring. In a catalogue of 
Commodus' self-glorifying excesses, Cassius Dio recorded 'The Roman Hercules' as 
one of the titles he assumed. That emperor was the first to employ imagery of Hercules 
on his coins in a systematic manner, while, 'Vast numbers of statues were erected 
representing him in the garb of Herakles'. The SHA chose to relate the association of 
Commodus and Hercules to the former's predilection for the slaughter of beasts in the 
amphitheatre.^ 
A distinguished family background and high status origins were clearly not necessary 
qualifications to be a legitimate and successful ruler. For Plutarch, the alien origins and 
doubtful family connections of Themistocles were features that made his achievements 
all the more worthy of note: 
'In the case of Themistocles his family was too obscure to have lent him 
any distinction at the begirming of his career.' 
However, such instances were perhaps the exceptions that proved the rule. More 
typically, in the context of third century CE Rome, Maximinus could be portrayed as 
going to extreme lengths to camouflage his notoriously 'half-barbarian' family origms 
in rural Thrace. He dismissed, banished or murdered the courtiers and servants of the 
previous regime because 
'...he wanted no one around him who was superior to him in birth...to 
whom he must defer'.^'^ 
Age 
As a feature relevant to the legitimacy and authority of a ruler, age could be a tricky 
element to handle. Coin obverses of different Hellenistic kings show them as 
considerably younger and older than must have been the case. For example, Ptolemy V 
Epiphanes, on succeeding to the throne when a child aged about five, is portrayed as a 
young man of perhaps twenty. Images of Mithridates V I Eupator always appear to 
'^^  Pisistratus: Bbardman (1989) p: 158^159. Macedonia: Hammond and Griffith p. 2, lef aird 31f. 
Baetica and legionary standard: Bennett p. 72; Plin. Pan. 14. 5; Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 84. Herakles as 
man/god: //. 14. 323; Eur. Heracl; Plant. Ampk; Hdt. 2.43-45. Domitian: Cass. Dio 73. 15. 2-6; SHA 
Comm. 8. 5; Burnett p. 77. 
Themistocles: Plut. Them. 1. Maximinus' origins: Herodian 6. 8. 1. His response: ibid. 7. 1. 2-3. 
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reduce his true age, while those of Ptolemy I Soter seem to do the opposite, hi terms of 
general culture, the positive aspects of youth (as suggestive of vigour and the absence 
of infirmity) were frequently evoked and depicted (Plate 10). The career of Alexander 
the Great would always ensure that the success and dominance of a young man could 
never be discounted. However, the task of ruling was routinely viewed as requiring 
experience and maturity. Plato had endorsed this view and, although the rules were 
often flouted, the Roman cursus honorum included minimum age requirements for its 
ascending levels. In the prefatory remarks to his history of sixty years of Roman 
Imperial rulers, Herodian stated the issue in unequivocal terms. In doing so, he also 
drew attention to the Roman reverence for tradition: 
The emperors who were advanced in years governed themselves and 
their subjects commendably, because of their greater practical 
experience, but the younger emperors lived recklessly and introduced 
many innovations'. 
To underline the point, he reviewed the catalogue of problems into which a variety of 
youthful rulers had been drawn. In the context of Marcus Aurelius' apprehensive 
musings on the prospects for the reign of his undisciplined son, the licentiousness of 
Dionysus of Sicily, the divine pretensions of Antigonus and the incest of Ptolemy were 
all listed, in addition to the matricide of Nero and savagery of Domitian.^'^ 
Images of youthfixl emperors such as Nero and Gallienus demonstrated a deliberate 
attempt to show them as more mature (Plate 16). At the other end of the scale, a 
significant element in the careful manipulation of the image of Augustus was an 
apparent arresting of the aging process around the time he acquired his new name. The 
relatively hard, bony representations of Octavian are replaced after 27 BCE by 
classically idealized portraits, presumably expressive of the now dominant auctoritas 
claimed in Res Gestae 34. 3. The persistence of these features in subsequent images 
vmderlined the ideology of timeless stability central to Augustan ideology (Plate 11). 
Nevertheless, it is possible that advancing age could be utilised even by the first 
princeps. The prominent employment of elephants in the decoration of the Temple of 
Concord, dedicated in 10 CE, may have reflected Augustus's then 72 years. The 
Roman view^f those beasts included supposed veneration of their elders and a natural 
^" Hellenistic kings: Smith (1988) p. 47. The mature should rule: PI. Resp. 412b-c; OCD3 p. 415. 
Aged/Youthful rulers: Herodian 1. 1. 6, 1. 3. 2-4. 
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Plate 16 
(i) Nero 
(ii) Gallienus 
lifespan of 200-300 years! The political realities of Marcus Aurelius' forty year 
exposure in the Imperial spotlight, allied to his personal ideology, resulted in the 
production of a series of portraits clearly reflecting the development of his official 
career; these ranged from the youthful heir of Antoninus Pius to care-worn 
philosopher/ruler (Plate 17). As we will see, expected elements of good physique were 
positive qualities in a ruler. However, Pliny the Younger, admittedly in an overtly 
laudatory context, found merit even in Trajan's receding hairline: 
'...the premature signs of advancing age with which the gods have 
seen fit to mark his hair and so enhance his look of majesty.' 
It is noteworthy that this aspect of Trajan's appearance was carefiilly concealed in 
publicly visible images (Plate 18 i). 
Physical appearance 
The idea of interpreting features of the body, reading ethical values from physical 
appearance, can be traced to accounts of Mesopotamian divination from the middle of 
the second millennium BCE. By the late fourth century BCE the Greeks had developed 
a science and literature of physiognomy. However, its application was far from 
sfraightforward; examples of descriptions and atfributes given different assessments in 
different contexts are not hard to find. For Homer, physical beauty was misleading and 
shallow in the case of Paris, but indicative of shining merit in Achilles. Nevertheless, 
as just illustrated by Pliny's view of Trajan, for the Romans, power and authority could 
be correlated with physical appearance. A physical description formed an element in 
each of Suetonius' accounts of twelve Caesars. With the exception of Titus, perhaps 
because it was so short, this had a specific place towards the end of the biography as 
part of the general summary of the particular ruler's character. Some association 
between outer and inner merit was a feature of Suetonius' method, a connection 
explicitly indicated more than once. Having described Otho's noble suicide, he began 
his summary by saying that the Emperor's '.. .appearance and manner did not suggest a 
spirit of such greatness.' As for Titus, 'His qualities of mind and body at once stood 
out.' Suetonius' Claudius provided interesting complexity. Possibly related to a 
condition such as cerebral palsy, the tradition of his misshapen body was strong. With 
satirical cruelty, Seneca described a 'shape of unprecedented kind' and 'unusual gait'. 
Augustan agelessness: Zanker (1988) p. 98-100; Smith (1988) p. 137-138. Elephants: Kellum p. 
226; Pliny Naturalis Historia 8. 28. Marcus Aurelius: Birley (1987) p. 8. Trajan: Plin. Pan. 4. 7. 
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Plate 17 
(i) (ii) 
(i i i) 
Suetonius provided documentary evidence in letters of Augustus that described 
Claudius as 'lacking and impaired in the wholeness both of his mind and of his body'. 
However, these letters also included the view that 
' . . . in important matters, when his mind doesn't wander, his nobility of 
character is clear enough.' 
In this context, the biographer's summary attempted to strike a balance: 
'His appearance was not lacking in authority and dignity...his face was 
handsome, as was his white hair...when he started to walk, his rather 
feeble knees would fail him and he had numerous undignified 
characteristics..'. 
The positive elements of this description are clearly evident in representations such as 
the statue of Claudius as Jupiter (Plate 18 ii). It has been suggested that, beyond the 
satire, the elements of ugliness and lack of self-control in Seneca's portrait of Claudius 
related directly to political and ethical failings. The contrast with Nero's physical 
beauty in the same work and the self-moderation of the good ruler in De dementia 
illustrates the point. Besides its general association with merit, physical attractiveness 
could be portrayed in relation to specific ancestral links, even to the divine. In a 
passage supporting claims to descent from Venus, Julius Caesar was said to have 
'...surpassed all his fellow-citizens in beauty of person.' Further aspects of Pliny's 
praise of Trajan linked his authority to his physical appearance. In the panegyrist's 
description of the modest manner of the Emperor's pedestrian entry into Rome in 99 
CE, Pliny nevertheless added that, 'You towered above us only because of your own 
splendid physique'. This link between height and dominance appeared as a convention 
on Trajan's Column and in representations of other emperors (Plate 19). Even 
barbarian kings, such as those of the Gauls, could be described as standing out fi-om the 
'510 
rest by virtue of their size. 
The character of 'bad' emperors was often represented in their physical appearance. 
For Suetonius, there appeared to be no positive aspects in the descriptions of Galba and 
Vitellius, and those of the author's particularly 'bad' emperors, Caligula, Nero and 
^—Early physiognomy: OeD3 prI 181-SM 50. HdmerT//. 3^  54-55, 22. 26. Suetonius: 
0//70 12; rZ/Mi 3. Description of Claudius: OCD3 p. 337; Sen. Apocol. 5.2>. Augustus's letters; 
Claud. 4. Suetonius's summary: Claud 30. Politics and ethics: Braund and James p. 308. Nero and 
Claudius: Apocol. 4. 1; Clem. 2. 3. 1. Julius Caesar: Veil. Pat. 2. 41. 1. Height: Plin. Pan. 22.2; Plut. 
Marc. 7. 
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Plate 18 
(i) Trajan's receding 
hairline concealed 
i i Claudius as Jupiter 
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Plate 19 
(i) Trajan's Column 
(ii) Trajan's Column 
(in) Trajan's Column 
(iv) Septimius Severus with 
his sons and Senators 
Domitian, were all predominantly negative. The 'fearful monster', Domitian, was 
described by Pliny as '...dreadfiil to see and to meet, with...a womanish pallor spread 
over his body'. In a typically more lurid style, the SHA dwelt on details of the disease 
and physical deformities suffered by Commodus. In terms of dress and adornment, the 
lavishly eastern presentation chosen by Macrinus and by Elagabalus was said to have 
scandalised both elite Roman society and the troops. It was cited as an element in the 
downfall of both emperors.^ '^' 
Education and advice 
The education and advice available to and used by a ruler bridged a space between 
what might be seen as his external and intrinsic personal qualities on the one hand, and 
his behaviour and public actions on the other. In addition to the usual literary links 
between the Greek and Roman worlds, the subject illustrates a degree of cultural 
continuity in terms of the practical advice accessible to a leader. The privileged 
counsellors (hetairoi) loosely grouped around the Macedonian kings were mirrored by 
their Hellenistic counterparts (philoi), who in turn bore resemblance to the consilium of 
Roman Republican dignitaries and emperors. As to literature, at the head of a well 
established genre on the instruction of princes. Homer had Agamemnon explicitly and 
publicly acknowledge the value of Nestor's advice, while Hesiod openly lectured those 
in authority about acceptable behaviour. Isocrates stressed the importance to a ruler of 
good counsel and gave the practical advice to, 'Associate with the wisest of your 
advisers, and send for any others you can'. Evagoras, another paradigm of Isocrates' 
best rulers, '...required no advisers and instead advised his friends.' It is noteworthy 
that he was portrayed as a 'thinker', perhaps in response to Plato's ideas of a 
philosopher-king, therefore transcending the need for counsel.^ '^ 
Alongside the works of Isocrates, as being very influential in antiquity, Xenophon's 
Cyropaedia fialfiUed to an extent its title promise by giving a prominent role to the 
education of the young Cyrus. The main theme of this process was the combined 
^" Suetonius' *bad' emperors: Galba 21; Vitellius l 7; Caligula 50; Nero 51; Domitian 18. Pliny: Pan. 
47. 3-48. 4. Commodus: SHA Comm. 13. 1-3. Macrinus: Herodian. 5. 2^4T5. Elagabalus: ibid. 5. 8. 1-
2. " 
Cultural continuity: Lund p. 178-179. Instruction of princes: Martin p. 32-33. Agamemnon: //. 2. 
372. Hesiod: '...you princes... make straight your judgements, you who devour bribes put crooked 
judgements altogether from your thoughts' Op. 261-263. Importance: AdNic. 27-28 and 13. Evagoras: 
Evag. 44,41-42. Isocrates and Plato: OCD3 p. 771. 
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efficacy of Cyrus' innate virtue and Spartan-style upbringing until the age of about 
twelve. Between them, these features produced a young man capable of lecturing his 
grandfather, the Median king, Astyages, on the superiority of a lifestyle without luxury, 
although there were hints that Cyrus was not immune to the attractions of adornment 
and glamour. In an echo of one of Herodotus' main themes, Isocrates in the 370s BCE 
added detail to what he saw as the particular difficulty of education and advice for a 
ruler once he was in power. After outlining various sources fi-om which 'ordinary 
citizens' might learn proper behaviour, he stated that 
'.. .the situation of monarchs, who need education more than others, is 
very different. When they come to power they are never admonished. 
This is because most men do not come near them, while those who do 
spend time with them do so to gain favour'. 
Also writing in the first half of the fourth century BCE, Xenophon had alluded to the 
same problem, although this time from the point of view of the tyrant. In a dialogue 
format he mdicated that such a ruler could gain no pleasure or true benefit from 
anything said to him, since he knew all would be flattery, concealing genuine feelings 
and opinions.^ ^^ 
Among Roman emperors, illustrations of the problem outlined by Isocrates were well 
documented. Suetonius provided an inventively grim illustration of Domitian's self-
imposed isolation at the beginning of his principate, describing the emperor spending 
'...hours every day closeted on his own, occupied with nothing other 
than catching flies and impaling them with a very sharp writing 
implement.' 
It is unfortunate that the only surviving literary account detailing the various 
contributions made to an Imperial consilium is of a decidedly satirical nature (see 
pages 138-139). It concerned Domitian's demand for advice, not about 'trouble across 
the Rhine' or '...panic-stricken dispatches...pouring in from all parts of the Empire', 
but about how to cook a giant turbot! Juvenal stressed the advisers' flattering 
responses, as they 'quailed beneath the Emperor's hatred'. Historical accounts of 
Influence: 0CD3 p. 1630. Didactic purpose: Xen. Cyr. 1. 1.6. 'Spartan' education: ibid. 1. 2. 3-
16. Innate virtue: ibid. 1. 4. 16. Median glamour: ibid. 1. 3. 2. Difficulties: Hdt. 1. 30-33; Isoc. Ad 
Nic. 4; Xen.Hier. 1. 15. 
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Commodus were routinely introduced by recording that emperor's rejection of the 
advisers appointed by his father. Instead he became 
'.. .the slave of his companions, and it was through them that he at first, 
out of ignorance, missed the better life and then was led on into lustful 
and cruel habits.' 
Of all the emperors, perhaps Caracalla was characterised as being the least open to 
advice. Significantly for this thesis, Cassius Dio expressed the trait plainly in terms of 
personal power: 
'...he clung to his own opinions; for he wished not only to know 
everything but to be the only one to know everything, and he desired not 
only to have all power but to be the only one to have power'.'^ ^^ 
Nevertheless, the formal education of future emperors was a frequent topic for 
biographers, and Roman magistrates had always exercised the right to seek advice fi-om 
their chosen consilium. Such education may not always have been successfiil and 
advisers, as indicated above, may have led some emperors astray. Other emperors, 
however, were seen as being open to and as benefiting from good advice. Although 
Suetonius could not resist the introduction of an ominous portent when recording the 
beginnings of Nero's education by Seneca, Tacitus was fiilsome in his praise of its 
effects and of the continued influence of the philosopher and of the soldier, Burrus, on 
the Emperor's early years. The SHA included an unusual amoimt of detail about the 
advisers of Alexander Severus. We are told that he relied on a semi-formal council of 
'...twenty of the most learned jurists and at least fifty men of wisdom 
who were also skilled in speaking'. 
The potential for specialization within such a system was suggested by the fiarther 
information that, whereas these advisers were used for '...matters of law or public 
business,' Alexander consulted veteran soldiers and historians on the practicalities and 
precedents of military campaigns. Although the SHA's Alexander Severus has been 
considered to be one of the more unreliable biographies in a generally unreliable work. 
Domitian: Suet. Dom. 3; Juv. 4. 37fr; Eck (2000) p. 196-197. Commodus: Cass. Dio 73. 1; Herodian 
1. 8. 1-2. Caracalla: Cass. Dio 77. 11. 5. 
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details such as those above do at least suggest what may have been plausible 'facts' to 
its late fourth century audience.^ '^* 
Some of our most direct evidence for Roman Imperial education and advice derives 
from Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. No less than eighteen teachers of the former 
were noted in the SHA, with the Emperor himself acknowledging nine or ten of these. 
The tutor appointed to oversee the education of the young princes, M. Cornelius 
Pronto, continued a substantial and informative correspondence with both his former 
charges until his death about five years into their joint reign. Much of the content of 
these letters, especially in the early years, concerned questions about rhetoric and the 
most appropriate use of language. This xmderlined the general importance of these 
matters in classical education and was in line with Isocrates' advice to a ruler. He had 
indicated that the importance of rhetoric went much further than establishing correct 
linguistic usage: 
'Practise speaking about fine pursuits, so that your thoughts may be 
conditioned to resemble your words'. 
Reflecting this idea, there was an undercurrent running through Pronto's concern with 
rhetoric, linking it vitally with good government. Much of his later correspondence 
with the two emperors appeared to be of a supportive and even consolatory nature, 
rather than giving advice or instruction. In the context of a defeat in Armenia in 162, he 
reminded Marcus that Rome had not always been successfiil and recalled Herodotus' 
account of Polycrates of Samos. He was deemed to have been too fortunate in his 
undertakings and therefore destined to end badly. Elsewhere Pronto urged Marcus to 
rest from his exertions, while at the same time bolstering the status of the Emperor's 
defence of the frontiers. He reminded Marcus that even emperors '...who enlarged the 
state and empire of Rome with huge additions' also took their ease. Care may be 
required here not to over interpret the political importance of this private 
correspondence. It seems likely that the raising of two new legions in 170 followed the 
traditional purpose of such recruitment in being the prelude to a planned campaign of 
expansion, in this case across the Danube.'^ ^^  
Frequent topic: Suet: ^ i/g. 89; C/au /^. 2-3; Tit:2\ SHk Hadr. 1.5 arid 5ev. 1. 4. Magistrates: OCD3 
p. 377. Unsuccessful education: SHA Comm. 1. 7. Portent: Suet. Ner. 7. Praise: Tac. Ann. 13. 2. 1. 
Severus Alexander: SHA Alex. Sev. 16. 1-16. 3. Unreliability: for example, Syme (1983) p. 214-215. 
Eighteen teachers; Champlin p. 118. Acknowledgements: M. Aur. Med. 1. 5-15. Isocrates and 
rhetoric: Isoc. AdNic. 38 and Mc. 9. Good government: Champlin p. 128. Lack of success: Fronto On 
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Virtues and personal behaviour 
It was only natural that the behaviour of rulers, then- observed actions and resultant 
ascribed character traits, should be given extensive treatment by our ancient sources. 
To a significant extent the scale of this treatment reflected the fact that the power and 
authority of rulers such as Roman emperors depended on, and/or dictated, the belief of 
their subjects that they, as all-powerful rulers, possessed features and qualities that 
necessarily surpassed those of'ordinary' individuals. In his important 1981 study. The 
Emperor and his Virtues, Wallace-Hadrill correctly related this phenomenon to Max 
Weber's concept of charismatic authority (see pages 6-7). As we have seen in chapter 
three, Weber identified physical coercion as the essential key to political power (see 
page 33), and Wallace-Hadrill's analysis of Imperial virtues showed them to be 
essentially misleading and 'chimerical', i f viewed as foci of effective authority.'^ ^^ 
It is also the case that the accounts given by our ancient sources of the virtues and 
behaviour of rulers can be difficult to interpret, and may underplay or leave unstated 
the coercive bases of political power. Xenophon's characterisation of Cyrus illustrated 
the point. Modem tradition has tended to take the preponderance of positive comments 
in the work to represent a ringing endorsement of the Persian monarch as a model of 
the virtuous and successful ruler. From this it has been assumed that Xenophon was 
associating these two features in a necessary relationship. Diodorus Siculus certainly 
made this connection in his praise of Egyptian rulers. Their personal orderliness and 
restraint, he said, led to those features being prominent in their government mid to 
success in war. There is no doubt that in the Cyropaedia the king is lavishly praised for 
his demonstration of good qualities. Among many possible examples, he admired and 
pitied brave but defeated opponents, was pious towards the gods, acted with modesty 
and restraint, and cared for the needs of his soldiers. However, in each of these 
instances Cyrus was shown to be motivated by calculation of the wider, long term 
advantages to the achievement or security of his power. Indeed, in the central instance 
of justice (one of Dio Chrysostom's 'pre-eminently kingly virtues') Cyrus was 
depicted as lecturing his companions about the advantages of merely 'appearing to be 
just'. The importance to Cyrus of appearances extended even to such details as 
the Parthian War 2-4 (Loeb Vol. 11 p. 21-23); Hdt. 3. 39-43, 124-125. Rest and planned expansion: 
Fronto De Fer. Als. 4 (Loeb Vol. 11 p. 9); Birley (1987) p. 142, 163. 
Charismatic authority: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 298; Weber (1968) p. 956fr, 111 Iff. Power as 
essentially coercive: Weber (1948) p. 78. Virtues as chimeras: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 317-318. 
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ensuring that he always looked taller than his chariot driver 'either really or in some 
otiier way.'^ ^^ 
That Xenophon should in fact have depicted Cyrus as adopting an instrumental 
approach to virtue should not surprise us. At the outset the author had announced the 
subject of his work to be a reflection on the difficulty of one human being achieving 
and maintaining power over others. Thus, i f Cyrus was put forward as an example of a 
good king, it was in the sense of good as meaning 'successfial' or 'skilfiil' (as in 'a 
good footballer'), not as being a model monarch in respect of his virtue. The picture 
given of Cyrus at the apogee of his power is clearly that of an oriental despot. All must 
prostrate themselves before him and he was punctilious about the protocol of public 
appearances. His desire for money was insatiable, although this too was merely the 
instrument towards greater and more secure power. Even in relation to Cyrus' success 
in the task of ruling, Xenophon's account was uhimately far from clear cut. The final 
chapter recorded the crumbling of Cyrus' empire after his death and deterioration in 
the quality of subsequent regimes. It must be added that the cogency of Xenophon's 
arguments on this matter is possibly brought into question elsewhere; his claims that 
the virtues of Agesilaus qualified him to rule and that the fact that he was accepted as 
ruler confirmed his virtue appear distinctly circular. 
The negative character of Xenophon's conclusion on Cyrus struck many commentators 
as so out of kilter with his supposedly adulatory view of the King that they incorrectly 
suggested that it is an inauthentic addition to the work. However, in reality the 
conclusion underlines the complexity of the account in the Cyropaedia, and thus forms 
a salutary example of the care required when interpreting views expressed in our 
ancient sources about the supposed virtues and behaviour of rulers. In fact the 
overwhelming feature of Cyrus' success outlined by Xenophon was the Persian ruler's 
military prowess. The theme of his victories in battle punctuated the account and 
formed the subject matter of the historian's concluding appraisal. Thus is reinforced 
the central position of military power in Xenophon's attempt to address the questions 
Xenophon, virtue and success: Anderson (1974) p. 73; Gera p. 280-285; Ambler p. jO 6. Egypt: 
Died. Sic. 1. 71: 1 "5. Opponents: 7. lT4l7Pifety: 1. 6. 3. Modesty: 871. 30-32. SoldTersTl. 5. 41. 
'Kingly virtues':Dio Chrys. Or. 2. 54. Justice: 4. 2.42. Appearances: 8. 3. 14. 
Xenophon's aim: 1.1. 1-2. A good 'ruler': 'So on the grounds that this man was worthy of 
wonder...he so excelled in ruling human beings' (1.1. 6). Prostration: 8. 3. 14. Protocol: 8. 4. 3; 
Money/power: 8. 2.20-22. Aftermath: 8. 8. Circularity: Ages. 5. 
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with which this thesis opened. Such an evaluation is consonant with Wallace-Hadrill's 
assessment that it was concern about the coercive nature of Imperial authority that 
actually underpinned overt discussion about the virtues of Roman emperors. 
Public actions: Civilitas - the ckcus and the theatre 
This apprehension among the Roman elite about the potential threat of an emperor's 
power found expression in the virtues regularly ascribed to the ideal holder of that 
position. Restraint and deference to the weaker position of senators and other members 
of the population were often prominent. Of these valued qualities, perhaps that of 
civilitas serves as a representative example. In its two broad meanings ('the art of 
government' and 'politeness, courteousness, affability') the concept neatly brought 
together what was looked for in an Imperial ruler, this in spite of or perhaps, more 
likely, because of their effective monopoly of control over military force and its use for 
political coercion. A significant manifestation of civilitas had been the Augustan self-
identification as princeps, with its implication of ruling as first citizen among equals. 
For Romans, the potency of this unofficial nomenclature lay in the deliberate 
distinction between it and a contrasting ethos based on the ruler as dominus. The latter 
term encompassed the negative meanings of 'master', 'lord' and even 'owner'. It had 
overtones of the perceived despotic rule of Asiatic kings, who were viewed as 
possessing their subjects as slaves. By contrast, the idea of the emperor as princeps 
emphasised the positive features of civilitas: rule over free men; restraint in the 
exercise of power; taking pleasure in everyday pursuits; essentially being 'one of us'. 
Suetonius ascribed the quality of civilitas to Augustus himself in relation to his 
clemency and restraint in pursuing opponents, and to Claudius when describing his 
moderation in accepting honours and his claims to 'unassuming maimers'. 
Significantly, in a later usage relating to Titus, the term was employed with direct 
reference to an absence of political coercion: 
'At Rome he displayed such great graciousness {civilitas) during his 
reign that he punished no one at all, dismissed those convicted of 
Xenophon's conclusion: See Gera p. 299-300 for discussion of the problems here. Cyrus and 
battle: for example Cyr. 3. 3. 61-63, 5. 3. 51-59, 6. 1. 25-30, 7. 1. 1-49. Concluding assessment: 8. 8. 
20-27. Concern about coercion: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 314-317. 
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conspiracy against him and treated them with the same intimacy as 
before'. 
Vespasian received favourable comments because of his accessibility, good humour and 
lack of affectation. Nowhere was this characterisation of a princeps more to the fore than 
in Pliny's praise of Trajan. Having already described the soldiers' admiration won by the 
princeps through his sharing their hardships, Pliny used his account of Trajan's return to 
Rome as ruler in 99 CE to emphasise civilitas as a welcome and essential quality. The 
new emperor walked into Rome, unlike predecessors who had been '...lifted up on 
human shoulders in their overbearing pride.' All sections of society were said to have 
rejoiced at the sight. Pliny made a point of describing Trajan's personal and physical 
greetings to senators, equites and clients. The Emperor even allowed himself to be 
'.. .jostied as one of the people' as he pressed through the crowd. No group of favourites 
monopolised the new ruler's attention. Encapsulating the civilitas of the occasion, Pliny 
stated that, 'On that very first day you made yourself accessible to all'. Cassius Dio 
provided a similar portrayal of Trajan, although he also noted that too great an 
accessibility could put an emperor at risk of assassination.^ '^ 
In their relationship with the population of Rome, the emperors' attendance at the 
theatre, games and circus provided a significant opportunity for the manifestation of 
civilitas. Augustus had set the pattern. In line with his carefiil approach to such matters, 
the first princeps did not overlook the importance of these gatherings for personal and 
dynastic display, rooted as they were in the social and religious fabric of the community. 
The scale and grandeur of the spectacles he provided for the Roman populace were 
included in the self-advertisement of his achievements, being given a prominent place 
within the statement of his religious benefactions. Suetonius noted the contrast between 
the ostentatiously inattentive behaviour of Julius Caesar at the games and Augustus' 
presumably equally calculated interested involvement in the proceedings. The author 
also commented on the latter's use of these occasions to promote his desired pattern of 
social hierarchy and confrol. However, there is abundant evidence to demonsfrate that 
Virtues of restraint: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 316, 312 n. 67. Civilitas: Lewis and Shortj^346. 
Pmceps an&civintas. OCD3 p. 1246; Tac. Am. \. 974; ibid. 3. 2872; RG 34. 3; Cameron p. 175; Suet. 
^Mg 51; Claud. 12, 35. Titus: Eutr. 7. 21. 
Vespasian: Cass. Dio 66. 10. 3b-12; Suet. Vesp. 21. Trajan and Soldiers: Plin. Pan. 13. 1. Return 
to Rome: ibid. 22-24. Predecessors: for example, Vitellius (Tac. Hist. 2. 87-89). Cassius Dio: 68. 7. 3, 
11.3. 
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the opportunity for communication provided by mass entertainments was not one-way. 
There are sufficient indications from sources such as Cicero to suggest that it was not 
exceptional for the audience of Roman mass entertainments to use such gatherings for 
the expression of public sentiments on political and other matters. As the rule of the 
emperors steadily reduced other opportunities, '...the Imperial theatre became the 
primary and final scene of mass expression.' Further, it is clear that the response of an 
emperor to unwelcome expressions of opinion at these gatherings could result in his 
repressive employment of the military. Before leaving the topic of civilitas as a desired 
quality of emperors, it is worth noting that the exercise of this virtue did not provide a 
sufficient qualification for the role. The focus of this thesis on the coercive nature of 
Imperial authority is supported by Herodian's contrast between the behaviour of the 
brothers Geta and Caracalla. While the former was described as going out of his way to 
be open and friendly, it was the latter, '...harsh and savage in everything that he did', 
who attained the throne.^ ^^ 
Building 
As an activity of Roman emperors, building was discussed to some degree by all the 
ancient historians and biographers. It provides a useful focus for this thesis as, both in 
its intention and later interpretation, the construction of cities and their grand edifices 
was clearly related to the psychology of domination and display so important to the 
authority of rulers. Perhaps reflecting general thematic context, the Iliad had 
concentrated more on the destruction of buildings than their erection and the Odyssey 
introduced its hero as a man '...who had sacked the sacred town of Troy'. However, in 
discussing the Samians, Herodotus clearly equated the importance of a people with the 
scale of their building and engineering achievements. He confirmed this perspective by 
reference to the insignificance of Egyptian monarchs who left no monuments. Echoing 
expressed hopes for his own fame in posterity stemming from writing, Thucydides had 
Pericles proclaim in the funeral oration: 
'Mighty indeed are the marks and monuments of our empire which we 
have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders 
now.' 
Theatre: Rowe, G. p. 97; Cameron. Augustus: RG 22-23; Suet. Aug. 43-45. Cicero: Sest 106; 
Cameron p. 158 . Geta and Caracalla: Herodian 4. 3. 2-4. 
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Such assessments must be put in the stem context of comments on the realities of 
power. Thucydides reflected that the buildings of Athens and Sparta would give a 
misleading impression of the relative strength of the two cities, in the former case 
prompting an overestimate and in the latter an underestimate: 
'We have no right, therefore, to judge cities by their appearances rather 
than by their actual power'.'^ ^^ 
Nevertheless, building activity played a significant role in the mythology of heroes and 
rulers. All Greek cities and colonies had at least one foundation myth. Invariably these 
involved figures of authority and political power, usually with divine aspects. The 
significance, particularly in the sphere of religion, of such oikists has been well 
established. Alexander the Great must have added hugely to the potential status and 
glamour to be obtained by any later ruler who built extensively. Plutarch suggested that 
he founded seventy Alexandrias during his conquests, although twenty is perhaps a 
more realistic number. The size and importance of Egyptian Alexandria, alongside the 
King's personal involvement in its foundation, certainly shaped the behaviour of his 
successors. The diadochoi founded numerous cities, which they named after 
themselves or members of their families. Nor could Alexander's example have failed to 
leave an impression on Roman emperors, many of whom openly evoked the reputation 
of the Macedonian in their ideology. The traditionally high status of royal building as 
an activity in itself and as a symbol of legitimate rule can also be recognized in 
Alexander's eastern operations. There was nothing arbitrary in the fact that his first 
recorded decision on coming into possession of Babylon was to initiate restoration 
work on temples destroyed by his 'predecessor', Xerxes. In a similar context, Cyrus 
had acted in the same way, himself reflecting the actions of even more ancient Assyrian 
conquerors. 
In the shadow of Cicero's statement that, 'The very wages of a labourer are the badges 
of slavery', both Nero and Vespasian were portrayed as participants in the manual work 
Samians: Hdt. 3. 60. Egypt: ibid. 2. tOl . Pericles: Thuc. 1. 22, 2. 41. Athens and Sparta: ibid. 1. 
10. 
Foundation myths: Notably celebrated in tfie Odes of Pindar^ for^xaniple, Tiepolenius^and Rhodes 
(O/. 7. 20-24), Aeacus and Aegina (Ol. 8. 29-37), Battos and Cyrene (Pyth. 4. 1-8). Oikists: Malkin 
(1987). Seventy: Plut. De Alex. fort. I. 5. Twenty: Walbank (1992) p. 43. Egyptian Alexandria: Arr. 
Anab. 3 .1 . Diadochoi: Lund p. I74f. Alexander: Arr. Anab. 3.16. Cyrus and Assyrians: Kuhrt p. 49; 
Pritchardp. 316. 
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of their building projects. Although he made no explicit editorial comment, Suetonius 
surely meant the contexts of the two Emperors' efforts, respectively a canal in Greece 
and the Capitol in Rome, to characterise the former as acting improperly while the 
latter was praised. It is worthy of note that in dealing with a similar episode, Alexander 
was described as closely guiding and motivating his labouring troops without actually 
getting his hands dirty. Nevertheless, building was a consistent focus for ancient 
analysis of the merits of Roman emperors. As in so many elements, Augustus was 
significant in establishing both the criterion and the necessary standards. His self-
proclaimed achievements included an account of the building he undertook in Rome. 
Suetonius endorsed the princeps'' account, adding the telling comment that previously 
Rome '...was not decked out in a manner fitting such a great empire'. Hadrian was 
responsible for numerous building restorations in Rome. In spite of his desire to 
'surpass everybody in everything', he was given credit for not embellishing them with 
his own name. Instead the Emperor recorded the original builder. The building projects 
of Septimius Severus received less than fulsome praise, partly because of his insistence 
on usurping the place of the inscribed originator.^ '^ ^ 
Activity, tastes and pastimes 
In a broad sense, a high level of purposeful activity was expected of ancient rulers. Its 
opposites, indolence and dalliance, were considered inappropriate. Xerxes was 
portrayed as being motivated to punish the Athenians in order to match the activity of 
predecessors stretching back for nine generations to Achaemenes himself Herodotus' 
story of Atossa and Darius may put another perspective on this evidence. Her goading 
of her husband, the king, 
'...to be seen engaged in some active enterprise, to show the Persians 
that they have a man to rule them' 
led directly to his disastrous attack on the Scythians. Similarly, his son Xerxes was 
portrayed as dismissing the cautions of Artabanus about invading Greece with a show 
of restless bravado: 
'...profit comes to those who are willing to act ...Only by great risks 
can great results be achieved.'^ ^^ 
Labour = slavery: Cic. O f f . 1. 150. Nero and Vespasian: Suet. Ner. 19 and Vesp. 8. Augustus: RG 
19-21; Suet. Aug. 28. Hadrian: Cass. Die 69. 3. 3; SHA Had. 19. 9. Severus: Cass. Die 77. 16. 3. 
Xerxes' ancestors: Hdt. 7. 11. Atossa and Darius: ibid. 3. 134. Xerxes' bravado: ibid. 7. 47-55. 
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In Roman self-perception action was of greater significance than precept. In this they 
saw themselves in positive contrast to the Greeks. Partly demonstrating his own 
absorption of Roman ideals, and partly reflecting those ideals back onto his chosen 
patrons, Josephus illustrated the desired model in his description of the young Herod's 
rise to power. He was said to be 'energetic by nature' and an 'active spirit'. By 
contrast, his rival, Hyrcanus, was portrayed as being '...indolent and without the 
energy necessary to a king'. No doubt Dio Chrysostom had the same flattering intent 
with regard to the Romans in general, and perhaps Trajan in particular, when he noted 
Alexander's perception of the ruinous luxury and idleness of Persian, Scythian and 
Indian rulers. It was clearly seen as a bad sign that the young Conmiodus, on his 
accession to the throne, '...hated all exertion and craved the comfortable life of the 
city.' The SHA included the detail that he was lazy in relation to his correspondence 
and other official duties, whereas Cassius Dio placed the criticism directly against 
comments about the new emperor deserting campaigns against the barbarians. Plutarch 
illustrated the role of activity in the delicate balance of a leader's virtues. He recorded 
that the aged Agesilaus was said to have jeopardised his hard-won reputation by 
supporting the cause of a minor Egyptian rebel against the Persians. The Spartan king 
justified his actions on the ground that any activity in the service of the state was 
superior to idleness. However, Agesilaus did feel his honour to be slighted when the 
rebel made him only second in command of his army. The need for a ruler to lead 
through persuasion as well as activity could be decisive in particular circumstances. 
Thus Thucydides characterised Pericles as '...the most powerful both in action and 
debate.' The practical advantages of activity over sloth were frequently illustrated. The 
luxuriating passivity of Pescennius Niger was contrasted with the decisive action of 
Septimius Severus in explaining the latter's success during the civil war of 193 CE. 
Septimius Severus' fiill daily routine received positive comment, emphasised in 
another version of his dying words, 'Come, give it here, if we have anything to do'.^ ^^ 
In the attention given to the leisure pursuits of emperors and other rulers, our ancient 
sources drew on the philosophical/psychological idea that underlying character could 
^" Roman self perception: Griffin (1989) p. 13; Quintilian 12. 30; Joseph. BJ 1. 203-204; Landau p. 
243. Alexander: Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 6. Commodus: Cass. Dio 72. 1.2; SHA Comm. 13. 7-8. Agesilaus: 
Plut. Ages. 36.1-37. 1-2. Pericles: Thuc. 1. 139. Niger/Severus: Herodian 2. 8. 9-10,2. 9. 1-3, 2. 14. 5-
6. Severus' routine: Cass. Dio 77. 17. 4. 
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be revealed in the actions of unguarded moments. Pliny the Younger expressed this 
clearly and in a manner that indicated the supposed profundity of the idea: 
'For it is a man's pleasures (yes, his pleasures) which tell us most about 
his true worth, his moral excellence, and his self-control.' 
Without doubt, war and the preparation for war were the most straightforwardly 
acceptable activities for a ruler. Plutarch contrasted the warlike 'kingly' pursuits of 
Demetrius with rulers who used to spend their leisure time '...making little tables or 
lamp-stands' and growing poisonous plants. Fighting and associated activities had their 
roots in the concept of the king as saviour of his people, protecting it from dangers. 
With reference to slaying dragons and wild beasts, this idea was prominent in the early 
Egyptian, Assyrian and Persian monarchies, although in the last of these instances the 
concept of saviour later centred on the more strictly religious figure of Zoroaster. It is 
clear that the Persia described by Xenophon was more his own Spartan influenced 
construct than an accurate picture of that society. Nevertheless, even from such a 
perspective, his references to the important role of the monarch in hunting, and indeed 
the significance of the activity itself, may have echoed some element of this 
fimdamental idea of the protection of his people. Cyrus was described as having been 
exceptionally keen on hunting and to have encouraged and been victorious in horse 
races, a related and valued Persian pastime. Contrasted with the indignity of Nero's 
'warbling and wailing in the theatres', hunting could be considered 'the best recreation' 
of the 'good king'. It has been argued that Domitian made deliberate use of Hellenistic 
models to promote his virtus as a hunter. Trajan was praised for his prowess in the 
chase and Hadrian was said to have named a town in Bithynia Hadrianutherae in 
recognition of a successful bear hunt in the area (Plate 20 i). However, in the case of 
Lucius Verus, such activity could be viewed as a wdlfiil distraction from proper duty. 
Pliny compared Trajan's positive energy and skill in sailing with the 'disgracefiil 
scene' of Domitian's apparent fear of open water and rivers. In analysing the generally 
military and coercive nature of political power, the relevance of this aspect of a 
monarch's role can be underlined: 
'When the essential qualification for kingship is an ability to protect the 
people of the state, there the army cannot be set aside'. 
Pleasures = character: Plin. Pan. 82. S.Contrast: Plut. Dem. 20. 2. King as saviour: Kuhrt p. 53; 
Dvomik p. 125-127. Sparta: Ambler p. 5. Hunting: Xen. Cyr. 1. 2. 10, 1. 4.4-8. Horseracing: ibid. 8. 
3. 25. Nero and 'best recreation': Die Chrys. 3. 135-136. Domitian: Tuck p. 221-222. Trajan: Plin. 
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By way of contrast, Marcus Aurelius was characterised as congenitally weak and 
ailing. Cassius Dio associated this with the Emperor's concentration on his books and 
in fact uses it as a further reason to praise him for his hard work and dedication to duty. 
The first of these points is also found in the Historia Augusta. Nevertheless, the 
Emperor must have led an active life during his prolonged spells with the army and 
makes brief mention of his personal wrestling coach. Perhaps indicating his close 
understanding of the Roman outlook, Arrian praised Alexander for acting as very much 
'one of us' in the context of sharing the general hardships of a soldier's way of life. In 
fact he employed the point as an argument to bolster the king's faltering control over 
his army. That a 'good' Roman emperor was willing and able to live like a common 
soldier in the field was an important element in the reputations of, for example, Trajan 
and Hadrian. Perhaps it indicates the significance of this readiness to share the day to 
day experience of soldiers that it should be prominent in the portrait of even an 
unsuccessful contender for the throne such as Pescennius Niger. However, while Trajan 
could refer positively to 'my fellow soldiers' and be triumphantly portrayed in that 
context on his Column (Plate 20 ii), in a very different political context Augustus was 
praised for keeping his distance from the troops.^ ^^ 
As a final note in this section, behaviours that were usually negative could also be 
tolerated if seen as in some way the price that had to be paid for the positive features of 
a great man. The well documented complexities of character in Alexander the Great 
would have been foremost in this respect, while Roman examples could include 
Augustus' 'taste for deflowering virgins' and Vespasian's cupidity. Bad behaviour 
could be more acceptable i f it was kept within the private sphere and did not interfere 
with a ruler's proper activities. Thus, Seneca and Burrus were said to have controlled 
Nero with a policy '...to direct his deviations from virtue into licensed channels', 
while the excesses of drinking and womanising indulged in by the young Demetrius 
were tolerated by his father because ' . . . in time of war he was as sober as those who 
were abstemious by nature'.'^ '**' 
Pan. 81. 3. Hadrian: SHA Had. 20. 13. Lucius Verus: SHA Marc. 8. 14. Sailing: Pan. 81. 4-82. 4. 
Army: Thapar p. 25. 
Bbbks: Cass. Dio 71. 1. 2772. 36r2rPraise^ 72. 36:3; SHA Marc. 3. 7:Wrestnng: AdMC 2. 12 = 
Fronto. Loeb Vol. 1. p. 151. Alexander: Arr. Anab. 2. 18 and 5. 27. Trajan: Plin. Ep. 10. 53. Hadrian: 
SHA Had. 10.4. Pescennius Niger: SHA Pesc. Nig. 11. 1-3. Augustus: Suet. Aug. 25. 
"^^  Alexander: Arr. Anab. 7. 29-30. Augustus: Suet. Aug. 71. Vespasian. Suet. Vesp. 16. Nero: Tac. 
Ann. 13. 2. 1. Demetrius: Plut. Demetr. 19. 3, 6. 
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Plate 20 
(i) Arch of Constantine: 
Hadrian hunting 
(ii) Trajan surrounded 
by his soldiers 
I 
i 
Fighting 
As a prelude to his account of Catiline, Sallust provided a brief survey of the political 
and moral development of Rome. He described the City's early relations with its 
neighbours, making the highly questionable claim that Roman military activity had 
initially been of a defensive nature in warding off the attacks of peoples that were 
jealous of Rome's prosperity. However, with the demise of the kings, Sallust identified 
a change in general outlook. From that time '...individuals...were able to distinguish 
themselves and to display their talents'. The author stated that '...the desire for 
glory...had possessed men's hearts'. He immediately associated this phenomenon with 
a willingness to take on the hardships of soldiering and the necessary competition for 
the highest honours. Those sought-after distinctions were integral to the political 
process in Rome, as illustrated by Polybius' statement that ten years of military 
experience were a precondition of holding any public office. True or not, this claim at 
least provides a potential explanation for the fact that war certainly appears to have 
been the normal state of affairs in Republican Rome.^ '*' 
Modem students of comparative sociology have consistently included Rome amongst 
the more aggressively militaristic empires. One such theorist, Anthony Giddens, used a 
basic observation to confirm such an assessment. He commented that the closing of the 
Temple of Janus, a ceremony signifying that Rome was not at war, had occurred only 
twice in the City's long history. While ancient historians may find their interest drawn 
to the erroneous numerical calculation in this statement, the fundamental meaning of 
both the ceremony itself and the prominence given to it in our sources is not 
undermined. It is of relevance here that OCD3 entry for 'Peace' provides no 
straightforward definition; rather it points to a series of separate entries exemplifying 
its manifestation in different circumstances. Note has already been made of the specific 
relationship between the Latin term pax and war (see page 105). If, then, war was 
ubiquitous and peace so vague a concept, how, it might be asked, can we account for 
our ancient sources' numerous and undoubtedly negative references to war? One 
answer to this question is to note that the majority of such negative statements derive 
froin civil war rather than war in general. Thucydides' harrowing descriptions of 
conflict amongsf the population of Corcyra in 427-424 BCE provided a model both in 
Early Rome: Sail: Cat. 6-8. War and political careers: Polyb. 6. 19. War as normal: Harris p. 9-
10. 
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terms of the scope of historiography and the tenor of political analysis. However, the 
pessimistic Thucydides saw this political violence within states as an inevitable 
consequence of human nature driven to extremes, just as he viewed wars between 
states as the unavoidable result of mutual envy and fear. In Latin literature, the peculiar 
dangers and horrors of civil war were fi-equently evoked. Julius Caesar, a keen and 
skilled exponent of war if ever there was one, portrayed himself and was described by 
others as being reluctantly forced to take up arms to defend himself and his reputation. 
After his decisive victory at Pharsalus in 48 BCE he was said to have lamented, "They 
would have it so." Eutropius used the loss of life at Pharsalus to make the explicit 
distinction between undesirable civil war and 'proper' war against barbarians, a 
distinction that he underlined regarding the more nearly contemporary battle of Mursa 
between Constantius I I and Magnentius in 351 CE: 
'Vast forces of the Roman Empire were destroyed in that conflict, 
forces which were sufficient for any foreign wars and which might have 
provided many a triumph and much security.'^ '^ ^ 
The recorded careers of nimierous famous Romans reflected the basically positive 
place of warfare in the Roman ethos. A selection of Plutarch's Lives exemplifies the 
point. The opening of his Marcellus could hardly have laid greater stress on the 
military qualities of its subject, including a claimed derivation of his name as meaning 
'martial'. From the outset Cato was said to have praised his father as a 'brave man and 
good soldier', and to have responded to his position as a 'new man' in politics with the 
reflection that 
'...as far as office and distinction went, he was indeed new, but having 
regard to ancestral deeds of valour, he was oldest of the old.' 
Plutarch confirmed his subject's sense of priorities by proceeding to concentrate on his 
military career until explicitly acknowledging a change of topic in the opening of 
chapter 15. In sununary, and quite possibly in order of importance, the advantages of 
military glory to members of the Roman elite could be said to be: the chance to 
demonstrate distinction; assistance in gaining political office; and the opportunity to 
•^•^  Modern theorists: Mbsca p. 54, Giddens (1985) p. 54. Janus: RG 13; Cass. Dio 53. 27; Aur. Vict. 
Caes. 27. OCD3 p. 793. Peace: OCD3 p. 1129; Hardwick p. 335. Corcyra: Thuc. 3. 81-85,4. 47-48. 
Human nature: ibid. 3. 82. Envy and fear: ibid. 1. 23, 36, 88, etc.; Homblower (1991) p. 15-17. Latin 
literature: Her. Cam. 2. 1. 1-8; Lucr. 3. 70-72; Prop. Elegies 1. 22;.Lucan 1. 1-32. Caesar's 
reluctance and regret: Caes. B Civ. 1. 7; Plut. Caes. 32,46. 'Proper' wars: Eutr. 6. 21, 10. 12. 
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gain wealth from booty. Statistics can be cited in support of these desirable outcomes. 
During the middle Republic roughly one out of every three consuls Celebrated a 
triumph and between 227 and 79 BCE fifteen out of nineteen praetors who were 
granted a triumph were successful in consular elections. When military distinction was 
lacking, conspicuous efforts had to be made to fill the gap. Thus, Plutarch's Brutus 
was a poor general, but excelled in public virtue, and private philosophical knowledge 
and endowment. ^ ''^  
Outside the elite it was equally true that, 'The love of military distinction infused 
Romans of every social class.' Perhaps in deliberate illustration of the extent to which 
military glory was embedded in the broader Roman ethos, Valerius Maximus 
organised his collected examples of bravery to include the actions of both the elite and 
the ordinary soldier. In a significant juxtaposition, Polybius outlined a constitutional 
role for the general population in relation both to the elite competition for honours and 
to the state's waging of war. In addition to the ratification of legislation, he noted that 
the people '...bestow offices on those who deserve them' and that they '...deUberate 
and decide on questions of peace and war'. The true extent of such powers may be 
doubted for any period, particularly after that in which Polybius was writing (the 
second half of the second century BCE). It has been noted that the record contains no 
instance of a senatorial decision to go to war being overturned by an assembly of the 
people. In addition the successful exploitation of military glory as the route to elected 
political office must indicate a widespread positive view of war.'^ '*'* 
Although direct testimony from the 'ordinary' population on this matter is as scarce as 
that about any other topic from the ancient world, evidence can be brought to bear. 
Polybius is again helpful. He described the honours and attention given to soldiers who 
had been rewarded for valour, sfressing that these men 
'...enjoy great prestige in the army and soon afterwards in their 
homes...they are singled out for precedence in religious processions 
when they return.' 
Marcellus: Plut. Marc. 1. 1-3. Cato: Plut. Cat. Mai. 1-14. Summary of advantages: Harris p 30-31, 
26, 56. Brutus: Plut. Brut 1. 1-2, 2. 1-2, 4. 1-2, Synk. 3. 2. 
'^^  War and difTerent social groups: Brunt (1990) p. 442; Val. Max. 3. 2. Powers of the people: 
Polyb. 6. 14. senatorial decisions and popular opinion: Harris p. 41-43, 263. 
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Polybius made a direct cormection between the Roman people's '...almost obsessive 
concern with military rewards and punishments' and his contention that '...they 
emerge with brilliant success fi-om every war in which they engage'. Livy provided a 
lengthy speech for a clearly non-elite soldier, Spurius Ligustinus. During the levy of 
171 BCE a number of former centurions had been listed in the lower ranks because of 
their now advanced age. In appealing against this, Ligustinus outlined his long and 
distinguished career, stressing the military honours he had won and the subsequent 
civic recognition he had received. In view of his attested courage he was reinstated and 
received an official vote of thanks from the senate. During the same levy, for war in 
Macedonia, Livy recorded that many recruits enlisted because they had seen veterans 
from earlier campaigns return as rich men.^ '*^  
There can be little doubt that during the Republic, and at least into the principate, the 
potential for material reward to be gained through military activity was a persistent 
motivator of recruitment. This, of course, reflected a perspective long established in 
the ancient world, for instance by Homer. The quarrel between Achilles and 
Agamemnon about who had the right to a war prize was a major element of the Iliad. 
In relation to the main thrust of this thesis it is worth noting here that the dispute over 
Briseis was not expressed in terms of her intrinsic value as a prize; rather she was a 
symbolic focus of the personal rivalry between the two leaders and of Agamemnon's 
perceived need to establish his supremacy over the whole army. As he stated to 
Achilles: 
' I myself 
will call for Briseis at your hut, and take her, 
flower of young girls that she is, your prize, 
to show you here and now who is the stronger 
and make the next man sick at heart - i f any 
think of claiming equal place with me.' 
Beyond elite power struggles, the poem also recognised the legitimate interest of 
ordinary soldiers in booty. For example, in recalling them to the task of fighting, 
Nestor urged the Greeks only to delay their collection of booty. There seems to be little 
doubt that aii expectatioh of economic reward was also an important recruiting agent 
War and ordinary people: Polyb. 6. 39; Harris p. 43. Ligustinus: Livy 42. 32-35. Riches as 
motivation: ibid. 42. 32. 
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for the legions of Rome. It is likely that Plautus demonstrated a widespread view in 
representing money-making to be a consequence of Rome's wars. The slave, Sosia, 
proclaimed of Amphitryo, his master and general of the Theban army: 
'With booty, fields and fame he hath enriched 
His fellow countrymen...'. 
It is reasonable to speculate that the order in which the slave listed his master's 
benefactions reflected a deliberately differentiated and possibly genuine contrast 
between the stated priorities of non-elite as opposed to elite Romans. The latter would 
surely have identified fame as the primary gain. It is true that from the later Empire 
there are indications of attempts to avoid service in the army, for example by self-
mutilation. However, over the longer span of Roman history it also seems clear that 
war was generally popular. Modem difficulties in accommodating this perception may 
well owe something to a prevailing anti-war sentiment amongst historians writing after 
the First and Second World Wars. Inscriptions confirming the material advantages 
granted to veterans can be exemplified from periods throughout the principate and 
Empire, including those of Augustus, Domitian and Constantine. Only the last of these 
mlers listed merely material provision, such as exemption from taxes, market dues and 
municipal service. Earlier rewards included those of political and social status. Under 
Domitian stress was laid on the grantmg of Roman citizenship to a veteran's family. 
Octavian/Augustus included similar benefits, but added special voting rights and 
eligibility for certain priesthoods. Nevertheless, speculation may be permissible 
regarding a genuine diminution over time of the social status of the soldier and of his 
political identity as a citizen. These matters will be discussed when more general 
consideration is given to the social and legal status of soldiers (page 267ff).'^ '*^ 
As a positive feature, fighting related to the virtue of courage, virtus. The Romans 
liked to stress the particular importance of virtus in their ethical ideals. Plutarch 
reflected this when he played on the word's double meaning, stating that 
'...there is only one word in the Latin vocabulary which signifies virtue, 
and its meaning is manly valour: thus the Romans made courage stand 
for virtue in all its aspects, although it only denotes one of them.' 
Agamemnon: Iliad 1. 185ff. Nestor: ibid. 6. 66-71. Economic gain and recruitment: Harris p. 
58ff, 102-103; Jos. BJ7. 15. Plautus: Amph. 193-4. Avoiding the draft: Cod Theod 7. 13. 10; Harris 
p. 47. Inscriptions: Lewis and Reinhold 1. 153, 2. 156. 
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The centrality of this link was stressed by Seneca as he commented on the necessity for 
Rome to be faced by enemies, 'Without an adversary virtus shrivels'. The primacy of 
virtus among the positive qualities of Roman emperors was illustrated by the author of 
the SHA's flattering portrait of Claudius Gothicus. To demonstrate that emperor's 
merits, reference was made to his possession of 
'...the valour (virtus) of Trajan, the righteousness (pietas) of Antoninus, 
the self-restraint (moderatio) of Augustus, and the good qualities of all 
the great emperors'. 
Thus, the martial virtue was given pride of place. ^ ''^  
The negative aspects of aggression and war were also accommodated in the ancient 
view of what constituted necessary/acceptable behaviour in a ruler. Homer had 
expressed both sides of this equation m Sarpedon's formulation of the implied contract 
between rulers and the ruled. In spite of a wistfully stated aversion to battle, the Lycian 
leader recorded his recognition that fighting was the return he made for honour and 
privilege. Again, although Homer's kings were expected to be first in battle, Zeus 
could still address Ares as 'most hateful to me of all Olympians. Combat and brawling 
are your element'. At what was ostensibly the most elemental level, Hesiod identified 
Battles and Combats as two of Strife's fifteen children. To underline the poet's 
distaste, their siblings were all unpleasant personifications and included Toil, Pain, 
Lies and Disaster. Subtler means could be used to undermine the more extreme aspects 
of 'Homeric' warrior values. Thucydides associated what he saw as over-bellicose 
rhetoric with violence of character and demagoguery. Plutarch appeared to record in a 
positive manner a number of instances in which his subjects fought opposing leaders in 
single combat; Pyrrhus duel with Pantauchus, and Pompey killing Cosis, the brother of 
Mithridates, are examples. However, the author immediately followed his account of 
the latter incident with speculation about the participation of Amazons m the ensuing 
battle, a possibility the likelihood of which he seemed to doubt. Thus a fantastical 
shadow was cast over the preceding duel. In fact as early as Philodemus it was a 
philosophical commonplace that the good king '...must therefore be warlike, but not a 
lover of battle' and '...even in times of relaxation it is essential to be constantiy 
exercising for war'. Tfajari provided something of a problem in this respect. Cassius 
"^^  Vocabulary : Plut. Vit. Cor. 1 ; Sen. Prov. 2. 4. Claudius Gothicus : SHA Claud. 2. 3. 
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Dio plainly felt obliged to record that the optimus princeps 'did delight in war', but 
immediately softened the characterisation; Trajan was satisfied when victory was 
achieved and did not allow his troops to become arrogant or ill-disciplined. At the 
extreme, a love of fighting was a feature of a 'bad' emperor. Commodus evidently 
transgressed the boundaries of acceptable behaviour by actually taking part in 
gladiatorial contests.^ ''^  
The close relationship between military victory and the authority of a monarch is 
reflected in Polybius' account of Attalos I of Pergamon. Following a pattern set by his 
predecessors, Philetairos and Eumenes I , Attalos ruled without the formal title of a 
king until after a decisive victory against the Gauls in 240 BCE. It has been suggested 
that the prominence of the concept of 'spear-won' legitimacy in the Macedonian and 
Hellenistic world can be illustrated by the frequency and literalness with which it was 
depicted. Spears are present on coin types of the diadochoi and can hardly be avoided 
in the most famous representation of Alexander's confrontation with Darius (Plate 21). 
A quotation from the Suda runs as follows: 
'It is neither nature nor justice which gives monarchies to man, but the 
ability to command an army and to handle affairs competently' 
Outside the concept of monarchy, military victory could be seen to legitimise general 
political authority. Issuing edicts, distributing gifts and honours, and regulating 
provinces were all 
'...things which victors are wont to do only when a war has been 
brought to an end and finished' 
Unequivocally positive expressions of the importance of virtus appear on the coinage 
of most Roman emperors. Examples of VIRTUS AUG on the coins of emperors 
markedly different in their actual behaviour indicate the ideological rather than 
descriptive content of such a legend. The least military emperors were described by 
our extant historical and biographical accounts with some reference to war, i f only 
negatively or with regard to unexecuted intentions. Caligula's reported childhood 
"^^  Sarpedon's contract: //. 12. 322-328. Zeus on Ares: II. 5.890. Hesiod: Theog. 226-232. 
Diemagbguery: Exemplified by Kleon (3. 36j Mff Atfeagoras (6. 35), described in similar language. 
Pyrrhus: Plut. Pyrrh. 7. 5; Duff p. 121. Pompey and Amazons: Plut. Pomp. 35. 3-4. Philodemus: 
Murray p. 169. Trajan: Cass. Dio 68. 7. 5. Commodus: SHA Comm. 11. 10-12. 
Attalos 1: Polyb. 18. 41. 7-8; Shipley p. 312. Spear-won legitimacy: Died. Sic. 18. 43. Alexander 
mosaic: Billows p. 27-28. Suda: Smith (1988) p. 49. Victory and political acts: Plut. Pomp. 38. 1-2. 
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Plate 21 
Alexander Mosaic 
experiences might have been assumed to prepare him for military activity. Instead, his 
actual involvements were depicted as a mixture of the accidental and the absurd. Nero 
was described as contemplating an expedition to the Caucasus, although not without a 
strong element of the characteristically theatrical; 
'He undertook preparations for an expedition to the Caspian Gates, with 
a new legion of conscripts from Italy, all six feet tall, whom he called 
the phalanx of Alexander the Great' 
Pliny, consciously or not, provided a summary of the central relationships between 
war, the political ideology of Rome, and its emperors. Relating to one of Trajan's 
campaigns in Dacia, he wrote: 
'May I congratulate you, noble Emperor, m your own name and that of 
the State, on a great and glorious victory in the finest fraditions of 
Rome? I pray the gods to grant that all your designs meet with such a 
happy issue, and that the glory of your Empire be renewed and enhanced 
by your outstanding virtues.' 
Here are assembled all the essential elements: the primacy of tradition; the 
compounding of the emperor's person and the State; the glory available to both in 
victory; the association of the gods with the emperor's actions; the role of glory in war 
as perpetuating ('renewing') the very existence of Rome; and the instrumental 
necessity of the emperor's individual merits.^ *^' 
At a more personal level than the achievement of military success, there was usually 
clear merit in a king taking an active part in fighting. There are numerous references to 
both Philip and Alexander being in the thick of battle and being woimded. That 
Thucydides recorded the deaths in the same skirmish of both opposing generals, 
Brasidas and Kleon, may be more relevant to the historian's subsequent political 
analysis than to a factual account of ancient warfare. Nevertheless, aged between 
seventy and eighty, the Hellenistic monarch, Lysimachus, died at the head of his 
troops. Valerius Maximus used a simple method to establish the temporal and ethical 
primacy of a mler's participation in fighting. At the head of a lengthy section of 
examples of bravery, he declared that it was to 
Trajan: BMC p. 103. Antonius Pius: BMC 259. Marcus Aurelius: BMC 1427. Caligula's 
childhood: Tac. Ann. 1.41.2; Suet. Cal. 9. His military involvement: Suet Cal. 43-46. Nero: Suet. 
Ner. 19. Pliny's summary: Ep. 10. 14. 
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'...Romulus, founder of our city, that the first place in this category of 
praise ought to be assigned...'. 
Valerius Maximus supported this judgement by adding details to Livy's account of 
Rome's war with Caenina. Romulus was said to have willingly accepted the challenge 
to single combat made by Aero, the opposmg city's king, even though he knew that the 
Romans would have had the better of a conventional battle. Livy himself placed such 
single combat at the fountainhead of Roman self-perception when he described the 
simultaneous deaths of Brutus, the first consul, and Arruns Tarquinius, son of the 
deposed last king. When leading the cavalry of their respective armies, they had sought 
each other out in battle, both dying from the other's spear thrust. Livy added the 
explicit comment that, 'In those days it was to a general's credit to take part in the 
actual fighting.' In repeating the story from his late fourth centiuy viewpoint, Eutropius 
added no such editorial comment, it by then being the norm for emperors to lead their 
troops in person. Polybius discussed the obvious problem of comanders involving 
themselves in fighting, commenting on their consequent loss of an over-all perspective 
on the battle. Plutarch drew attention to this difficulty by including as a specific merit 
of Pyrrhus that he managed to combine both. In a double accoimt of Titus personally 
saving the day through his prowess in battle, Josephus examined the dilemma of a ruler 
putting himself at risk by leading from the front. The author had Titus' froops urge him 
'...not to act the part of a common soldier', because '...he on whom all depended 
ought not to face so imminent a risk'. Titus brushed aside the argument by fighting on; 
an outcome that appeared to have been satisfactory to Josephus judging by his fulsome 
praise of the commander at the conclusion of the incident.^ '^ 
Augustus' personal involvement in fighting was seen at its most noteworthy in the 
accounts of the Illyrian War of 35/34 BCE. Florus gave it the full treatment. He had 
the young Caesar not only leading and directing the campaign, but at a crucial moment 
seizing the shield of a hesitating soldier and being first to cross a dangerous bridge. In 
case the message remained unclear, Augustus was described as 
'...wounded in the hands and legs, his comeliness enhanced by his blood 
and his dignity by his very danger'. 
Philip and Alexander: Homblower (1991) p. 256; Anab. 2. 12,27, 3. 30,4. 24 and 6. 10. Brasidas 
and Kleon: Homblower (1991) p. 135; Thucydides 5. 16. Lysimachus: Lund p. 182. Romulus: Val. 
Max. 3. 2 praef., 3. 2. 3; Livy 1. 10. Brutus and Arruns: ibid. 2. 6. 7-9; Eutr. 1. 10. Loss of 
perspective: Polyb. 10. 32-33; Plut. Pyrrh. 16. 7-8. Joseph. BJ71-91. 
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There must be some likelihood of hindsight in the view that such demonstrations 
related to his need to match the military renown of Antony. In the context of 
Octavian's career to that date, it would be equally reasonable to see the requirement 
that personal valour be attached to his reputation as being necessary for any aspiring 
Roman leader. There are certainly references to his relationship with the army pre-
dating the assassination of Julius Caesar, although it is of course impossible to 
discount the possibility that such 'facts', recorded long after Augustus' death, were 
inserted for their retrospective ideological plausibility. Titus' left arm was permanently 
weakened by a blow suffered at the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Trajan was described 
as being in the firing-line of missiles during another siege. Despite attempts to conceal 
his identity in terms of dress, we are told by Cassius Dio that '...seeing his majestic 
grey head and his august countenance' the enemy recognised him.^ ^^ 
In spite of the activities described above, a ready solution to this danger and to the 
problem outlined by Polybius had no less a figure than Augustus as model. In the 
initial stages of establishing power, military victory played a central role in his 
personal ideology. After Actium the forum was filled with monuments to his military 
success. Columns were erected topped by the prows of Egyptian ships modelled in 
bronze extracted from captured vessels, and figures of Tritons adorned the Temple of 
Saturn. However, as early as the planning for the Battle of Actium Octavian was 
portrayed as giving way to the advice of Agrippa. Suetonius recorded that Augustus 
took part in later campaigns in Dalmatia and Cantabria, and indeed that he was 
wounded. However, he went on to add that, 'His other wars were conducted through 
legates'. Augustus himself made personal claims about his military exploits ( ' I 
undertook many civil and foreign wars by land and sea throughout the world'), but 
also openly stated that these successes were '...gained by me or by my legates acting 
imder my auspices'. The arrangements of 27 BCE had provided the princeps with a 
unique imperium over the provinces. Undoubtedly the military victories of his 
stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, were absorbed into the official ideology as his 
successes. Illustrating this idea as an established element of the Imperial system, the 
SHA recorded in a straightforward manner that the wars of Antoninus Pius were 
fought through legates. However, the same source criticised Commodus for the 
Illyrian war: Flor. 2. 25. 7. Rivalry with Antony: Syme (1939) p. 239-240; App. B Civ. 3. 9. Titus: 
Cass. Dio 66. 5. 1. Trajan: ibid. 68. 31. 3. 
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practice. Thus, the desire of ancient authors to present over-all portrayals of 'good' and 
'bad' rulers can make it hard to delineate specific behaviours as unequivocally positive 
or negative (se pages 183-184).^" 
Inscription and other evidence suggest the presence of Hadrian in Judea during the 
Jewish revolt of 132-135 CE. However, the Emperor's personal participation in the 
fighting there is not attested. In relation to Hadrian's non-expansionist policies, it may 
well be that the lack of military experience and inclination on the part of Antoninus 
Pius were viewed as positive features in the decision to adopt him as successor. When 
in 161 CE Marcus Avirelius and Lucius Verus ascended the throne: 
'They had never seen an army - other than the Praetorian Guard - let 
alone military action'. 
Thus, before Verus took the field against the Parthians in 162 it had been forty-five 
years since a reigning emperor (in the person of Trajan) had led a frontier army in a 
full-scale war. The triumph he held jointly with Marcus Aurelius to celebrate the end of 
this campaign was the first for fifty years. However, contrary to the claims of Pronto, it 
seems most probable that Verus participated little in actual fighting. It is tempting to 
see this evidence as casting doubt on the importance of military campaigns and 
triumphs for Imperial ideology. Yet it is clear that Marcus himself was personally 
involved in the campaigns against the Marcomanni, Quadi and others for many years in 
the 160s and 170s. In fact this regime proved to be a turning point in the history of 
Roman emperors' participation in active fighting. With the exception of a small 
number, who were clearly unsuitable for the role and/or reigned so briefly as to make a 
military campaign impossible, for the next two hundred years all emperors took the 
field in person. The exceptions included: Didius Julianus, who had military experience 
as a young man, but reigned for little more than two months in 193, and was more 
renowned as a lawyer and lover of extravagant food; Balbinus, deliberately chosen as 
an administrator to rule jointly with the soldier, Pupienus Maximus; and Valentinian I I , 
four years old on the death in 375 of his father, Valentinian I , and always the puppet of 
others until his murder in 392. It is also worthy of note that many of the emperors who 
^—Augustan liiilitaiiT monuments: Zanker (1988) p. 79^82. Agrippa: Cass. Dio 50T 31. Wars and 
wounds: Suet. Aug. 20. Imperium and legates: Eder (1990) p. 106-107; Zanker (1988) p. 223-225. In 
relation to the last of these, Zanker's identification of Tiberius and Drusus ( fig. 179a) seems more 
convincing than BMC Augustus 443-449's surely rather lame 'men offering olive branches'. SHA: Ant. 
Pius 5. 4; Comm.: 13.5-7. 
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did lead their armies in person were described as doing so in a very direct manner 
indeed. The exploits of Titus and Trajan have already been mentioned. Among later 
emperors, Septimius Severus had his horse killed beneath him during the titanic battle 
with the forces of Albinus at Lugdunum in 196. Subsequent campaigns took him to 
Parthia, while as an ill man he was carried in a litter during the war in Britain, finally 
dying at York in 211. In keeping with his military backgroimd, Maximinus Thrax, was 
reported as actively leading his troops against the Germans, including being first to 
pursue the enemy into a treacherous swamp. Even Gallienus, portrayed as an 
irredeemably effete and unmilitary emperor, was said to have been wounded by an 
arrow during a siege in 265, while the same distinction was ascribed to the more 
martial Aurelian seven years later at Palmyra. The norm of martial emperors was 
maintained until the death of Theodosius I in 395, although contemporary theorists, for 
example Synesius of Cyrene, could still reconmiend that an emperor lead his troops in 
254 
person. 
The line between courageous initiative and over-bold rashness was thin. It was 
explored by authors at very different times within the wide period covered by this 
thesis. Agesilaus, in an action that involved an unnecessary fi-ontal attack resulting in 
heavy casualties and his own wounding, remained for Xenophon just on the right side 
of the distinction. A link with piety is introduced in order to bolster this position: 
'Agesilaus' next action may, without any question at all, be described as 
courageous. One must own, however, that he certamly did not adopt the 
safest plan...In spite of the many woimds he had received, he still 
remembered what was due to heaven' 
In Arrian's account, Alexander's 'reckless courage' was not only 'engendered by 
success', but was used by the king as an element of calculated strategy. In debate with 
the ever-cautious Parmenio, Alexander declared it to be in his nature to reject safe 
compromise in the pursuit of greater glory and that it was necessary to defy the odds 
because 
^^Hadrian: Birley (1997) p. 272-273. Antoninus Pius: Bifley (1987) p. 47. Marcus and Lucius: 
Birley (1987) p. 122-123, 130 and p. 147; Fronto Ad Verura Imp. 2. 1. 22-23 = Loeb Vol. 2 p, 129-133; 
SM'Msf^c. 8:'12:'22r7rbidiuif ffiHaHusTSH^^^ Jul. 1. I , 1! 6-9, 3. 8-9; OCD3 p. 467. Balbinus 
and Pupienus: Herodian 7. 10. 4-5. Valentinian II: Amtn. Marc. 30. 10. 4. Severus' Iiorse: SHA Sev. 
11.2. Parthia: Cass. Dio 75. 9. 1. Britain: Cass. Dio 76. 13. 4. Maximinus: Herodian 7. 2. 6-8. 
Gallienus: SHA Gall. 4. 4. Aurelian: ibid. Aurel. 26. 1. Post-Theodosius I: Lee p. 228-229. Synesius: 
Birley (1988) p. ix. 
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'...success so far beyond reason and probability would be a serious 
blow to the morale of the enemy.' 
Julian's fatal wounding in 363 CE was described by Eutropius as being the result of his 
'...mingling too rashly in the battles', whereas Ammianus Marcellinus reflected his 
generally positive view of that emperor by a more equivocal focus on his bravery, 
over-excitement and disregard of wamings.^ ^^ 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sampled the wide range of personal characteristics seen as being 
relevant to the connected questions of a ruler's merits and the legitimacy of his 
authority. It has done so while acknowledging that instances from that range may seem 
to be contradictory. For example, the franian concept of a shining Hvarena (something 
like 'awful royal glory'), the possession of which appeared to be synonymous with 
lawfiil kingship, could hardly be more distinct from Pliny's apparent image of Trajan as 
'one of us'. Yet there are echoes of the eastern concept of royalty in the fiery qualities 
attributed to the appearance of, for example, Hadrian and Commodus. In a work 
devoted to the theory of physiognomy, although laced with personal grudges, M. 
Antonius Polemon indicated that Hadrian's 'shining eyes' denoted a 'pure and spotless 
character.' According to Herodian, central to the impressive exterior of the young 
Commodus was that '...his eyes were burning and flashing' and that his hair gleamed 
as i f '...a heavenly halo was shining round his head'. Echoes of Xenophon's early 
fourth century BCE portrayal of Cyrus can be heard in Ammianus' late fourth century 
CE account of Constantius IPs entry in to Rome. The latter author emphasised eyes, 
gaze, blaze and shimmer in a description of the Emperor, around whose person a 
'...mingled glitter seemed to form a sort of shifting light'. This pervasiveness of certain 
features attributed to successfiil rulers was found to be most prominent in the value 
placed upon the martial virtues, thus emphasising the military and coercive qualities of 
Roman emperors. There was certainly inconsistency in the manner with which these 
features were applied and evaluated by ancient authors. For example, the military 
merits of some emperors were described in such a way as to enhance their 
qualifications for the throne. Other emperors appeared to have been given scant credit 
for the possession of such qualities, while their absence in yet others could be 
Agesilaus: Xen. Ages. 2. 12-13. Alexander: Arr. Anab. 4.21,2.26. Julian: Eutr. 10. 16; Amm. 
Marc. 25. 3. 3-6. 
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expressed in ways that suggested either ignominy or no discredit. However, two 
elements are clear: firstly, that fighting and military skills were central to the range of 
features considered; and secondly, as concluded by Wallace-Hadrill, that the ancient 
literature on virtues and other aspects of ruler behaviour essentially addressed issues of 
the maimer in which a sovereign ruled, rather than those concerning the bases of his 
power.^ ^^  
—Hvareha-.BvoMk'pf^^ (1997) 
p. 166. Commodus: Herodian. 1. 7. 5. Constantius: Amm. Marc. 16. 10. 4-6; Xen. Cyr. 8. 1 41-42; 
Matthews p. 233; Charlesworth (1947) p. 36. Positive military career: Suet. Vesp. 4; Tit. 4. Poorly 
recognized military career: SHA Hadr. 21. 8-14. Ignominy: Suet. Calig. 43-46; SHA Alex. Sev. 7. 10: 
No discredit: SHA Ant. Pius 5. 4). How a sovereign rules: Wallace-Hadrill (1981) p. 318. 
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8. The emperor and his soldiers 
Introduction 
In the first sentence of the preface to his definitive work on this subject, Brian 
Campbell could hardly have been clearer about the main source of an emperor's power. 
At least in respect of the security of his throne: 
'Ultimately the Roman emperor did not rely for survival on political 
parties.. .groups of senators and equites, or on mass popular support.. .but 
on military strength and the personal loyalty of his army.'"^ ^^  
In this chapter evidence will be examined concerning the origins and development of 
the connection between the emperors' political power and the Roman military. General 
questions to be addressed will include: What were the elements of the relationship 
between the emperor and his soldiers? Was there a set of generalisable features or did 
the attitudes of individual emperors predominate? What role did soldiers play in an 
emperor's initial candidature, the ongoing support of his activities and his tenure of 
office? The definitive nature of the quotation from Campbell cited above should lead 
to the anticipation of at least some positive responses to these questions. Part of this 
section will take the form of a re-examination and expansion of the evidence presented 
in both primary and secondary sources. However, in order to expose the crucial role of 
the military in the coercive Roman state, it will be necessary to consider some rather 
more specific questions: To what extent were soldiers politically aware and active? Did 
soldiers' legal and social position have specific implications for the emperor's authority 
over his subjects? Was there a political element, whether explicit or implicit, in 
soldiers' behaviour towards civilians? At their different levels it is the answers to these 
sets of questions that may reveal a coercive core in the authority of Roman emperors. 
The attitude of ancient authors 
Before looking at evidence relevant to these questions it will be well to bring together 
and to re-emphasise important features of the evidence available to us. It must be 
acknowledged that the dkect evidence about soldiers' attitudes and motives is severely 
limited. The content of inscriptions, papyri and other writings, such as those found at 
Vindblahda, cannot be stretched far towards answering questions about the political 
^" Campbell: 1984 p. vii 
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involvement of soldiers. The ancient comments we have on that subject come from our 
elite literary sources. It has been argued that these writers could express 'a more than 
sneaking admiration' for an ideal of the rugged military ethos under which soldiers 
were at least supposed to operate. However, it seems unreasonable to interpret the 
warm feelings of our sources as extending to soldiers' involvement in politics. In fact 
ancient writers characteristically adopted a moral and judgemental tone when 
considering the issue. 
A good example is provided by the writings of Cassius Dio. Undoubtedly and self-
consciously a member of the elite, he made his general attitudes clear by describing 
Trajan's good government m terms of his havmg done 'much to please the better 
element'. Cassius Dio made no secret of his allegiance to the senatorial elite. He 
identified a watershed in his writings at 192 CE, claiming fi-om that time to have 
witnessed the events he described. One result of this was a predilection to refer to 'us' 
and 'we' when describing the activities of the senate. Notably he included himself in 
this manner when he described Pertinax greeting the senate only after securing the 
loyalty of the Praetorians in 193 CE. The surviving epitomes of Cassius Dio's historical 
work ended in 229 CE. In that year he held the ordinary consulship with the Emperor, 
Severus Alexander, as his colleague. He stated that he was granted additional honours 
and even that his consular expenses were paid by the Emperor himself. Reading the 
relevant passages in context, however, it is hard not to feel sympathy for the author. 
What ought to have been the triumphant climax to an already distinguished career was 
in fact sandwiched between accovmts of his personal difficulties with undisciplined 
soldiers. The Emperor, fearfiil it was said for the very life of his fellow consul, 
persuaded Dio spend his time '. . . in Italy, somewhere outside of Rome', thus 
minimising the chances of rurming up against recalcitrant troops. Despite the addition 
of some heroic verses from Homer, Dio's grand history concluded with leaden bathos, 
as he felt obliged to seek permission to retire because of his bad feet. Perhaps this 
explains why Dio's attitude towards soldiers in general and, in particular, their 
involvement in politics was consistently negative. For example, he described the 
elevation to the throne of Elagabalus as being in no small part engineered by greedy 
soldiers. They paraded their teenage nominee, advertising falsely that he was the son of 
Caracalla, himself closely associated with the army. Dio later recorded that Elagabalus 
was eventually overthrown and killed by soldiers, drawing the moral: 
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'Thus it is that persons, particularly i f armed, when they have once 
accustomed themselves to feel contempt for their rulers, set no limit to 
their right to do what they please, but keep their arms ready to use against 
the very man who gave them that power.' 
These attitudes must have been based on Dio's personal experience as a commander 
and on his reflections about history, coloured in particular by the civil wars and 
military rebellions of the late second century. They can also be seen to be retrojected 
into his account of the earliest stages of the principate. Maecenas' invented speech of 
advice to Augustus contained the recommendation for a professional army, drawn from 
'...those in most need of a livelihood.... who are in their physical prime, 
who are often compelled to win a livelihood by brigandage'. 
Dio specifically differentiated this group from the respectable farmers, sailors and other 
tradesmen of the citizen body. He later reported that the Praetorians disbanded by 
Septimius Severus m 193 CE had indeed turned to brigandage.'^ ^^  
Cassius Dio was far fi-om being the only ancient author to express distaste at the 
involvement of soldiers in politics, although some of these articulated views require 
careful attention. In the opening of his life of Galba, Plutarch appeared to be 
unequivocal. In a number of contexts he recorded condemnation of the army's 
participation in the affairs of state. At one level these were specific and appeared to be 
relatively trivial, as in the story of Aemilius PauUus' rebuke to his legions in 
Macedonia. On taking command in 167 BCE and finding them to be 'infected with 
loquacity and meddlesomeness', he advised the troops to 
'.. .take no thought or concern for anything, except how each man might 
keep himself and his armour in readiness for action, and ply his sword 
in Roman fashion (and) that he himself would look out for the rest'. 
At a wider and more significant level, Plutarch indicated that the problems experienced 
by the Empire after the death of Nero in 68 CE showed clearly that 
'...an empire has nothing more fearful to show than a military force 
given over to untrained and xmreasoning impulses' 
Admiration for military ethos: Lendon (1997) p. 238. Trajan: Cass. Dio 68. 5. 4. Pertinax: ibid. 
74. 1. 4. The end of Cassius Dio's career: ibid. 80. 4. 2-5. 3. Elevation of Elagabaius: ibid. 79. 32. 2. 
Dio's judgement: ibid. 80. 17. 1. Maecenas: ibid. 52. 27. 5. Praetorian brigandage: ibid. 75. 2. 5. 
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The responsibility for this state of affairs appeared to laid at the feet of troops 
themselves; the Empire 
'...collapsing upon itself, not so much through the ambition of those 
who were proclaimed emperors, as through the greed and licence of the 
soldiery'. 
However, Plutarch seemed to forget his own assessment of accountability almost 
immediately, since he proceeded to portray Nymphidius Sabinus as the one who 
'...persuaded the soldiery to proclaim Galba emperor' and who eventually took '...the 
entire control of affairs into his own hands'. 
The surviving accounts of the short reign of Otho during 69 CE revealed features 
similar to those just discussed. Tacitus could hardly have characterised the situation in 
starker terms. Against a backdrop of Otho's courting the goodwill of the troops through 
familiarity, favours and '...all the other arts which work upon uneducated minds', 
Tacitus portrayed him as encouraging two junior officers to assassinate Galba. The 
historian therefore felt himself able to describe the event in horrified and censorious 
language: 
'So a couple of common soldiers took it upon them to hand over the 
Roman Empire - and they did it.' 
I f this did not indicate clearly enough Tacitus' view of who was controlling events, he 
soon spelled out his assessment in no uncertain manner: 'The will of the soldiers was 
henceforward supreme.' As evidence for this extreme statement he made the doubtful 
claim that the Praetorians were able to appoint their own officers. At the other end of 
Otho's short reign the spontaneous will of the soldiers was strongly expressed but 
entirely ineffectual. As news spread of the defeat of his forces at the first battle of 
Cremona in April 69, troops loyal to Otho, both Praetorians and legionaries from 
Moesia, urged him to fight on. The Emperor, however, declined to continue what he 
termed the 'contest' with Vitellius for the throne. This use of competitive language is 
relevant to the themes of rivalry, personal ambition and psychological domination 
explored elsewhere in this thesis. In fact Tacitus had Otho elaborate the point and claim 
a sort of individual distinction even in defeat: 
Aemilius Paullus: Plut. Aem. 13. 4 and Galb. 1. 2; PI. Resp. 376A-C as an origin of this idea. Post-
Nero: Galb. 1. 3. Ordinary soldiers' responsibility: ibid. 1.4. Nymphidius: ibid. 2. 1 and 8. 1. 
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'Others may have held the scepfre longer, but no one can ever have laid 
it down so bravely'. 
Here, however, the issue is the straightforward one that Otho provided another example 
illustrating the limitations of our sources' editorial view that undisciplined soldiers 
were in control of affairs. Not only did the Emperor refuse the calls by the froops to 
continue the war, but in order to leave no doubt about his good faith in this matter he 
committed suicide. Tacitus described the anguish among Otho's loyal soldiers at this 
course of events, distress that was sufficient to bring about its emulation on a not 
inconsiderable scale.'^ '^^  
The issue of who was really confroUing events, the soldiers or their leaders, can be 
approached from a slightly different direction by examining the career of L. Verginius 
Rufiis. There is ample evidence in our sources that during the crises of 68-69 CE there 
was a strong and repeated desire among the legions to proclaim Verginius Rufus 
emperor. In May 68 at Vesontio in Gaul the army of Verginius had defeated the forces 
of Vindex in their open revolt against Nero. The victorious soldiers of the Upper 
German legions pressed Verginius to become emperor. He declined the offer, but it was 
not without some difficulty that he resfrained his froops and restored order. Tacitus 
added the detail that legions originating in Illyricum had also 'made overtures to 
Verginius' at this time. Most sources credited the general with conceding to the senate 
and people of Rome the right to appoint a new emperor. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
bearing in mind his general views described above, Cassius Dio went fiirther. He 
suggested that Verginius' decision may have been 
'.. .merely (my emphasis) because he did not deem it right for soldiers 
to bestow the supreme power upon anyone...or because he was entirely 
high-minded and felt no desire himself for the imperial office, to secure 
which others were willing to do anything and everything'. 
The distinction being drawn here appeared to attach the greater potential merit to the 
conjectured feature of Verginius' moral make-up. The opinion that soldiers should not 
appoint an emperor was relegated to a secondary status. Such a differentiation supports 
two of the main elements of this thesis; it weakens the view that soldiers had no place 
Otho suborns the troops: Tac. Hist. 1. 23-25. Soldiers supreme and Praetorians choosing their 
officers: ibid. 1.46. Tacitus' claim: accepted by Wellesley p. 27; doubted by Levene (Tac. Hist n 28 p. 
255) and by Chilver (1979) p. 103. Otho's suicide: Tac. Hist. 2.46-49; Plut. Oth. 15-17. 
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in the legitimate Roman political process and it highlights the element of personal 
morality/psychology in that process. Accounts in our sources of the Battle of Vesontio 
contribute to this analysis. Both Plutarch and Cassius Dio suggested that a reluctant 
Verginius was more or less forced into fighting Vindex by his own troops. However, 
this portrayal of a wilful army seems more in line with the authors' editorial views on 
the matter than it does with the details of their own histories. There is surely a basic 
incongruity in soldiers repeatedly championing as potential emperor a general who was 
not even in control of his forces in the face of an enemy. 
After the death of Nero in June 68, Verginius defied fiirther attempts by his soldiers to 
elevate him to the throne. Instead he gave way to Galba's nominee as commander of 
the German legions and joined the entourage of the new emperor. Although Tacitus, 
Plutarch and Cassius Dio suggested that he was regarded with some suspicion by 
Galba, all indicated that Verginius came to no harm in these circumstances. Based no 
doubt on his knowledge of a greater nvimber of emperors, Dio was able to add the dry 
comment that the general might have regarded it as an unusual favour that in his case 
'...a man who had frequently been hailed as emperor was allowed to live'. In fact 
Verginius held a consulship under Otho and on the death of that emperor in April 69 he 
was in Rome. Yet again 
'...soldiers turned to (him) and begged him with threats now to accept 
the principate'. 
Once more he avoided the situation, this time by fleeing. As a postscript it is worth 
adding that this most durable of characters, having gained his first consulship under 
Nero in 63 and survived the suspicions of all the Flavians, was consul for the third time 
in 97 with the special honour of being colleague to the then emperor, Nerva. It is 
relevant that this late honour, Verginius was then in his eighties, may have occurred 
precisely because of the old general's high reputation with the soldiers. It has been 
argued persuasively that at that time, Nerva's shaky regime badly needed a specifically 
military endorsement. The distinguished natiire of Verginius' career was given a 
suitable conclusion soon after by the rare allocation of a public funeral, at which 
May 68: Tac. Hist. 1. 8; Cass. Dio 63. 25; Plin. Ep.6. 10; Plut. G /^fcJ. 2^ 1utat^ ^^ ^ actually 
suggested that even before the battle Vergihiiis' froop persuade him to become 
emperor). Illyrian legions: Tac. Hist 1. 9. SPQR: Cass. Dio 63. 25. 2-3; Plut. Galb. 6. 2. Verginius' 
moral outlook: Cass. Dio 63. 25. 3. The issue of control before Vesontio is discussed by Griffin (1996) 
p. 286 n. 94 and the idea that the battle was an 'accident' caused by undisciplined soldiery was rejected 
by Levick(1985) p. 330. 
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Tacitus gave the oration. Taken in the round, the career of L. Vergmius Rufus mdicated 
on a number of occasions that soldiers formed an important constituency among those 
who had an active interest in the destination of the Imperial title. As such, they could 
make known their wishes in a forceful manner. However, it by no means supports the 
view of some of our sources that the events of high politics were completely at their 
mercy.'^ ^^  
A senatorial outlook and consequent bias against soldiers' involvement in politics was 
certainly the norm in our later literary sources. Aurelius Victor characterised the 
election of Tacitus as emperor in 275 CE as a happy occasion 
'...because the senators had recovered the right to choose the emperor 
from the arrogant military'. 
Although any clear and consistent editorial prejudice is hard to distinguish in the SHA, 
its author does appear to favour a senatorial viewpoint. His outlandish lament on the 
death of Probus, with its evocation of an ideal world in which there were no soldiers, 
illustrated the general tone.'^ "^' 
Military strength and political authority 
It would be entirely conventional to identify Gaius Marius as the first in a line of 
individuals whose challenge to the prevailing control of the senatorial oligarchy led to 
its weakening during the first century BCE. A yet wider perspective might suggest that 
the career of Scipio Africanus provided still earlier indications that an individual could 
overcome the political system's restrictions on personal power. In either case the point 
to be made here is the same; the threat to the status quo was based on military 
achievements and on the personal loyalty of soldiers. However, reflecting the attitudes 
described in the previous section, the editorial comments of our ancient authors do not 
always give full weight to the political nature of this process. For example, the analysis 
contained in Plutarch's Lives has been found to be deficient in respect of its failure to 
recognise the full extent of the role of soldiers. Nevertheless, even here the material 
presented does seem to provide abundant evidence for just such a view. Thus it is 
perhaps noteworthy that the biographer chose to include a story that linked a later 
June 68: Plut. Galb. 10.2-3; Tac. Hist. 1. 8; Cass. Dio 63. 29. April 69: Tac. Hist. 2. 51; Plut. Oth. 
18. 3. Consulships: OCD3 p. 1588; Tac. Ann. 15. 23. 1; Cass. Dio 68. 2. 4. Nerva's difficulties: 
Beriman and Todd p. 316. Funeral: Plin. Ep. 2. 1. 
Tacitus: Aur. Vict. Caes. 36; Watson p. 211. Probus: SHA Prob. 24; OCD3 p. 713. 
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Scipio with Marius. Having given pride of place to the latter's military qualities in 
introducing his account, Plutarch reported that these features had come to the attention 
of Scipio Aemilianus Africanus in 133 BCE. When the general was asked if he could 
suggest someone who might emulate his military glory, Scipio was said to have 
indicated the young Marius. In his earliest political acts Marius was depicted as using 
force in the senate, responding to opposition by having his rival, Metellus, imprisoned. 
Plutarch recorded the first action of his subject as consul to be that of levying troops 
from the lower sections of society 'contrary to law and custom'. Marius was said to 
have 'pleased the soldiers' and a notable feature of Plutarch's portrait contrasted his 
pre-eminence in war with a lack of skill in the political arena of the popular assemblies. 
To get the vote he wanted over one issue he '...stirred up the soldiery (and) got them to 
mingle with the citizens in the assembly.' As a climax to this behaviour, Plutarch 
recorded Marius' deployment of troops in the forum during his sixth consulship in 100 
BCE. Although the author's comments here seem a little cryptic, he must have been 
referring to this matter when he wrote that his subject had caused 
'...a mischief that was not to be cured, but made its way by arms and 
slaughter directly towards tyrarmy and subversion of the government'. 
The 'mischief that Plutarch had in mind was surely that of the substantial overthrow of 
the Republic during the following one hundred years, when Marius' successors as 
military leaders, Sulla, Pompey, Julius Caesar and Octavian, dominated the state and 
paved the way for the emperors.^ '^* 
Accession and overthrow 
In relation to Mommsen's dictum that '...any soldier had the right to make someone 
else emperor', the distinction has been drawn between the army's de facto and de jure 
roles in establishing an emperor in power. For example, having acknowledged that 
'...troops had the practical power to make a man emperor', Campbell went on to assert 
that: 
'Those who sought the purple.. .would never have thought in terms of the 
soldiers having a legal right to be asked for their support and to confer 
power.' 
Marius and Scipio: Harris p. 158, 27; OCD3 p. 925; Gabba p. 26; Plut. Mar. 2. 1-3. 3; Cic. Rep. 6. 
12; Stevenson p. 146-147. Plutarch's analysis: Pelling p. 344-346. Metellus: Plut. Mar. 4. 3. Troop 
levy: ibid. 9. 1. Pleasing the soldiers: ibid. 14. 3. Lack of political skill: ibid. 28. 1-3. Soldiers in the 
assembly: ibid. 28. 5. Soldiers in the forum: ibid. 30. 
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Some of the difficulties in applying strictly legal criteria to the question of Roman 
Imperial authority have already been explored (see page 143ff). In spite of the mass of 
relevant evidence deployed in chapter DC of his 1984 study, the confrast drawn by 
Campbell is probably misleading in two ways. Firstly, the presentation of the issue in 
terms of such a dichotomy is too closely related to the preoccupations of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century scholarship. Mindfiil of the truism that 'All history is 
contemporary history', a defensible generalisation could characterise scholarship of 
that period as examining the Roman Empire from the perspective of the then existing 
and emerging nation states/empires. The relevant political context was dominated by 
the identification of constitutional checks and balances in the power relationships 
within and between the existing imperial, monarchical and democratic European 
countries. Mommsen himself is generally held to represent an interpretive orientation 
that focussed on relatively sfrict legal definitions of power. For example, he has been 
seen to interpret the position of princeps as being equivalent to one of the regulated 
magistracies of the Roman state. Famously he defined the rule of Augustus as a formal 
dyarchy, in which the princeps shared power with the senate, each having delineated 
areas of power and responsibility. Secondly, the de facto/de jure distinction reflected an 
explicit view of Roman soldiers as possessing no political role or consciousness of their 
own. Rather their impact on political events was seen as that of powerful tools in the 
hands of ambitious members of the elite, and their actions as being motivated solely by 
short-term pecuniary self-interest. To a considerable extent this analysis was 
underpinned by adherence to Cassius Dio's perception of Roman soldiers as a group 
drawn from and reflecting the interests of the lowest elements of the plebeians. 
To suggest a different interpretation of the army's role in the accession and overthrow 
of emperors, evidence will be reconsidered, for example on the significance of military 
acclamations and donatives. However, as an initial framework on which to examine 
these aspects of the army's role, it must be acknowledged that the institution of the 
Roman military was far from operating in a monolithic fashion. It must be correct to 
reject the concept of a dominant and permanent 'high command' of viri militares. 
Clearly military experience formed a significant element in the training and in at least 
Emperors made by soldiers: Campbell (1984) p. 374-5; Mommsen 2. 2. p. 814. Mommsen and 
dyarchy: for discussion see Linderski (1990) p. 50-52; Eder (1990) p. 78-79. De Jure/de facto: see, for 
example, Jones, H. S. p. 160-161; Campbell (1984) p. 10, 198, 386 and (2002) p. 32fF. 
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the early careers of the elite that ruled Rome. Polybius had stated that ten years' service 
in the army was a prerequisite for political office, a qualification that Trajan was said to 
have fulfilled. Nevertheless, the essentially amateur status of Roman military leaders 
should be emphasised, while the high status that our ancient sources' accorded to 
military achievement may be a factor in the absence of discussion of this lack of 
professionalism. It may be possible, however, to draw analogies from writings on other 
subjects. Cato the Younger was described as being unusual in his mastery of the detail 
involved in the post of quaestor. He deprived the treasury clerks of their accustomed 
role as the effective 'superiors' of those nominally set over them. To imderplay the 
amateurism of the elite who led the soldiers would probably constitute a specific 
instance of the general problem of anachronism in the study of the Roman military 
organisation, equating its form and operation too closely with that of modem armies. In 
fact it has been argued that the political role of the Roman army was limited by its 
structure; no officer class or central command in Rome, its regular leadership 
(centurions) being essentially permanent but of low status, while its high status 
leadership (equites and senators) was temporary. As a result of these features it must 
be acknowledged that the army as a single political unit did not make or break 
emperors. However, it will be argued that the undoubted validity of these 
considerations, together with the misleading de facto Ide jure contrast and the view of 
the soldiery as depoliticised, has lead to a significant underestimate of Roman soldiers 
as a specific political constituency.^ ^^ 
Acclamations 
Defined as '...vocal expressions of approval and good wishes in ritual form', 
acclamations were an important element in the communication of public opinion in the 
ancient world. Homer, for example, included a formal debate among the Greek troops 
in which 
'...a great shout from the Argives echoed fiercely among the ships: they 
cried "Aye" to noble Odysseus' words.' 
Voting m the Spartan assembly was conducted in a similarly oral manner. The 
Macedonian military would be gathered and asked to voice its approval of a course of 
Viri mUUares: Campbell (1984) p. 328-330; (1975) p. 17-24. Experience: Polyb. 6. 19 ; Plin. Pan. 
15. 3. Cato: Plut. Cat. Min. 16. 1-3. Anachronism: Alston (1995) p. 3-4. Structure: Isaac (1992) p. 
381,384. 
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action at moments of particular crisis. These might include such occasions as the death 
of a king. Although all commentators do not agree on the precise powers of the army 
assembly in these circumstances, it has been suggested that its role presaged that of 
eighteenth century Prussia, which Mirabeau famously described as '...not a state that 
possesses an army, but an army that possesses a state'. A notable and muhiply 
documented example of the Macedonian army's involvement in politics occurred when 
Alexander unexpectedly died at Babylon in 323 BCE. He had named no successor 
beyond the cryptically unhelpful suggestion that it should be 'the strongest/best man'. 
In relation to the events that followed, modem views cover a wide spectrum. Some 
regard it as being urmecessary for Alexander to have named a successor since the army 
could choose one. Others suggest that the army's role was a formal one, to approve the 
chosen candidate. Yet others indicate that, in the context of Alexander's death, the 
army's intervention constituted a mutiny incited by officers. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether an assembly's acclamation was necessary for a Macedonian monarch's 
legitimacy. What is beyond doubt is that the army occupied centre stage in 
deliberations about the successor.^ ^^  
In addition to Diodorus, references in Plutarch and a fragmentary epitome of a lost 
work by Arrian, Curtius Rufus provided our most substantial account of this process. 
The complex and still disputed detail of the affair lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
However, Curtius' description is of particular interest because of the extent to which it 
was coloured by the author's experience of Roman events. While uncertainties about 
Curtius' identity must be acknowledged, he may well have been the suffect consul of 
43 CE referred to by Tacitus. If so, it supports a view that as, in Errington's words, 'a 
Roman man of affairs', he could have witnessed the accessions of Tiberius, Gains and 
Claudius. The circumstances of the last of these will examined later from a number of 
different angles, since they provide significant testimony concerning the role of the 
army. At this point it is relevant to keep in mind the events of 41 CE following the 
assassination of Gaius, because of similarities between them and Curtius' account of 
what happened in Babylon in 323 BCE. These sunilarities, it will be argued, allow 
plausible generalisations to be made from Curtius' expressed views about the political 
DeHnition: OCD3 p. 4; //. 2. 335-340. Sparta: Forrest p. 47-50. Macedonian army assembly: 
Billows p. 18-20. Prussia: Ducrey p. 50. 'Best man': Arr. Anab. 1. 26. Range of modern views: 
Errmgton (1970) p. 49-50; Shipley p. 40; Bosworth p 174. 
227 
role of the Macedonian army to that of Roman soldiers during the period in which he 
was writing?^^ 
The troops at Babylon have been described as being '...the nearest convenient 
equivalent to a Macedonian army assembly'. While the generals debated possibilities 
and jockeyed for position, it was reported that the rank and file infantry took the 
initiative. They produced and acclaimed as king Alexander's half-brother, Arrhidaeus. 
Sources other than Curtius are clear that previously this individual had been 
overlooked because he was regarded as being in some way mentally unfit. This 
assessment is surely supported by the mere fact of Arrhidaeus' survival until 323 BCE 
in the face of Alexander's otherwise thorough cull of family members who might have 
had claims to the throne. Unlike other sources, Curtius appeared to play down the 
supposed deficiencies of the young man. These may of course be detailed in the lost 
parts of Curtius' account, but in relation to the succession to Alexander they are only 
hinted at and then largely ignored as Arrhidaeus is portrayed as a manipulated but 
active participator in the events at Babylon. At one stage he is given an eloquent and 
effective speech, offering to give up the throne and urging an end to discord. The 
parallels between the acclamation of Arrhidaeus and that of Claudius are clear enough 
not to require exposition. Not only that, but Curtius' may have been deliberately 
suppressing the otherwise well advertised defects of Arrhidaeus in order to make his 
situation appear more convincingly like that of the Roman emperor. Whatever his 
inherent problems may have been, Claudius ruled as undoubted emperor for thirteen 
years; Arrhidaeus became the puppet of successive contenders in the struggle for 
control of Alexander's succession, finally being murdered in 317 BCE. By 
accentuating the similarities between the two, Curtius would have been using his 
experience of contemporary events to enhance his account, at the same time adding a 
layer of interest for his readers.^ ^^  
Alexander's successor: Diod. Sic. 18. 1-2; Plut. Eum. 3; Arrian FGrH 156 F 1 = Austin (1981) 
22(a); Curt: 10. 7. Tff; Errington (1970) p. 50-73. Curtius' identity and historipgrf phy: 0CD3 p. 415-
A\6\ Tac^Am. 11. 20. 3=21.3; Atkinson p. 73rBa(iian (1962) p. 382yErfington (1978) pr87. 
Troops at Babylon: Errington (1970) p. 49-50. Arrhidaeus: Plut. Alex. 77. 5; Diod. Sic. 18. 2. 2; 
Errington (1970) p. 52. Alexander's purges: Diod. Sic. 17. 2. 3-6, 17. 5. 2. Curtius' hints: Curt. 10. 7. 
4-5. Arrhidaeus' speech: Curt. 10. 8. 16-21. Acclamation of Claudius: Suet. Claud. 10; Jos. BJ2. 
204-214. Murder of Arrhidaeus: Diod. Sic. 19. 11. 4. 
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The established Claudian anachronism of Curtius' account permits an examination of 
its details for other echoes of Roman affairs; in particular his views on the role of 
soldiers may provide evidence concerning the political involvement of the legions. It 
must be acknowledged that in these particulars, as in Curtius' writings over-all, care' 
and consistency were not marked characteristics. Nevertheless, in setting up the debate 
at Babylon, he clearly gave soldiers a central role. Curtius mingled the ideas of a 
private discussion between the generals and a formal assembly of the troops; the initial 
invitation to discussion was made to '...the chief of the king's friends and the leaders 
of his forces'; by way of introduction to the general's speech, he had Perdicas spell out 
the situation to the massed soldiers as, 'We have need of a head. To name one is in 
your power'. At a crucial stage in the difficult discussions the claims of Arrhidaeus 
were put forward by 
'.. .a man unknown to most of the Macedonians, one of the lowest of the 
common people'. 
With such a description, Curtius went out of his way to indicate the involvement of the 
ordinary soldiers. In the fashion typical of our other elite sources, he had pejorative 
intent in associating the troops with the 'vulgi', contrasted with the 'principum' of the 
officers. Nevertheless, the formality of the expressed popular view was portrayed in the 
phalanx 'clashing their spears against their shields' to signify approval of Arrhidaeus. 
After much wrangling, involving the generals, the soldiers, and the infantry and 
cavalry as separate protagonists, Curtius' account ended with a settlement under the 
auspices of both the army and the 'leading men'.^ *^' 
In spite of his own social prejudices, Curtius thus provided useful evidence for the 
involvement of soldiers in the process of choosing Alexander's successor. In relation to 
specific parallels with the installation of Roman emperors within the author's 
experience, and with his general tendency to retroject Roman features, Curtius' 
evidence is relevant to the formation of a view of similar involvement by Roman 
soldiers. In the context of Alexander, attempts have been made to dismiss the soldiers' 
involvement as reflecting merely either their 'mundane ambitions' for pay and 
discharge or a pragmatic response by the elite to the situation in Babylon. While there 
Debate/assembly: Curt. 10. 6. 1-4. Perdicas: ibid. 10. 6. 8. Arrhidaeus' lowly champion: ibid. 10. 
7. 1. Vulgi/principum: ibid. 10. 7. 8. Spears and shields: ibid. 10. 7. 14. Wrangling: ibid. 10. 7. 16 - 9. 
5. Settlement: ibid. 10. 10.Iff. 
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may be some truth in these explanations, both the requirements of the troops and the 
reaHties of power operating at Babylon in 323 BCE were genuinely part of a political 
landscape. Thus Lock missed the point in his assessment that, 'It seems unnecessary to 
see any political initiative' in the activities of the Macedonian soldiers. The lack of any 
operating legalistic formula, an absence which was obviously lamented by Lock, did 
not mean that the events were outside definable poUtical processes, or that they were 
not recognised as such by their participants and by our ancient sources.^ '^ 
In the Roman Republic a successful general could be hailed 'imperator' on the 
battlefield and have the right to add the honour to his name. Augustus recorded that he 
had been saluted as imperator twenty-one times, although many of his victories were 
gained by others. In the context of military operations it became the norm for emperors 
to be credited with at least one acclamation as imperator. A close connection 
developed between such honours and the general power to command {imperium). This 
lay behind the trend for their concentration during the early principate on the ruler and 
his designated successors. Tacitus recorded that Augustus had both his stepsons, 
Tiberius and Nero Drusus, hailed as imperator. However, he went on to explain that at 
the time '...there was no lack of heirs of his own blood.' In fact Tiberius was accorded 
seven of his eight acclamations while Augustus was alive, Titus fifteen of his 
seventeen during his father's reign. Later, Tacitus could report in a matter-of-fact 
manner that the troops proclaimed Tiberius imperator after a victory by Germanicus in 
16 CE. In time, as the connection between actual military achievement and 
imperatorial honours became more distant, their role in establishing the general 
authority of the emperor increased in significance. Tacitus may have been consciously 
reflecting this change in his account of the early days of Vespasian's bid for power. 
The historian described the scene in Judea when, impatient in their enthusiasm to 
promote their leader's cause, 
'...a few of the soldiers, forming up in the usual way to salute him as 
commander (legatum), saluted him as emperor (imperatorem). The 
others promptly rushed up calling him Caesar and Augustus'. 
Mundane ambitions: Errington (1970) p. 51. Pragmatism: Locii p. 105-107. In a similar vein. Lock 
characterised the army's acclamation of Alexander as King of Asia as being nothing 'more formal than 
an outburst of enthusiasm' (p. 100; Plut. Alex. 34). 
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The primacy of the military nomenclature over the other Imperial names should be 
noted, as should the positive effect wrought by these events on Vespasian's 
confidence."^ ^^  
Prior to Constantine, Claudius, that most unmilitary of emperors, recorded the highest 
number of acclamations. His twenty-seven topped the twenty-two of Domitian, the 
twenty of Vespasian and the thirteen of Trajan. While it seems possible to argue that 
these emperors either had a greater than average need to use accepted means to confirm 
their grip on power or were particularly close to the army, such reasoning does not 
explain Caracalla's low figure of three or indeed their complete absence in the record 
of Severus Alexander. However, the hnperial evidence does demonstrate a specific 
connection between military acclamations and the political position of the emperor. 
Understanding the precise nature of this connection is an important matter for this 
research as it may help in the assessment of the political power of the army.'^ ^^  
In a ceremonial context traceable ahnost one hundred years earlier, the Eastern 
Emperor, Marcian, was crowned in 450 CE at the Hebdomon, the major army camp 
situated at the seventh milestone fi"om Constantinople. Our account of the accession of 
his successor, Leo I , in 457 provided even clearer detail of the involvement of the 
military in the ceremony. He was apparently crowned by an army quartermaster, the 
new emperor acknowledging the acclamation of the troops by accepting his elevation to 
the throne through the power of '...God the almighty and your decision, most brave 
fellow-soldiers.' How had this state of affairs come about? The accession of Gains in 
37 CE provides a useful perspective on this issue. It is perhaps significant that our 
sources recorded for him a number of specific links to the army prior to his becoming 
emperor. As an infant he had accompanied his parents, Germanicus and Agrippina the 
Elder, with the legions in Germany. On account of his being habitually dressed in a 
miniature military uniform the troops had nicknamed him Caligula ('Little Boots'). 
Less whimsically, the possibility that Gains and his mother might be sent from the 
camp into danger was cited by Suetonius and Tacitus as one of the reasons why 
Germanicus was able to regain control of the troops during the mutiny of 14 CE. To 
Republic: Campbell (1984) p. 122. Augustus: RG 4. 1-2. Norm for emperors: Campbell (1984) p. 
122. Imperator/imperium: App. B Civ. 2. 44; McCormick (1986) p. 13. Designated successors: 
Campbell (1984) p. 125; Tac. Ann. 1. 3. 1, 2. 18. 2. Vespasian: Tac. Hist. 2. 80. 
Acclamation numbers: Campbell (1984) p. 124-5. 
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emphasize the soldiers' feelings towards the child, Tacitus referred to him as 'the 
legions' foster-son'. Perhaps building on these elements, Suetonius had the adult Gaius 
seduce Ennia Naevia expressly 'to increase his chances' of becoming emperor by 
gaining influence over her husband. Macro, the Praetorian Prefect. 
In this context it is noteworthy that from the accession of Gaius it became standard 
procedure for a new emperor to address the Praetorian Guard as one of his first acts. It 
seems imlikely to be coincidental that from the same reign come our first adlocutio 
coins, depicting an emperor speaking to soldiers in a formal setting. Gaius also 
appeared to be the first emperor to count his initial acceptance by the army in Rome as 
his first recorded acclamation. Campbell seemed to be unsure whether the occasion of 
this appearance before the troops was purely ceremonial or whether it constituted a 
significant element in establishing the ruler in power. A papyrus probably relating to 
the revoh of Avidius Cassius in 175 CE, although difficult to interpret, may support the 
latter position. In the document a distinction was apparently drawn between election by 
the troops and the practical assumption of power - the first being used as a justification 
for the second. A passage in Cassius Dio may concur with this view. Campbell invoked 
his distinction between de jure and de facto elements of the soldiers' role in this 
example. He did the same in reviewing Tacitus' account of Nero's accession. In both 
instances obtaining the acclamation by troops was seen to be a necessary but 
preliminary precaution by the new ruler, prior to the 'official' senatorial stamp of 
approval. However, there seems to be little justification in the evidence for assuming 
such a distinction or for emphasising the importance of any of the recorded elements. If 
anything, the clear priority in time of the military aspect might indicate its greater 
significance. In addition even Campbell drew attention to the sarcastic tone of Tacitus' 
account of Nero's accession, implying that the real power lay with the military; 'The 
soldiers' verdict was followed by the fathers' decisions'. This assessment of political 
realities appeared to be confirmed by the depiction of the events that brought Claudius 
to power. Although we lack Tacitus' account, those of Suetonius and Josephus were 
such as to make it highly unlikely that the author of the Annals would have interpreted 
matters any more favourably in terms of the senate's real autonomy. Certainly in his 
Ceremony: Amm. Marc. 26. 4. 3. Marcian and Leo: Whitby (2000) p. 470; MacCormack p. 243-
246. 'Little Boot': Suet. Calig. 9; Cass. Dio 57. 5. 6. Mutiny: Tac. Ann. 1. 41. 1; Suet Calig. 9. Ennia 
Naevia: Suet. Galig. 12. 
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account of later events in Claudius' reign, Tacitus indicated what he saw as the basis of 
that emperor's power. During the political crisis attendant upon the 'marriage' of Silius 
and Messalina in 48 CE, the historian had Claudius' friends advise him that 
'...he should go to the army, he should consolidate the Praetorian 
cohorts, he should consider security before revenge.' 
These examples support a view of soldiers as being a recognised element in the 
establishment and maintenance of an emperor's power.. 
Although Campbell piled up evidence to sustain his alternative outlook, much of it 
seems capable of an interpretation that contradicts his analysis. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that his arguments in support of those views progressively 
weakened. In dealing with the Emperor Hadrian, he moved from the de jurelde facto 
distinction to citation of the standard criticisms of the SHA as a source. Thus an 
interesting reference to documentary evidence, Hadrian's letter to the senate 
apologising for accepting the troops' acclamation as emperor before the fathers had had 
a chance to decide on the accession, is brushed aside with references to the SHA's 
senatorial bias and Hadrian's conventional politeness. The letter's reported concluding 
aphorism, whether authentic or not, may as easily have reflected early second century 
political realities as those of the source's era, probably three hundred years later. The 
new ruler explained that his haste '...was due to the belief that the state could not be 
without an emperor'. Dio's criticism of Didius Julianus for appearing in the senate with 
an intimidatory force of troops has been described as 'hostile propaganda'. While it is 
true that neither Herodian nor the SHA was as explicit about the intended role of 
soldiers on this occasion, both included broadly similar accounts, the former in fact 
granting only a cursory mention of the senate's role in the Emperor's elevation.'^ ^^ 
The same three sources provided accounts of the accession of Macrinus in 217 CE. 
This involved a letter said to have been written to the senate in circumstances not 
dissimilar to those of Hadrian. According to Campbell, Cassius Dio (in a particularly 
uncertain section of his epitomised text) expressed anger because the new emperor had 
" ' Gains: Campbell (1984) p. 126-127, n. 28, 297 Avidius Cassius: Bowman (1970) p. 21-25; Cass. Dio 
72.23. I.Campbell: (1984) p. 378 and (1994) 310. Nero: Tac. ^«« . 12.69. 1-2; Cass. Dio 61. 3. 1. 
Claudius: Suet. Claud. 10; Joseph. BJ 204-214; T&c.Ann. 11. 31. 1. 
Hadrian: Campbell (1984) p. 378; SHA Had. 6. 1-2. Didius Julianus: Cass. Dio 74. 12. 1-2; 
Campbell (1984) p. 379; SHA Did Jul. 4. 3; Herodian. 2. 6.2, 11-13. 
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assumed the throne before acceptance by the senate. Although he went on to suggest 
that the ancient author was well aware of the political reality of Macrinus' reliance on 
the military, Campbell added by way of conclusion that 
' . . . i t is important that senators did feel even at this date that an emperor 
should approach them for the formal grant of his tities and powers'. 
Perhaps it was wishful thinking on Campbell's part that Cassius Dio's recorded 
expression of such a sentiment must equate to the reality of the protagonists' views. In 
fact Dio had already described Macrinus' cautious steps before claiming the throne. 
These included his careful contacts with military detachments scattered through 
Mesopotamia and an insistence that 'it was impious to put a senator to death'. Both 
Herodian and the SHA indicated Macrinus' stated deference to the senate, but also 
recorded the Emperor's prior acceptance of the throne from the soldiers. Herodian in 
fact suggested that after the assassination of Caracalla the army responded to the 
leadership of Macrinus not 
'...because of the soldiers' affection and loyalty, as from necessity and 
the urgency of the impending crisis.' 
Since this 'crisis' took the form of the Persian king, Artabanus,'.. .marching toward the 
Romans with a huge army', it could be argued that the soldiers' decision to accept the 
authority of Macrinus, the general on the spot, could hardly have been more responsive 
to the best interests of the state.'^ '' 
For Campbell, as for the ancient sources, the advent of Maximinus in 235 CE provided 
something of a climax to the series of accessions initiated by the military. This was 
largely because, in the words of Aurelius Victor, he '...was the first common soldier to 
seize power as the choice of the legions'. Eutropius spelled out the issue; '...the 
authority of the senate played no role and he himself was not a senator.' Herodian also 
stressed the 'lowly station' of Maximinus and went one step further than he had in the 
case of Didius Julianus, this time not mentioning the senate at all! In the process of 
drawing one of his typically moralising conclusions, Aurelius Victor provided 
significant direct and indirect commentary on this situation. Directly, he identified the 
death of Severus Alexander and the accession of Maximinus as a watershed of Roman 
greatness before decline, an assessment largely mirrored in the modem tradition. 
Macrinus: Campbell (1984) p. 379; Cass. Dio 78. 16. 2; ibid. 78. 11.4-5, 12. 2; SUA Mac. 6. 1-6; 
Herodian. 5. 1.2-8,4. 14.3. 
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Indirectly, Victor reinforced the more specific point about the effects of abandoning 
legal process ('...when there is universal confusion and nothing is done in its proper 
maimer'), by preceding his judgement with praise of Severus' reliance on renowned 
jurists to f i l l senior posts. In this context it must be worth recalling that the official 
posts held by Victor implied legal training and experience. Modem historians have 
continued the interpretative assumption that soldiers' involvement must have cut 
through some standard legal process, for example, in the treatment of Julian's 
acclamation at Paris in 360 CE.^ ^^  
In fact the bulk of the evidence on Roman Imperial accessions indicates no consistently 
applicable legal process to bring a new emperor to the throne. Rather there were a 
number of important constituencies whose agreement had to be obtained in whatever 
manner and sequence the circumstances made most appropriate. In that context, the 
demonstrable temporal primacy of military acclamation probably tells its own story. 
This view is supported by the priority given to military matters in other contexts. Thus, 
after noting their origins and parentage, Plutarch introduced Theseus and Romulus as 
being similar first as warriors, and only then as wise, city founders, rapers of women, 
unhappy family men and victims of civil unrest. In seeking to identify a strictly legal 
process of Imperial acclamation, Campbell's problems stemmed fi-om an apparent 
assumption that soldiers were not one of the relevant constituencies to be won over. 
This judgement was based on an assessment that the army played an essentially non-
political role, or rather that its constituent soldiers could not be regarded as one of the 
properly political elements of the state. Instead they were viewed as being motivated 
largely by short-term financial gain, this assessment itself being predicated on 
observations about the lowly social origins of troops. Evidence for nobler motivations 
can certainly be extracted from our ancient sources, perhaps more frequently than 
modem interpretations usually allow. Thus, the role of the urban cohorts and 
Praetorians in the accession of Claudius has been typically characterised in terms of 
disloyalty to the senate, self-preservation and greed; this may be correct, but the 
evidence permits other interpretations. For example, the actions of the urban cohort 
'soldier' who forestalled the senate's armed resistance to Claudius' elevation by the 
Maximinus: Aur. Vict. Caes. 25; Eutr. 9. 1; Herodian. 6. 9. 5-7. 1. 1. Watershed: OCD3p. 1331. 
Legal process: Aur. Vict. Caes. 24. Julian: Amm. Marc. 20. 4. 12-19; Hunt 56-58; Lendon (1997) 261-
262. 
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Praetorians may equally have been motivated by a desire to prevent a pointless civil 
war. Suetonius related a story in which 'a common soldier' committed suicide as a sure 
way to have his news of a defeat believed. The author invested in the significant 
corroboration of citing the direct observation of his own father to support the veracity 
of this accoimt. Tacitus reported the similar action of a centurion. Valerius Maximus 
told a rather complex story about a soldier who refused a lavish reward offered by a 
rich former slave, but accepted a lesser one from his commander, Scipio Africanus. The 
moral drawn by the author was, '...there is no rank too humble to be affected by the 
sweetness of glory'. Whatever the scale and pervasiveness of soldiers' pecuniary 
motivation, it serves to introduce another element in the interaction between an 
emperor and his army, that is, the donativum?^^ 
The Donative 
In addition to his regular pay, the Roman soldier had traditionally received extra 
financial rewards. At the capture of New Carthage in 209 BCE Polybius described an 
apparentiy established and highly organised system by which the victorious army 
collected and shared booty 'according to the Roman custom'. During the first century 
BCE military leaders such as Pompey had distributed huge rewards to their troops. 
These payments continued during the civil wars, culminating in Augustus' donation of 
1,000 sesterces to each of his 120,000 veterans in 29 BCE. In his will he left money to 
the Praetorians, urban cohorts and legionaries. Tiberius honoured and doubled these 
bequests before in turn leaving money to the troops in his own will. Although 
Suetonius made little of the information, in fact using it in a section suggesting 
Tiberius' lack of generosity, it was perhaps a significant development that the Emperor 
also rewarded troops for their conspicuous loyalty during the crisis over Sejanus. In 
particular the Praetorians received a large amount of cash, 4,000 sesterces, for not 
supporting their prefect's supposed plans for usurpation. Gains emulated Tiberius' 
doubling of his predecessor's legacies to the soldiers, but perhaps charted new territory 
as the first ruler to pay a donative on campaign.^ ^" 
Siinilarities: Rom. X. l,. Nolwpolitical: Campbell (1984) p. 375. Motivated by money: ibid. p. 117. 
Social status: ibid. p. 9-10. Claudius' accession: Levick (1990) p. 31-33; Joseph. BJ2.211-2U. 
Soldier suicides: Suet. Otho 10. 1; Tac. Hist. 3. 54. Reward: Val. Max. 8. 14. 5. 
Rewards: Polyb. 10. 16; Plut. Pomp. 45. 3; RG 15; le Bohec p. 214-217. Augustus' will: Tac. Ann. 
1.8.2; Suet. Tib. 48. Tiberius: Suet. Tib. 76,48, 65. Gains: Cass. Dio 59. 2. 3; Suet. Calig. 46. 
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Our sources identified dramatic change with the accession of Claudius. Suetonius 
declared him to be '...the first of the Caesars to have won the loyalty of the soldiers 
with bribery' as he promised the Praetorians an unprecedented 15,000 sesterces per 
man. Despite the unusually direct involvement of those troops in his accession, it seems 
unlikely that soldiers in the rest of the army were ignored. Nero appeared to follow the 
precedents set by his predecessors, on his accession promising to the Praetorians '...all 
that Claudius had given them' and later paying them money in the aftermath of Piso's 
conspiracy, '...as i f to expound achievements in war.' I will return to Claudius when 
drawing together the issues of military acclamation and the donative. For the moment, 
it is clear that special payments to troops were regularly made by emperors and indeed 
by most pretenders to the throne. The amounts seemed to vary, although the significant 
but uncertain effects of coin debasement and inflation make comparisons difficult. 
Nevertheless, the unusually large amount of 20,000 sesterces paid by Marcus Aurelius 
and Lucius Verus on their coming to joint power in 161 CE is perhaps worthy of 
special notice, particularly in relation to that regime's later financial difficulties. It is 
true that lacking Cassius Dio or any other more reliable source, we must have recourse 
to the Historia Augusta for the details. However, it is relevant that the author of that 
source discussed the donatives of other emperors as a matter of routine. For example, 
he mentioned that of Pertinax no less than three times.^ '^ 
The accession donative of Marcus and Lucius was exceeded in our sources only by that 
of Didius Julianus. He paid the Praetorians 25,000 sesterces per head in 193 CE. For 
this act he was described as having purchased the Empire 'shamefully, disgracefully 
and fraudulently' in circimistances of the utmost confusion and irregularity. The 
situation in 161 CE could hardly have been more different. Hadrian had identified 
special qualities in Marcus as a boy and had later insisted that Antoninus Pius adopt 
him when he in turn was adopted as the Emperor's successor. Thus, as early as 138 CE 
Marcus Aurelius had appeared destined for the throne: 
'...for he (Hadrian) wished to appomt those who were afterwards to be 
emperors for as long a time ahead as possible.' 
Claudius: Suet. Claud. 10. Other soldiers: Campbell (1994) p. 166-167. Nero and precedent: 
Cass. Dio 61. 3. 1. Piso, Tac. Ann. 15. 72. 1. Other emperors: Campbell (1984) p. 169-170. 
Debasement and inflation: Burnett p. 105-121. Marcus Aurelius: SHA Marc. 7. 9. Financial 
difficulties: ibid 17. 4-5. Pertinax: SHA Pert. 4. 6, 6. 6, 15. 7. 
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On his deathbed, Antoninus Pius named him as successor and his daughter's future 
husband. He also transferred to Marcus' apartments the statue of Fortuna '...which was 
wont to stand in the bed-chamber of the emperor'. In addition, Marcus had already 
played a progressively larger role as the aging Antoninus declined in health. After 
Antoninus' long reign there were no immediate external threats to Rome and, 'The 
armies were restrained by the firm but gentle hand of...successive emperors'. In short, 
it is hard to bring to mind another accession about which there was less doubt or a 
greater consensus, or which took place more smoothly. In this context, scholars have 
found it difficult to understand the apparent generosity of the donative in 161 CE. It has 
been described as an 'expensive ceremony...(that) was not perhaps immediately 
necessary.' Suggestions that a double donative constituted 'useful insurance' convey 
little more than a determination to put forward some plausible explanation. The 
reflection that: 
'It was emperors who desperately needed military support who had to 
make promises of this kind...' 
should lead to alternative analyses. Perhaps another rather bald suggestion from the 
same source, that a double accession required a double donative, holds the possibility 
of greater illumination. Although the point is left unexplored it may be that an unusual 
accession called for more than usually careflil political handling of the army.^ ^^  
Part of the problem possibly resides in the mindset reflected in Birley's use of the term 
'ceremony'. Campbell employed the same word in relation to the donative of Gains 
and he used it again when referring to a scene depicted on Trajan's Column (Plate 22 
i). It seems highly likely that a ceremonial element would be built into such an event 
where possible. Also the occasion would inevitably develop its own forms of 
correctness and display. Nevertheless, I detect in the usage of both Birley and 
Campbell a sense of the 'merely ceremonial' as opposed to the politically 
legitimate/acceptable. Despite their intrinsic bias in favour of the senate, the ancient 
sources may have betrayed a different feel for the balance of events. Thus, in 161 CE 
Marcus and Lucius 
Didius Julianus: Herodian. 2. 6. 12; Cass. Dio 74. 11. 3. Marcus: SHA Marc. 1. 10; Hadrian: Cass. 
Dio 69. 21. 1; Antoninus Pius: SHA Ant. Pius 12. 5-6; Birley (1987) p. 114. Restrained armies: 
Gibbon Ch. I l l 'Happiness of the Romans' p. 95. Expensive ceremony/emperors needing military 
support/double accession: Birley (1987) p. 117-118. 
238 
Plate 22 
(i) Trajan's 
• 'ceremonial' adlocutio 
and (ia*j: 
ima Porta 
(iv) Augustus 
BMC 418 
'.. .when they had done those things which had to be done in the presence 
of the senate, they set out together for the Praetorian camp', 
perhaps conveying a meaning of 'after some necessary preliminaries, the real task (of 
confirming the will of the soldiers) was undertaken'. In a similar vein, for his initial 
address to the senate, Nero had reminded the assembled fathers that he had already 
obtained the soldiers' consensus.'^ ^^  
It may well be that the donative was a more politically complex phenomenon than is 
suggested by its characterisation as either a routine ceremony or a bribe. A cryptic 
comment in Cassius Dio could provide support for this view. After a major victory 
against Germans who had threatened Italy itself, Marcus was said to have refused his 
soldiers' demand for a special donative, arguing that anything beyond their normal 
payments would have to be '.. .wrung from the blood of their parents and kinsmen.' He 
is then said to have continued '...as for the fate of the sovereignty. Heaven alone could 
determine that'. This event probably took place in the spring of 170 CE. Lucius Verus 
had died a year previously and even though Marcus' younger son, Verus, had also just 
died, it is hard to see why there should have been any threat to the throne at that point. 
Cassius Dio's juxtaposition of a refused donative and a question mark over the 
sovereignty may of course have reflected his experience and prejudices about soldiers 
and politics (see pages 218-219). In a similar vein, ancient commentators had seen it as 
necessary to seek a reason for Galba's failure to pay a special donative on the ill-fated 
adoption of Calpumius Piso as his successor in 69 CE. Suetonius appeared to view the 
matter merely as a political blunder that opened the way for Otho to usurp the throne 
five days later. Tacitus, on the other hand, gave the issue greater attention. Bearing in 
mind his generally negative attitude to soldiers' involvement in politics, it is interesting 
that he seemed to see the absence of a donative (which he defined as 'bounty and 
bribery', and thus an 'immoral' way of gaining their 'goodwill') as legitimising the 
role of troops in a clearly political occasion. These examples, then, may relate to the 
wider political significance of the donative. Illumination may be derived from the idea 
that the donative represented a gesture recognising a special relationship. Such a 
relationship has been hinted at by modem scholars, for example, in viewing the 
doriativfe as^ mechffiisrh for inspiring gratitude within a wider system of benefits and 
Merely ceremonial: Campbell (1984) p. 126-127, 183. Military precedence: SHA Marc. 7. 9; Tac. 
Ann. 13.4. 
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obligations. As far as ancient evidence is concerned, it is noteworthy that Herodian 
identified the accession of Didius Julianus in 193 CE as the occasion on which '...the 
Praetorians were corrupted for the first time'. Although not usually credited with great 
political insight, it is hard to believe that this historian was unaware of the recorded 
behaviour of the Imperial guards when other emperors had come to the throne, 
illustrated by comments such as those of Suetonius regarding Claudius.^ *'* 
The emperor's image on military standards 
Within the operation of acclamation and the donative, concentration has been on the 
examination of evidence for an overtly political dimension in the army's role. Analysis 
has suggested that such a dimension did exist, providing support for a view that the rule 
the emperors was characterised by a strongly coercive element. The analysis can be 
strengthened by evidence of individual and personal aspects of the relationship between 
the emperor and his troops. This was manifest in a number of significant ways. 
Amongst these, and bridging the political and the personal, was the use of Imperial 
images on military standards, particularly in relation to changes of regime. 
An illustration of the traditional status of a legion's standard was provided by Livy. In 
the context of Scipio's capture of New Carthage in 210 BCE, the historian had rival 
military units use their standards in a sacred oath concerning claims to achievements 
during the fighting. Exaggerating for the sake of rhetorical effect, TertuUian declared 
that a soldier 
'...venerated the standards, swore by the standards, set the standards 
before all the gods.' 
Like TertuUian, interpreting this status and respect from a Christian standpoint, John 
Chrysostom equated St Paul's role as representative of Christ with that of standard-
bearing soldiers as agents of the emperor. It was certainly true that the eagle 
represented the spirit of a legion and was treated with great respect, being housed in the 
camp shrine. That it could take on a wider political and psychological significance was 
nowhere better illustrated than in the emphasis placed by Augustus on the recovery of 
standards. Lost to the Parthians by Crassus thirty-three years earlier, legionary 
Donative and sovereignty: Cass. Dio 71. 3. 3-4; OCD3 p. 220. Benents and obligations: Lendon 
(1997) p. 257; see also, Flaig; Lintott (1994) p. 131 suggested that such an analysis may be overstated. 
Galba: Suet. Galb. 17; Tac. Hist. 1.17; Coulston p. 98. Didius Julianus: Herodian 2. 6. 14; Claudius: 
Suet. Claud 10.. 
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standards were returned by means of diplomatic pressure in 20 BCE. From today's 
perspective, and indeed in the view of Cassius Dio, there must have been exaggeration 
involved in claiming this event as a military victory. Nevertheless, its real importance 
may well reflect both the significance to the Romans of obtaining deference from 
others and the intrinsic ideological value placed on the standards. Both explanations 
appear necessary to justify the prominence of the occasion in iconography (Plate 22 ii-
iv) and in the weight given to the return of these standards, and others from Spain, Gaul 
and Dalmatia, in Augustus' account of his achievements. The Res Gestae stated that the 
recovered standards were placed in the Temple of Mars Ultor. By so doing Augustus 
added to the religious significance of legionary insignia and thus to their over-all 
importance. Support for the standards' ideological role can be found in Livy's account 
of an important occasion in Roman myth/history. On returning to the ruins of Rome 
after its sack by the Gauls in 390 BCE, the senate was on the point of deciding to 
abandon the site and migrate to Veii, when a centurion's cry was heard from outside 
the Curia Hostilia, "Standard-bearers, fix your ensign; here will be our best place to 
remain". This chance order was interpreted as an omen and decided the debate. The 
ideological function of the military standards is given extra weight by the association 
between the implied re-founding of the City in this story and the significance of 
Augustus' image as a second founder.^ ^^ 
Such a context gives added relevance to the fact that images of the emperor were 
portrayed on the legionary standards. Examples can still be seen of Trajan on reliefs 
from his Column, and of Septimius Severus on the Arch of the Argentarii (Plate 23 i 
and ii). Literary references reinforce the importance of these likenesses. In line with 
their use in Augustan diplomacy described above, military insignia and Imperial 
images were combined in relations between Rome and the Parthian king, Artabanus. In 
the reign of Gains, that foreign monarch was reported to have 
'...crossed the Euphrates to offer his respects to the eagles and 
standards of Rome and to the portraits of the Caesars.' 
However, it was perhaps in the context of violent changes of regime that the 
association could be seen to operate most clearly. As a dramatic indication of Otho's 
Respect for the military standard: Livy 26. 48. 12; Tert. Apol. 16. 8. John Chrysostom: Ando p. 
259); Herodian 4. 4. 4; Ando p. 259-265. Parthians: Cassius Dio 54. 8; RG 29. Gauls: Livy 5. 55. 1. 
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Plate 23 
(i) Trajan's 
i Column 
(ii) Arch of 
Argentarii 
military coup against Galba in 69 CE, Tacitus described the act of the standard bearer 
of the latter's guard as he 
'.. .tore off the effigy of Galba and flung it to the ground. This signal 
clearly showed that all the troops were for Otho.' 
The significance of this act beyond its immediate context was increased by the 
historian calling on 'tradition' to support his record of the name of this standard bearer. 
Such an explicit evocation of the collective memory elevates the importance of the 
account. At a later stage in the civil wars of 68-69 CE, the soldiers of Vitellius were 
reported as demonstrating a shift of loyalty to Vespasian by removing the former's 
images from their standards. The general association between military standards and 
the emperors was illustrated in Tacitus' account of the Civilis episode during the same 
crisis. At one point: 
'The emperors' medallions had been torn down and their standards 
desecrated...'. 
The points of particular interest here are the reference to representations of more than 
one emperor and the fact that the standards, so closely associated with the legions, are 
said to belong to the emperors. This iconic significance of the juxtaposition of eagles 
and portraits of the emperors surely justifies Campbell's conclusion that: 
'To smash and tear down the imperial imagines was not casual 
vandalism, but a gesture of political and military disloyalty to the 
reigning emperor, and indeed almost a formal indication of revolt' 
Confirmation of this special element in the relationship between an emperor and his 
soldiers can be found in the application of the maiestas law. The penalty laid down for 
a soldier who defaced an Imperial portrait was more severe than that for a civilian. This 
distinction serves to introduce wider aspects of the legal and social position of soldiers. 
The evidence will reveal related personal and legal elements of the emperors' close 
connection with the army, demonstrating his identification with the troops and 
emphasising his reliance on military support.^ ^^  
Imperial images on standards: Suet. Calig. 14; Cassius Dio (59. 27. 3) described the role of images 
of Augustus and Gaius in this incident, but made no explicit mention of military standards. Otho and 
Galba: Hist. 1. 41. Vitellius and Vespasian: Cassius Dio 64. 10. 3; Tacitus///*/. 2. 85; 3. 13. Civilis: 
ibid. Hist. 4. 62. Revolt: Campbell (1984) p. 99. Maiestas: Dig. 48. 4. 7. 4. 
242 
Emperor and Soldiers: a very personal relationship 
In response to considerable Roman casualties during the Jewish uprising of 132 CE, 
the Emperor Hadrian was said to have altered the usual opening of an emperor's letter 
to the senate. According to the epitomator of Cassius Dio, the greeting 'commonly 
affected' ran thus, " I f you and your children are in health, it is well; I and the legions 
are in health". A specific use of this familial rhetoric was ascribed to Commodus. In 
addressing the troops at the start of his reign, the young emperor stated his conviction 
that his father 
'...took greater delight...in calling me "fellow soldier" than in calling 
me "son", for he considered the latter a title bestowed by Nature, the 
former, a partnership based on excellence'. 
The depth of the emperor's feelings towards his soldiers could certainly be 
reciprocated. In an important section of his narrative, Velleius Paterculus armounced 
his £irrival as an officer under Tiberius in the German campaign of 4 CE. The author, in 
full panegyrical style, proceeded to gild the lily of his own praise of the newly adopted 
heir of Augustus. He recounted the passionate responses of the soldiers: 
'.. .tears which sprang to their eyes at the sight of him... "Is it really you 
that we see, commander? Have we received you safely back among 
us?'". 
In a tellingly incidental detail, Valerius Maximus suggested the physical union of his 
most revered Roman leader, Julius Caesar, and the soldiers under his command; he 
described them as '...the unconquered right hand of the unconquered general.' The 
intimacy between emperors and their soldiers advertised by such examples requires no 
underlining. In the following, consideration will be given to various features 
characterising that close relationship: the soldiers' oath; nomenclature of the emperor 
and of his legions; and military aspects of the emperor's formal and informal 
behaviour.^ ^^ 
The Military Oath 
Dionysius of Halicamassus declared the soldier's oath of allegiance, the sacramentum, 
to be the most strictly observed of all Roman oaths. The seriousness of the vow must 
have been bolstered by its heavily religious character. This was intrinsic to its Latin 
Parental rhetoric: Cass. Dio 69. 14. 3; Herodian 1. 5. 3. Tiberius: Veil. Pat. 2. 104. 3-4. Julius 
Caesar: Val. Max. 7. 6. 5. 
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name and can be seen on coinage, such as a sestertius of Domitian showing Emperor 
and soldier shaking hands over an altar. Herodian also referred to it as '.. .that sacred 
rite of the Roman Empire' and it played a significant role in what has been called the 
Roman army's 'highly sacralised community'. Although in fact describing Samnite 
practice, Livy provided detail of the duty, mystery and awe surrounding the ceremony 
of the military oath. In the Roman context Livy stated that the oath had ancient origins 
in voluntary undertakings made by troops to their commander and in their mdividual 
units. He reported that this informal procedure had been replaced by a 
'...formal oath, administered by the general officers, to the effect that 
they would assemble for service on the consuls' orders'. 
Although the historian did not make the point explicitly, it was probably significant that 
this change took place in 216 BCE during the crisis caused by Hannibal's invasion of 
Italy. Be that as it may, later crises certainly influenced the development of the 
sacramentum. The oath had always been sworn to named magistrates of the Republic. 
However, in the military and political turmoil of the first century BCE it received a 
more decidedly personal emphasis. Before embarking for Brundisium in 84 BCE, 
Sulla's troops were said to have sworn '.. .to stand by him and to do no damage in Italy 
except by his orders (my emphasis)'. Plutarch stressed the ominous nature of this event 
by immediately preceding it with the fantastic story of Sulla's horror at the failure of a 
captured satyr ('just like those represented by sculptors and painters') to communicate 
anything intelligible. In the account he gave of his struggle for supremacy against 
Pompey, Julius Caesar highlighted the significance of the sacramentum in determining 
to whom particular bodies of troops were loyal.^ ^^ 
Despite carefully claiming to have acted in a way that 'championed the liberty of the 
Republic', Augustus could not have been clearer in pointing to the personal nature of 
the oath: 
'The Roman citizens who took the soldier's oath of obedience to me 
numbered about 500,000.' 
I do not intend to enter into the debate about the genuineness or otherwise of Tiberius' 
wish to return to more Republican forms of government. However, it is noteworthy that 
Strictly observed oath: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 11. 43. 2; OCD3 p. 1343. Altar: BMC Domitian 301; 
Herodian. 8. 7.4; Lendon (1997) p. 253. Samnites: Livy 10. 38. Origins: ibid. 22. 38. Crises: Plut. 5M//. 
27. 3. Caesar: B Civ. 2. 32. 
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in Cassius Dio's account he was already surrounded by loyal troops when he parried a 
facetious suggestion that he be given an official bodyguard with the statement that, 
'The soldiers do not belong to me, but to the State.' To reinforce the real point, Cassius 
Dio ensured that this comment was fixed into a context in which he had detailed the 
Emperor's predilection for never saying what he really thought; in fact '...his words 
indicated the exact opposite of his real purpose'. In case the meaning was still not clear, 
Dio immediately followed Tiberius' remark about the soldiers with an example of his 
subject's duplicity: 
'...he was administering in reality all the business of the Empire while 
declaring that he did not want it at all'. 
In the next chapter Cassius Dio indicated the actual situation. Tiberius 
'...had previously made sure of the soldiers in Italy by means of the 
oaths of allegiance established by Augustus.'^ ^^ 
Tacitus provided an interesting perspective on the issue in his account of legions 
swearing loyalty to 'the senate and people of Rome' rather than to Galba as a named 
princeps. The historian pointedly referred to the troops' chosen wording as 'obsolete' 
and clearly implied that it concealed their actual partisanship for Vitellius. Of the 
alternative versions, Suetonius gave an account of the occasion in the context of the 
German legions' dissatisfaction with Galba. Although the biographer reported without 
comment that the soldiers '...refused to swear their oath...unless it was in the name of 
the senate', he immediately described their decision to send a delegation to Rome to 
seek an emperor '...who would be approved of by the armies'. Plutarch invoked what 
he saw as the 'lawless spirit' of the troops in explaining their refusal to swear to Galba, 
again noting their alternative oath 'to the senate and people of Rome'. It is striking that 
in this context he referred to the declined Imperial oath as being 'customary'. Cassius 
Dio did not mention the oath incident at all; instead, with characteristic disdain for their 
motives, he merely reported that the soldiers had failed to get any favour from Galba 
and therefore '...sought to obtain it under some other leader'. It may well be the case 
that, as a focus for their oath of loyalty, SPQR provided the German legions with 
nothing more than 'a convenient political slogan'. However, i f authentic, the 
occuifence suggested clear knowledge on the part of the military, not only of the 
Tiberius and the Republic: See Levick (1999a) p. 761T. Real situation: Cass. Dio 57. 1. 1 - 3. 2. 
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basically personal nature of their allegiance, but also of an awareness of the political 
significance of that allegiance in relation to alternative loyalties. Perhaps more 
straightforwardly, Tacitus' account of the earliest moves in the elevation of the next 
emperor gave pride of place to the soldiers' oath: 
'The move to confer the throne on Vespasian began at Alexandria, 
where Tiberius Alexander with great promptitude administered the oath 
of allegiance to his troops on 1 July. This was later celebrated as his day 
of accession'.•^ ^^  
Other evidence from the Imperial period, although not plentiful, confirms the nature of 
the sacramentum as loyalty to the person of a particular emperor. Plutarch underlined 
this feature of the oath during the crisis that led to the end of Galba's reign. During the 
confused fighting in Rome, a soldier forced his way into Galba's presence brandishing 
a bloodied sword and shouting that he had killed an enemy of Caesar. The emperor 
asked him on whose orders he had shed this blood. Plutarch had the soldier reply 
'.. .that it was his fidelity and the oath he had sworn'. Epictetus referred to new recruits 
swearing '...an oath to value the safety of the emperor above everything'. In three of 
his letters Pliny reported to Trajan that the oath of loyalty had been re-administered on 
the anniversary of his accession. The Emperor's warm replies attested to the personal 
nature of this ceremony and his use of the expression commilitones ('comrades/fellow-
soldiers') reinforced the closeness of the relationship."^ '^ 
"My fellow-soldiers" 
Trajan's personalised references to his soldiers presumably reflected his particularly 
long and close relationship with them. Pliny's claim that the subject of his panegyric 
had spent ten of his formative years in the army may well be exaggerated, although the 
fiiture emperor certainly had extensive and varied experience of military life. 
Nevertheless, it appears that Trajan was by no means the first Roman leader to use this 
form of address. Suetonius felt it to be worthy of note that Julius Caesar referred to his 
soldiers as commilitones rather than milites. He added the editorial comment that, in so 
doing, Caesar was flattering the troops. From his early second century CE perspective. 
Tacitus: Hist. I. 55, 57. Suetonius: Galb. 16. Plutarch: Galb. 22. 3-4. Cassius Dio: 64. 4. 1. 
Campbell (2002b) p. 110. Slogan: Wellesley p. 15. Vespasian: Hist. 2. 79. 
Galba's loyal soldier: Plut. C 
Ep. 10.35,36, 52, 53, 100, 101. 
Galb. 26. 1-2. New recruits: Arr. Epict. Diss. 1. 14. 15. Trajan: Plin. 
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Suetonius may have been reflecting distaste for soldiers' involvement in politics sunilar 
to that of Tacitus. Writing a little later in the same century, Appian, a historian of 
pronounced conservative and monarchist leanings, identified as a fatal blow to concord 
and stability a situation in which soldiers fought 
'...not against the common enemy, but against private foes...lending 
assistance.. .to leaders who needed them for their own personal ends.'^ ^^  
Such an assessment was said by Suetonius to lie behind Augustus' reported decision, 
taken after 31 BCE, that the personal commitment suggested by commilitones language 
was inappropriate in the official pronouncements of the newly stabilised res publico. 
The biographer added the convincing circumstantial detail that the princeps forbad his 
family to employ such terms while they were holding military office. Nevertheless, 
Quintilian had included an example of Augustus using commilito in direct conversation 
with a soldier. A story was included by Cassius Dio in which the first princeps was 
shamed into making an appearance in court on behalf of a soldier. The trooper's 
response to Augustus' initial disinclination to attend in person was recorded as: 
'But whenever you needed my help, I did not send somebody else to act 
in my place, I came myself and faced the danger'. 
It must be reasonable to assume that a riposte of this quality represented either Cassius 
Dio's literary source or the product of his own early third century CE imagination. In 
either case, or indeed if the quotation was authentic to its setting of about 9 BCE, the 
incident as reported adds useful weight to a view of the perceived closeness of an 
emperor and his soldiers. Even if the firmly established first princeps made efforts to 
avoid signs of over-familiarity with soldiers 
' . . . i t was he who established the idea of the army as a specially 
privileged group, requiring particular attention from the emperor.' 
The idea of there being a personal relationship between emperor and his soldiers can 
find support in wider evidence. The bond between a Roman commander and his froops 
can certainly be seen to go beyond the loyalty of each party towards the state. 
According to Plutarch, during his campaign in Italy against Hannibal, Fabius Maximus 
negotiated an exchange of prisoners. A ransom sum was agreed in the event of the 
numbers not being equal. Foreshadowing its response after Cannae, the Roman senate 
Trajan: Plin. Pan. 15. 3; Bennett p. 23.Caesar: Suet. Jul. 67; Caes. B Civ. 5. 17. 
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refiised to ratify the payment of money to effect the return of men whose capture it 
regarded as having demonstrated their cowardice. Fabius, however, sold his property in 
Rome to raise the money himself, refusing any later repayment by the ransomed 
men.^ ^^  
There is no direct evidence that Tiberius or any later emperor before the civil wars of 
68-69 CE addressed soldiers as commilitones. However, in the reigns of all the Julio-
Claudians, with the significant exception of Nero, the sentiment i f not the language can 
be demonstrated. During the mutinies of 14 CE Drusus read a letter from Tiberius to 
the unsettled troops. In it the Emperor alluded to the fact that he had shared the 
soldiers' hardships on campaign. Mention has already been made of some of the 
elements linking Gaius with the army (pages 231-232). As emperor he developed these 
into eccentric, self-conferred titles, for example, 'Son of the Camp' and 'Father of the 
Forces'. The exfraordinary circumstances of his accession and his lack of military 
experience provided Claudius with a special need to emphasise his relationship with the 
army. Coins depicting him shaking hands with a soldier and including legends denoting 
mutual acceptance illustrated the point. The glamour of Nero's blood relationship to 
Augustus may be one explanation for the soldiers' residual loyalty towards him after 
his death. Even during the early stages of the revolts in 68 CE many of the German 
legions were slow to move against their emperor. During his reign he appeared to show 
no consistent effort to cultivate the army, although an interesting exception possibly 
proved the rule. Nero's designation of certain legions as 'his crack troops' was cited by 
Tacitus as a reason for their relative enthusiasm for the Emperor. This detail invites 
speculation about the grip on power that Nero might have achieved had he devoted 
more attention to such matters. However, against such a minor positive instance was 
the general perversion of military values evident in many of the Emperor's major 
activities. Notable here were the travesties of triumphs held to celebrate his entry to 
Rome on the death of his mother in 59 CE, the aftermath of the Pisonian conspiracy in 
65, his reception of Tiridates in 66 and return from the artistic tour of Greece in 68. It 
must be germane to a consideration of the political role of soldiers that commilitones 
language became prominent i f not standard in our sources for the civil wars of 68-69 
CE. Campbell stated it to be '...the usual form of address to soldiers' during that 
Family usage: Suet. Aug. 25; Campbell (1984) p. 33-34. Augustus: Quint. Inst.6. 3. 95; Cass. Dio 
55. 4. 2.Army as privileged group: Campbell (1984) p. 283. Fabius Maximus: Plut. Fab. Max. 1. 3-5. 
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period. Tacitus gave the term prominence in the introductory exhortations of paired 
speeches by Piso (on behalf of Galba) and by Otho.'^ '^' 
Sources such as Josephus, Cassius Dio and Herodian recorded the Greek equivalent of 
commilitones (sustratiotai) being commonly used by Roman leaders/emperors in the 
first, second and third centuries. Josephus employed the word m the introduction of a 
speech by Titus, and Dio had Marcus Aurelius use the term three times at rhetorically 
important points in a speech to soldiers. The fact that this oration took place in the 
context of the revolt of Avidius Cassius possibly gave the language greater 
significance. Instances in Herodian included the use of commilitones language by 
Macrinus and Severus Alexander, and Caracalla's seeming pleasure at being so 
addressed by the soldiers themselves. Usages by, for example, Plato and Aristotle, 
indicate that these commanders were employing, not some special form of address, but 
language that could be applied to any group of soldiers.^ ^^ 
The potency and political resonance of commilitones language becomes evident when it 
was deliberately withheld. The example from which others undoubtedly derived was 
attributed to Julius Caesar. It was recounted that he had responded to the indiscipline 
and unreasonable demands of the tenth legion by confronting them and addressing 
them as 'Quirites^ (citizens, civilians).The troops were immediately shamed into 
obedience, the incident illustrating a consciousness, at least on the part of ancient 
authors, of an important distinction between soldiers and civilians. That the importance 
of this language had been absorbed into the historical tradition (and possibly also the 
military/political tradition) can be seen in its use by Tacitus and later authors. Thus, 
Julius Caesar's rebuke was quoted by Germanicus as he attempted to quell the mutiny 
of the first and twentieth legions in 14 CE. The late fourth century author of the SHA 
included a substantial passage describing Severus Alexander in a similar predicament. 
Although this author is not usually credited with profound political analysis and 
Tiberius: Campbell (1984) p. 35-36; Tac. Am. 1. 25. 3. Gaius: Suet. Calig. 22. Claudius: BMC 
Claudius 5, 8. Nero - residual loyalty: Tac. Hist. 2. 11. German legions: Griffin (1984) p. 185. 
Enthusiasm: Tac. Hist. 2. 11. Perverted triumphs: Griffin (1984) p. 239-23L Civil wars: S^, for 
examplerTac: ///rt. I r83 and I>lut. Go//?. 27: 3ft :ampbeii i; iW^ 2,6. Piso: Tac. Hist. \. 29, 37. 
Titus: Joseph. BJ6. 34. Marcus Aurelius: Cass. Dio 72. 24. 1,25. 1, 26. 1; Campbell (1984) p. 38. 
Macrinus: Herodian 4. 14. 4. Severus Alexander: ibid. 6. 3. 3. Commodus: ibid. 1. 5. 3-4; Lendon 
(1997) p. 253-254. Caracalla: Herodian 4. 7. 6. Ordinary usage: PI. Resp. 556c; Arist. Eth. Nic. 
1159b28; Liddell and Scott p. 1736. 
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insight, his account is of interest here. The Emperor was described as dealing with a 
situation in which mutiny threatened because he had arrested disorderly troops. He 
opened his initial address to the resentful legionaries with a resounding 'Commilitones', 
going on to refer to the arrested troops as '...your companions, my comrades and 
fellow soldiers'. This appeal failing, as did a reminder to the soldiers that they were 
threatening '...him who gives you rations...clothing and pay', Alexander discharged 
them with the single word 'Quirites''; not only this, but he went on to question whether 
they could even be called 'citizens', since they were flouting Rome's laws. He thus 
identified the soldiers as a distinct element of the res publica, threatening that, should 
they kill him, 
'...the state and the senate and the Roman people will not lack someone 
to take vengeance for me upon you.' 
The sudden and 'marvellous' effect of this approach by the Emperor prompted editorial 
comment from the author that ' . . . i t illustrated how much could be accomplished by 
...strictness and discipline'. However fictional or derivative of Julius Caesar's account 
this may be, various elements of the Severus Alexander story serve to indicate a 
number of themes relevant to this thesis: the ideology of a close and personal 
relationship between emperor and his soldiers; a perception of the interconnected but 
distinct roles of the senate, people and army in the Roman state; and our elite sources' 
attitude that the soldiers must be kept under tight control.^ ^^ 
Formal nomenclature 
In addition to the informal linguistic usages between an emperor and his soldiers, more 
formal aspects also revealed the bond between the two. The battlefield origins of the 
term imperator have already been indicated (page 230). Literary sources named Julius 
Caesar as the first to use the title on a permanent basis. Cassius Dio reported that the 
senate bestowed on 
'...him first and for the first time, as a kind of proper name, the title of 
imperator (autokratory. 
The historian explicitly stated that it had formerly been earned in war and that the 
senate's purpose was 'excessive flattery'. Although Suetonius also included an account 
of this episode in a section listing Caesar's 'excessive honours', no coin or inscription 
Withholding commilitones language: Suet. lul. 70; App. B. Civ. 2. 92-94; Tac. Ann. 1.42. 3; SHA 
AlexSev. 52.3,53. 1-54. 6. 
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confirms the nomenclature. Cassius Dio indicated his anachronistic early third century 
perspective by adding that 
'.. .the same title is.. .now granted to all those who hold successively the 
supreme power.' 
A little earlier, and in a similar vein, a reference to an episode in the life of Scipio 
Afiicanus had illusfrated this changed outlook. Around 200 CE the compiler of 
geographical commonplaces, C. lulius Solinus, retold a story of the great general's 
acclamation as king by Spaniards and Carthaginians in the act of submitting to him. In 
Polybius' account, Scipio dutifully rejected the title (basileias), reminding the second 
group that imperator was the grandest honour acceptable to Romans. Livy included a 
similar version, transmitting basileus as rex. However, Solinus revealed the later 
merging of all these expressions by his rendition of the unacceptable term as caesar. 
Thus the earlier, subtly shifting uses and meanings of imperator and imperium no 
longer had any real political resonance. The former had its origins in the honouring of a 
commander by his troops, recognising leadership in an outstanding military 
achievement. The latter was rooted in the authority vested in magistrates by the Roman 
people. However, in phrases such as imperium populi Romani it was frequently 
sfretched to denote the collective power of the Roman people in relation to others. For 
example, Livy included the terms of a freaty imposed by the Romans on the Aetolian 
Greeks in 189 BCE. Its opening demand required that: 
'The Aetolian people shall maintain the sovereignty and majesty of the 
Roman people {imperium maiestatemquepopuli) with all good faith.' 
Again in 169 BCE he had the consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, address his troops about 
the fate that awaited their opponent, Perseus, as he challenged '...the Roman people, 
who now controlled the whole earth'. Augustus, in the careful handluig of his 
exceptional powers in the context of traditional Republican political forms, showed an 
awareness of the sensitivity surrounding these terms. Nevertheless reflecting the moves 
towards autocracy that characterised his reign, the language and ideology of collective 
power {imperium populi Romani) swung towards that of a grander, depersonalised 
entity {Imperium Romanum), the direction of which became the prerogative of the 
supreme leader.^ ^^  
'^"^  Imperator as a name: Cass. Dio 43. 44. 2-5; Suet. lul. 76; Syme (1958a) p. 176. Scipio and 
Solinus: Polyb. 10. 38,40; Livy 27. 19. 3-6; OCD3 p. 786; Millar (1992) p. 613. Aetolians: Livy 38. 
11.2. Perseus: ibid. 44. 1. 12. See Koebner p. 1-17 for an account of the amalgamation and 
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It is undoubtedly the case that an important element of Augustus' policy was based on 
the desire to distance himself from the military methods by which the principate was 
established. However, in summarising the early part of his career he claimed that he 
was saluted imperator twenty-one times. In fact Augustus went so far as to adopt 
imperator as a praenomen, coins appearing with that legend in 38 BCE. Syme, havmg 
characteristically satisfied himself that the adoption of the name did not imply any 
claim to special legal authority, nevertheless passed brief and accurate judgement on 
the usage. It was '...exorbitant, far outshining any predecessor or competitor.' The 
refusal by both Tiberius and Claudius to adopt the name seems likely to have been 
related to a perception that it was an 'unconstitutional' novelty. Within that analysis 
must have been calculations about the effectiveness and acceptability of 
acknowledgmg the established political role of the army. Following the military 
upheavals of 68-69 CE no such scruples were evident; Vespasian's Imperator Caesar 
Vespasianus Augustus becoming the pattern for subsequent emperors. Also in the 
Flavian period, the cormection became more firmly established between the name/title 
'Imperator' and real power. As younger brother to Titus, it was to an extent natural 
that Domitian should play the role of junior partner during the reign of their father, 
Vespasian. Of the three members of the dynasty, he held fewer in total and more 
suffect consulships. When his father and brother were carried through the sfreets on 
sedan chairs, Domitian followed using the less prestigious fransport of a litter. While 
his absence from the campaign explains his minor role in the Judean triumph, it is 
notable that Domitian received no formal acclamation for the military exploits that he 
did undertake, achieving his first title as Imperator only on his accession after Titus' 
death in 81 CE. Although the matter is uncertain, it is arguable that the earlier lack of 
this title indicated a deliberate policy of distancing the younger Flavian from executive 
power. 
Some of the emperor's honorific titles were also relevant to his relationship with the 
army. The cognomina ex virtute shared the Republican origins of imperator. These 
were derived from the names of towns or peoples conquered by particular generals. 
transformation of/ffiperd/dr and lmperium, especially p. 11. But see l^saac (1992) p. 395 for a different 
view. 
Augustus: RG 4. 1; Grueber p. 411; Syme (1958a) p. 182. Novelty: Suet. Tib. 62, Claud. 12; 
Campbell (1984) p. 94. Army's political role: Campbell (2002b) p. xiii-xiv; Peachin p. 1-2. Flavians: 
Jones, B. p. 18-21; Suet. Dom. 2 ; Levick (1999) p. 188-189,200. 
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The honour of adding such a title to his name could become hereditary. Thus, after his 
triumphs in the First Punic War, M. Valerius Maximus Messalla acquired the last part 
of his name in recognition of his securing Messana in Sicily. In a similar fashion, P. 
Cornelius Scipio Afiicanus earned his extra cognomen after his victory over the 
Carthaginians at Zama in 204 BCE. His adoptive grandson, P. Cornelius Scipio 
Aemilianus Afiricanus inherited the name and even added to it an unofficial 
Numantinus in recognition of his own 134 BCE achievements in Spain. Awareness of 
the political prestige attached to these honours is noticeable both in the frequency of 
the emperors' acquisition of such names and in sensitivity to their genuine military 
origins. Most obtained an honorific title referring to victory in war. For Gaius, 
Claudius and Nero, the name Germanicus had a hereditary element, although its 
adoption must have been seen as useful to those unmilitary emperors. This latter 
explanation may also have accounted for Vitellius' adoption of the name in 69 CE. 
True to their characters in our literary sources, Marcus Aurelius was recorded as being 
careful about his use of cognomina ex virtute, in contrast with his son, Commodus. 
Marcus accepted the use of Parthicus Maximus during the period that Lucius Verus, 
the author of the exploits on which the title was based, ruled with him as joint emperor. 
After the latter's death, however, Marcus reverted to Germanicus, a title related to his 
personal involvement in war. Commodus accepted Britannicus as a cognomen even 
though he was not present at the relevant victories of Ulpius Marcellus in 184 CE.^^ 
In an evocation of Scipio Aemilianus' Numantinus, Peachin noted that documentary 
sources tended to credit third century emperors with victory titles for which no 
authoritative official sanction can be found, for example from coins of the Roman mint. 
For his purpose, (the use of such titles to indicate a chronology), this provided a 
difficulty. However, as a demonstration of the breadth and depth of those emperors' 
claimed associations with military success, the high fi-equency of victory ascriptions 
and the wide variety of their sources are still significant. Examples from the large pool 
available include: Maximinus Thrax as Sarmaticus on a military discharge diploma; 
Trajan Decius credited with Dacicus and Germanicus on milestones in Spain and 
Pannonia; and Arabicus, Britannicus and Persicus amongst no less than twelve 
different such names linked to Aurelian. Sources for these included the SHA, coins and 
Honorific titles: OCD3 p. 1025, 1579, 398, 397. Emperors: Campbell (1984) p. 128-129. Marcus: 
SHA Marc. 12. 9. Commodus: Cass. Dio 73. 8. 2. 
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various papyri. More generally, Invictus (unconquered) became a regular Imperial title 
from the reign of Gordian III. Although an element of honours 'inflation' operated here 
as in the names of the legions (see below), the process could still be taken seriously. 
Macrinus was described as being too ashamed to accept the title of Parthicus, because 
he had not been victorious in his wars in the east. It was reported to be a joke on the 
part of Aurelian that after victory over the Carpi, a relatively minor Danubian tribe, he 
refused the title Carpisculus, because of its punning association with a word for a boot. 
Nevertheless, the incident indicated a serious hierarchy of such names, with precedence 
being ascribed to the likes of Gothicus and Parthicus?^^ 
Nomenclature could also play a significant role in cementing a particular legion's 
relationship with the emperor. The size, nature and individual identity of a Roman 
Imperial legion largely derived from the military reforms carried out by Marius in the 
early first century BCE. It was at that time that the eagle standard was adopted, 
symbolising the spirit of the unit. Developed into a standing professional force by 
Augustus, this structure remained stable until Diocletian's reorganisation towards the 
end of the third century. Originally designated only by numerals, recruitment by the 
contenders in the civil wars of the fu-st century BCE brought confijsion to this system 
and led to identification through nicknames. These often derived from the area in which 
a legion had been raised or had met with conspicuous success, for example, Legio III 
Gallica (formed from veterans of Caesar's Gallic wars) and V Macedonica (raised in 
43 BCE by Augustus for service in Macedonia). Such distinctions could become 
attached to legions as long as they functioned as distinct units. Various types of 
nomenclature demonsfrated links to the emperor. Some were straightforwardly derived 
from his name, such as the / / and VIII Augusta, and the IV Flavia raised by Vespasian. 
A negative example served to emphasize that the importance of such links went beyond 
that of honorific titles and became part of the system ensuring soldiers' fighting 
qualities. As a direct result of losing battles in Spain in 19 BCE, a legion led by 
Agrippa was punished in various ways, including being deprived of its title 'Augustan'. 
Other names reflected a ruler's favoured divinity, exemplified by Augustus' Legio XV 
Apollinaris and Domitian's / Flavia Minerva. This practice was still in operation 
'^^  Victory titles: Peachin p. 53-54. Maximinus Thrax: Peachin p. 58. Trajan Decius: ibid p. 68. 
Aurelian: ibid p. 9\. Invictus. Brunt (1990) p 478. Macrinus: Cassius Dio 78. 27. 3. Aurelian: SHA 
Aurel. 30. 5. 
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during the Tefrarchy, Diocletian's Jupiter being represented by the new / and IlJovia, 
and Maximian's Hercules as the //, III and IV Herculia. Both emperor and legion could 
share the positive aura of some names, for example the / / Traiana fortis ('sfrong') and 
Hadrian's XXX Ulpia victrix ('victorious'). A more specifically political message was 
contained in the designations of the VII and XI Claudia pia fidelis ('Claudian loyal and 
faithful'). These forces were so renamed after their refusal to support Scribonianus' 
revolt in 42 CE. Unusually Claudius had this confirmed by a vote in the senate. In line 
with his general analysis, Campbell suggests that in doing so Claudius was seeking to 
placate a senate that might have taken exception to so close an association between 
emperor and army. However, it appears equally plausible that he wished to demonstrate 
just such an association and to implicate the senate in flattering the troops. The 
reflection of political loyalty in legionary names was perhaps understandably 
highlighted during the civil wars of 68-69 CE. The VII Galbiana was raised m Spain 
while the 1 Macriana Liberatrix ('Macer's Liberating') was formed in Africa. It would 
seem natural that these names did not long outlive their sponsors' actual or attempted 
Imperial careers. Although it is interesting that Tacitus' reference to the VII Galbiana 
was in the context of events in Parmonia several months after Galba's death, perhaps 
the deliberate allusion helped to fill out the author's theme of general confusion, and of 
the seemingly irrational loyalties and disloyalties of the legions.^ "' 
That the eponymous naming of legions could be seen as going too far was illusfrated in 
Cassius Dio's account of Commodus. Among other excesses of personal glorification 
desired by that emperor was listed his wish to rename all the legions Commodiana. 
Caracalla actually achieved this distinction. Inscriptions indicate twenty-two legions 
bearing a title, Antoniniana, and thus related to his contemporary official name. Third 
century and later emperors maintained this pattern. For example, during that period, 
inscriptions record the I Minervia Antoniniana, I Minervia Severiana Alexandriana and 
/ Minervia Gordiana. Modem authors have also interpreted these developments as 
excesses and the inflation of titles and honours. However, such exaggeration, although 
real, may have demonsfrated the emperor's increasingly explicit reliance on the army. 
Linking this idea with the historical importance of imperium as representmg more 
Agrippa's legion: Cass. Dio 54. 11. Legionary names in general: Webster, G. p. 103-105; OCD3 p. 
839-842. Tetrarchy: Williams, S. p. 97. Claudius: Suet. Claud. 13; Campbell (1984) p. 90. Civil war: 
Tac.Hist.2. 86, 97; ibid 1.2. 
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generalised authority, Severus Alexander was described as demonstrating his civilitas 
by eschewing the use of all honorary tities except that of Imperator. Illusfrating the 
deep-seated historical roots of the relationship between command of the soldiers and 
political power, three hundred years earlier Pompey was also said to have taken care to 
retam that title when laying down all others on his return from the east in 63 BCE.^ *^ ^ 
Adlocutio 
In ancient historiography, speeches tended to take one of three forms: a leader's 
address to an assembly; an envoy's appearance before such a body in another country; 
and a general's amidst his froops. It is the last of these that is relevant to the present 
theme. Homer included a number of set-piece occasions in which the Achaean troops 
met in assembly to hear their leaders (and even, in the case of Thersites, an ordinary 
soldier) discuss important matters. The significance of these occasions appeared to be 
underlined by juxtaposition when Pafroclus was referred to as passing a spot '...where 
the assembly ground and place of justice were, and gods' altars'. Xenophon gave 
detailed accounts of speeches to assemblies of troops and of the resulting votes to 
establish a chosen course of action. Absent in Herodotus, the speech directly before a 
battle may have been a literary genre invented by Thucydides. Although the debate 
about their authenticity has champions on both sides. Woodman is convincing in his 
contention that the ancient author's own claims on this matter were severely limited.^"^ 
One of the more important points of direct contact between a Roman emperor and 
soldiers would have been the situation in which he addressed assembled troops. In our 
sources these included formal occasions, such as succession acclamations and 
inspections, and presumably less plarmed events, for example battlefield speeches. The 
substantial pictorial record provides possible evidence for their being relatively 
frequent and convincing evidence of their ideological importance. The scene and 
legend appeared first on a coin of Gaius, although Augustus had been depicted in an 
'address' pose without an audience or appropriate legend. Coins of other emperors are 
illusfrated. They show a presumably stylised setting, although Plutarch provided 
Cdmmodus: Cass. Dio 73. 15. 2. THiird Century 'inflation': CampbelT(1984) p. 92-93; Lendon 
(1997) p. 263; Gilliam p. 357. Severus Alexander: SHA Alex. Sev. 4. 1-3. Pompey: Yell. Pat. 2. 40. 3. 
"^^  Types of speech: Polyb. 12. 25a. 3; Hansen p. 161. Assemblies: //. 2. 90ff, 9. 15flF. Thersites: 2. 
226ff. Patroclus: 11. 806-807. Xenophon: An. 3. 2, 5. 6; Hansen p. 166; Hammond p. 249-250. Battle 
speeches: Hansen p. 172; Woodman p. 11. 
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evidence for the common sense use of an elevated platform. Scenes of adlocutio were 
placed on the Column of Trajan, the Arch of Constantine and on the early fourth 
century Arch of Galerius (Plate 24 i-iii).^ *''* 
Julius Caesar's accounts of his own exploits gave an indication of the frequency and 
range of a leader's oral contacts with the mass of his troops or at least of the impression 
of such communications that a conmiander wished to convey. Before the climactic 
Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BCE, he portrayed himself as '...giving the usual address to 
the troops' as he deployed them on the battlefield. This particular speech had a high 
political content, justifying the actions he had taken. Even so, Caesar claimed that on 
its conclusion his soldiers were 'afire with enthusiasm'. In fact the general quoted a 
verbal response from a particularly enthusiastic legionary. He recorded that elsewhere 
on the field he gave more straightforward tactical instructions and exhortations. In the 
account of his earlier conquest of Gaul, Caesar provided insight into the place of a 
battlefield address amongst the other tasks of a general. During a campaign against the 
Nervii in 57 BCE the army was caught off guard by a sudden attack. Writing as usual 
in the third person, he recalled that: 
'Caesar had to do everything at once - hoist the flag which was the 
signal for running to arms, recall the men from their work on the camp, 
fetch back those who had gone far afield in search of material for the 
rampart, form the battle line, address the men, and sound the trumpet 
signal for going into action. Much of this could not be done in the short 
time left available by the enemy's swift onset.' 
The account goes on to state that of these pressing tasks, one of things for which Caesar 
found time was a short address to the assembling tenth legion.^°^ 
At the other end of the spectrum from Caesar's hurried pre-battle speech to the tenth 
legion were the occasions for adlocutio provided by an emperor's plarmed inspections 
of military imits. No emperor was more assiduous in this activity than Hadrian. Prior to 
his final return to Rome in 134 CE, all but six of the preceding seventeen years of his 
reign had been spent outside Italy. A whole series of coins recorded speeches to legions 
in various provinces (Plate 24 iv) and the texts of some of these were preserved in 
'^^  Platform: Plut. Mor. 41C. 
Legionary: B. Civ. 3. 90-91. Tactics: B.Civ. 3. 89. Pre-battle tasks: B. Gall. 2. 20-21. 
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inscriptions. The most detailed examples come from Africa. Dated to 128 CE these 
were addressed to legionary chief centurions and directly to the troops. Their content 
confirmed the Emperor's wish to be associated with positive comments about the 
soldiers' drill, manoeuvres and building activity. Hadrian appeared to go out of his way 
to share the ordinary soldier's perspective. He demonstrated an understanding of the 
complexity of particular drills and the hard work involved in a number of manual tasks. 
Emphasising his adoption of the common soldier's viewpoint, the Emperor included 
specific praise of their officers. For example to one cavalry cohort he stated that, 
'Comelianus too, your prefect, has handled his duties satisfactorily', while to another 
his recorded declaration ran as follows: 
'The remarkable care taken by my legate Catullinus, distinguished man, 
is obvious from the fact that he has men like you under his 
command'. 
That speeches to the troops may have been relatively frequent was suggested by 
Suetonius' account of Augustus' attempt to control the language used by his family 
members in addressing soldiers (see page 247). Of the emperors reigning between 68 
and 235 CE, Campbell could find only three without an attested adlocutio. Even these 
absences he put down to gaps in the record. Nevertheless, Campbell tended to play 
down any specifically political significance in these speeches, perhaps confirming his 
generally limited view of soldiers' relevance in that respect. Rather grudgingly he 
conceded that it was important for an emperor to demonstrate an interest in his troops 
and that the adlocutio provided an opportunity to achieve this with a measure of useful 
display. Campbell's approach created difficulties for him in assessing the real 
importance of this aspect of the relationship between soldiers and emperor. He 
concluded his review of the subject by leaving the impression that direct contacts 
between emperor and soldiers were an irksome and ultimately defensive duty for any 
ruler hoping to retain his power, while for 
'.. .simple men the break in the humdrum tedium of the normal duties of 
a soldier was no doubt welcome'. 
Campbell had included the evidence of Titus' summary execution of Aulus Caecina, 
described by Suetonius as 
Hadrian's inspections: Lewis and Reinhold 2. 148; Campbell (1994) 17; Cass. Dio 69. 9. 1-5; 
Birley(1997) p. 210-213. 
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'...a matter of urgency, since a speech had been found in the man's 
writing which was to be delivered to a gathering of the soldiers.' 
Ahhough the treasonous aspect of Caecina's intention was noted, nothing was made of 
the impHed poUtical role of troops as forming a constituency to be won over.^ *'^  
Taking a broader view, there is in fact useful scope here to see soldiers gathered in an 
audience as demonstrating a degree of political awareness and active involvement. 
Through the semi-formal mechanism of the contio the Roman populace had long been 
able to gather, as often as not to be addressed by a politician looking for a platform or 
to consider legislative and judicial matters without determining any binding conclusion. 
However, such meetings also facilitated the formulation and expression of their 
collective views. Soldiers in camp came together in a similar way, for instance to 
receive campaign awards or to present their commander with an imperatorial salutation. 
Even at a time of high excitement and doubtfiil discipline Appian described the scene 
as Julius Caesar's mutinous soldiers 
'...ran together tumultuously without arms, and, as was their custom, 
saluted their commander who had suddenly appeared among them.' 
In the context of the principate the political meanings of these rewards and 
acclamations became more specific. Characteristics of the army of that period, a 
gradually widening recruitment base, and increasing pay and professionalisation, 
undoubtedly brought about a loosening of the formal political ties between soldiers and 
the Roman people. However, these did not disappear completely and could re-emerge 
at times of particular stress, for example during the civil wars of 68-69 CE. Tacitus, 
certainly no apologist for the political sensitivities of massed soldiery, portrayed the 
legions in Upper and Lower Germany as deferring their oaths of allegiance to a new 
emperor to the decisions of the 'senate and people of Rome'. Bearing in mind the 
author's antipathy towards the involvement of the army in politics, the fact that he 
made these references in a sarcastic tone is perhaps less important than that he recorded 
them at all. In the hasty comings and goings that brought Claudius to power, contiones 
of the troops in Rome operated alongside meetings of the senate and people. Josephus' 
account showed the military garrison to be playing an overtly political role. Suetonius 
concurred in the number and order of meetings. The sequence of these meetings is 
Frequency and importance of speeches: Campbell (1984) p. 69-71, 87-88; Suet. Tit. 6. 
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significant for the interpretation of the accession donative and the army's role in 
politics. Having first acclaimed Claudius as emperor on the Palatine, subsequent 
meetings saw the swearing of the loyal oath and the promise of a donative. Debate and 
decision about what to do preceded formal confirmation, which in turn was followed 
by fmancial gain. From this it is possible to interpret the donative as 'an expected 
reward for empowerment' rather than a bribe or gesture of gratitude. In fact the 
expectation has been defined as 'part of the soldier's evolving political culture'. It is 
clear that Tacitus had these developments in mind when writing about Tiberius' 
accession. There is no mistaking the deliberate sourness in his references to what he 
saw as subversion of the traditional formula of senatus populusque as he rendered it as 
senatus milesque et populus. Alongside the clear disapproval there was perhaps 
recognition of the emergence in the principate of a genuinely political aspect to the 
army's behaviour. It is undoubtedly the case that other references to this tripartite 
division of the res publico appeared to be more matter-of-fact than critical. When 
circumstances dictated that the Roman senate could not be in attendance, the remaining 
elements of the trinity could certainly form an acceptable representation of the state. 
Pescennius Niger was described as addressing a joint meeting of soldiers and civilians 
at Antioch during the initial stages of the civil war of 193 CE. His rival, Septimius 
Severus, lacking such an urban setting, made do with the soldiers alone as he 
proclaimed his candidature. Most likely writing only a few decades after Tacitus, 
Appian had demonstrated a relaxed attitude to what must then have been clearly 
demarcated political groups. He recorded four divisions at the fiineral of Sulla in 79 
BCE, senate, equites, soldiers and plebeians, honouring the dead man apparently in that 
order of precedence.^ "^  
In its characteristically confused fashion, the SHA had M. Claudius Tacitus succeed 
Aurelian at the instigation of the senate alone. The elderly senator was reported to have 
argued against his own appointment, principally because of his lack of military 
Contiones: Lintott (1999) p. 42-43; Rowe, G. p. 155-157; App. B. Crv.2. 93. Soldiers and SPQR: 
Hist. 1. 12, 55; Rowe, G. p. 158-160. Claudius: Joseph. AJ204-2U; Suetonius 10. 4; Rowe, G. p. 161, 
169-172. Tacitus: 1. 7. 2; Rowe, G. p^l61; Syme (1958bXp^l2; Griffiiv(1991)p, 4^ ^ Other 
tripfrtiteldivisiMs: Cas^ ^ 1; a good Icing, said Dio Chrysostom, was ' . . .fond of his 
companions, fellow-citizens and soldiers in like measure' (1 . 28); the author of the SHA warned of the 
dangers looming for emperors ' . . . who do not win the love of the senate, the people and the soldiers...' 
(Heliogab. 17. 7). Niger and Severus: Herodian 2. 8. 1-6; 2. 10. 1-9. Sulla's funeral: App. B Civ. 1. 
106. 
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prowess. However, when he eventually agreed to become emperor, he was presented to 
the Roman people on the Campus Martius, an area traditionally associated with the 
army, and proclaimed as the choice of the senate 'at the request of all the armies'. 
Tacitus was then described as addressing the troops and, using commilitones language, 
to have portrayed himself as their choice. In relation to the earlier discussion of the 
donative, it is noteworthy that it was only after the completion of these meetings that 
the 'customary' payments were made to the soldiers. With greater clarity, the political 
role of soldiers, and indeed the desirability of militarily qualified emperor, were made 
clear in the author of the SHA's hymn to the suitability of Probus for the role: 
'So great, moreover, was Probus in matters of war that the senate 
desired him, the soldiers elected him, and the Roman people itself 
demanded him by acclamations'."^ "^  
The emperor as proprietor of the Roman military 
The evidence cited so far has established that the emperor had a close personal 
relationship with the army. This relationship can be further clarified by reference to its 
exclusivity. It is true that in the early second century CE, Appian could put into the 
mouth of Cassius a speech specifically refuting the idea that soldiers' first loyalty was 
to their commander. However, this was delivered during manoeuvrings prior to the 
climactic battle at Philippi in 42 BCE. Faced with the prospect of fighting the avenging 
forces of Antony and Octavian, Cassius and the other assassins of Julius Caesar were 
only too aware that the best of their own troops had been under Caesar's personal 
command. Cassius emphasised to the assembled soldiers that they '.. .were not his.. .but 
our country's' and that they were fighting '...only for the fi^eedom of the senate Jind 
people of Rome'. Of course, this rallying cry represented the claims of Cassius and his 
co-assassins, and to an extent must be seen as rhetorical, concealing their underlying 
motives in upholding the oligarchic power of an elite threatened by shifts towards 
autocratic authority. With regard to the soldiers of the legions, Appian appeared, at 
least initially, to conclude that the loyalty of Caesar's former troops was assured by 
cash handouts and promises. The analysis of modem commentators, such as Syme, has 
generally left it at that. However, Appian himself went on to record that the generals of 
the opposing sides both offered special bonus payments and made promises of fixture 
Claudius Tacitus: SHA Tac. 4. 1-9. 1; 0CD3 p. 284. Probus: SHA Tac. 14. 3. 
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rewards. Further, he added that suspicions about the loyalty of Caesar's former soldiers 
remained and, at the end of his account of the battle, the historian feU the need to 
explain why those soldiers had in fact stood unwaveringly against Antony and 
Octavian, respectively Caesar's close colleague and adopted son. Appian's 
straightforward and perhaps surprising conclusion was that they had fought not for 
'...their own interest, but the cause of democracy'. Although the author then appeared 
to disparage the general idea of such motivation, he did so no more in relation to the 
soldiers than to their leaders, Brutus and Cassius. What, i f anything, can be concluded 
from this consideration of soldiers' behaviour at Philippi? Two relevant things seem to 
emerge about Appian's outlook. Firstly, from his likely Trajanic/Hadrianic perspective, 
he clearly expected soldiers to be personally loyal to their commanders; secondly, he 
was not so easily persuaded as some modem historians that troops could be motivated 
solely by short-term financial incentives. '^" 
There can be no doubt that, in the most general way, the state's use of military force 
was focused on the emperor; part of the treason law covered anyone who assembled an 
army 'without the command of the emperor.' At the most detailed level we have 
evidence for the emperor's response to the suggested deployment of troops for non-
military tasks away from their units. This was recorded in the correspondence of Pliny 
the Younger. Several sets of letters indicated a basic policy on Trajan's part, described 
by the Emperor himself as a 'general rule', that'.. .as few soldiers as possible should be 
called away from active service'. This guidance should be seen as being relevant in a 
number of contexts. Although not explicitly referring to soldiers, two of Pliny's own 
requests, for a land surveyor and an architect, were met by the Emperor's reluctance to 
release personnel (almost certainly military) for provincial civilian tasks.^" 
It is interesting, i f tantalising, to compare the information provided by Pliny with that 
from other, potentially more direct sources. A feature of the Imperial Roman army was 
the enormous amount of record keeping that attended its activities. Unfortunately, little 
of this has survived. For example, it has been calculated that for the period between 
Augustus and Diocletian there could have been as many as 225 million pay records for 
Cassius' speech: App. B Civ. 4. 98. Financial rewards: ibid. 4. 118, 121; Syme (1939) p. 204. 
Suspicions and Appian's analysis: B Civ. 4. 124, 133. 
^" Treason: Dig. 48. 4. 3. Troop deployment: Ep. 10. 17B and 18, 39 and 40, 19 and 20, 27 and 28. 
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individual soldiers; of these only a handfiil survive in a useful state of preservation. 
Documents that do exist come in a number of forms, including papyri and ostraka from 
Egypt, Dura-Europus on the Euphrates and North Africa. The Egyptian material covers 
a large number of locations and dates, while that from Syria relates to a third century 
cohort of archers. The North African documents provide elements similar to a resource 
unique to Britain, the Vindolanda tablets. Most of these derive fi-om the period 92-103 
CE, thus slightly predating Pliny's Trajanic material. For the present purpose, that of 
considering the ideological implications of evidence for the control of troop 
deployments, one important tablet provides exceptional detail about a single unit. This 
docimient indicated the condition and activities of a cohort of Tungrian auxiliaries, 
probably dating from 92-97 CE. Relevant to the Pliny/Trajan correspondence, the tablet 
recorded that one detachment was in London on guard duty with the governor of 
Britain and that specific numbers of others were elsewhere than at Vindolanda. Besides 
a substantial deployment at nearby 'Cor/a' (presumably Corbridge), the legibility of 
these locations has defeated decipherment. The lack of information about where these 
detachments were and about the nature of their tasks makes interpretation difficult. 
Nevertheless it must imlikely that the Tungrians' variety of deployments was startlingly 
unusual, at least for a frontier unit. Nothing about the tablet indicated that it was 
anything but a routine record. It is therefore safe to assimie that neither Trajan nor any 
other emperor could possibly have involved himself in such small scale troop 
deployments. While it is of interest that there must have been some plausibility in the 
suggestion that Severus Alexander had detailed knowledge of such matters, the claim 
must be exaggerated. However, the customary nature of Roman military records 
provides an indication of the deep-seated relationship between an emperor and his 
soldiers. Papyri recording the 'morning reports' of the Cohort 20 Palmyrenorum at 
Dura Europus are prefaced with the formula, 'There are standing watch at the standards 
of our lord the Emperor...' (in this case one of the Gordians between 239 and 241 CE). 
Similar formulae connected the person of the emperor with recruitment of soldiers and 
with their discharge at the end of service. But in terms of the bases of authority and the 
realities of political power, how significant were such connections? It might be argued 
that the present British monarch has comparable links with the contemporary armed 
forces and that these connections are merely ceremonial. While this is undoubtedly 
true, such ceremonies and links are not synthetic; rather they are the vestigial remains 
of once real relationships and powers. Illustrative episodes in British history include the 
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following: Harold IPs defence of his kingdom in 1065-66 centred on his personal 
ability to mobilise and lead varying forces in different parts of the country; Charles I's 
attempts, beginning in 1634, to raise funds for the navy without the intervention of 
Parliament were a significant element in the disputes leading to the Civil War; and as 
late as 1743 at Dettingen, a King of England, George I I , led his troops into battle. In the 
light of such evidence, we need not doubt the reality of a Roman emperor's personal 
connection with his troops.^  
The obvious practical limitations of the emperor's competence exemplified from 
Vindolanda may serve to highlight an important aspect of the issue discussed in Pliny's 
letters. He recorded Trajan's response to the request of a prefect, transmitted by Pliny, 
for a larger military escort. In turning down the application, the Emperor added a 
revealing comment about the officer's possible motives for wanting more soldiers: 
'It is important to distinguish between the needs of a situation and the 
likelihood of his wishing to extend his privileges because of it' 
The Emperor's proprietorial concern for the correct use of his soldiers was clear. His 
responses revealed an unambiguous view about the ideal use of soldiers and a 
menacing grasp of the importance to his own status of his complete control over them. 
The significance of the relationship was well illustrated by Josephus' elaborate account 
of the aftermath of the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Having secured the city, Titus' first 
thought was to 
'...congratulate the whole army on its achievements and bestow suitable 
rewards on those whose services were outstanding'. 
Josephus recorded that the young Caesar (whose position at this stage was as close to 
being that of an emperor as is required for the present argument) was at pains to 
acknowledge and reward personally the outstanding acts of individuals: 
'Calling them by name he praised them as they came forward, as 
delighted as a man could be over his own exploits' 
'^^  Documentation: Bowman (1994) p. 34ff; writing at some time between ttie late fourth and mid fifth 
centuiy GE Vegetius provided detail (for exainpler^/^^^ thtliotutnentation produced in the 
'ancient legion'. He is likely to have used sources dating back to Cato the Censor's De re militare; 
Milner p. xxxvii. Pay records: Fink p. 242. Tungrians (Tab. Vindol. 1154): Bowman (1994) p. 22, 
104-5. Severus Alexander: SHA /^e=c. 5ev. 21. 6-8. Formulae: Fink 50 (p. 196); Gilliam p. 113, 163. 
British monarchy: Stenton p. 586-593; Davies p. 84-85; Williams, B. p. 242. 
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It is particularly telling that Josephus went on to state that it was only at the conclusion 
of this ceremony, focussed directly on the soldiers, that Titus '...then turned his 
attention to sacrifices in honour of his victory'.^'^ 
The emperors' jealous guardianship of their soldiers can be illustrated from numerous 
fiirther examples. In the context of specifying the titles by which Tiberius cared to be 
designated, Cassius Dio had the Emperor identify himself with the military; ' I am 
master (dominus) of the slaves, imperator of the soldiers, and chief (princeps) of all the 
rest'. The fact that Cassius Dio demonstrated confusion over the usages of princeps, 
employing the Greek word relating to princeps senatus, does not seriously detract from 
the point. During campaigns in Germany in 47 CE Corbulo was recalled by Claudius; 
the Emperor's reason, stated in general terms as a fear that the general was becoming 
too powerful, was characterised by Cassius Dio as personal jealousy. Later, indeed, 
Corbulo was to be forced into suicide by Nero because of similar emotions of fear and 
jealousy. Tacitus porfrayed Domitian's feelings towards Agricola in a similar light, that 
general surviving only through judicious retirement. These specific instances of an 
emperor's close relationship with his soldiers support Campbell's general statement 
that: 
'The emperor's control of military affairs was limited only in so far as 
he chose volimtarily to consult more widely'^''* 
The emperor honours his soldiers 
Emperors could display the utmost sensitivity about actions that had the potential to 
influence the political loyalty of their soldiers. Instances already discussed include 
Augustus' strictures on the use of commilitones language and Trajan's advice to Pliny 
about the ulterior motives of army commanders. An area with which emperors took 
particular care was the control of sources from which soldiers could expect to receive 
rewards and honours. The experiences of the first century BCE civil wars had amply 
demonstrated the destabilising effects of a situation in which armies looked solely to 
then- immediate generals for the fulfilment of pecuniary and other aspirations. A clear 
aim of Augustus' military reforms had been to make himself the only focus for such 
Trajan and the prefect: Plin. Ep. 21 and 22. Titus: Joseph. BJ 1. 10-16. 
Tiberius: Cas. Dio 57. 8. 2; 0CD3 p. 1247. Claudius: Cass. Dio 60. 30. 4-5. Nero: Cass. Dio 63. 17. 
6. Domitian: Tac. Agr. 39-42. General statement: Campbell (2002b) p. 5. 
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ambitions. His measures included the establishment of a central aerarium militare to 
ensure regular pay. Initially this was ftmded from his own resources and later fi-om 
hypothecated taxation. In general, Augustus sought to establish a professional standing 
army under the personal control of the princeps, reducing to a minimum any clientela 
relationship between soldiers and their commanders. His example was followed by 
Tiberius when it was suggested by Junius Gallio that veteran soldiers should receive 
special privileges with regard to theatre seating. In an incident included by Cassius Dio 
and Tacitus, the latter had the Emperor round on Gallio, 
'...asking him...what his business was with soldiers who should 
properly receive neither words nor rewards except fi-om their 
Commander.' 
The point was elaborated in a manner that made Tacitus' and/or Tiberius' views on the 
matter crystal clear. Besides the intrinsic error of devising an arrangement at odds with 
those proposed by Augustus, the accusation levelled at Gallio was that he 
'...sought discord and mutiny in order to propel raw minds, under the 
pretext of an honour, to corrupt the conventions of the soldiery' 
The importance of the principle at stake was emphasised by the relative triviality of 
Gallio's suggestion, most likely motivated as it was by sycophancy rather than military 
ambition. Cassius Dio expressed the underlying issue plainly and succinctly, stating 
that Gallio had been banished, 
'...the specific charge being that he was apparently trying to induce the 
guards to be loyal to the state {koinon) rather than to the emperor'. 
In the matter of honours, the personal nature of the relationship between an emperor 
and his soldiers was clearly expressed by Velleius Paterculus. He reported the joy of 
troops at being reunited with Tiberius, the soldiers being unable 
'...to restrain such cries as..."I received my decoration fi-om you in 
Vindelicia! And mine in Paimonia! And I in Germany!'". 
It is worth adding that the author's army experience enhances his reliability on such a 
topic, particularly because he chose to precede this anecdote with detail of that career, 
'It was at this time that I became a soldier in the camp of Tiberius Caesar'.^ '^  
Augustus: Keppie p. 1005-1016. Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 6. 3. 1-3; Cass. Dio 58. 18. 3-4; Lendon (1997) 
p. 260-261. Velleius Paterculus: 2. 104. 3-4. 
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The social status of soldiers 
This topic is important here because it provides a necessary perspective on detail 
considered in the earlier sections. There it was noted that Roman emperors, alongside 
other ancient rulers, projected positive images of themselves as sharing in the physical 
labours and hardships of soldiers. Emperors addressed their troops in strikingly 
familiar forms, bestowed personal honours upon them and even shared their names 
with the legions. In a society characterised by markedly rigid hierarchies of status and 
wealth, such behaviour needs explanation. Manual labour, even in pursuit of an art or 
skilled craft, could be considered vulgar at best, contrary to the behaviour of an 
ethically good man at worst. Its inescapable association with the activities of slaves 
must be relevant here. Personal communication with those considered to be of inferior 
social standing could be seen as problematic. Suetonius described a relevant incident 
said to have taken place during Tiberius' retirement on Rhodes. In a passage 
emphasising the lack of social pretension adopted by the future emperor at this time, 
the biographer described how Tiberius would occasionally stroll through the town 
'exchanging greetings with the ordinary Greeks'. On one occasion his expressed 
intention to visit individuals who were unwell was misinterpreted by his attendants. 
They gathered together all the local sick, arranging them for inspection. Suetonius 
recorded that Tiberius was for some time at a loss as to what to do, 
'...eventually going round each individual, apologising for what had 
happened even to the humblest and most insignificant.' 
It is probable that the intended interpretation of Tiberius' response was positive, as 
demonstrating his readiness to admit a mistake in embarrassing circimistances. 
However, the spirit of Suetonius' story clearly indicated the awkwardness of the 
situation and its inclusion must be intended to demonstrate that this aspect of Tiberius' 
behaviour was unexpected in usual social relationships. Far more typical must have 
been manifestations of the editorial sentiment expressed by Plutarch that, 'The 
multitude can have no greater honour shown to them than not to be despised.' Even 
when social acknowledgement was expected, it could be unmistakably graded. For 
example, someone could be employed to walk beside a Roman of superior social status 
and to greet, on their behalf, individuals of lower status with whom direct 
communication was considered demeaning. It is against this background that we must 
consider the implications of emperors' behaviour towards their soldiers, viewed in 
relation to assessments of the social backgroimd of the troops. A postscript to the 
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incident of Tiberius and the sick population of Rhodes is indicative. Admittedly in 
what amounted to a panegyrical context, Tiberius was specifically praised for the 
personal care he took over sick and injured soldiers.^  
That soldiers' general social status was indistinguishable from that of the lower 
elements of urban plebeians or rural labourers finds support from a reading of our elite 
ancient sources. Tacitus habitually equated the behaviour of troops with that of the 
undisciplined urban masses. Often this was in the context of mutiny or some other 
breakdown in discipline. However, as it suited his editorial intentions, he slid beyond 
such disordered situations to characterise as 'mob' behaviour the involvement of 
soldiers in the turbulent politics of disputes about the Imperial throne. In relation to the 
general quality of soldiers, Tacitus had Tiberius complain in 23 C E that voluntary 
recruitment was attracting 'only the impoverished and vagrants'. PlutJirch was clearly 
disgusted that Eumenes' Macedonian soldiers 'acted like a capricious mob'. Cassius 
Dio had Maecenas differentiate among the citizens those who would be suitable as 
soldiers and those who might be farmers, sailors or follow other productive pursuits. In 
the same speech Maecenas equated troops from the ranks with '...men who have 
carried loads of firewood and charcoal'. This broadly negative view of soldiers' 
background and status has been upheld by modem scholars, such as Campbell. He 
emphasised an interpretation of the evidence that tends to debase soldiers' motives, 
origins and education. On this basis he felt able to conclude that: 
'In general, although emperors identified themselves closely with the 
army, they remained aloof from and even contemptuous of the ordinary 
soldiers'. 
Beyond the behaviour of probably undisputed exceptions to this generalisation, such as 
Trajan and Hadrian, the totality of evidence is susceptible to alternative interpretations 
that better fit the close link between an emperor and his soldiers.^'' 
The starting point for a reconsideration of this issue must be the myth/historical origins 
of the Roman military and the reverence in which these were held in later periods. 
Maiiual-labdur: Gic. O0\ . 150 and 2. 88^89; Plut. Per. 1.5; Lendoii (1997)'p. 240; Shelfon p. 125-
126. Communication: Cell. 7. 11. 1; Dio Chrys. 66. 3; Suet. Tib. 11; Plut. Nic. 2. 4; Cat. Min. 8. 2. 
Soldiers: Veil. Pat. 2. 114. 1-2. 
Soldiers as mob: Tac. Hist. 2. 29,44, 93, 3. 31; Carrie p. 105. Soldiers in politics: ibid. 2. 37. 
Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 4.4. 2; Plut. Eum. 15. 3; Cass. Dio: 52. 25, 27; Campbell (2002a) p. 13-14, 32fr. 
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Detail of the privileged personal status ascribed to soldiers in the early Republic was 
considered in Part One. Here it suffices to restate that the tradition indicated citizenship 
to be comprised of an interlinked series of privileges and responsibilities founded on 
political, religious and military factors. The established organisation of the army was 
based on a citizen's ability to fmance his own equipment; the greater his resources, the 
more prominent and dangerous his role in battle. The image of fighting for the 
Republic as a high status activity was maintained. This is demonsfrable by the manner 
in which later writers reported deviations from the norm. The exfraordinary 
circumstances following the crushing defeat by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 BCE 
necessitated what Livy referred to as an 'unprecedented form of recruitment', namely 
the admission of slaves into the ranks. Valerius Maximus commented that the City had 
previously '...disdained to have as soldiers even free men without property'. 
Undoubtedly the property qualification for the legions was gradually eroded in 
response to the increasing demands of Rome's overseas expansion. At the start of the 
first century BCE a watershed, seen as a sinister precursor of the civil wars, was 
reached when Gaius Marius recruited citizens unable to meet any property requirement 
(see pages 50-51). This reorganisation of Roman forces into a professional standing 
army of citizen volunteers was further systematised by Augustus after his victory at 
Actium in 31 BCE. If the military situation appeared to be especially threatening, even 
Augustus could take measures that broke from this established pattern. After the loss of 
Varus' legions in 9 CE, the census classification of Roman citizens was used, not to 
allocate military duties to those individuals, but to determine their liability to produce 
freedmen to fill the gaps in the army. Perhaps it was uncertainty about social status in 
this fluid and evolving situation that could cause problems even for the normally sure 
footed Octavian. At the theafre in 41 BCE he was said to have ordered the removal of a 
soldier who had occupied a seat reserved for senators and equites. In slightly differing 
accounts, our sources indicated that the soldier's colleagues reacted badly to a 
suspicion that he had been imprisoned or killed. Only the reappearance of the 
unharmed soldier saved Octavian from physical atack. The evidence remains strong 
that concern about recruitment continued in these new circumstances.^ '* 
Republican soldiers: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 59. 2.8. Slaves: Livy 22. 57; Val. Max. 7. 6. la. 
Erosion of property qualification: OCD3 p. 172; Sail. lug. 86. 2-3. Augustus: Cass. Dio 55. 23-24; 
Suet. Aug. 49. Post-Varus: Cass. Dio 55. 31; Veil. Pat. 2. 111. Soldier in the theatre: Suet. Aug. 14; 
App. B Civ. 5. 15. 
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The care taken to prevent the enlistment of any but the ireebom can certainly be 
demonstrated. A papyrus fi-om 92 CE recorded the oaths required of both a recruit and 
his guarantors that he was freebom and a Roman citizen. The fact that sponsors were 
necessary at all, added to the evidence of a papyrus discharge certificate, dated to 52 
CE, noting the release from service of a weaver, suggests that these soldiers were not 
of the lowest status. An exchange of letters between Pliny and Trajan recorded that the 
Emperor took very seriously the discovery of two slaves who had enlisted in the 
eastern legions. The matter was viewed as a potential capital offence for the men 
involved and one which would have serious consequences for anyone else implicated. 
Second century CE injunctions against the drafting of those not deemed to be suitable 
for the army can be found in the law digests. As to the general status of recruits, 
Tiberius' complaint about the quality of volunteers was made in the context of his 
attempt to justify a desired tour of the provinces. One of the 'pretexts' he employed 
was the need to levy troops outside Italy, thus indicating the peninsula to be the origin 
of the poor quality soldiers, but weakening the possible objective truth of his recorded 
opinion. It is clear that the proportion of Italian troops in the legions fell during the first 
century CE, reaching perhaps twenty percent by the end of the century and dwindling 
to zero under Hadrian. However, as Tiberius' view may indicate, this does not 
necessarily suggest a fall in the over-all social background of recruits. The impression 
that such a decline may have taken place as recruitment widened from its Italian base 
may be connected to Augustus' formation of the Praetorian Guard in 27 BCE. They 
were drawn from Italy and being the troops closest to the person of the emperor it was 
not surprising that their pay and conditions were superior to those of other legionaries. 
Nevertheless, focussing on the legions as a whole, it has been argued that the status 
origins of soldiers increased during the first two centuries of the CE. The legions 
involved in the civil wars of 68-70 CE have been credited with a consciousness of their 
own political and economic place in society, and with a wish enhance both; 
'legionaries were scarcely proletarians'. Support for such an assessment comes from 
the jurists. Arrius Menander, possibly a libellis under Caracalla, noted that in the 
tradition the evasion of military responsibility had been a more serious crime than 
ineligible recruitment. The fate of C. Vettienus, chained 'in perpetuity' because he cut 
off fingers from his left hand in order to avoid fighting in the Social war, provided a 
potent symbol of the state's response to evasion. However, Menander went on to say 
that such avoidance was no longer such a problem because: 
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'With the changed conditions of military service...for the most part the 
numbers are made up with volunteer soldiers' 
This would not seem to be describing an activity of declining status, but rather one in 
which the intrinsic attractions were perceived as being enhanced. In this respect it is 
relevant to add that, whatever the status of ordinary legionaries might be at any 
particular moment, there is no doubting that in all periods soldiers had greater access to 
upward social mobility than most sections of Roman society.^ '^  
Evidence concerning the educational attainments of Roman soldiers is limited and 
therefore should not be over interpreted. For example, Egyptian papyri provide some 
examples of a useful level of literacy among soldiers. In a document of 179 CE 
concerning the hay ration of a cavalry unit, about ten percent of the notional strength of 
five hundred troops demonstrated the ability to write up to six lines of Greek. Others 
could sign their names. Against this, there are indications that soldiers' ignorance had 
to be accommodated. The privileges granted to troops in the making of wills were 
explained by the jurists relation to soldiers' inability to carry out proper legal 
procedures. Although some have suggested that soldiers may have been above the 
average, generalisations are hard to make from such instances and tell us little about 
levels of literacy in the military in relation to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, 
the origin and substance of some of the information that is available are highly 
suggestive. The Vindolanda tablets provide examples of written material that concern 
numerous aspects of the official and unofficial activity of a legionary base. Despite 
evidence indicating the presence of professional scribes, the documents show the hands 
of hundreds of individuals. Two justifiably broad conclusions have been drawn from 
Vindolanda about the role of literacy in the Roman legions. The first relates to the 
location of the site on the northern edge of the Empire within a few decades of the 
invasion of Britain. The existence of an undeniably literate military community in such 
circumstances suggests that the use of reading and writing throughout Roman forces 
would have been of at least a similar level. The second conclusion informs the estimate 
that we can make of the role and importance of literacy for the military. Evidence of 
- ' Papyri^Lewisand Reinhold 1. 1447Trajan: Plin. £p. 10. 29-30rLaws: Dig. 49. 16. 2. 1-9; 16. 11. 
Tiberius: Tac. Ann. 4. 4. 2. Fewer Italian troops: Campbell (2002b) p. 26. Praetorians: OCD3 p. 
1241. Increasing status: Carrie p. 107-8. 68-70 C E : Chilver (1957) p. 31 n. 20. Menander: Dig. 49. 
16. 4. 10; New Pauly 2 p. 29. Vettienus: Val. Max. 6. 3. 3c. Social mobility: Syme (1939) p. 352; 
Marcone p. 364-365. 
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identifiably literate individuals other than the higher officers and centurions includes at 
least the principales (specialist soldiers, such as standard bearers). Further it is clear 
that literacy served a vital ftmction in the control and organisation of all ranks, 
effectively shaping the military occupation of the island through communication 
between its establishments.^ ^*' 
Another indicator of the social status of Roman soldiers was their place within the 
economy of the Empire. Although any figure can be no more than a broad estimate, it 
is clear that military spending was the Roman state's largest item of expenditure. It 
required perhaps forty percent of the Empire's disposable income in the first century 
CE. The task of supplying three or four hundred thousand troops stationed around the 
Empire between the beginnings of the first and third centuries CE fell largely on the 
areas in which they were based. The available statistical data allows no precise 
calculation of the local economic impact of this situation, although it must be the case 
that the over-all burden was sustainable. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that soldiers 
could be troublesome in their demands, and that their money, skills and organisation 
could give them a significant grip on the local economy. Pliny's letters to Trajan and 
the law digests are indicative. They record the problems of troops travelling through 
towns and list soldiers whose proficiency in skills such as land surveying, cart-making 
and charcoal-burning, made them exempt from other duties. It is inconceivable that 
such expertise did not impinge on the local population. In starker economic terms laws 
were recorded that prevented soldiers from buying land in the provinces in which they 
served. However, these laws appear to be considerably weakened by provisions that 
allowed soldiers to inherit land in those areas, to buy it in other provinces and even to 
retain land bought in their legion's province i f no one complained prior to the 
purchaser's discharge date. 
Estimates of the personal spending power of soldiers are bedevilled by problems; in 
particular those surrounding the twin uncertainties of monetary inflation in relation to 
Limited evidence and Egypt: Carrie p. 126-127, 128. Wills: Dig. 29. 1. 1; Gai. Imtl. 109. Relative 
standards of literacy: Coulston p. 91. Vindolanda: Bowman (1994) especially ch. 7. Scribes: ibid. p. 
88, 93, 95. Priiicipales: ibid: p. 59. Cohclu'sibiis: ibid. p. 83, 96; Woolf (2000) p. 892. 
Military expenditure: Campbell (1994) p. 85. Local impact: Gamsey and Sailer p. 88-90, 102-103; 
Roth p. 155, 241-243; Plin. Ep. 10. 78-79. Exemptions: Dig. 50. 6. 7. It must be added that the 
inclusion of'makers of bronze statues of cows' within the long list of exempted occupations must cast 
doubt on its accuracy! Land: Dig. 49. 16. 9 and 13. 
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levels of pay, and the financial value of materials and services received by soldiers 
both as part of and in addition to their pay. Also, the existing evidence can seem to be 
sufficiently contradictory to baffle clear analysis; for example, food parcels and a 
variety of personal material appear to have passed in roughly equal quantities between 
Egyptian legionaries in Alexandria and then- families in other areas. However, for the 
end of the fourth century the SHA may have provided evidence to support the notion 
that soldiers could have been sufficiently wealthy to take advantage of legal loopholes 
that allowed them to buy land. While the nature of the document certainly indicates the 
need for caution in precise interpretation, it included orders made by Pescennius Niger 
to the effect that soldiers were forbidden to use silver table vessels in camp or to carry 
into battle money-belts containing gold and silver coins. In addition to the civilian 
settlements that grew beside military bases throughout the Empire, the fifty or so 
coloniae set up for veterans between 14 and 117 CE must have had a major effect on 
their areas. Certainly some of these, such as Timgad, became large cities, while the 
relative power and wealth of Camulodunum seemed to be a factor in the Boudiccan 
revolt of 60 CE. As far as individual soldiers were concerned, it has been concluded 
that their security of pay, general welfare, medical provision and pension/land 
settlements at the end of service would appear favourable in comparison with those of 
many armies up to the modem age. While still under arms, their spending power has 
been calculated to have had a significant impact, particularly in Rome itself.^ ^^ 
During the first and second centuries CE there was a growing trend for particular 
legions to be stationed for long periods of time in one locality. A natural consequence 
of this development was that recruitment also tended to be from the same area, thus 
inevitably strengthening routine connections between soldiers and civilians. The 
potential complexity of the resultant relationships can be illustrated from the reign of 
Maximinus Thrax (235-238). Herodian recorded that this avaricious soldier-emperor 
took for himself, first the wealth of the rich and then the resources of the cities and 
provinces. He excused this behaviour by indicating the needs of the army. However, 
such double-dealing could not go unnoticed in a society in which soldier and civilian 
were closely linked. Thus, 
Problematic data: Burnett p. 105-121; Hassall p. 320; Bohec p. 213-218. Egypt: Carrie p. 123-124. 
SHA: Pesc. Nig. 10. 1, 10. 7; OCD3 p. 713. Colonia: Mann, J. C. p. 59; Tac. Ann. 14. 31. 3. General 
welfare: Campbell (2002b) p. 34. Spending power: Coulston p. 89. 
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' . . . in the cities and the provinces, the hearts of the people were filled 
with rage. The soldiers too were disgusted with his activities, for their 
relatives and fellow citizens complained that Maximinus was acting 
solely for the benefit of the military'. 
By the end of the third century CE there can be no doubt of the military's central 
position in the economy or of the emperor's direct concern about the matter. The 
preface to Diocletian's price edict of 301 CE made it clear that the primary target of the 
measure was to regularise the circumstances in which the army was supplied and in 
which individual soldiers were able to use their spending power. The preface first 
contextualised the edict as being necessary to consolidate the stability made possible 
by efforts of the military in securing the Empire from barbarian threat. After berating 
the excesses of unscrupulous traders in general, it continued: 
'Who does not know that wherever the common safety requires our 
armies to be sent, the profiteers insolently and covertly attack the public 
welfare, not only in villages and tovms, but on every road?' 
The edict claimed that the resources of the Empire as a whole were being wasted in this 
way, and the evil was personalised in the problems of the individual soldier, who 
'...sometimes in a single retail sale... is stripped of his donative and pay'.^ ^^  
The legal status of soldiers 
In relation to the period between Augustus and Severus Alexander, Campbell has 
provided a detailed picture of the legal status and privileges of Roman soldiers. Their 
special advantages ranged over wills, property rights and access to the emperor. In 
addition, laws deriving from the early third century jurist Herennius Modestinus' Book 
of Punishments indicated that soldiers were not liable to certain penalties that could be 
inflicted on civilians. These included being sent to the mines or tortured. Veterans also 
enjoyed exemptions fi-om some of the worst legal impositions. At the outset of his 
lengthy exposition, Campbell identified and attempted to deal with a problem 
presented by this evidence to any analyst holding the view that soldiers generally came 
from the lowest echelons of society. He acknowledged the disjunction between a 
dismissive social assessment and the numerous legal advantages enjoyed by soldiers. 
Campbell offered two possible explanations; that the privileges were a pragmatic 
Legions locally based: Campbell (2002b) p. 35. Maximinus: Herodian 7. 3. 3-6. Price edict: Lewis 
and Reinhold 2. 129. 
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response to practical difficulties attendant on a soldier's life or that their special rights 
stemmed from the emperor's need to maintain the personal loyalty of his soldiers. 
Without resolving this issue, Campbell effectively re-stated his opinion of troops as 
lower class by cautioriing that an emperor could not go too far in privileging his 
soldiers for fear that they might '...aspire to the dignity and social prestige that were 
the prerogative of men of rank.' The jaundiced views of Cassius Dio were deployed to 
support this argument. An alternative analysis, taking the evidence of legal privilege 
more at face value, might see the soldier's position as deriving in part from a genuinely 
elevated status, i f not in polite society, then at least in relation to the emperor and to 
political decision making.^ '^' 
The plausibility of this more positive view is supported by evidence from outside 
Rome about the army's role in policy making. Shortly after his death, Alexander's 
plans for future campaigns were put to and rejected by the army in assembly. 
Antigonus' major policy proposals about campaigning against Cassander and 
proclaiming 'freedom' for Greece were voted for by an assembly of his soldiers before 
being advertised. In general, Hellenistic monarchs recognized that soldiers formed a 
separate legal and political group. Even mercenary regiments were granted the status of 
distinct politeumata (juridical entities), thus creating political groups parallel to those 
of Hellenistic population centres. In a Roman context, the right of soldiers to consider 
the stated plans of their leaders, and then to approve or disapprove specific actions, can 
be recognised. Perhaps the evidence may relate this to particularly desperate 
enterprises, such as that proposed by Publius Decius. In order to cover the retreat of 
Roman legions fighting the Samnites in 345-343 BCE, he outlined to designated units 
a scheme that seemed certain to end in their destruction. Decius requested that the 
soldiers involved should indicate their agreement or disagreement, and stated that he 
would abide by the majority decision. Nevertheless, when considered alongside the 
earlier sections of this chapter, this brief survey of the social and legal status of soldiers 
helps to explain the identification of emperors with their troops, and the Roman rulers' 
positive behaviour towards them. In part such evidence helps to fi l l an apparent gap 
identified by Campbell when he concluded: 
Legal position: Campbell (1984) ch. IV-VU. Wills; Juv. 16. 51;Campbell (1984) p. 210ff. Property: 
ibid. p. 229fF. Access: ibid. p. 267f; Plin. Ep. 10. 106. Punishments: Dig. 49. 16. 3. 1; 49. 18. 1. Lower 
classes/privileges: Campbell (1984) p. 207-8; Cass. Dio 52. 25. 
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'They (soldiers) had no natural connection with the nexus of power and 
patronage that maintained the rule of the emperors'. 
Soldiers as a discrete community 
It is not easy to gain a clear picture of the social consciousness or position of soldiers. 
The ancient sources focus on their activities in war, and on specific instances of their 
involvement in politics and interaction with civilians; the latter two elements normally 
generating marked disapproval. It has been noted, for example, that soldiers made 
relatively few appearances in Latin fiction. Of relevance here are ideas that have 
appeared under the baimer of 'Theoretical Roman Archaeology'. Largely focused on 
manifestations of the Roman Empire in the provinces and the resulting response of the 
indigenous populations, studies in this field are also contributing to a reassessment of 
soldiers in that context. Two aspects of the military's role and political nature put 
forward in this literature are of interest here. One concerns its conceptualisation within 
modem histories of ancient Rome, the other relates to soldiers' behaviour and self-
image.^ ^^  
It has been argued that the political conception of the Roman army in general 
scholarship has been too much that of a 'monolithic state institution' rather than of a 
collection of sentient human beings. The very term 'Roman army' (or even more so, 
'Roman Army') is increasingly viewed as being anachronistic. It betrays, so the 
argument runs, underlying analogies with the unified organisation of armies in modem 
westem coimtries, occupying, as they most often do, a distinct but peripheral role in the 
body politic. In fact our ancient literary sources by no means always refer to a 
homogenised exercitus ('army', 'trained body of soldiers'). As often used is the plural 
legiones or the even more personalised milites ('soldiers'). In these manifestations it 
becomes easier to identify a socio-political group within the Roman world. An author 
who certainly did employ the word exercitus was the soldier, Velleius Paterculus. 
However, in one context his use of the term still served to delineate soldiers as a 
separate political constituency. In recording Augustus' elevation of Tiberius to 'power 
Alexander's plans: Diod. Sic. 18.4. 1-6; Errington p. 59. Antigonus: Diod. Sic. 19. 61. 1-4; Shipley 
p. 73-74rHellenisHc'lung^rean-i6 p:'103rPublii^ 2. Appai^rgSpy Campbell 
(2002b) p. 33-34. 
Fiction: Carrie p. 100-102. Theoretical Roman Archaeology: For a wide sample of this material, 
see the reports of proceedings at the annual conferences on Theoretical Roman Archaeology (TRAC), 
variously edited, between 1994 and 1999. For a detailed reference, see James, S. in the bibliography. 
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equal to his own' in 13 CE, the authority in question was described as being 'in all the 
provinces and armies'. In this manner, the power to command the soldiers was not 
indicated as being subsxmied under the control of the provinces, but was highlighted as 
separate element in authority over the state. It is true that exercitus and its variants 
were employed as coin legends. However, from a survey of the British Museum 
collection, these instances are concentrated in the reigns of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian, 
and in times of prominent civil wars, such as 68-70 CE and the 180s CE. A possible 
explanation might connect the phenomenon to those named rulers' military insecurity, 
wars and legionary tours. Further, the Trajanic and Hadrianic examples record a 
specific Roman army, rather than 'the' army; thus EXERC-SYRIACVS and 
EXERCITVS DACICUS . This differentiation becomes more pronounced on coins that 
refer to particular legions, such as the LEG VI of Marcus Aurelius and a whole series 
issued under Septimius Severus denoting legions 1 - 30.^ '^ 
While the idea of the Roman 'Army' as a single political institution may be 
anachronistic, more is now being made of soldiers' consciousness of being part of what 
is termed an 'imagined community'. This conception recognises the value systems and 
psychological impact involved in becoming a Roman soldier. A telling example was 
the frequency with which provincials adopted a Romanised name on enlistment, thus 
encapsulating the extent to which their identity was now to be absorbed in an all-
embracing commimity. Again, our elite ancient authors tend to explain the endemic 
unruliness of soldiers in terms of individual corruption and degeneracy; so, to some 
extent, it must have been. However, it has been argued that at another level such 
behaviour may relate to the democratic traditions of free speech in Republican 
assemblies and even to wider conceptions of the warrior class in the ancient world. 
Such arguments receive support from scholarship beyond that focusing on the ancient 
world. Research into collective responses to authority and into self-imposed constraints 
on behaviour within modem military units has identified features that are specific to 
the soldier's perspective. Amongst soldiers of peasant stock the moral ties of military 
comradeship and the war experience of veterans have been seen to influence behaviour 
in ways that are independent of the individual's social origins. Thus the solidarity and 
Anachronistic views and language: James (1999) p. 14; Carrie p. 100. Tiberius' power: Veil. Pat. 
2. 121. 1. EXERCITVS. BMC Nerva 5-9; BMC Hadrian 1674, 1686. Marcus: BMC 500. Septimius 
Severus: BMC 7-25. 
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high combat morale of Swiss yeoman farmers and Flemish burgher pikemen had more 
to do with '...the inherent nature of their military rather than their civilian groups.' 
External signals of such an ethos amongst Roman soldiers are too numerous to 
catalogue in detail. A few examples include distinctive vocabulary, dress and 
hairstyles, besides more official indicators, such as the wearing of broad belts (baltei), 
and, of course, the legal right to carry weapons. Although important social, linguistic 
and behavioural characteristics common to Roman soldiers have been seen as relating 
to the sociological concept of the 'total institution', such an idea should not be pushed 
too far. In other aspects of their life, such as religion, soldiers maintained important 
links with the civilian community. 
Another aspect of Roman soldiers' behaviour, their meetings in camp contiones, can be 
seen to have wide political resonance. In discussion of the ordinary soldiers in the 
Homeric army, it has been commented that they 
'.. .play a significant and communally indispensable role. The battles are 
fought and decided by mass armies. Although lacking initiative and 
vote, the assembly witnesses and legitimises decisions and 
actions...Leaders who ignore the assembly's opinion do so at their own 
risk; failure may jeopardise their position.' 
The limiting effect of ancient soldiers in assembly has been traced in relation to the 
power of both Homeric heroes and the Macedonian monarchy. A practical 
demonstration of the authority of soldiers in assembly was provided by Plutarch. In 
227 BCE Aratus of Sicyon was blamed by the Achaean army under his command 
because his inaction led to the death of Lydiades of Megalopolis. As a result 
'.. .the Achaeans left the field in anger (and) forced him to accompany 
them to Aegium. Here they held an assembly, and voted not to give him 
money and not to maintain mercenaries for him'. 
The special status of Roman legionary contiones is highlighted by the fact that other 
forms of collectivity outside their formal organisation were perhaps understandably 
Imagined community: James (1999) p. 15-16. Free speech: Livy 8. 33. Military ethos: Ashworth p 
456-7,469. External signals: Coulston p. 91; Juv. 16. 48. Total institution: Pollard (1996) p. 223, 226; 
Goffman(1961). 
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frowned upon. For example, laws are recorded that forbade soldiers in camp form 
collegia.^^^ 
In the Imperial period direct evidence of soldiers acting in relation to a collective 
political will is scattered and difficult to interpret. What, for example, are we to make 
of the account in Cassius Dio of the detachment of 1,500 javelin men who travelled 
from Britain to Rome in 185 CE? In that version of events the incident occurred after a 
failed attempt by elements of the army in Britain to proclaim one of their number as 
emperor. This rebellion followed serious fighting on the island in the previous year and 
was related to disquiet among the soldiers about the growing authority of Tigidius 
Perennis, the Praetorian prefect, leading directly or indirectly to his downfall. Although 
both Herodian and the Historia Augusta noted elements of these happenings, the 
javelin men from Britain only occurred in Cassius Dio. There they were said to have 
been 'chosen' by officers of the British legions and 'sent' to Rome, therefore appearing 
to be some sort of agreed delegation. Arriving in the City, the soldiers were said to 
have met with Commodus himself and to have convinced him that their purpose was to 
warn that Perennis was planning treachery. The most recent treatment of this strange 
story is surely correct to question earlier interpretations, including that of Brunt, that 
sought to connect it to specific political events. While it seems most likely that the tale 
as told by Dio is untrue, the fact that he included it must say something about plausible 
contemporary views of soldiers' behaviour. In a broader sense it has been argued that 
the behaviour of the Homeric Greek army gathered in assembly should play a crucial 
role in our conception of the depicted political landscape. Evidence can also be brought 
to bear from sources at first sight even less directly relevant to Roman military camps. 
In discussing the nature of Greek theatre, Goldhill has emphasised that the action of 
Athenians gathering in an audience was imbued with features that gave it political 
significance. It was seen as being analogous with their gatherings for other purposes, in 
the courts and in formal assembly. In each instance, a body of citizens came together in 
some privileged manner; arguments were heard and judgements were made in a 
competitive context. Aristotle sought to establish an enhanced role for citizens in 
assembly. He ascribed to such a body a superior aggregate of deliberative wisdom, in 
Homeric army: Raaflaub (1980) p. 355; Ducrey p. 53-54; Od. 10. 187-195. Macedon: Ducrey p. 59-
60. Aratus: Plut. Arat. 37. 3. Collegia. Dig. 47. 22. 1. 
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the same sense as it possessed an aggregate of feet or hands. Thus, Goldhill was 
justified when he concluded that in such a situation 
'.. .to be in an audience is not just part of the social fabric of life. It is a 
fundamental and defining political act.'^ *^* 
My proposal here is not that the Homeric army and Athenian theatre audience provide 
any precise parallels with Roman soldiers at a camp meeting; it is rather that such 
evidence should sensitise us to the likely special status of any large-scale audience and 
to the presence of a political element in any of the ancient world's institutionally 
organised mass gatherings. The Roman military had from its earliest manifestations 
never been anything less than an institutionally organised mass gathering, given extra 
significance by the operation of specifically religious requirements. In that context it 
therefore becomes more plausible to interpret soldiers' activities, and the behaviour of 
emperors towards them, in a consistently political maimer. The process by which Galba 
adopted Piso as his successor has already been discussed in relation to the non-
payment of a donative (page 239). It is also significant that the venue for this occasion 
was the Praetorian camp. Tacitus drew attention to this location by recording (a 
presumably invented) discussion about the appropriateness of the other possibilities, 
the Forum and the Curia. In a rare, positive comment on soldiers' involvement in 
politics, he suggested that their '...goodwill...was by no means to be despised' i f it 
could be obtained without bribery. Modem parallels may be useful to illustrate some of 
the mechanisms at work in the relationship between Roman soldiers and politics. 
Under political pressure during the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, President 
Bush was reported as: 
'Speaking in his favourite setting of a military base, before a cheering 
audience of soldiers...'. 
A plausible analysis might suggest that when feeling threatened, even a democratically 
elected twenty-first century ruler knows the most secure location of his power.^ '^ 
"° Bylti^h Javdin^men and Perennis: Cass. Dio 72. 8. 1-10. 1; Birley (2000) p. 187-188; Brunt (1973); 
HeMer^.lwVEIemen^^ SH/CComm. 6. 1-3. DelegatiM: Cass. Dio 72; 9. 2^^^^^^ 
Aggregate: Pol. 128 lb 1-10; John Stuart Mi l l (1861 p. 30) had something of the same idea of 
aggregating the impact of active minds when he identified collectivity as a major criterion of good 
government. Homeric army: Barker p. 93ff. Audience as political act: Goldhill p. 62. 
Galba and Piso: Tac. Hist. 1. 17; Ash p. 24. Bush: The Independent (13 September 2003). 
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Conclusion 
Relevant to the issue of soldiers' political involvement is the more fimdamental 
question of what constituted politics in Imperial Rome. On this matter it has long been 
tempting to accept the views of our elite sources. For them the constituents of politics 
equated to two broad areas: the activities of the senate and magistrates, usually 
reflecting a nostalgic, resentful or guilty idealisation of the lost Republic; and, in 
acknowledgement of the realities of the post-Augustan age, the personalities and 
behaviour of the ruling emperor and his circle. Of these, the latter was generally 
portrayed as a more or less grimly perverted substitute for the former. Within such a 
defmition it was reasonable to analyse the role of soldiers as largely instrumental to the 
schemes and conflicts of the elite players, and to characterise the political 
consciousness of the troops as encompassing nothing more fimdamental than their own 
short-term pecuniary interests. This view of the politics of ancient Rome and of the 
military's place within it had its roots in two aspects of the academic tradition. One 
mirrored the preoccupations of the ancient literary sources, concentrating on the 
activities of the ruling elite. The substance of politics was consistently limited to a 
narrative of the circumstances by which power was obtained and managed by the 
individuals who ruled. The second aspect, more specific to the study of ancient history 
and the classics, was and is an understandable reluctance to diverge too far from the 
path provided by the surviving literary sources. Analysis that strays outside this narrow 
limit can appear wide open to characterisation as speculative anachronism, although, as 
suggested, close adherence to it may expose any theorising to the often self-serving 
agenda of ancient authors. From the perspective of an analysis that is locked into the 
outlook of our ancient literary sources, J. B. Campbell has been cited as an exponent of 
a view of Roman soldiers as operating outside normal political structures. His 2002 
restatement of this argument was, as before, chiefly based on the unexplored 
assumption that soldiers' apparent major concern about their own pay and conditions 
automatically removed them from the principal theatre of politics. In addition to 
questions about our literary sources' credibility on this matter, it should by now be 
clear that such evidence can be turned on its head. The totality of information about the 
emperor's relationship with his troops demonstrated that in Rome's militaristic society 
the interests and well-being of soldiers were themselves central issues in politics. 
Evidence noted by Campbell, that after 68-69 CE it was not until the end of the second 
century that another emperor was overthrown by a provincial army, supports this 
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interpretation. The care taken by the emperor to manage the relationship with his troops 
ensured his survival. It can also be added, again sampling Campbell's own evidence, 
that the undoubted interest taken by most successful emperors in their relationship with 
the senate was itself not unconnected to concerns about the army; '...senators provided 
most of the army commanders'.^ ^^ 
Alternative visions of the nature of Roman politics have been developed in studying the 
nature of imperialism in the wider Empire. Allied to an application of 19* and 20* 
century sociological, anthropological and political science, such approaches provide a 
different perspective on the role of the military in the authority of the emperors. An 
important aspect of this alternative vision is related to a rejection of the rhetorically 
inspired perception of the Roman military as remote from the civilian population, 
circling the Empire ready to impose its will on outsiders. This view is replaced in the 
words of Alston by one of soldiers 
'...intimately involved in the everyday life of a Roman province...a 
very visible presence...(bringing) Roman Imperial power to the cities 
and villages'. 
Crucially for the present thesis the same author continues: 
'The army would provide the means for the imperial power becoming a 
real and intrusive element in the life of a provincial' 
As the evidence has revealed, this analysis can be generalised from the provinces to the 
Empire as a whole. Its application is central to an examination of the authority of the 
Emperor himself 
Soldiers were more than instruments in the hands of elite politicians vying for supreme 
power. Their special and personal relationship with the emperor was integral to the 
definition of that power, a situation recognised and made operational by both parties. 
Thus it was that elements of the relationship between emperor and ordinary soldier 
could be seen as superseding the plans of apparently more politically sophisticated 
army officers. Tacitus described a number of instances during the crises of 68-69 CE in 
^%Pay and conditions: pr 110: Mahageiiient aiid survival: p. 115; see also the account of Septimius 
Severus' deathbed advice to his sons (Cass. Dio 76. 15. 2). Army commanders: Campbell (1984) p. 
217. 
Alternative visions: See, for example, Webster and Cooper or Mattingly (1997). Soldiers and 
provincials: Alston (1995) p. 7. 
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which the troops and their immediate commanders supported different candidates for 
the throne. In one, remaining loyal to the claims of Vitellius over those of Vespasian, 
German legionaries were given a clear expression of their particular perspective. They 
complained that the generals supporting Vespasian wanted 'to rob them of their 
emperor'. In another, Tacitus baldly stated the differing allegiances: 
'The common soldiers' loyalty to Vitellius was beyond question, while 
the higher ranks inclined towards Vespasian.' 
In a later context, this situation could lead to troops assassinating their own officers.^ "^* 
Soldiers and commanders: Tac. Hist. 3. 13,4. 26; Cass. Dio 79. 32. 3; Lendon (1997) p. 252. 
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9. General Conclusion 
This thesis began with an emphasis on the general relevance of its subject matter and 
with indications of its particular applicability to the study of the Roman Empire. The 
first of these has been restated frequently; for instance, 
'The ways in which power is gained and maintained constitute a central 
problem in every society'. 
The principal focus taken on the second has also been noted elsewhere; for example a 
review of Campbell (1984) noted the 
'...often cited but rarely studied secret of the Roman Empire - that the 
power of the emperor rested ultimately on the loyalty of the army.' 
To help make up this observed deficiency has been the intention of the present thesis. 
To this end, the general ethos of Rome as a coercive, military community has been 
outlined, as has the function of psychological dominance as the driving force of both 
individual and collective political activity. Evidence has been cited to indicate the 
particular role of soldiers in Roman politics; also revealed was how the Imperial 
regimes yoked this role to the prevailing culture of individual domination in 
developing a personal relationship with their soldiers. To establish this characterisation 
of Ancient Rome it has been found necessary to react against altemative modem 
analyses. This has resulted in part from taking the explicit evidence of ancient authors 
more at face value, rather than fitting their statements into prevailing socio-political 
pattems. Nevertheless, modem theorising about the sociology of political power has 
provided usefiil support for the view taken of Rome's power stmctures, for example by 
confirming the coercive basis of all governments. As expressed by Weber: 
'All political structures use force, but they differ in the manner in which 
and the extent to which they use or threaten to use it'. 
Ideas such as these have also helped to elucidate the continuity of Rome's political 
ethos over time and to place it within a wider conception of power in the ancient 
world."^ 
There is certainly nothing original in the contention that Rome was a highly militarised 
entity, even by the standards of the ancient world. As outlined in chapter two, the 
Importance of the subject: Maier p. 709. Military loyalty: Wilkes p. 242. Sociology: Weber (1948) 
p. 159. 
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conclusions of ancient thinking on the philosophy of power seemed to be in no doubt 
on the matter. Modem statements of this characterisation also abound. In relation to the 
Imperial era, that of Jean Gage was as clear as any, 'L'empire romain est une 
monarchie militaire'. He went on to emphasise the truth of this categorisation, whether 
it was 
'...dans la personne d'un Marc-Aurele ou d'vin Maximin, toujours il se 
resume en un imperator, chef des armees.' 
More generally, and as represented by Nicolet in his study of the citizen m the 
Republic: 
'Like all ancient cities, but perhaps to a greater extent than any other, 
Rome was a community of warriors.' 
A reason for the choice of Nicolet's formulation is that he went on to refine the idea as 
it applied specifically to Rome by substituting the word 'soldier' for that of 'warrior'. 
In so doing he distinguished the latter as a semi-independent, elite individual acting 
with the primary motivation of seeking personal glory; the former as a disciplined 
member of a citizen militia. It is suggested that in casting its military tradition in this 
form, Rome established both the basis for its long-term success and for the strongly 
coercive nature of its body politic. Thus, after the third century of its Imperial era, 
when Rome was threatened by dangerous extemal enemies, it was 'saved by a military 
revolution'. Reforms carried out by emperors, some of whom were described by hostile 
sources to be so close to their soldiers that they had risen from the legions' lower ranks, 
enabled the Empire to maintain its aggressive dominance. Several of these mlers were 
said to have emerged from unusually humble origins: Diocletian the son of a freedman; 
Galerius the offspring of a Carpathian cattle-herder; or Constantius Chloras 'an obscure 
country-gentieman'. Even i f the accounts of their modest parentage were true, their 
portrayal in the standard modem analysis as a new breed of 'soldier-emperors' hardly 
seems justified by the evidence cited in chapters seven and eight. Rather their 
emergence is better explained as another manifestation of the Roman military ethos, 
adapting itself to changed circumstances. Such renewals had already occurred during 
the first century BCE and in the establishment of the Augustan principate.^ ^^ 
Roman Militarism: Gag€ p. 1; Nicolet (1976) p. 89-90. Third Century Crisis and low class 
emperors: Brown p. 24-27 ; Nicasie p. 10. 
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Equally obvious in its relevance to the fiindamentally militaristic nature of Rome is the 
fact of its empire. It has been argued in the case of Macedon that: 
'The centrality of the army in the state system created by Philip led 
naturally to an ongoing process of military conquest'. 
On an altogether different scale of chronology and social complexity, surely the same 
simple point holds true for Rome. Observations on the nature of other states by ancient 
writers of Roman history also revealed their views about Rome itself In an editorial 
comment on fourth century BCE Sparta, Plutarch pronounced on the impossibility of it 
recovering past expansionist glories. He stated that it was the earlier imperialist 
generations that had been in error: 
'For to a civil polity best arranged for peace and virtue and unanimity 
they had attached empires and sovereignties won by force.' 
An implicit contrast with the success of Rome as an empire must be contained in 
Plutarch's unspoken view on the nature of its government. The modem sociological 
study of power and empires has provided support for a direct correlation between the 
existence of empire and coercive political authority (see chapter three). Although not 
without their general critics and specific difficulties of application to the ancient world, 
the definitions of social power that emerge from the work of Weber and his derivatives 
do seem to provide useful perspectives on the evidence of our ancient sources. Chapters 
four and five considered that evidence in relation to the development and operation of 
coercive political power in Rome. Direct relationships were identified between the 
recorded psychological imperatives towards domination, Roman self-image as a 
military people, and the nature of the City's government and mle over others. 
Illustrating these connections, the example of Britain demonstrated that throughout its 
involvement with the island, Roman initiatives were driven more by the personal 
ambitions of emperors and commanders than by any practical military or geopolitical 
factors. Attempts have been made to portray some of these campaigns, such as that of 
Septimius Sevems of 208 CE, as chiefly motivated by the need to establish secure 
frontiers against threatening barbarians. Perhaps such an analysis reflected its origins in 
end-of-empire, mid-twentieth century Britain. Certainly, it is useful to note that the 
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psychological domination and personal glory explanation chimes best with the explicit 
comments of our ancient authors.^ ^^  
It has been a consistent element of this thesis to take seriously aspects of ancient source 
material that have often been acknowledged with a cursory nod, neglected altogether or 
even actively denied. Throughout this thesis reference has been made to interpretations 
of Roman political power that have dismissed, played down or recognised and then 
largely ignored its essentially coercive nature. Some have gone out of their way to 
circumvent this reality, douag so with varying degrees of subtlety. For example, Ando 
attempted to deal with the issue by direct and immediate confrontation. At the very 
outset of his detailed exposition, he declared: 
'No date identifies that moment when Rome ceased to rule her subjects 
through coercion and began to rely on their good will. ' 
Readers of this thesis will, I hope, respond with the comment that the absence of a date 
in the record is hardly surprising, since the change never took place. More persueisively, 
Ando also deployed an array of sociological theorising, apparently underpirming his 
contention that the developed Roman Empire constituted a progressively more 
inclusive communis patria. In this conceptualisation, coercive authority, although still 
available to the emperors, was of less importance in the maintenance of power than an 
ever widening appreciation of the benefits of Roman bureaucratic justice. Max Weber 
was invoked in theoretical support of this contention, although only via a secondary 
source that explicitly considered the sociologist's ideas from the point of view of his 
contribution to the 'development and practical application of legal theory'. In fact, the 
relevant passages in Weber do not sustain the weight of Ando's interpretation. Indeed it 
is topically tempting to identify in Ando's characterisation of Roman power 
(constitutionally based and widely accepted because of its material and cultural 
benefits) the colouring present in scholarship emanating from the current world super-
power. These points were not missed by early British reviewers, and it may be 
indicative that a recent trans-Atiantic review of American scholarship in ancient history 
failed to identify the influence of contemporary politics as one of the factors intrinsic to 
the pursuit. Parallels are readily available from an earlier era and another world power. 
Macedon and Rome: Billows p. 219. Sparta and Rome: Plut. Ages. 33. 2. Critics of Weber: 
Bourdieu (1980) p. 141. Value of Weber: Raaflaub (2003) P. 423. Britain and glory: Isaac (1992) p. 
387-390; Cass. Die 76. 11-12. Britain and defence: Millar (1964) p. 148-149. 
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some of them probably unconscious, others quite explicit. Thus, the editors of the 1934 
Cambridge Ancient History on the Augustan Empire were probably unaware that their 
summary of early Emperor cult bore a comfortable resemblance to the contemporary 
Church of England, as the cult 
'...set Rome and the emperor in its due place, neither too exalted nor 
too visionary... (and) planted the conception of a religion of the State 
which transcended but did not challenge the deeper emotions of 
worship.' 
On the other hand, within his usually cool and measured approach. Brunt could plainly 
state in 1965 that the Roman and British Empires shared a number of features, 
including that they had both '.. .undoubtedly established peace and order in a large part 
of the world'. We have already explored the violent imderpirmings of Roman 'peace' 
(page 105). In relation to Ando's analysis, and even prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
an overt American military presence in 132 of the 190 countries in the United Nations 
must be relevant.^ ''^  
As an approach to the subject of the coercive element in the power of the emperor, the 
present thesis might claim a relevant precedent. William Harris' study of attitudes 
towards notions of aggressive expansion by Rome during the Republic took a similarly 
revisionary perspective. In particular, he argued for the validity of Polybius' stated 
views on the matter. It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, that I should choose an 
imequivocal statement of Polybius to represent under-analysed information as it applies 
to this thesis: 'Now in general the Romans rely on force (fiia) in all their imdertakings.' 
The meaning of the Greek term is made clear in situations in which overwhelming 
physical force was invoked. Homer employed it to describe the Cyclops' domination 
over the Phaecians and Hesiod used it to account for the defeat of the Nemean Lion; 
'...but mighty Herakles' force overcame it.' At this fundamental level, in its Greek 
origin, the word pcb/utj itself has meanings of'might' and 'bodily strength'. As such it 
was used by Herodotus to describe the primary physical attribute of the heroes Cleobis 
and Biton. In a more overtly political context, Thucydides had Spartan envoys employ 
" ' Denial of coercion: Ando p. 19. Communis pdtrla: ibid. p. 10-15. Sociology: ibid. p. 19-29. Weber: 
(1968) p. 217, 954; Ando p. 27; Kronman p. 50, back cover. Reviews of Ando: Kelly, C (2001) p. 32; 
Levick (2001) p. 240. Ancient History in the USA: Potter (2001) p. 315. Roman and other Empires: 
Cook, Adcock and Charlesworth p. vi; Brunt (1990) p. 110. American military presence: 'The Model 
Empire' (Channel 4, 2002). 
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the word when trying to emphasise the continuing power of their city after the disaster 
at Pylos. Plutarch included an association with the Greek word as the first among the 
various explanations that he recorded for Rome's name.^ ^^  
Other studies of the Roman state that have failed to highlight coercion are not hard to 
find. In The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Lintott acknowledged that 'Rome's 
military needs determined the shape of the political year'. However, he went on to 
detail how the Republican state functioned, concentrating on the legal and procedural 
relationship between the senate, people and magistrates. While noting that the comitia 
centuriata, and eventually other electoral assemblies, met on the campus Martius 
(military parade ground), Lintott judged the survival of that form of social organisation 
to represent a vestigial representation of groupings based on 'worth, wealth and age' 
rather than as having any military significance. He made much, albeit reasoned and 
critical, use of Polybius' analysis of the Roman state. However, Lintott chose to 
relegate his source's view of the coercively powerftil consuls to that of an awestruck 
provincial. Lendon delineated the 'day-to-day business of government' as collecting 
taxes, providing drafts for the army and keeping the peace He acknowledged that 
soldiers were 'involved' in these administrative activities, and that coercion, at least of 
others by Romans, was integral to the Empire. However, nowhere in this analysis is an 
appreciation that the getting and maintenance of power itself was a primary focus of 
Rome's rulers or that coercion was at the heart of this process. The omission appears to 
be compounded in the same author's consideration of patronage as the main 
mechanism of power relations in Rome. Lendon ascribed considerable potency to this 
idea, but admitted that it lacked something, since: 
'Part of the psychological basis of patronage as a method of rulership 
remains obscure.' 
His attempted clarification involved concepts of honour and pride, ideas which are 
vulnerable to the same critique as that of patronage itself (see page 180). Fergus Millar 
provided another example, in a similar manner to that already noted of Paul Zanker 
(see pages 140-141), of analyses that acknowledge but fail to give sufficient emphasis 
to the role of coercion. He attempted to define the authority of an emperor in terms of 
the recorded content of his written arid Verbal communications with his subjects. In 
Harris on Polybius: p. 107fF. Polybius on fila. 1. 37. 7; Harris p. 17. Homer: Od. 6. 5. Hesiod: 
Theog. 332; Liddell and Scott p. 314. Pm/it ibid. p. 1578; Hdt. 1. 31; Thuc. 4. 18; Plut. Rom. 1.1. 
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doing so, Millar identified the role as commander of the soldiers as 'the most obvious' 
of 'other elements' explaining his power. The current study reverses this analysis, 
presenting the military role as the key determinant of Imperial identity, and considering 
in chapter six some of the relevant 'other' factors.^ '"' 
The thrust of this thesis is not that emperors ruled solely through coercion and physical 
force. As argued by Bendix: 
'Power needs ideas and legitimation...Rulers...could never obtain 
compliance if each command were purely random and had to be backed 
by force sufficient to compel obedience.' 
Accession to power is routinely followed by efforts to shape its meaning and 
legitimisation - justifying and rationalising both its exercise and acceptance. It is 
fundamental that this is a reciprocal process, involving the commitment of both ruler 
and ruled to particular attitudes and behaviour that in turn affect each other's attitudes 
and behaviour. Rimciman characterised this process as the distribution of what he 
termed 'institutional' power; that is, power organised on the basis of rules, which may 
or may not be mutually acknowledged or agreed. Crucially he saw this distribution as 
being a defining characteristic of society and that it was always a two way process: 
'A cannot have power over B without B having some power, however 
minimal, over^'. 
Despite the undoubtedly reciprocal characteristics of this relationship, the fi-agility of 
the rules by which it was underpinned can readily be demonstrated. In a Classical 
context this reveals the essential focus of power to be coercion. Two examples Irom 
Valerius Maximus establish the point. In the first, he told a story about Agesilaus, to 
the effect that the Spartan King simply set aside the laws of the state for one day when 
he believed that illegal action was necessary against certain individuals suspected of 
plots. In the second, a Sabine farmer attempted to fulfil the stipulations of an oracle 
that promised his country worldwide domination. However, he was unwise enough to 
tell a Roman priest what he was doing. The priest promptly got rid of him by giving 
misleading advice about the rites to be performed, and then carried out the correct 
ritual on behalf of Rome. Trivial as these examples may appear, they nevertheless 
Political year: Lintott (1999) p. 13-14. Comitia Centuriata: ibid. p. 41, 61. Consuls: ibid. 193-194. 
Government tasks: Lendon (1997) p. 4, 6. Patronage: ibid. p. 11-12. Critique: see pages 179-180. 
Millar: (1992) p. 617-618. 
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illustrate an ideology in which the subversion of both law and religion was perfectly 
acceptable in the cause of state security and expansion. The priorities on display here 
are emphasised by the fact that Valerius Maximus included both stories in his 
compilation of instances of For tuna's blessings, listing the first under his heading of 
'Things Wisely Done' and the second under 'Things Craftily Done'.^ '*' 
The usefiil distinction to be made here in political terms is between power and force. In 
the former the strong issue orders that are obeyed by the weak; in the latter the strong 
physically coerce the weak to respond in specific ways. On such an analysis, power is 
perceived as an active phenomenon in which the weak cooperate in their oppression, as 
often as not seeking ways in which to demonstrate their acceptance of the situation. 
Force, on the other hand, involves the passive response of the weak, reacting to 
situations over which they have no control in order to minimise their exposure to 
physical compulsion. From this perspective power can be effective well beyond its 
immediate physical reach; force is inefficient in its application, expensive and 
dangerous in its exercise, consuming itself in use. Nevertheless, it is an underlying 
contention of this thesis that the legitimation of coercive power, its reciprocal aspects 
and its absorption into other forms of authority are alterations in outward form, not 
transformations in the essential nature of social power as domination through force. As 
illustration, Velleius Paterculus discussed the relative positions of Pompey and Caesar 
on the eve of their civil war in 49 BCE. He distinguished between the former as having 
the 'appearance' of power, while the latter possessed its 'reality', the difference being 
that: 
'Pompey was armed with the authority of the senate, Caesar with the 
devotion of his soldiers' 
Thus it is fair to conclude that 
'...whenever a mandate to rule is to sway the minds and hearts of men, 
it requires the exercise of force or the awareness that those who rule are 
able, and will not hesitate, to use force if that is needed to assert their 
wiU.'^^^ 
Institutional power : Runcitnan p. 2. Agesiiaus: Val. Max. 7. 2. ext. 15. Sabine farmer/Roman 
priest: ibid. 7. 3. 1. 
'"•^  Power and fore 
Bendix(1978)p. 16-17. 
ce: Luttwak p. 197-198. Pompey and Caesar; Veil. Pat. 2. 49. 2. Force is necessary: 
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Aristotle theorised that in his ideally organised state, combining the best features of 
oligarchy and democracy, 'The government should be confined to those who carry 
arms'. He went on to suggest that the earliest Greek states had developed from 
monarchies and oligarchies into 'constitutional governments' as popular participation 
in war had widened. Although these views have been criticised as being based on 
'poorly formed inferences', they do appear to be consonant with the idea of the 
military's role in the establishment of coercive political authority. There can be no 
doubting that soldiers were the source of coercive force within the Roman state. As 
such. Part Two of this thesis established their role as one of three constituencies, 
alongside the senate/elite and the people of Rome, that had to be won over and kept 
loyal i f an emperor was to succeed in establishing and maintaining his dominance. The 
political potency of each of these agencies was demonstrated by respectively: the 
fi"equency with which the legions and the Praetorians were directly involved in 
changes of emperor; the fate of Julius Caesar; and lasting concern about sedition in 
Rome and care for measures to discourage it. Woolf linked these issues with the 
physical coercion used to maintain authority in Rome. He invoked Foucault's 
timelessly rhetorical question, 'Isn't power simply a form of warlike domination?' 
stating that: 
'The emperors ruled not by abolishing violence but by channelling it, 
using and perpetuating rivalries...to ensure a dynamic equilibrium 
which they controlled and which necessitated their participation'. 
A tellmg image of the precariousness of an emperor's position in this situation and of 
the violence intrinsic to its management was attributed to Tiberius. He was said to 
have likened his task to that of 'holding a wolf by its ears'. It should hardly be 
surprising, then, that for centuries Roman rulers were so closely connected to their 
soldiers, thus exemplifying Weber's stark dictum that, 'The king is everywhere 
primarily a war-lord.' Indeed the eventual weakening of that link resulted in a 
diminution of the Imperial office itself Up to the end of the fourth century CE the 
personal involvement of emperors with their troops had been a vital factor in securing 
their political power. On the death of Theodosius I in 395, the vagaries of dynastic 
succession resulted in the extreme youth of his successors. In these circumstances, 
effective power in the western Empire passed from the emperors to the military 
commanders themselves, men such as Stilicho and Aetius. Thus soldiers, the long-time 
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agents of coercive political power in Rome, finally emerged to wield that authority 
directly.^'^ 
•^•^  Greek states: Arist. Pol. 1297b 2-3, 16-28. Criticism of Aristotle: Wees 71f. 82. Emperors and 
violence: Woolf (1993) p. 191; Foucault (1980) p. 123. Tiberius: Suet. Tib. 25. War-lord: Weber 
(1948) p. 251. Weakened link: Lee p. 228-229. Power to the soldiers: MacGeorge p. 5-14. 
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